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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates whether earnings conservatism is significantly higher 
amongst Malaysian publicly listed firms subject to higher standards of ‗direct custodian 
excellence‘ of the financial reporting system relative to counterparts subject to lower direct 
custodian excellence standards. Drawing on agency theory, supplemented by tenets of key 
corporate governance reforms undertaken in Malaysia since the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, it is expected that direct custodian excellence is positively associated with earnings 
conservatism.  
For purposes of the main analysis, conservatism is defined in terms of both 
timeliness and persistence, and measured using models developed by Basu (1997). Direct 
custodian excellence, meanwhile, is derived as the function of audit quality (measured as a 
function of independence, specialization and brand name) and audit committee effectiveness 
(measured as a function of independence, financial expertise and diligence). Analysis is 
based on annual data (spanning the years 2002 to 2007) collected from 100 randomly 
selected Malaysian firms listed continuously on the Bursa Malaysia from January 1 2002 till 
December 31 2007) for each annual period from 2002 to 2007. Following exclusions for 
missing data points and outliers, empirical analysis is based on a final useable sample of 577 
firm-year observations. 
Findings from an extensive analytical analysis show limited support for the study‘s 
general proposition. Rather, findings show the level of earnings conservatism is likely to be 
equivalent for a Malaysian publicly listed firm subject to higher standards of direct custodian 
excellence than a counterpart facing lower levels of direct custodian excellence. There is 
some evidence, however, supporting the view that a Malaysian publicly listed firm engaging 
a higher quality auditor is more likely to have higher levels of persistent earnings 
conservatism than a counterpart using the services of a lower quality external auditor. 
Additional analysis, meanwhile, suggests a lack of association between audit committee 
effectiveness and (both the timeliness and persistence of) earnings conservatism within the 
Malaysian capital market setting. Overall, findings provide valuable insights and 
understanding, not only in respect to the direct custodian excellence/earnings conservatism 
linkage, but the individual dynamics and significance of corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism concepts." 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Conservatism1, considered by some (Sterling 1970; Basu 1997) as the most 
influential principle underpinning accounting valuation, has a lengthy historical application 
to financial accounting exceeding, five centuries. Nonetheless, the concept of conservatism 
faces major criticism by capital market regulators, standards-setters and academics. Critics 
argue conservatism leads to the understatement of net assets in the current period leading to 
the overstatement of earnings in future periods due to the understatement of future expenses 
(LaFond and Watts 2008). Despite heavy criticism, empirical research indicates 
conservatism has increased during the past decades (Givoly and Hayn 2000, 2002; Kim and 
Kross 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006). This suggests critics may overlook significant benefits of 
conservatism. The lengthy persistence and resilience to criticism of conservatism are 
intriguing empirical dilemmas producing a number of important unanswered questions. 
The importance of conservatism to accounting is thought to have various facets. One 
area receiving much attention is associated with earnings quality. Kung, James and Cheng 
(2008), for example, argue conservatism is an important underlying attribute of reporting 
quality often used by capital market participants to benchmark the quality of a firm‘s 
earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), meanwhile, suggest conservatism is an important 
attribute of earnings quality because it makes financial statements more informative and 
useful; therefore, stakeholders are better able to monitor a firm‘s performance. Also, 
conservative accounting practices are thought to provide more timely information giving 
shareholders and creditors better opportunities to make key decisions on loss making 
projects (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003).  
Others suggest conservatism is an effective mechanism for constraining managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Kung et al. 2008) such as the manipulation of earnings. It is argued 
(e.g. Watts 2003a; Chen, Hemmer and Zhang 2007;Kung et al. 2008) pressure to adhere to 
the underlying tenets of conservatism provides an important disincentive for corporate 
management to actively seek to manipulate earnings. Whilst it may be argued conservatism 
acts as a natural deterrent to earnings manipulation, the mere existence of this principle is 
unlikely in practice to be a complete constraint. Rather, the degree to which conservatism 
                                                     
1Conservatism encompasses a number of important dimensions such as earnings conservatism and balance sheet 
conservatism. Whilst acknowledging this, the proposed study will examine conservatism purely from an earnings 
conservatism point of view and if conservatism is used without a prefixed word in this thesis, then it refers only 
to earnings conservatism and to no other form of conservatism. For the purposes of this study, earnings 
conservatism is defined as earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news, where a higher degree of 
verification if preferred by accountants to recognized good news as gains than to recognized bad news as losses. 
For further discussion, please refer to Chapter 2. 
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constrains earnings manipulation is likely to be a function of pivotal ‗human-driven‘ 
corporate governance2 mechanisms that enact and enforce the principle. 
The past decade has witnessed unprecedented discussion on the role of numerous 
mechanisms for enhancing a firm‘s corporate governance structure and financial reporting 
system (McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subamanyam 
1998; Abbott and Parker 2000; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Abbott, Parker, Peters and 
Raghunandan 2003a; Vera-Munoz 2005; Jenkins, Kane and Velury 2006; Lennox and Park 
2007). From this intense debate it is recognized that the external auditor and audit committee 
are the most direct3 and immediate custodians4 responsible for the key role of enforcing 
pivotal financial reporting principles including conservatism. Respective corporate 
governance codes, or recommendations of best practice (see Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000; Council on Corporate Disclosure and 
Governance 2001; ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003; Council on Corporate 
Disclosure and Governance 2005), enacted in numerous nations during the past several 
decades have highlighted the role and responsibilities of the external auditor and audit 
committee for monitoring and oversight of a firm‘s financial reporting system. Also, these 
roles and responsibilities have continued to expand. 
Though entrusted with enormous authority and responsibility, the simple 
engagement of the external auditor and establishment of the audit committee is unlikely to 
necessarily prompt better monitoring of a firm‘s financial reporting system, enforcement of 
fundamental accounting principles, or improvements in the quality of financial information 
reported. The corporate governance literature (McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Becker et 
al. 1998; Abbott and Parker 2000; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Abbott et al. 2003a; Agrawal 
                                                     
2 Various definitions of corporate governance exist. For this study, the definition of corporate governance in used 
is as follows ―the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective or realizing long 
term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interest of other stakeholders‖. For full discussion on 
corporate governance and the underlying definition adopted is shown in Section 3.2. 
3It is acknowledged the financial accounting system and the quality of earnings may be influenced by other 
corporate governance mechanisms and custodians such as boards of directors and internal auditors. However, 
respective corporate governance codes and best practices generally iterate that the specific primary function of 
the external auditor and audit committee is the monitoring and oversight of the financial reporting system and 
external reporting. Other mechanisms and custodians have indirect influences. For example, the boards of 
directors may have the ultimate say on the accounting values reported but delegate day-to-day monitoring to the 
external auditor and audit committee.  
4 The phrase custodian (or custodians) is used to define corporate governance mechanisms comprising human-
agents (i.e. individuals or small groups of people) and driven by a structured human-agent decision-making 
process that have formal authority for monitoring and oversight. Non-custodian corporate governance mechanism 
may or may not involve human-agents. However, in contrast to custodian corporate governance mechanisms 
those of a non-custodian nature do not involve specific human-agent decisions and lack formal authority to 
monitor a firm‘s corporate governance and financial reporting system. An example of a non-custodian 
mechanism is the ownership structure. The very nature of a shareholding (such as higher family ownership) may 
naturally constrain management but the structure does not have an active and structured human-agent decision-
making process or authority. 
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and Chadha 2005; Vera-Munoz 2005; Jenkins et al. 2006; Lennox and Park 2007) is heavily 
postmarked with arguments that the major custodians of the financial reporting system can 
only achieve the assigned roles and responsibilities if comprised of members with 
appropriate and necessary credentials (such as members with financial expertise) and traits 
(such as independence and diligence) that promote quality and effectiveness. 
 It is frequently cited in the literature that the quality of the external auditor is a 
central determinant of the direct custodian‘s ability to monitor and oversee the financial 
reporting system. For example, Chen, Lin and Zhou (2005) found higher quality auditors are 
better able to detect and restrain earnings management. These findings are supported by 
Reynolds and Francis (2000). As part of detecting and constraining earnings management, 
auditor quality provides information useful to investors in assessing a firm‘s value. This is 
because the higher the quality of the auditor the greater an investor will assess a firm‘s value 
(Titman and Trueman 1986). Moreover, according to Behn, Choi and Kang (2008), higher 
quality audits are associated with better forecasting performance by analysts. In addition, 
higher quality auditors are expected to be less willing to accept questionable accounting 
methods, and are more likely to detect and report errors and irregularities (Becker et al. 
1998). Therefore, external auditors of high quality are more likely to be able to ensure the 
reporting of higher quality earnings. Quality will also be of significance in establishing 
whether the external auditor will enforce key accounting principles—such as conservatism—
when seeking to improve earnings quality. 
The lack of a precise consensus on a definition highlights the underlying multi-
dimensional nature of auditor quality (Balsam, Krishnan and Yang 2003). According to 
DeAngelo (1981b) audit quality is the joint probability that an existing problem is detected 
and reported. Whilst a number of audit quality studies (e.g. Abbott and Parker 2000; Lennox 
and Park 2007) utilize the DeAngelo (1981b) definition, others abound. Palmrose (1988), for 
example, referred to audit quality as the probability that financial statements contain no 
material omissions or misstatements. Davidson and Neu (1993), meanwhile, defined audit 
quality as an auditor‘s ability to detect and eliminate errors and manipulations in reported net 
income. Similarly, O‘Keefe, King and Gaver (1994) refer to audit quality as the level of 
compliance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). In more recent research, 
Behn et al. (2008) defined audit quality as the employment of effective audit practices that 
improve the reliability of financial statement information and allow investors to make a more 
precise estimate of the firm‘s value. Despite the range of different definitions, a majority of 
prior literature usually expresses auditor quality as a function of auditor independence 
(Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew 2003), auditor 
specialization (Hogan and Jeter 1999; Abbott and Parker 2000) and/or brand name (Chen et 
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al. 2005; Behn et al. 2008). For the purposes of this study, therefore, auditor independence, 
auditor specialization and brand name form the underlying attributes of auditor quality.  
Due to huge accounting scandals (such as WorldCom, Enron and Parmalat) various 
worldwide corporate governance reforms have been enacted recommending firms establish 
audit committees to oversee the financial reporting process. Corporate governance reformists 
have focused on audit committee effectiveness as a key in improving corporate financial 
reporting system, reporting of higher quality earnings. Effectiveness is cited as the key 
barometer that will determine the influence of an audit committee on financial accounting 
issues (Beasley and Salterio 2001; Abbott, Parker and Peters 2004). Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1993) argue audit committee effectiveness is a function of the sub-committee‘s power and 
authority over the monitoring of financial reporting practices, and the external and internal 
auditing process. DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed (2002) and Vera-Munoz 
(2005) state that an effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority and 
resources to protect shareholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal 
controls and risk management through its diligent oversight efforts. Prior research has sought 
to link various alleged properties of audit committee effectiveness to financial reporting 
issues such as fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley 1996; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
1996), earnings management (Peasnell, Pope and Young 2000; Klein 2002a; Bédard, 
Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed-Ali 2006) internal control 
problems (Krishnan 2005b), restatements (Abbott et al. 2004) and auditor dismissal 
(Carcello and Neal 2003). 
Whilst having not received much empirical attention as yet, audit committee 
effectiveness may also have a bearing on the extent to which conservative accounting 
practices are adhered to. For example, it is alleged there is a greater likelihood a more 
effective audit committee is able to enhance the quality of reported earnings (encourage 
greater earnings conservatism) as compared to a less effective audit committee (Klein 2002a; 
Mangena and Pike 2005; Ling 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Similar to auditor 
quality, there is no precise consensus on a definition of audit committee effectiveness. Many 
corporate governance advocates (Song and Windram 2000; DeZoort et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 
2003a; Abbott et al. 2004; Noland, Nichols and Flesher 2004) suggest audit committee 
effectiveness is a function of key traits such as independence, financial expertise and 
diligence. Prior research (Beasley and Petroni 2001; Noland et al. 2004; Agrawal and 
Chadha 2005; Mangena and Pike 2005; Vera-Munoz 2005), for example, reports 
independent directors are less reluctant to question management‘s actions and policies that 
impact financial accounting numbers, thereby, leading to sounder accounting practices and 
better earnings quality. Meanwhile, audit committees with members having financial 
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accounting expertise are more cognizant of financial reporting, accounting and auditing 
issues (McMullen and Raghunandan 1996). Thus, an audit committee comprised of members 
with greater financial expertise will have an increased ability to distinguish between 
conservative or aggressive accounting policies. Finally, audit committees meeting regularly 
are more capable of ensuring financial reporting practices are being followed on a timely 
basis (Menon and Williams 1994; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004), and are more 
likely to detect internal control weaknesses (Krishnan 2005b). Consequently, a more diligent 
audit committee is likely to be associated with better financial accounting practices such as 
earnings conservatism leading to higher quality earnings reported.  
Malaysian corporate governance regulations have gone through major changes since 
the Asian financial crisis.5 Changes were designed, in part, to restore investor and 
shareholder confidence, and to increase the quality of financial reporting. A major 
component of Malaysia‘s corporate governance reform efforts involved the release of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (The Code) in March 2000 by the Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG)6. The Code provides a set of principles and best 
practices for firms related to corporate governance. The role and responsibilities of the 
external auditor and audit committee feature extensively in The Code with an emphasis on a 
need to preserve auditor quality and improve the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
Following the introduction of The Code, another major change in Malaysian corporate 
governance regulations occurred in January 2001. Specifically, the Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad issued Revamped KLSE Listing Requirements requiring listed firms to 
state the level of compliance with the requirements of The Code. Issuance of the Revamped 
KLSE Listing Requirements further reinforced efforts by Malaysian regulators to improve 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness so as to improve the financial reporting 
process. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) also has made several amendments 
to regulations governing external auditors since 2002. Amendments by the MIA were 
designed to enhance the auditor‘s role and responsibilities to better protect shareholder 
rights, increase investor confidence and encourage outside investment. Finally, the MICG 
has revised The Code (released October 1, 2007) and provided further amendments aimed at 
strengthening the board of directors and audit committees, and ensuring that the board of 
directors and audit committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. These 
                                                     
5The Asian financial crisis occurred between the second half of 1997 and August 1998. The crisis was triggered 
in Thailand when foreign investors lost their confidence and started to withdraw capital due to currency 
devaluation. The problem was transmitted to neighbouring nations with Malaysia being one such 
nation(Vichitsarawong, Eng and Meek 2010). 
6MICG has continuously been the Malaysian authority active in reviewing and revising The Code, where 
appropriate, as seen with the Revised Code 2007 which focused on the eligibility criteria for appointment, 
composition as well as roles and responsibilities of boards of directors and audit committees. 
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amendments spell out the eligibility criteria for appointment of directors and the role of the 
nominating committee. With regards to the, audit committees, the amendments spell out the 
eligibility criteria for appointment as an audit committee member, the composition of audit 
committees, the frequency of meetings and the need for continuous training (Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance 2007).  
Ball et al. (2003) argue shareholder litigation is an important factor in enforcing 
earnings conservatism in Common Law nations like Malaysia. However, Diga and 
Saudagaran (1998) report litigation risk in Malaysia to be low, thereby, reducing the 
incentive for managers to disclose bad news in a timely fashion. In this case, lower reported 
earnings quality and lower conservatism levels are expected. In a low litigation risk 
environment like Malaysia, responsibility for ensuring earnings conservatism to maintain 
earnings quality falls on key corporate governance mechanisms such as the auditor and audit 
committee. As Malaysian corporate governance regulations have gone through major 
changes introduced since 2000, numerous questions remain. For example, it is important to 
determine if recent corporate governance reforms (such as those affecting the auditor and 
audit committee) have prompted improvements in the quality of earnings, and level of 
earnings conservatism in Malaysia. 
 
1.2 Research questions and objectives of the study 
Ongoing concerns about the quality of earnings, exacerbated by enormous volatility 
in international capital markets driven by questions about financial sector financial results, is 
reinforcing the importance of conservatism. This emphasis is extending the need for greater 
insights into factors influencing conservative accounting practices. Given the close affinity 
between direct custodians (i.e. external auditors and audit committees) and the financial 
reporting system, it is appropriate that research should focus on any linkages with 
conservatism. However, whilst research on the influence of external auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness is increasingly emerging, the vast majority of studies related to the 
two key corporate governance custodians to date have focused predominantly on 
associations with the magnitude of earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; Peasnell et al. 
2000; Jenkins 2002; Klein 2002a; Chen et al. 2005; Ling 2007). To the best knowledge of 
the author, there is at best limited formal examinations of linkages between key properties of 
the pivotal direct custodians of a firm‘s financial reporting system and earnings conservatism 
(especially in developing economies like Malaysia). Given that associations between key 
corporate governance custodians remains an unexplored and open important question, the 
overriding focus of this study is to address this imbalance by investigating the following 
main research question (MRQ): 
7 
 
 
MRQ:  Is there an association between the excellence of direct custodians of the 
financial reporting system and the earnings conservatism of Malaysian publicly 
listed firms? 
  
 As the MRQ implies the overarching objective of this study is analysis of the linkage 
between the combined influence of the key underlying features of direct custodians of the 
financial reporting system and earnings conservatism. The overarching objective, however, 
can be divided into two primary objectives. Specifically, the first primary objective is to 
determine if a higher quality external auditor is associated with higher levels of earnings 
conservatism whilst the second primary objective concentrates on the audit committee 
effectiveness–earnings conservatism linkage. These questions are stated as: 
 
PRQ1:  Is there an association between the quality of the external auditor and the 
earnings conservatism of Malaysian publicly listed firms? 
PRQ2:  Is there an association between audit committee effectiveness and the earnings 
conservatism of Malaysian publicly listed firms? 
 
  
 Prior research indicates external auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness 
are multi-dimensional concepts. Consequently, in support of the two primary objectives this 
study will address related secondary objectives that concentrate on the association between 
specific components of external auditor quality, that is, the level of non-audit services 
provided (proxy for independence), industry specialization and brand name and audit 
committee effectiveness (i.e. sub-committee independence, financial expertise and 
diligence), and the level of earnings conservatism. The main secondary research questions 
are stated as: 
 
MSQ1:  Is there an association between the specific components underlying external 
auditor quality (i.e. independence, specialization and brand) and the earnings 
conservatism of Malaysian publicly listed firms? 
MSQ2:  Is there an association between the specific components underlying audit 
committee effectiveness (i.e. independence, financial expertise and diligence) 
and the earnings conservatism of Malaysian publicly listed firms? 
 
  
 Finally, given the longitudinal nature of this study a third main secondary objective 
is to determine if earnings conservatism practices of Malaysian publicly listed firms changed 
between 2002 and 2007:  
 
MSQ3:  Has the extent of earnings conservatism amongst Malaysian publicly listed firms 
changed between 2002 and 2007? 
 
   
 The intention of the study is to be as comprehensive as possible. Aside from the above 
questions, this study will also look at minor issues such as the effect of auditor quality and 
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audit committee effectiveness on the level of earnings conservatism in different industries 
and across different firm sizes (i.e. large versus small). 
 
1.3 Significance and contributions of the study 
This study provides several key contributions to the extant earnings conservatism 
and corporate governance literatures. First, it provides evidence of the influence of auditor 
quality and audit committee effectiveness (defined in this study as the direct custodians of a 
firm‘s financial reporting system) on earnings conservatism. Despite the mounting 
importance of corporate governance, previous analysis has not considered the influence of 
such key corporate governance features on conservatism, particularly in combination. For 
example, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) examined the association between conservatism 
and only a specific aspect of audit committee effectiveness (i.e. financial expertise of audit 
committee members) using US data. Meanwhile, Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) only 
examined the link between board composition and earnings timeliness and conservatism. 
Neither study considered the joint effects of other key corporate governance feature. 
Second, most prior research related to earnings conservatism, has focused on 
determining the amount and benefits of conservatism with limited attention to factors 
influencing conservatism. For example, Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris (2002) 
(using US data) found accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating 
bondholder–shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and reductions in a firm‘s debt costs. 
Given the focus on determinants of earnings conservatism, this study provides new insights 
and broadens the understanding of conservative accounting practices.  
Third, this study is conducted using data from an emerging market economy (i.e. 
Malaysia). Prior earnings conservatism research has focused heavily on developed nations, 
particularly the US and UK. For example, Lobo and Zhou (2006) using data from 4,441 US 
firms, found firms on average became more conservative in their financial reporting 
practices after the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Givoly and Hayn (2002), 
also using US data, found that financial reporting, already conservatively biased by 
accounting conventions, had become more conservative in the US since the early 1980s. 
Meanwhile, Ball and Shivakumar (2005), in a study using 7,683 UK firms, found that 
financial reporting quality (related to conservatism) is not affected by size, leverage, industry 
membership and auditor size, or by allowing endogenous listing choice. Moreover, Beekes et 
al. (2004), also using the UK data, show board composition is an important factor in 
determining the quality (earnings timeliness and conservatism) of a UK firm‘s reported 
earnings with respect to incorporating bad news on a timely basis. Previous studies using 
data from developed nations provide valuable insights but such findings may not be relevant 
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in emerging economies. This is because there are many structural differences between 
developed and emerging market economies. Thus, this study will provide insights into 
conservatism through an alternative national lens (Shakir 2007).  
Fourth, since the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia‘s corporate governance regulatory 
system has gone through unprecedented changes designed to restore investor confidence, and 
to increase the quality of financial reporting. The external auditor and audit committee have 
featured prominently in regulatory changes—such as via the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (2000) and Revamped KLSE Listing Requirement 2001 (Bursa Malaysia 2001). 
Findings from this study will assist in determining if changes by Malaysian policy-makers of 
corporate governance regulations have potentially had indirect influences on conservatism. 
Overall, results will be informative to Malaysian regulators such as Securities Commission 
(SC), Central Bank of Malaysia, Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) providing 
guidance on the potential impact of future rules regulating auditors and audit committees. 
 
1.4 General research design and main findings 
The initial sample comprises all companies listed continuously (i.e. 847 firms) on 
the Bursa Malaysia from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2007. From the initial sample 
relevant exclusions were made. First, all firms that had been liquidated, delisted and/or 
suspended during any part of the specified observation period were excluded. Then, 
consistent with prior literature, firms from the banking, finance, brokerage, and investment 
services industry were excluded. Next, to reduce any abnormalities associated with an IPO, 
all firms that listed during the 2001 calendar year were also excluded as were any firms 
subject to merger and acquisition activities during the observation window. Following the 
relevant exclusions, a random sample of 100 firms is selected giving approximate 600 firm-
year observations for use in the statistical analysis. All the data is retrieved from DataStream 
Database. Data which is not available in the database is to be gathered through annual 
reports which are accessible from the Bursa Malaysia‘s websites. After exclusions for 
missing documentation and data, the final useable sample to be used in the analytical 
component of this study is 557 firm-year observations7.  
For dependence variable, earnings conservatism is measured using Basu (1997) 
model. Even though research suggests that earnings conservatism can be conceptualized in 
different ways, in this study, conservatism is defined in terms of both timeliness and 
persistence. The timeliness approach of earnings conservatism is grounded in the assumption 
that share prices reflect bad news in contemporaneous market losses earlier than good news 
                                                     
7 Please refer to Table 5.1 for detail sample selection process. 
10 
 
via market gains.While, earnings persistence presumes bad news reverses whilst good news 
persists. Whereas for independence variables, direct custodian excellence is derived as the 
function of audit quality (measured as a function of independence, specialization and brand 
name) and audit committee effectiveness (measured as a function of independence, financial 
expertise and diligence). 
Findings from this study show limited support for the study‘s general proposition. 
Generally, the findings suggest that no evidence is found of direct custodian excellence 
mechanisms influencing the earnings conservatism. Specifically, there is no evidence that the 
quality of the external auditor influencing the timeliness of earnings conservatism. However, 
there is some evidence to support the view that a Malaysian publicly listed firm engaging a 
higher quality auditor is more likely to have higher levels of persistent earnings conservatism 
than a counterpart using the services of a lower quality external auditor. While for audit 
committee effectiveness, findings indicate there is no evidence is found that audit committee 
effectiveness is influencing earnings conservatism in the Malaysian capital market.  
Overall, findings from this study provide valuable insights and understanding in 
respect to the direct custodian excellence/earnings conservatism linkage and the significance 
of corporate governance and earnings conservatism/quality concepts. Findings from this 
study also highlighting important insights with significant implications, for various key 
financial accounting stakeholders (e.g. regulators, corporate management, practitioners, 
investors and scholars).  
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 provided an overview of this study. 
Key research objectives and the significance of this study were indicated. The latter 
discussion in this chapter focused on the limitations of the study.  
An in-depth literature review on earnings conservatism is covered in Chapter 2. The 
first part of the discussion is focused on the concept and definition of conservatism. 
Subsequently, the central emphasis on the issue of earnings conservatism such as trends in 
conservatism in the US, European nations, Australasia, East Asia, South-East Asia, and 
particularly earnings conservatism in Malaysia, is discussed. This is followed by 
explanations of conservatism as well as determinants of earnings conservatism.  
Chapter 3 details the theoretical framework used in this study. This chapter discusses 
the possible influence of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings conservatism. A few 
potential theories underlying the theoretical framework of this study are then outlined. 
Subsequently, this chapter focuses on the corporate governance environment in Malaysia 
including the equity market regulatory environment, the financial accounting system and 
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auditing environment. The latter discussion of this chapter defines the prime concepts of the 
study (i.e. direct custodian excellence, auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness). 
Discussion on how these variables affect earnings conservatism provides the foundation of 
the development of the hypotheses underpinning this study. Thereafter, the conceptual 
schema is developed with a diagrammatical overview presented. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research method adopted in this study. Discussion on sample 
selection and data collection approaches are detailed in this chapter. Subsequently, this 
chapter emphasizes on the instrumentation used in measuring the study‘s key variables (i.e. 
dependent and independent variables). Justification for the selection of the relevant proxy 
measures is also outlined in this chapter. Finally, detailed major statistical tests and 
regression models inclusive of robustness and sensitivity tests to be performed are specified. 
Main descriptive statistics are reported in Chapter 5. The first part of this chapter 
focuses on the sample selection process in determining the final usable sample. Descriptive 
statistics associated with key firm characteristics (i.e. firm size and financial performance) 
are then thoroughly discussed. The later part of this chapter outlines descriptive results of the 
two main variables associated with direct custodian excellence (i.e. auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness). 
Meanwhile, Chapter 6 presents the study‘s main multivariate analysis findings. The 
first part of discussion in this chapter outlines the multiple regression analysis results using 
the Basu (1997) base models of timeliness and persistence. Subsequently, statistical results 
of analysis examining the impact of direct custodian excellence on earnings conservatism are 
then presented. Finally, statistical results of analysis testing the individual effects of auditor 
quality and audit committee effectiveness on earnings conservatism are reported.  
In Chapter 7, major sensitivity and robustness tests conducted for this study are 
presented. This additional analysis provides further insights in determining any impact on the 
main findings reported in Chapter 6. Additional tests included: (i) use alternative measure 
earnings conservatism; (ii) alternative measures of earnings and return; (iii) revised 
composite scores computed after excluding auditor brand name and industry specialization; 
(iv) industry and auditor classification (Big 4 and Non-Big 4); and (v) individual audit 
quality and audit committee effectiveness components.  
Chapter 8 summarizes the key findings of this study. Discussion on the acceptance 
or rejection of the study‘s testable hypotheses is outlined in this chapter. In addition, 
implications from the analysis are discussed in respect to methodology, future research, and 
the competing interests of investors, regulators, practitioners and corporate management. 
Finally, findings of this study are reviewed concluding with suggestions for future research 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 CONSERVATISM LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided background and motivation of the study. Key 
research questions and objectives of the study were then outlined. A later part discussed the 
significance and limitation of the study. In Chapter 2, an in-depth literature review on 
earnings conservatism is covered. The first section provides a comprehensive review of 
literature related to conservatism with various definitions discussed. Then, discussion on the 
central emphasis of issues related to earnings conservatism such as trends in conservatism in 
various countries such as the US, European nations, Australasia nations and Asian countries 
is presented. The next section discusses the four explanations of earnings conservatism; that 
is: (i) contracting; (ii) litigation; (iii) taxation; and (iv) accounting and institutional 
regulations. The final section of the chapter discusses the determinants of earnings 
conservatism, with particular emphasis given to corporate governance features.  
 
2.2 Different types of conservatism 
Sterling (1970) suggests that conservatism is the most influential principle of 
valuation in accounting. The reason for using conservatism in accounting practice is the 
existence of uncertainty and difficult-to-predict future benefits of certain economic assets 
and liabilities (Devine 1963 as cited in Kung 2005). Conservatism is an important underlying 
attribute of reporting quality that is often used by capital market participants to benchmark 
the quality of a firm‘s earnings (Kung et al. 2008). Conservatism also makes financial 
statements more informative and useful. Thus, stakeholders are better able to monitor a 
firm‘s performance (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). In addition, conservatism is thought to 
provide more timely information giving shareholders and creditors better opportunities to 
make key decisions on loss making projects (Ball et al. 2003). Moreover, it is recognized 
that conservatism is an effective mechanism for constraining managerial opportunistic 
behaviour (Kung et al. 2008) such as manipulation of earnings. Despite criticism of 
conservatism, prior research indicates earnings conservatism has increased in the past 
decades (Givoly and Hayn 2000, 2002; Lobo and Zhou 2006). 
According to Bliss in 1924 (as cited in Basu 1997), conservatism is a state of mind. 
Specifically, it (conservatism) is an attitude that favors excessive cautiousness when there is 
a need to choose between alternative accounting treatments in relation to any particular 
accounting issue. Accountants apply conservatism as an admonition to anticipate no profit 
but anticipate all losses (Basu 1997). Generally, accounting conservatism is defined as an 
action of accelerating expenses and deferring revenue recognitions. Textbooks commonly 
present conservatism as the choice (by regulators or firms) of an accounting treatment (when 
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selecting among two or more reporting alternatives) that is least likely to overstate assets and 
income (Revsine, Collins and Johnson 2002; Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield 2004). 
As noted above, there is presently a lack of consensus on a precise definition of 
earnings conservatism. Such a lack of consensus stems in part from ambiguity associated 
with the concept of conservatism. Such ambiguity has resulted from the lack of attempts to 
standardize definitions and the lack of a prescribed set of feasible actions taken to arrive at 
an acceptable level of conservatism (Givoly and Hayn 2000; Kung 2005). In the absence of a 
consensus on a definition of conservatism researchers generally have tried to measure 
conservatism by examining properties of either balance sheet items or income statement 
information such as asymmetric timeliness in earnings (Basu 1997), overall downward bias 
in book value relative to market value (Beaver and Ryan 2005) or downward bias in earnings 
and book value because of specific accounting choices (Penman and Zhang 2002). 
Also, researchers tend to define conservatism into two parts:(i) conditional and (ii) 
unconditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan 2005). Unconditional conservatism – also 
known as ex-ante (Richardson and Tinaikar 2004) or news dependent conservatism 
(Chandra, Wasley and Waymire 2004) – stems from the application of GAAP or accounting 
policies that reduce earnings independent of current economic news. The concept of 
unconditional conservatism is usually identified as an accounting bias toward reporting low 
book values (that enhances stockholders equity) which is independent of economic income 
(Kung 2005). Examples of unconditional conservatism include the use of historical cost 
accounting, accelerated depreciation, last-in-first-out method, pooling-of-interests for 
mergers and acquisition, and immediate expensing of costs associated with internally created 
intangible assets even if associated with positive expected future cash flows. Under the 
unconditional conservatism concept, Beaver and Ryan (2005) define conservatism as the 
average understatement of the book value of net assets, relative to the asset‘s market value, 
which is the existence of expected unrecorded goodwill. This definition is consistent with 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) who expect that reported net assets will be less than market 
value in the long run.  
Conditional conservatism, meanwhile, is also known as ex-post (Richardson and 
Tinaikar 2004), news independent conservatism (Chandra et al. 2004), or asymmetric 
income timeliness (Basu 1997). Conditional conservatism is defined as a tendency to 
accelerate losses and defer gains (Kung 2005). Specifically, it refers to the write down of 
book values under sufficiently adverse circumstances (or reduced present value of expected 
future cash flows from assets), but not the write up of book value under favorable 
circumstances. Examples include the lower-of-market rule, goodwill write downs following 
impairment testing, and asymmetric recognition of contingent losses and contingent gains.  
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In the absence of a generally accepted definition of earnings conservatism, the prime 
options available to this study are to develop a unique definition, establish a synthesized 
definition based on several other studies, or adopt verbatim an established definition. Whilst 
there is merit in developing a unique or synthesized definition based on a strong theoretical 
foundation which is acceptable to empirical researchers, such an objective is not the primary 
goal of this study. Rather, this study is strictly empirical in nature. Consequently, rather than 
distract attention from the empirical analysis and findings by developing and debating the 
merits of a unique or synthesized definition, this study adopts a definition commonly used in 
previous related empirical research. 
One such commonly used definition applied in prior empirical based conservatism 
studies (Beekes et al. 2004; Pae, Thornton and Welker 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Ruddock, 
Taylor and Taylor 2006) is that developed by Basu (1997). He (Basu 1997) defines earnings 
conservatism as earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news, where a higher 
degree of verification is preferred by accountants to recognize good news as gains than to 
recognized bad news as losses. The Basu (1997) definition of earnings conservatism focuses 
on the protection of shareholders. Shareholders always demand to be informed in a timely 
way through financial statements in order to be able to make their decisions. In the case of 
bad news, the demand for timely information will be more crucial. In addition, Basu (1997) 
argues that debt holders and other creditors demand timely information about bad news 
because the option value of their claims is more sensitive to a decline than an increase in 
firm value. Given the longevity of the Basu (1997) definition, and usage in prior empirical 
research, this study adopts this definition as the underlying premise of earnings 
conservatism. 
 
2.3 Literature review of trends in earnings conservatism 
Earnings conservatism is recognized as an important issue in respect to earnings 
quality. Nonetheless, prior empirical research is less prevalent than studies examining other 
concepts thought to underpin earnings quality, in particular earnings management. 
Furthermore, studies of earnings conservatism have predominantly relied on data drawn 
from the US or UK. The following subsections provide a review of the major empirical 
research of earnings conservatism conducted in prominent nations and regions to provide 
key background for this study. 
 
2.3.1 Earnings conservatism in the US 
The US accounting literature has a lengthy history debating the role of conservatism 
in financial accounting. Before World War I, financial accounting textbooks argued about 
the appropriateness of the lower of cost or market rule for inventory (Hatfield 1909 p.101-
15 
 
104 as cited in Basu 2005). Various US empirical studies tend to examine earnings 
conservatism across time. According to Givoly and Hayn (2002), there has been a growing 
trend in the US towards greater conservatism since the early 1980s. This increase is 
highlighted during the past several decades of earlier recognition of expenses instilled in 
many new accounting standards such as those dealing with employee benefits and 
compensation (contracting) and standards on impairment of assets. Also, increasing litigation 
in the US seems to have led auditors and managers to adopt more conservative reporting 
(Watts 2003a; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Amir, Guan and Livne 2009). This is because a firm 
that overstates profit and net assets is more likely to incur litigation costs than a firm which 
understates profits and net assets (Hogan and Jeter 1999; Holthausen and Watts 2001). 
Givoly and Hayn (2002), however, speculated that in the new economic era dominated by 
firms with higher market-to-book values conservative accounting practices would decline.  
Basu (1997) used the earnings/stock return relationship to examine conservatism 
levels in the US during high and low litigation growth periods (1963–1966, 1967–1975, 
1976–1983, 1983–1990). High and low litigation period were originally identified by 
Kothari, Lys, Smith, and Watts (1988). Based on the analysis of 43,321 firm-year 
observations, Basu (1997) found earnings sensitivity to current negative returns increased 
relative to earnings sensitivity to current positive returns across the period 1963–1990. This 
finding is perceived to be consistent with increases in accounting conservatism over time 
(Basu 1997). The significant increases in earnings conservatism during high litigation 
growth periods but not in low litigation growths periods were attributed to two factors. The 
first factor was a perceived significant increase in the legal liability exposure of auditors and 
corporate management managers due to less timely disclosures of bad news during the 
observation period last 3 decades. The second factor was greater demand from contracting 
parties for the higher adoption of conservative accounting practices. Results presented by 
Basu (1997) were consistent with auditors tightening impairment triggers when exposed to 
greater liability but loosening the impairment triggers when exposure was reduced. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) argued financial reporting in the US should have been 
significantly conservative pre-1967. This is because contracting incentives favoured the 
adoption of conservative accounting practices during that period (Holthausen and Watts 
2001). The increase in litigation risk toward the end of the 1960s prompted Holthausen and 
Watts (2001) to speculate this further spurned an increase in conservative accounting 
practices in the 1970s and 1980s. Using the same earnings/stock returns relationship to 
measure conservatism, the results of Holthausen and Watts (2001) were consistent with Basu 
(1997), that is, a significant increase in earnings conservatism, particularly in the three 
litigation periods examined by Basu (1997). Holthausen and Watts (2001), however, point 
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out earnings conservatism significantly increased in non-litigation periods (i.e. 1927–1941 
and 1954–1966). 
Based on the empirical findings of Basu (1997) and Holthausen and Watts (2001), 
Watts (2003b) concluded the earnings of US firms are not timely in reflecting good news but 
are in reflecting bad news. Watts (2003b) further suggested the significant increases in 
conservatism partially stemmed from the standard setting activities of the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB). In paragraph 95 of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), conservatism is also described as ―If there are two estimations of the same 
receivable or payable fund in the future while incidence probability of both is identical, then 
conservatism dictates the use of the estimation which is less optimistic‖ (FASB 2011 para. 
95). This resulted in fewer accepted accounting techniques such as: (i) recognition of sale 
revenue; (ii) faster recognition of cost; (iii) evaluation of assets less than real values; and (iv) 
evaluation of liabilities greater than real values (Kazemi, Hemmati and Faridvand 2011). 
More recent studies of earnings conservatism within the US capital market have 
continued to focus on identifying whether conservatism has continued to increase. Such 
studies have adopted alternative approaches to measuring earnings conservatism. 
Nonetheless, these more recent studies show earnings conservatism in the US continues to 
increase in more recent time periods. For example, Kim and Kross (2005) report increases in 
conservatism in the US during the period 1973 to 2000. Based on the analysis of 100,266 
firm-year observations, they (Kim and Kross 2005) found the relationship between current 
earnings and future operating cash flows increased significantly during the aforementioned 
observation period in the US.  
Meanwhile, Lobo and Zhou (2006), using a sample of 4,441 US firms, found that 
relative to the two years preceding the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, 
earnings conservatism had significant increases within two years of the introduction of such 
significant legislation. Finally, using a sample of 99,109 firm-year observations, Srivastava 
and Tse (2007) found the level of conservatism increased during the 1972–2006 time period 
amongst US high technology firms. They (Srivastava and Tse 2007) found the increase in 
conservatism was primarily due to the delayed recognition of gains rather than the prompt 
recognition of losses. Thus, Srivastava and Tse (2007) suggest this explains why 
conservatism increased more rapidly in high technology industries relative to other industries 
in more recent decades. Table 2.1 provides a summary of major US-based studies of 
earnings conservatism. 
 
17 
 
Table 2.1: Summary table for studies of trends in earnings conservatism in the US. 
 
Author (s) 
 
Title 
 
Focus 
 
Period covered 
 
 
Findings 
Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) 
The effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earnings 
US. 40,000 
firm-year 
observations 
 
 
1985–1995  
 
 
Level of conservatism will vary depending on the institutional context or 
remain a function of its political and legal systems. There is a significant 
increase in the conservatism level in the US for the period of 1985 to 
1995. For the US, (a Common Law nation), accounting numbers are used 
to reduce info asymmetry among stakeholders and thus demand more 
conservative reporting. Common Law nations (e.g. US) are significantly 
more timely than Code Law nations due entirely to quicker incorporation 
of economic losses (income conservatism). 
Basu (1997) The conservatism principle and the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings 
 
US.43,321 firms 1963–1990 The earnings sensitivity to current negative returns increased relative to 
earnings sensitivity to current positive returns over the period 1963–
1990, consistent with accounting conservatism increasing over time. Two 
factors attributed to this increases, (i) the legal liability exposure of 
auditors and managers for tardy disclosure of bad news has increased 
significantly over the last 3 decades, and (ii) contracting parties increased 
their demand for conservatism. 
Givoly and Hayn 
(2002) 
Rising conservatism: Implications for financial 
analysis  
US. 896 firms 1968–1998 Financial reporting already conservatively biased by accounting 
conventions has become more conservative since the early 1980s. 
Kim and Kross (2005) The ability of earnings to predict future 
operating cash flows has been increasing, not 
decreasing 
US. 100,266 
firms 
1973–2000 Relationship between current earnings and future operating cash flows 
has increased over time (evidence of accounting conservatism) 
Lobo and Zhou (2006) Did conservatism in financial reporting increase 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial evidence 
 
 
US. 4,441 firms Pre and post SOX 
(2 years before 
and 2 years after 
SOX) 
Firms on average are more conservative in their financial reporting after 
the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SEC requires that Chief 
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer certify their financial 
statement, reducing potential earning overstatements) than they were in 
the two years immediately preceding the introduction of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. It is concluded that litigations under Securities Acts 
encourage conservatism because litigation is much more likely when 
earnings are overstated. 
Srivastava and Tse 
(2007) 
What drives changes in accounting 
conservatism? The effects of the promptness of 
recognizing anticipated gains versus losses in 
conservatism 
 
US.99,109 firm-
year 
observations 
1972–2006 Level of conservatism increased more rapidly in high technology 
industries in the US rather than other industries over the period of 1972 
to 2006 due to slower gains recognized and accelerated losses 
recognized. 
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2.3.2 Earnings conservatism in European nations 
Relative to US studies8, research of earning conservatism in Europe tends to focus 
on cross-nation comparisons of the levels of conservatism rather than time-series analysis of 
individual nations. For example, Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) analyzed the earnings 
conservatism of US and non-US firms (including European firms) from 1985 to 1995. They 
(Ball et al. 2000) reported earnings amongst UK firms relative to US firms were five times 
more sensitive to negative returns than to positive returns. Ball et al. (2000)concluded based 
on their findings that UK accounting was less conservative than the US accounting. 
Also, Ball et al. (2000) questioned the influence of the legal system on earnings 
conservatism. Differences in legal systems are important within the context of discussions 
related to Europe. This is because the legal systems of nations around the world inherently 
stem from Europe; in particular, the influence of the UK in respect to Common Law and 
France and Germany in regards to Code Law. Ball et al. (2000) examined the demand of 
accounting income in seven international GAAP regimes. They (Ball et al. 2000) divided 
these regimes into Code Law and Common Law nations respectively. Empirical results 
showed the level of conservatism varied depending on the institutional context, or remained 
a function of a nation‘s political and legal systems. It was found that in Code Law nations 
such as France and Germany there was less demand for conservatism practices (Ball et al. 
2000). This is because accounting numbers used to resolve issues between stakeholders were 
conveyed privately. In contrast, for Common Law nations such as the UK accounting 
numbers were used more openly to reduce information asymmetry amongst capital market 
participants. To avoid conflicts and legal action more conservative reporting practices were 
adopted. Among Common Law nations the UK was deemed to have less asymmetric 
conservatism relative to the US due to lower political involvement in accounting, lower 
litigation costs and less issuance of public debt (Ball et al. 2000).  
Meanwhile, Giner and Rees (2001)9 found that during the period 1990 to 1998, 
asymmetric recognition was generally stronger in the UK than France and Germany. 
However, they (Giner and Rees 2001) failed to find any significant differences across these 
nations, thereby suggesting harmonization of accounting practices between these nations 
during the time period under observation. Their (Giner and Rees 2001)result is further 
supported by Lara and Mora (2004). They (Lara and Mora 2004) examined the level of 
conservatism in eight European nations (i.e. the UK, Germany, France, Switzerland, 
                                                     
8 It is acknowledged a number of studies have been conducted of earnings conservatism in the US. For brevity 
(given the majority of studies of US data lead to similar trends) only major seminal studies are listed (in 
alphabetical order). A more comprehensive summary of studies examining trends in earnings conservatism in the 
US is provided in Appendix A: Table A:1. 
9 This study also indicates results of earnings conservatism in other nations. However, the author of this study 
focuses on European nations only. The findings for other nations are irrelevant to this discussion. 
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Netherland, Italy, Spain and Belgium) from 1997 to 2000. They (Lara and Mora 2004) found 
that the overall level of conservatism was statistically similar across nations. Lara and Mora 
(2004) argued differences in institutional factors across European nations were not as 
pronounced as reported in the previous literature. 
In a recent study, Goncharov and Hodgson (2011) examined debt holders decisions 
especially for contracting by assessing the extent of asymmetric timeliness of news 
recognition. By using 56,702 firm-year observations, they (Goncharov and Hodgson 2011) 
found significant results of earnings conservatism (timeliness and persistence) in 16 
European countries10 over the period of 1991–2005. Nonetheless, it is generally suggested 
European firms are reporting more conservatively over time in order to improve the ability to 
raise capital in the expanding global debt and equity markets (Basu, Hwang and Jan 2001; 
Goncharov and Hodgson 2011).  
 
2.3.3 Earnings conservatism in Australia and New Zealand 
Research of earnings conservatism in Australia (whilst limited) suggests, like the 
US, that conservative financial accounting practices have increased across time. For 
example, Balkrishna, Coulton and Taylor (2007) examined conservative financial accounting 
practices of Australian firms over the period of 1993–2003 using a sample of 5,980 firm-year 
observations. They (Balkrishna et al. 2007) found that Australian firms frequently report 
losses. The average magnitude of losses in the early 1990s was approximately equal to 16% 
of beginning period total assets. By the early 2000s the average had increased to above 35%. 
Balkrishna et al. (2007) suggested this result demonstrates a statistically significant increase 
in conditional conservatism among loss years relative to years in which profits are reported. 
Over the period 1993 to 2003, losses – though not only extremely common among 
Australian listed firms –were also reported more frequently. Moreover, Balkrishna et al. 
(2007) reported losses had a tendency to persist. This result is consistent with a prior study of 
Australian firms (using a sample of 1,321 firm-year observations) from the period 1985 to 
1995 (Ball et al. 2000) . They (Ball et al. 2000) found that like other Common Law nations 
Australian stakeholders demand more conservative accounting to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
Research has indicated that whilst earnings conservatism in Australia appears to 
have increased in the private sector it may extend to the public arena. Pinnuck and Potter 
(2009), for example, examined the quality of accounting earnings across a large sample of 
Australian local governments (2058 observations representing 67% of total local government 
firm-year observations) from 1996 to 2003. They (Pinnuck and Potter 2009) found no 
                                                     
10Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
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evidence of conservatism in the earnings across Australian local governments in general. 
Nevertheless, where there is a clear use of accounting for contracting purposes, Pinnuck and 
Potter (2009) report evidence of conservatism in financial reports of large local governments.  
In respect to New Zealand, very few empirical studies have been undertaken in 
respect to earnings conservatism. Zhang and Emanuel (2008) provide the first evidence of 
existence of earnings conservatism in New Zealand during 1995 to 2001 by using Basu‘s 
(1997) model. By using 176 New Zealand firms (528 firm-year observations), Zhang and 
Emanuel (2008), examined the relationship between non-audit services provided by 
incumbent auditors and earnings conservatism. They (Zhang and Emanuel 2008) 
hypothesized that a negative relation exists between the provision of non-audit services and 
clients‘ earnings conservatism. The result is consistent with the finding of Ball et al. (2000) 
and Ball et al. (2003) which display significant earnings conservatism in Common Law 
nations. Overall result suggests that earnings are more responsive to contemporaneous bad 
news in New Zealand. However, they (Zhang and Emanuel 2008) failed to find any 
evidence of a higher level of non-audit services being associated with reduced earnings 
conservatism.  
 
2.3.4 Earnings conservatism in East Asia (PRC, Japan and Hong Kong) 
Ball et al. (2000) examined accounting regulations in the People‘s Republic of China 
(PRC) via a comparison between Chinese GAAP and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). They (Ball et al. 2000) found that despite ‗alleged‘ improvements in 
reporting standards, firms using IFRS based standard to determine financial accounting 
earnings did not show a higher level of conservatism than counterparts using Chinese 
GAAP. Ball et al. (2000) suggested the accounting infrastructure in the PRC could not be 
changed independently of wider economic, legal and political infrastructure. Thus, 
conservatism levels in the PRC were likely to be determined essentially by market forces, 
institutional factors and incentives posed by managers and auditors. 
A recent study by Kung (2005), however, shows earning conservatism in the PRC 
increased significantly over time. Kung (2005) assessed whether existing institutional 
differences affected the level of accounting conservatism in the PRC market place. His 
(Kung 2005) results showed that not only had the demand for accounting conservatism in the 
PRC increased significantly over time, but also suggested greater attention was paid to 
accounting conservatism by stakeholders. This may be due to an increased interest in 
reporting quality driven (in part) by the increasing complexity of transactions, growing 
corporate governance importance, and recent accounting scandals in the PRC (Kung 2005). 
Commonly categorized as a Code Law nation, previous studies show Japan demands 
less of conservatism practices as compared to Common Law nations (Ball et al. 2000; 
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LaFond 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). However, a few studies show demand on 
conservatism for Japanese firms. For example, Tazawa (2003) examines the effect of 
conservatism in Japan during 1975 to 1999 with a total of 20,218 firm-year observations. He 
(Tazawa 2003) argued that Japan has a unique ownership structure which includes bank and 
cross-shareholdings and these groups play an important role in corporate governance of 
Japanese firms. He (Tazawa 2003) suggested that managerial ownership has a strong effect 
on the demand for accounting conservatism to reduce agency costs. Following the Basu 
(1997) model, he (Tazawa 2003) found asymmetric timeliness and persistence of earnings 
under Japanese GAAP (i.e. earnings reflects bad news a more timely fashion than good 
news). 
This is supported by a recent study (Shuto and Takada 2011). By using 27,448 firm-
year observations covering 15 years from 1991 to 2005, Shuto and Takada (2011)examined 
the effect of the fraction of shares owned by directors on accounting conservatism. By using 
the Basu (1997) model, they (Shuto and Takada 2011) found that managerial ownership had 
a strong effect on the demand for accounting conservatism and thus helps in addressing the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. Moreover, managers with larger 
shareholdings have a stronger incentive to act in line with shareholders‘ interests. 
Another pivotal capital market in East Asia is Hong Kong. Whilst this capital market 
has received the attention of researchers on various financial and accounting issues, earnings 
conservatism has received little if any active attention. In a departure from other 
international capital markets based on Common Law (such as the US, UK and Australia), a 
study by Gul, Srinidhi and Shieh (2002) found earnings conservatism has decreased during 
the 1990s in Hong Kong due to a decline in economic conditions. Specifically, from 1996 to 
1997, Hong Kong has suffered a major financial downturn. Gul et al. (2002) argued the 
severity of the financial downturn put pressure on managers to convey more positive news to 
the investors. They (Gul et al. 2002) compared earnings conservatism levels of Hong Kong 
firms in the two years before the downturn (1994–1995) with the two years of the downturn 
(1996–1997). Results show earnings conservatism decreased significantly during the 
downturn, supporting the arguments of Gul et al. (2002). Also, they (Gul et al. 2002) showed 
an inverse association between yearly accounting conservatism and average audit fees.  
 
2.3.5 Earnings conservatism in the South-East Asia group 
Studies of South-East Asian nations neighbouring Malaysia are limited. In an 
international comparative analysis, Ball et al. (2003) did examine some South-East Asian 
nations such as Singapore and Thailand. They (Ball et al. 2003) suggested South-East Asian 
nations were subject to high quality accounting regulations—heavily influenced by UK, US 
or International Accounting Standards (IAS) frameworks. However, institutional features in 
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South-East Asian nations generally provided incentives for low-quality financial reporting. 
Ball et al. (2003) found accounting regulations had a second-order effect on financial 
reporting practices in South-East Asian nations neighbouring Malaysia but did not have as 
great an effect on conservatism as compared to managerial incentives. South-East Asian 
nations were considered to be significantly less conservative than Common Law nations 
such as the UK and Australia. Results of the analysis by Ball et al. (2003) suggested that the 
quality of financial reporting in South-East Asian nation will not be improved by mandating 
accounting regulations alone, and that institutional settings in these nations profoundly affect 
firm reporting incentives (thus, less conservative reporting is supplied). 
Equity ownership in South-East Asian nations based on tight family cross-holdings 
provides disincentives for improvements in reporting quality, including conservatism. 
Family controlled businesses in East Asian nations reduce the demand for public disclosure 
and thus demand less conservatism in accounting. Other factors may also reduce incentives 
for high quality conservative accounting practices in South-East Asian nations. Private loans 
from banks, for example, constitute a major source of financing instead of public debts and 
equity. Due to the close relationship, key financial accounting information may be provided 
privately rather than publicly. Also, shareholder litigation against corporations and auditors 
in South-East Asian nations is generally infrequent. For example, Diga and Saudagaran 
(1998) reported no judicial actions against auditors had occurred in Thailand up till mid-
1990, whilst lawsuits against auditors in Singapore are minimal. 
Nevertheless, a recent study (Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) which examined 
conservatism and earnings timeliness in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, 
found that following the crisis (1999–2004), accounting conservatism in the East Asian 
countries has improved and is even higher than in the pre-crisis period. They 
(Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) suggest that this positive impact on conservatism and timeliness 
of earnings could be due to improvement in corporate governance. Nevertheless, their 
(Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) findings strongly supported an increase in conservatism for 
Singapore, but partially supported an increase in conservatism for Thailand. Different levels 
of corporate governance could be the reason for the difference caused. 
 
2.3.6 Earnings conservatism in Malaysia 
The Asian financial crisis that swept across Asian economies in 1997–1998 raises 
serious questions about transparency, disclosure, and the role of accounting in producing 
reliable and relevant financial information (Rahman 1998). Accordingly, Ku Ismail and 
Abdullah (1999) surveyed the earnings quality of 13 Malaysian public firms with respect to 
accounting conservatism. Ku Ismail and Abdullah (1999) found 73% of respondents agreed 
that there was a direct and positive association between accounting conservatism and 
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earnings quality. They (Ku Ismail and Abdullah 1999) also found that of 14 accounting 
policies examined, the practice of capitalizing period costs was perceived to have the 
greatest impact on the degree of conservatism. However, despite the perceived importance of 
conservatism on earnings quality, Ball et al. (2000) (using 1985–1995 data) found no 
evidence of conservatism in Malaysia.  
According to Ball et al. (2003), equity ownership in Malaysia is typified by closely 
held family cross-holdings that reduce the incentives to disclose information publicly. 
Furthermore, like other South-East Asian nations, private bank loans constitute a major 
source of financing rather than use of public debt and equity instruments; thus, again less 
incentive to report publicly and to improve earnings quality. Ball et al. (2003) suggest the 
lack of demand for public disclosure of information affects the properties of reported 
accounting information, including adoption of conservative accounting practices. 
Accounting numbers in Malaysia are traditionally lacking in transparency and timeliness 
(e.g. timely disclosure of information in general including negative news) relative to other 
Common Law nations like the US and UK. Moreover, there had been very few judicial 
actions against auditors that could have stimulated practices of conservatism in Malaysia 
before the Asian financial crisis (see Diga and Saudagaran 1998; Krishnan 2011). 
Nevertheless, Krishnan (2011) reported a recent spate of financial scandals involving 
auditors which occurred in Malaysia during the post Asian financial crisis11. 
Despite the lack of evidence of demand for earnings quality in previous years, recent 
researchers (Mohamed-Yunos, Smith and Ismail 2010; Mohammed, Ahmed and Ji 2010; 
Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) exhibit empirical findings that earnings quality (e.g. earnings 
conservatism) in Malaysia has improved. Vichitsarawong et al. (2010), for example, 
examined the impact of the Asian financial crisis on conservatism using Basu‘s model and 
the accumulation of non-operating accruals suggested by Givoly and Hyan. They 
(Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) found that conservatism and timeliness of earnings during the 
crisis period (1997) were low. This was due to the practice of aggressive accounting to 
convey more positive information to the public in order to reduce the negative impact of the 
crisis. However, following the crisis (1999–2004), East Asian nations, particularly Malaysia, 
introduced improvement in corporate governance. Thus, findings of Vichitsarawong et al. 
(2010) indicate accounting conservatism improved in the post-crisis periods. This might be 
due to corporate governance reforms contributing to more transparent financial reporting. 
Another study by Mohammed et al. (2010) using 207 Malaysian firms for the period 
of 2004–2007, examined the relationship between accounting conservatism, corporate 
                                                     
11 Financial scandals involving auditors which occurred in Malaysia include the case of Technology Resources 
Industries Bhd (TRI), Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd (CSMB), Transmile Group Bhd, Ocean Capital Bhd, Megan 
Media Holdings Bhd, Bumiputra Commerce-Holdings Bhd (BCHB) and Fountain Views Development Bhd. 
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governance and political influence in Malaysia. Their (Mohammed et al. 2010) results 
provide evidence of conditional conservatism in Malaysia. Specifically, they (Mohammed et 
al. 2010) found that audit committee size and independence are related to conditional 
conservatism. However, political influence is found to be unrelated to conservatism. This 
study is consistent with the results of Vichitsarawong et al. (2010). Finally, Mohamed-Yunos 
et al. (2010) who examined the relationship between accounting conservatism and ownership 
concentration amongst 300 non-financial Malaysian firms (2001–2007) found that corporate 
governance mechanisms (board independence, board tenure, board size and auditor) 
significantly influenced earnings timeliness. Nevertheless, the findings implied that 
accounting conservatism is not an effective governance tool if it is under the control of the 
substantial shareholders. 
 
2.3.7 Summary of literature review of trends in earnings conservatism 
In the earlier years, a number of studies in the US tended to examine earnings 
conservatism across time. Empirical evidences exhibit that there is a significant increase of 
earnings conservatism over time in the US. Legal liability exposure and greater demand from 
contracting parties have led auditors and managers to adopt more conservative reporting. 
Relative to US counterparts, studies on earning conservatism in Europe are more likely to 
focus on cross-country comparisons of the levels of conservatism rather than time-series 
analysis of individual nations. This research provides evidence that a different legal system 
such as Common Law and Code Law is important within the context of earnings 
conservatism discussions. Demand for earnings conservatism in Common Law nations, such 
as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, are higher than in Code Law nations, such as France 
and Germany. However, recent study shows that in order to improve the ability to raise 
capital in the expanding global debt and equity markets, both Common Law firms and Code 
Law firms are reporting more conservatively.  
Similarly, literature shows earnings conservatism in the PRC and Japan has 
significantly increased over time. The growing importance of corporate governance and 
recent accounting scandals in the PRC has a great impact on how management reports 
earnings. Meanwhile, demand for earnings conservatism in South-East Asian nations is 
generally low compared to other countries. This could be contributed to family controlled 
businesses in South-East Asian nations reducing the demand for public disclosure and thus 
demanding less conservatism in accounting. Nevertheless, despite the lack of demand for 
conservative practices in financial reporting, the 1997–1998 financial crisis that badly 
affected South-East Asian economies provided a wake-up call. Consequently, most South-
East Asian nations, particularly Malaysia, revamped corporate governance mechanisms to 
regain investor confidence via higher quality of earnings (i.e. conservative reporting).  
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2.4 Explanations for existence of earnings conservatism 
Whilst the majority of earnings conservatism research has tended to focus on 
determining the concepts existence and level (whether in a specific nation or a cross-border 
comparison) some more limited work has sought to identify the origins underpinning 
earnings conservatism and why this phenomenon may persist. In a seminal work in this area, 
Watts (2003a, 2003b) suggested accounting conservatism was a function of contracting, 
litigation, taxation and accounting regulations.  
 
2.4.1 Contracting 
Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a) suggest contracting considerations are one of the 
major factors that explain the origin of conservatism. According to the contracting 
perspective the overstatement of earnings can lead to higher payments to corporate 
management, thereby increasing agency costs. Pae et al. (2005) argued excessive payments 
to corporate management are generally difficult (if not impossible) to recover. Thus, 
shareholders demand corporate management adopt conservative accounting practices in 
reporting earnings to constrain earnings-based payments to corporate management. 
The overstatement of earnings may also affect other contractual arrangements. For 
instance, overstatement of earnings can give rise to excessive dividend distributions that 
reduce assets available to creditors or bondholders in making any claims against the firm to 
regain debts. As a result, creditors and bondholders are likely to demand greater earnings 
conservatism to preserve their (i.e. creditors and bondholders) interests (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986; Watts 2003a, 2003b). This suggestion has been supported by prior 
empirical research. Ahmed et al. (2002), for example, found accounting conservatism plays 
an important role in mitigating bondholder–shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and 
reducing a firm‘s debt costs. Also, prior studies (Dechow et al. 1996; Dichev and Skinner 
2002; Klein 2002a) suggest the ability of shareholders and debt holders to enforce demands 
for conservatism is greater when equity and debt governance mechanisms are stronger. 
Accordingly, firms with stronger equity and debt governance mechanisms are expected to 
choose more conservative accounting. 
 
2.4.2 Litigation 
Another explanation for the existence of accounting conservatism is litigation. 
Accounting researchers argue litigation under various legislative acts (e.g. Securities Act) 
encourages conservatism because the overstatement of earnings and assets is more likely to 
trigger litigation than understatements (Kellogg 1984; Watts 2003a; Beaver and Ryan 2005). 
Kim, Chung and Firth (2003) argued that to reduce litigation risk, auditors prefer clients to 
use conservative (or income decreasing) accounting choices rather than aggressive 
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accounting (i.e. income increasing choices). Watts (2003b) observed courts generally 
punished firms that overstated earnings and assets than those that understated. This is 
because stakeholders (especially shareholders) are more likely to suffer losses when 
earnings/assets are overstated than when earnings/assets are understated (Watts 2003b). 
Kellogg (1984) and DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2004) supported this view showing 
aggressive financial reporting is more likely to be associated with shareholder litigation than 
conservative financial reporting. These findings are consistent with other empirical research 
such as Basu (1997), Lobo and Zhou (2006) and Kung et al. (2008).  
 
2.4.3 Taxation 
Watts (2003a) suggests that tax regulation also creates conservatism in financial 
reporting. Even though financial accounting and tax accounting can differ in a number of 
ways (e.g. treatment of depreciation), tax planning usually involves managerial use of 
accounting discretion to minimize the present value of tax payments (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001). According to Watts (2003a), asymmetric recognition of gains and losses (i.e. 
conservatism) assists managers of profitable firms to reduce the present value of the taxes 
and, thereby, increase the value of the firm. Recent studies are in support of this notion (Pae 
2007; Qiang 2007; Lara, Osma and Penalva 2009b).  
Lara et al. (2009b), for example, assert that both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism are used by managers as a tool to reduce the present value of taxes, thus 
increasing firm value. In a scenario where firms face greater tax pressures, management tend 
to adopt conservative accounting practices (Lara et al. 2009b).For instance, earnings 
conservatism is used to shift income across periods, specifically from periods with high 
expected tax rates to periods of low expected tax rate. This shifting of income reduces the net 
present value of tax payments as well as the overall amount paid. 
 
2.4.4 Accounting and institutional regulations 
A number of studies provide evidence that the regulatory environment influences 
conservatism (Ball et al. 2000; Watts 2003a; Xinrong 2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; 
Huijgen and Lubberink 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). According to Watts (2003a), 
financial accounting standard-setters and regulators have incentives to favor conservative 
accounting and reporting. Specifically, standard-setters and regulators are likely to face more 
criticism if firms overstate net assets than if firms understate net assets. Thus, by favoring 
conservative financial reporting, political costs imposed on them may reduce. Xinrong 
(2004), meanwhile, argues regulation costs are a secondary factor for conservative reporting 
because it follows investor‘s demand for conservatism predicted by the litigation and 
contracting hypothesis. 
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The views of Watts (2003a) have been empirically tested by several studies (Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005; Huijgen and Lubberink 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006), for example, provide evidence that firms in nations with 
strong investor protection and high quality judicial systems reflect bad news in reported 
earnings numbers in timelier fashion (i.e. earnings conservatism) than firms in nations 
characterized by weak investor protection and low quality judicial systems. Therefore, they 
(Bushman and Piotroski 2006) suggest that investor protection embodied in corporate law 
and the efficiency and impartiality of a judicial system play a significant role in creating 
incentives for earnings conservatism. 
 Some prior empirical research has sought to examine the influence of standard 
setters and regulation on conservatism. Huijgen and Lubberink (2005), for example, 
examined the level of conservatism of UK firms cross-listed in the US relative to UK GAAP 
and US GAAP earnings. They (Huijgen and Lubberink 2005) found no significant 
differences in conservatism level between UK GAAP and US GAAP counterparts. However, 
they (Huijgen and Lubberink 2005) found UK cross-listed firms were significantly more 
conservative than those UK firms without a US cross-listing. They (Huijgen and Lubberink 
2005) suggested that besides the higher threat of litigation from a wider shareholder 
audience, a stricter enforcement system on cross-listed firms may explain the significantly 
higher levels of conservatism. 
 All four explanations of conservatism (i.e. contracting, litigation, taxation and 
accounting regulations) as suggested by Watts (2003a), are then investigated by Qiang 
(2007). His (Qiang 2007) findings indicate that both forms of conservatism (i.e. conditional 
and unconditional conservatism) played distinct roles in all contracting, regulation and 
taxation as well as a common role in litigation. Moreover, both forms of conservatism played 
an interrelated role (i.e. unconditional conservatism reduced conditional conservatism). 
 
2.5 Determinants of earnings conservatism 
The prior subsections described major explanations offered in the extant literature to 
explain the existence, persistence and evolution of conservatism within financial accounting. 
These explanations provide valuable insights to understanding conservatism, and are 
important in explaining variations in earnings conservatism across international boundaries. 
However, such explanations provide limited insights to explain possible variables between 
firms within a nation. As this study has a nation-specific focus, it is imperative to consider 
factors at the firm-level that are likely to best explain variations in earnings conservatism 
within a nation. Various factors have been proposed by scholars though to potentially 
influence earnings conservatism between firms. These factors can be broadly categorized in 
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four main groupings: (1) firm characteristics; (2) institutional factors; (3) market factors; and 
(4) corporate governance features. 
 
2.5.1 Firm characteristics 
There is a lengthy history of researchers seeking to link (theoretically, empirically 
and methodologically) firm characteristics to various financial accounting issues. Three 
prominent and well researched firm characteristics are firm size, leverage and industry type.12 
Some prior research has also sought to determine a linkage between earnings conservatism 
and these three firm characteristics (i.e. firm size, leverage and industry type). Ding and 
Stolowy (2006), for example, found small firms are often less conservative than large ones. 
They (Ding and Stolowy 2006) argue that this could be due to small firms being more risky 
in term of market equity. Moreover, small firms tend to be less diversified than large firms 
(i.e. returns are more volatile). Their (Ding and Stolowy 2006) results are consistent with a 
study conducted by Klein and Marquardt (2006). 
Kwon, Yin and Han (2006), meanwhile, investigated differences in the level of 
accounting conservatism between high-tech and low-tech firms. By using 2,728 high-tech 
firms and 984 low-tech firms in year 2000, they (Kwon et al. 2006) found that there is a 
higher level of accounting conservatism in high-tech firms compared to low-tech firms. 
Similarly, Srivastava and Tse (2007), who examined factors that drove changes in 
accounting conservatism during 1972–2006, reported that levels of conservatism increased 
more rapidly in high technology industry than other industries. They (Srivastava and Tse 
2007) suggested that both delayed gains recognition and prompt loss recognition generally 
contributed to increasing conservatism in the high technology industry. 
Gotti (2008), alternatively, used a few different firm characteristics to examine 
conditional conservatism in the US during 1963–2005. With a sample consisting of 6,282 
firm-year observations, he (Gotti 2008) found that firms with (i) high debt-to-asset ratios, (ii) 
executives compensated more heavily based on the firm's accounting performance, (iii) 
audited by a Big-7 auditor in the previous year and received an unqualified auditor opinion, 
and (iv) received an unqualified audit report with a going concern assumption, are more 
conservative (i.e. recognizing future good news in annual earnings more quickly than bad 
news) than the rest of the sample. Appendix B presents a summary of major studies linking 
firm characteristics to earnings conservatism. 
 
                                                     
12 Aside from the three firm characteristics noted (i.e. firm size, leverage and industry type), other firm 
characteristics examined include firm risk, market-to-book values, financial performance and business cycle. 
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2.5.2 Institutional factors 
Prior research has investigated the influence of institutional factors on earnings 
conservatism such as legal regimes (i.e. Code Law versus Common Law), accounting 
policies and regulation, political influence and cross-listing of firms in different jurisdictions 
(Lara, Osma and Mora 1999; Pope and Walker 1999; Huijgen and Lubberink 2005; Kung 
2005; Brown, He and Teitel 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). 
Pope and Walker (1999), for example, investigated differences in the reported 
timeliness and conservatism of US firms and UK firms‘ reported earnings. They (Pope and 
Walker 1999) concluded that the UK accounting regime was significantly less conservative 
than the US regime, when comparing earnings before extraordinary items. However, when 
comparing bottom-line earnings, US firms were less conservative than UK firms. Findings 
indicate that US GAAP is more conservative than UK GAAP for earnings before 
extraordinary items and the opposite for bottom-line earnings. 
Ball et al. (2000), meanwhile, examined the effect of international factors on the 
properties of earnings conservatism, specifically timeliness and conservatism. The empirical 
analysis by Ball et al. (2000) indicated that Common Law accounting income did exhibit 
greater timeliness than Code Law accounting income but this difference was due to Common 
Law accounting income‘s greater sensitivity to economic losses (i.e. income conservatism). 
Brown et al. (2006) investigated the association between conditional conservatism 
and accrual intensity on the value relevance of accounting earnings in 20 different nations. 
With a sample of 47,802 firm-year observations from 1993 to 2004, results indicated that 
conditional conservatism is positively associated with the value relevance of earnings in 
nations with higher accrual intensity (i.e. incremental to the effects of shareholder 
protection). They (Brown et al. 2006) further indicated that, in the use of accruals, 
conditional conservatism serves as an efficient contracting role to reduce managers‘ 
opportunistic behaviour.  
Meanwhile, Kung et al. (2008) argued that Chinese firms cross-listed in the stock 
exchange of Hong Kong (H-shares) are exposed to the threat of litigation, competitive 
market forces and a stricter regulatory regime. Thus, these firms are expected to be more 
conservative than Chinese firm without an overseas listing. However, results shows that 
Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong (H-shares) are not significantly more conservative 
than firms without cross listing. They (Kung et al. 2008) suggest that the location of listing 
has little effect on accounting conservatism (i.e. a significant exposure to the domestic 
institutional environment was retained by cross-listed companies). This indicates that 
institutional setting and country environment are important determinants of the level of 
accounting conservatism. 
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Finally, Bushman and Piotroski (2006), using the Basu (1997) model as a proxy for 
earnings conservatism, analyzed the relationship between key characteristics of nation-level 
institutions and conditional conservatism. The analysis by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
found that investor protections embodied in corporate law and the efficiency and fairness of 
the judicial system played a significant role in creating incentives for earnings conservatism 
(i.e. timely loss recognition). Firms in nations with strong investor protection and high 
quality judicial systems reflected bad news in reported earnings numbers in a more timely 
fashion than firms in nations characterized by weak investor protection and low quality 
judicial systems. For a summary of major studies linking institutional factors to earnings 
conservatism see Appendix C. 
 
2.5.3 Market factors 
Factors associated with the dynamics of the capital market of a nation (e.g. 
proportion of private firms to public firms, coverage by analyst, liquidity of the market, 
industry breakdown) may also influence earnings conservatism. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), for example, argued that the market tends to demand lower quality financial 
reporting for private firms than public firms even though the financial statement is prepared 
under substantially equivalent regulations. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) found positive 
association between conditional conservatism and public firms. Based on these findings a 
market dominated by a higher proportion of large private firms than public firm will likely 
have less incentives for the production of high quality earnings and adoption of conservative 
earnings practices. Meanwhile, in respect to analyst coverage it has been suggested a firm 
with a higher level of coverage by financial analysts will adopt more conservative financial 
accounting practices. Empirical analysis by Sun and Liu (2011) supports a positive 
association between analyst coverage and earnings conservatism. Thus, just as with firm 
characteristics and institutional factors, market factors may also act as determinants of 
earnings conservatism between firms.  
 
2.5.4 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance13 is a major area of debate and discussion with continuing 
demands from various parties (e.g. reformists, scholars, investors) for improvements in 
standards. Recently some scholars for example, Lara, Osma and Penalva (2007), have 
considered the impact of corporate governance on earnings conservatism. They (Lara et al. 
2007), for example, suggested corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that ensures 
                                                     
13Depending upon the definition one may adopt, the concept of corporate governance may encompass ownership 
structure and aspects of market factors. For the purposes of this study, corporate governance is perceived to 
encompass only firm constructed, engaged and instigated mechanisms and controls designed to oversee the firm 
(e.g. the board of directors, audit committee, engaged external auditor). 
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the firm‘s assets are used efficiently, and can prevent the inappropriate distribution of assets 
to corporate management at the expense of other stakeholders. Dargenidou, McLeay and 
Raonic (2007), meanwhile, suggested that when investor protection is weak, and corporate 
governance does not separate supervision from management, there is systematic 
understatement in the recognition of bad news, leading to poorer earnings quality.  
Though still generally within its infancy, empirical studies examining the linkage 
between earnings conservatism and various corporate governance features have begun to 
emerge. Beekes et al. (2004), for example, examined the association of accounting quality 
(i.e. earnings timeliness and conservatism) and the composition of UK boards of directors. 
Using the Basu (1997) reverse regression model, Beekes et al. (2004) selected listed non-
financial firms from 1993 to 1995 consisting of a sample of 508 firm-year observations. 
Their (Beekes et al. 2004) results indicated that firms with a higher proportion of outside 
board members were more likely to recognize bad news in earnings in a timelier fashion. 
Predictably, firms whose boards were comprised of a relatively high proportion of outsiders 
did not display greater conservatism with regard to the recognition of good news. Beekes et 
al. (2004)findings reflect that board composition is an important factor in determining the 
quality of firms‘ reported earnings. 
In a similar vein to Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) performed a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between accounting conservatism and five 
characteristics of the board of directors: (i) percentage of inside directors; (ii) average 
number of additional directorships by the board of director‘s members; (iii) CEO duality; 
(iv) percentage of shares held by outside directors; and (v) board size. Three measures of 
earnings conservatism, namely, (i) accruals-based measure, (ii) market-based measure, and 
(iii) asymmetric timeliness of earnings, were used with a sample comprised of 306 US firms 
for the period of 1999 to 2001. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) found that the percentage of 
inside directors was negatively related to conservatism and the percentage of outside 
directors‘ shareholdings was positively related to conservatism. Overall, the findings were 
consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism assists the board of directors in 
reducing the agency costs of firms. 
Aside from the board of directors, other researchers have begun to examine the 
influence of other corporate governance mechanisms such as board sub-committees and the 
quality of the external auditor. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007), for example, examined the 
association of accounting conservatism and an audit committee‘s financial expertise. Four 
measurements of accounting conservatism were used; (i) an accruals-based measure; (ii) a 
measure derived from book-to-market ratio; (iii) a conservatism score; and (iv) asymmetric 
loss. With a sample comprised of 929 firm-year observations spanning 2000 through 2002, 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) indicated that an audit committee‘s financial expertise (i.e. 
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accounting financial experts, non-accounting financial experts and non-financial experts) 
was positively associated with conservatism when financial expertise was defined to include 
only accounting experts. Their (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007) findings are consistent with 
the assumption that accounting expertise enhances reported conservatism (i.e. greater 
monitoring by members of the audit committee). 
Ruddock et al. (2006), meanwhile, sought to investigate a link between unusually 
high levels of non-audit services and any association with reduced earning conservatism. 
They (Ruddock et al. 2006) argued that supplying of non-audit services compromises auditor 
independence and results in the auditor accepting less conservative accounting, leading to 
poorer earnings quality. Using the models of Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
and a sample comprised of 3,746 firm-year observations for the period of 1993–2000, their 
(Ruddock et al. 2006) results, however, suggested that higher than expected non-audit 
services are not associated with reduced earnings conservatism. Ruddock et al. (2006) 
concluded that the results were consistent with factors such as market-based incentives, the 
threat of litigation and alternative governance mechanisms offsetting any expected benefits 
to the audit firm from reduced independence. 
Finally, Lara, Osma and Penalva (2009a) asserted that corporate governance 
structures of firms play an important role in the reporting of earnings conservatism. Three 
measures were used to capture conditional conservatism (i.e. (i) Basu model (1997); (ii) Ball 
and Shivakumar model (2005); and (iii) Givoly and Hayn model (2000)) with a sample 
containing 9,152 firm-year observations of US firms for the period 1992 through 2003. 
Results indicated that firms with stronger corporate governance provisions in place are more 
conservative (i.e. use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier 
fashion).14 Evidence is consistent with stronger (weaker) corporate governance structures 
demanding more (less) conservative accounting information. For a summary of major studies 
linking governance structures to earnings conservatism see Table 2.2. 
 
                                                     
14 Lara et al. (2009a) classify firms into strong and weak governance structures by developing a composite 
measure of total governance that incorporated attributes of external and internal governance. Specifically, three 
measures proxy for internal governance: (1) CEO involvement; (2) board composition; and (3) board 
effectiveness. For external governance, the level of external monitoring using the takeover index developed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is used as proxy. 
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Table 2.2: Major prior studies—governance structures and earnings conservatism 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Governance structures  
Board of 
directors 
Audit committee 
Auditor 
characteristics 
Other 
Findings 
Ahmed and 
Duellman 
(2007) 
US. 
306 firms 
1999 to 2001 % of inside 
directors, average 
number of 
additional 
directorships by 
board members, 
CEO duality, %of 
shares held by 
outside directors 
and board size 
- - - There is a negative relationship between the 
percentage of the inside directors on the board and 
conservatism. However, there is a positive 
relationship between the percentage of a firm‘s 
shares owned by the outside directors and 
conservatism. 
Amir, Guan 
and Linvne 
(2009) 
US. 
21,682 firm-
year 
observations 
2000 to 2007 - - Auditor 
independence 
- There is a positive association between measures of 
auditor independence and earnings conservatism 
(i.e. timely recognition of losses). This association 
is stronger for Big 4 auditors, clients with high 
litigation risk and highly leveraged firms.  
Beekes, Pope 
and Young 
(2004) 
UK. 
508 firm-year 
observations 
1950 to 1998 
(i.e. a 49-year 
period) 
Proportion of 
outside board 
members 
- - - The results indicate that firms with a higher 
proportion of outside members are more likely to 
recognize bad news in earnings on a timely basis. 
Hamilton, 
Ruddock, 
Stokes and 
Taylor (2005) 
Australia 
3,621 firm-
year 
observations 
1998 to 2003 - - External audit 
partner rotation 
- There is a positive association between conditional 
conservatism (i.e. asymmetrically timely 
recognition of economic losses) and after the audit 
rotation (note: a change in audit partner is not a 
change in auditors). 
Kamarudin, 
Dunstan and 
van Zijl 
(2010) 
Malaysia 
2,235 firm-
year 
observations 
2005 to 2008 - - i) Provision of 
non-audit services 
 
ii) Auditor 
industry 
specialization 
Government-
Linked-
Companies (GLC) 
ownership 
Results show that firms with higher non-audit 
services are associated with higher earnings 
conservatism. Specifically, NAS is negatively 
associated with earnings conservatism for GLC. 
Meanwhile, for non-GLC, NAS is positively 
associated with higher earnings conservatism, 
regardless of whether the firms are audited by an 
industry specialist or non-industry specialist. 
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Table 2.2: Major prior studies - governance structures and earnings conservatism (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Governance structures  
Board of 
directors 
Audit committee 
Auditor 
characteristics 
Other 
Findings 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 
(2007) 
US. 
929 firm-year 
observations 
2000 to 2002 - Financial 
expertise: (i) 
accounting 
financial experts; 
(ii) non-
accounting 
financial experts; 
(iii)non-financial 
experts 
- - Audit committee‘s financial expertise is positively 
associated with accounting conservatism (i.e. when 
financial expertise is defined to include only 
accounting experts). 
Lafond and 
Roychow-
dhury (2008) 
US. 
14,786 firm-
year 
observations 
1994 to 2004 - - - Managerial 
ownership 
Findings shows that information asymmetry is 
positvely related to accounting conservatism (the 
larger the information asymmetry between inside 
and outside investors, the more conservative are the 
firms‘ financial statement). In addition, information 
asymmetry changes lead to conservatism changes 
(conservative financial reporting is a governance 
mechanism that reduces the manager‘s ability to 
manipulate and overstate finiancial performance. 
Lara, Osma 
and Penalva 
(2009a) 
US. 
9,152 firm-
year 
observations 
1992 to 2003 Independence of 
board members 
and number of 
meetings 
- - Takeover index 
(proxy for 
external 
monitoring) and 
CEO involvement 
Results indicated that firms with strong (weak) 
governance are more (less) conservative than firms 
with weak (strong) governance (there is a positive 
association between governance and conservatism). 
Ruddock, 
Taylor and 
Taylor (2006) 
Australia 
3,746 firm-
year 
observations 
1993 to 2000 - - Provision of NAS 
by incumbent 
auditors 
- Higher than expected NAS is not associated with 
less conservative accounting. Moreover, Big 6 
auditors encourage more conservative financial 
reporting than Non-Big 6 auditors due to reputation 
concerns. 
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2.5.5 Summary of determinants of earnings conservatism 
As described in this section, various factors are proposed as being potential 
determinants of earnings conservatism. These factors can be broadly categorized in four 
main groupings: (1) firm characteristics; (2) institutional factors; (3) market factors; and (4) 
corporate governance features. With the immense focus and debate surrounding corporate 
governance, empirical analysis of corporate governance factors potentially linked to key 
financial accounting issues (such as earnings conservatism) are worthy endeavors. Though a 
range of corporate governance mechanisms and controls may have a bearing on earnings 
conservatism, it is the perception of this study that the external auditor and audit committee 
are likely to have the greater direct bearing on adoption of conservative accounting practices. 
This perception is adopted because corporate governance reforms, regulations and best 
practice recommendations adopted in numerous nations around the world during the past 
several decades have increasingly stressed the external auditor and audit committee are the 
two primary mechanisms responsible for the oversight of a firm‘s financial reporting system. 
Given the joint importance assigned to the external auditor and audit committee these two 
mechanisms are described in this thesis as constituting the direct custodians of the financial 
accounting system. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter was to provide the background of earnings conservatism. 
Different types of conservatism were discussed and the definition of earnings conservatism 
by Basu (1997) was adopted in this study. Subsequently, a review of the major empirical 
research of earnings conservatism conducted in leading nations such as the US, Europe and 
other nations were presented. The later discussion explained the origins of earnings 
conservatism. This was followed by the various factors such as (1) firm characteristics; (2) 
institutional factors; (3) market factors; and (4) corporate governance features. The next 
chapter will present the theoretical perspective of the study. The first part of the chapter will 
discuss the possible influence of corporate governance mechanisms in earnings 
conservatism. A few potential theories underlying the theoretical framework of this study are 
then outlined. Next, this chapter will focus on the corporate governance environment in 
Malaysia including the equity market regulatory environment, financial accounting system 
and auditing environment. This chapter will also discuss the development of the hypotheses 
tested in this study on how corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness) affecting earnings conservatism, with key literature provided. To 
better illustrate the key relationship examined in the study, a conceptual schema with a 
diagrammatical overview is then developed. 
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a comprehensive review of the literature on earnings 
conservatism. Different types of earnings conservatism were discussed and a review of the 
major empirical research of earnings conservatism conducted in leading nations such as the 
US, Europe and other nations were presented. This was followed by the four explanations of 
conservatism, namely, (a) contracting, (b) litigation, (c) taxation, and (d) accounting and 
institutional regulations. Finally, the determinants of earnings conservatism with particular 
emphasis given to corporate governance features were discussed. 
In this chapter the development of theory and hypotheses related to the study is 
detailed. The first part of the chapter discusses the possible influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms in earnings conservatism, and outlines multiple theories related to 
corporate governance (i.e. institutional theory, stakeholder theory, resources dependence 
theory and agency theory). Discussion then focuses on the corporate governance 
environment in Malaysia including: (i) equity market regulatory environment; (ii) financial 
accounting system; and (iii) auditing environment. This is followed by a discussion defining 
prime concepts of corporate governance mechanisms used in this study (i.e. direct custodian 
excellence, auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness). Discussion on how these 
variables affect earnings conservatism provides the foundation for the development of the 
hypotheses underpinning this study. A diagrammatical representation of the conceptual 
schema that represents the testable hypotheses for this study is the presented. 
 
3.2 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance has been defined in a number of ways by regulators, corporate 
governance advocates and scholars (Singam 2003; du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric 2005; 
Gay and Simnett 2007; Zainal-Abidin and Ahmad 2007). In general terms, corporate 
governance can be defined as a set of rules, processes, customs, policies and incentives by 
which a firm is directed and controlled (du Plessis et al. 2005). Textbooks commonly define 
corporate governance as ―the system by which firms are directed and managed and covers 
the conduct of the board of directors and relationship between the board, management and 
shareholders‖ (Gay and Simnett 2007 p.89). Specifically, corporate governance in Malaysia 
is defined as ―the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of 
the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders‖ (Singam 2003 p.315). 
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The above definition concluded that corporate governance mainly focuses on the 
principal stakeholders in any firm such as shareholders, corporate management and the board 
of directors. Thus, the main objective of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability 
of these different stakeholders via mechanisms that attempt to eliminate the traditional 
agency conflict/cost/problem (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2002; Klein and 
Marquardt 2006; Lara et al. 2007; Chen, Lu and Sougiannis 2011). The need for corporate 
governance has received escalating interest from academic researchers and practice because 
of the high number of alleged accounting scandals such as financial reporting frauds, 
earnings restatements and earnings manipulation by corporate management (Palmrose and 
Scholz 2002; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005). 
A vast body of literature acknowledges the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms to improve financial reporting quality. Researchers have found evidence that 
show strong corporate governance is associated with higher quality financial reporting (e.g. 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley 2002; Klein 2002a; Abbott et al. 2003a; Carcello and 
Neal 2003; Xie, Davidson III and DaDalt 2003; Vafeas 2005). Conversely, past literature has 
also demonstrated that weak corporate governance structures lead to poor financial reporting 
quality including earnings manipulation, financial statement fraud and weaker internal 
control (e.g. Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Cohen 
et al. 2002; Palmrose and Scholz 2002; Abbott et al. 2004; Krishnan 2005a).  
Specifically, prior research has focused remarkably on three crucial instruments of 
corporate governance: (1) boards of directors; (2) the external auditor; and (3) audit 
committees. In such research it is argued that the these crucial instruments of corporate 
governance have important influences on earnings quality (including conservatism) either 
individually, collectively or by some combination (Carcello et al. 2002; Klein 2002a; Abbott 
et al. 2003a; Carcello and Neal 2003; Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005). 
 
3.3 Theoretical perspectives of corporate governance 
Multiple theories concerning corporate governance have been explored to explain 
various corporate governance phenomena. Nonetheless, four major theories of corporate 
governance have emerged. These are stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995), 
institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 1972) 
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Each of 
these theories is briefly discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
3.3.1 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory considers the firm from a broad perspective, whereby 
shareholders are only one of many potential stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Clarkson 1994; 
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Blair 1995; Donaldson and Preston 1995). Other stakeholders include creditors, employees, 
suppliers, government authorities and society as a whole. Stakeholder theorists (Freeman 
1984; Clarkson 1994; Blair 1995; Donaldson and Preston 1995) argue stakeholders are 
affected by and also affect the firm. The premise is that since society provides the social 
structure and framework in which firms can prosper, to ignore society is to threaten the 
equilibrium that it (society) provides (Clarkson 1994; Blair 1995; Psaros 2009). 
Stakeholder theory has been viewed by a number of theorists as a more valid and 
morally acceptable framework in which to assess corporate governance issues (Freeman 
1984; Clarkson 1994; Blair 1995; Donaldson and Preston 1995). Freeman (1984 p.2), one of 
the earliest stakeholder theorists, argued a stakeholder means ―any group or individual who 
can affect or be affected by the achievements of firms‘ objectives‖. He (Freeman 1984) 
further conceptualized the stakeholder model as a map in which the firm is the hub of a 
wheel and stakeholders are the ends of the spokes around the wheel. Freeman (1984) 
suggests that a firm intending to achieve goals can only do so with a full and detailed 
understanding of the relationships it holds with different stakeholders‘ groups. 
Relative to Freeman (1984), Clarkson (1994) provided a more vibrant explanation of 
stakeholder theory, and focused on the fact that stakeholder theory is important because it 
can help firms to achieve goals. According to Clarkson (1994 p.322), ―the firm is a system of 
stakeholders operating within the large system of the host society that provides the necessary 
legal and market infrastructure for the firm‘s activities. The purpose of the firm is to create 
wealth and value for stakeholders by converting stakes into goods and services‖. Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) present a more detailed explanation of stakeholder theory and view the 
firm as an entity through which numerous and diverse participants accomplish multiple 
purposes. The central core of the stakeholder theory asserts that managers and other agents 
act as if all stakeholders‘ interests have intrinsic value, though not necessarily equal value 
(Psaros 2009). 
Of the competing views of stakeholder theory, the conceptualization by Freeman 
(1984) became the overwhelming focus upon which this theory has developed. Nonetheless, 
two different categories of stakeholder theory have emerged. These are the ethical branch 
and managerial branch. The ethical branch generally focuses on issues associated with rights 
to information, and what rights should be met regardless of the power of the stakeholders 
involved. For the ethical branch, disclosures are considered to be responsibility driven 
(Cupido 2008). Meanwhile, the managerial branch explicitly refers to issues of stakeholders‘ 
power, and how a stakeholder‘s relative power affects the ability to coerce the firm into 
complying with the stakeholder‘s expectations (Deegan 2007). The managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory predicts that firms will tend to satisfy the information demands of those 
stakeholders who are important to the firm‘s ongoing survival. Whether a particular 
39 
stakeholder receives information will be dependent upon how powerful they are perceived to 
be, with power often considered in terms of the scarcity of the resources controlled by the 
respective stakeholders (Cupido 2008). 
 
3.3.2 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory explores how (at a broader level) particular formal structures 
might be adopted in order to bring legitimacy to a firm (Deegan 2007). According to 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001), institutional theory provides another lens through which to view 
economic dependency incentives‘ impact on accounting rule choice. In an attempt to apply 
institutional theory to a corporate governance context, Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest 
organizational structures play a vital role as symbolic displays of conformity and social 
accountability. Theorists argue institutional theory indicates that numerous aspects of formal 
organizational structure, policies and procedures result from prevailing societal attitudes of 
what comprises acceptable practice and the views of important constituents (Scott 1987; 
Bealing, Dirsmith and Fogarty 1996). Firms obey rules and regulations, not just on 
efficiency grounds, but also to enhance legitimacy, resources and survival capacities 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Institutional pressures operate in conjunction with other forces 
such as completion to effect ecological influences (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Institutional theory advocates argue the real functioning of the firm is accomplished 
by internal operating processes. Consequently, firms with appropriate structures in place 
avoid detailed investigations of key internal operating activities by external parties (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977 p.346) classify firms as ―dramatic enactments of 
the rationalized myths pervading modern societies‖. Firms are subject to rules and 
regulations to which firms must conform in order to ensure legitimacy, access to resources 
and survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Together, rules, accreditation processes and 
public opinion make it essential (or at least beneficial) for firms to adopt new structures to 
conform. By developing a formal configuration (which includes key corporate governance 
mechanisms) that adheres to prescriptions of the institutional environment, a firm displays 
that it is operating on communally valued principles (O`Connell 2006). Conversely, firms 
that exclude environmentally justifiable components of structure lack acceptable legitimate 
records of operations. Such firms are, therefore, susceptible to allegations that the firms are 
neglectful, irrational, or redundant and risk forfeiting stakeholder patronage (O`Connell 
2006). As a result, the pressures to achieve legitimacy help initiate isomorphism; a process 
that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Deegan 2009). 
Institutional theorists have identified two major isomorphism forms: (1) competitive; 
and (2) institutional. Competitive isomorphism assumes a system of competitive markets and 
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robustness measures and is often used to explain how firms develop bureaucracies and 
respond to new innovations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Three mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphic change were identified: (1) coercive; (2) mimetic; and (3) normative. Coercive 
isomorphism emanates from stresses applied on firms by other firms and by cultural 
expectations in society as a whole. Mimetic isomorphism reflects a standard response to 
ambiguity. Firms will follow other firms when faced with an uncertain outside environment. 
Normative isomorphism pressures stem from professionalization. While diverse type of 
professionals within a firm may vary from one another, they (professionals) display many 
identical characteristics to the equivalents in other firms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Deegan 2009; Psaros 2009). Institutional isomorphism promotes the success and survival of 
firms (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Isomorphic firms functioning in a mode comparable to 
competitors may lessen the risk of performing poorly when compared to other firms (Kondra 
and Hinings 1998). 
In a corporate governance context, institutional theory applies to a wide variety of 
situations including the choice of accounting methods. Fogarty (1992), for example, studied 
the FASB‘s standard-setting process and found that institutionalization, through the basis of 
separated procedures and the formal characteristics of assessment, enables the board of 
directors to achieve tolerable decisional freedom. Fogarty (1992 p.331) further noted that the 
visibility of a firm‘s processes and the consequences of outcomes contributed to the ―critical 
dependence on legitimacy‖. Fogarty (1992) analyzed the peer review process of accounting 
firms as a mechanism utilized by the US accounting firms seeking to legitimize a largely 
self-regulatory industry. Finally, Bealing et al. (1996) studied the historical development of 
the SEC, specifically the form, content and rhetoric of early regulatory actions, as a case 
example of a firm attempting to justify its existence and role in the financial reporting 
process. 
 
3.3.3 Resource dependence theory 
Although resource dependence theory was originally formulated to discuss 
relationships between firms, the theory is applicable to relationships among units within 
firms. In the context of corporate governance, resource dependence theory can be applied to 
suggest effective corporate governance structures within firms can lead to the generation of 
resources. Particularly, a board of directors contributes to a firm through expertise and 
linkages to other firms and institutions and directors can also contribute to the positive 
valuation of a firm through reputation. Boards can be a key source of various resources 
(McGregor 1960; Pfeffer 1972; Hillman and Dalziel 2003) based on human capital and 
social capital (Certo 2003). The former includes the director‘s advice and expertise and the 
latter covers resources such as legitimacy (Westphal and Zajac 1994) and links to other 
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firms. Cumulatively, the resources are all described as board capital (Hillman and Dalziel 
2003). The relationship between board capital and firm performance is well documented by a 
number of studies (Pfeffer 1972; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 1998). 
Resource dependence theory is based on the premise that various elements of 
corporate governance can act as critical resources for the firm (Psaros 2009).Advocates of 
this theory argue that a firm‘s level of success is contingent on the ability to control external 
resources. Firms must cope with great uncertainty in order to survive. This uncertainty 
undermines the firm‘s control of resources and strategic choices leading to inefficiencies in 
the operations of the firm. The board of directors is viewed as providing the crucial link to 
external resources for a firm when seeking to achieve the firm‘s stated goals and objectives. 
In a resource dependency role, directors serve to connect the firm with external factors which 
reduce environmental uncertainties and external dependencies (Pfeffer 1972; Hillman, 
Cannella and Paetzold 2000). 
It is further posited by advocates of resource dependence theory that directors also 
add value to the firm in a number of other ways. Hillman et al. (2000), for example, suggest 
directors bring other resources to the firm including unique skills, specialist information and 
access to key constituents (e.g. suppliers, environmental groups, educators and government 
policy makers). The extent to which directors add value to a firm depends on the skills and 
resource base of those directors. The members of a board may also bring an enhanced 
reputation to the firm by virtue of personal reputation.  
 
3.3.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory deals with one-to-one relationships; for instance, a relationship 
between the agent (management of the firm) and the principal (shareholders of the firm). 
Most studies in earnings quality (conservatism) use agency theory as the underlying basis of 
research propositions (e.g. Beekes et al. 2004; Ruddock et al. 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 
2007; Lara et al. 2007). 
Agency theory evolved from the concept of separation of ownership from 
management in modern firms as initiated by Berle and Means (1932). In discussing the 
separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means (1932) highlighted the potential 
conflict between shareholders and management when ownership is widely distributed among 
shareholders. Although Berle and Means (1932) initiated the concept of agency theory, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were probably the first researchers to place the theory in a 
precise theoretical framework.15 Further developments of this theoretical perspective were 
provided by Fama and Jensen (1983). Both Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
                                                     
15 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a detailed discussion of the conflicts arising from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
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Jensen (1983) posit an agency relationship arises when one party, a principal, delegates some 
decision-making authority to another party, the agent (Gaffikin 2008). The principal and the 
agent enter into a contract recognizing the relationship. It is argued by agency theorists that 
both parties will act in their own self-interest that does not necessarily coincide. 
The most frequently cited example of an agency relationship is between shareholders 
and corporate management.16 For shareholders the objective will be interested in maximize 
wealth by ensuring the firm increases in value. Meanwhile, corporate management will want 
to maximizing personal rewards and benefits from managing the firm (e.g. material-financial 
and perquisites, reputation of the manager). Agency costs are incurred by the principal due to 
a need to monitor the behaviour of the agent who—having been delegated responsibility for 
managing the assets of the firm (and, thereby, the principal)—may act out of self-interest 
rather than for the principal (Deegan 2009). A number of monitoring costs will directly 
involve accounting such as the need for engagement of an external auditor (Gaffikin 2008). 
Aside from the cost of monitoring the conflicts associated with the agent/principal 
relationship, other costs may be incurred. These include bonding costs (Gaffikin 2007), 
residual loss costs and political costs. In principle, the various costs stemming from conflicts 
within the agency/principal relationship arise from opportunistic behavior of corporate 
management. Within an agency theory setting, therefore, corporate governance structures in 
firms is viewed as important mechanisms to overcome agency problems and prevent 
opportunistic behavior. Burton (2000) believes that agency costs are best controlled by 
limiting management discretion through the establishment of structures to monitor and 
control management behavior. Such structures include an independent board of directors, an 
independent chairperson and independent board sub-committees such as the audit committee 
(Ellstrand, Daily, Johnson and Dalton 1999). 
 
3.3.5 Comparison of corporate governance theories 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), competing theories have different 
purposes and, therefore, different validity criteria and implications. As highlighted in the 
previous subsections there are a range of competing theories to explain corporate governance 
phenomena. Each theoretical perspective offers respective benefits and insights. For the 
purposes of this study, however, agency theory forms the underlying theoretical perspective. 
 Agency theory is used because this study concentrates on examining how specific 
key monitoring mechanisms (i.e. direct custodians such as the external auditor and audit 
committee) influence a financial accounting issue associated with corporate management‘s 
                                                     
16Whilst conflicts between shareholders and corporate management are recognized as underpinning the most 
easily identified agency relationship, conflicts also arise between (a) bondholders and corporate management; (b) 
bondholders and shareholders; and (c) majority shareholder and minority shareholders. These relationships have 
also been identified as examples of agency relationships. 
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opportunistic behavior. Since agency theory focuses squarely on addressing such 
relationships it (agency theory) provides a common theoretical perspective. In addition, in 
aiming to generalize results to the broader Malaysian and international capital markets, 
agency theory provides a moreuniversally applicable theoretical framework. Finally, the 
application of agency theory to corporate governance issues and earnings conservatism fits 
within the Malaysian context. Due to prior historical relationships and current business ties, 
Malaysia‘s underlying business environment model has increasingly followed the Anglo-
American approach. Furthermore, pressures of economic and capital market growth in 
Malaysia have prompted a gradual shift toward greater reliance on corporate management 
and wider dispersion of ownership structures particularly amongst listed firms. Prior research 
(e.g. Ball et al. 2003) also indicates Malaysia is plagued by a weak financial structure, over-
leveraging by firms and poor transparency. Overall, Malaysia is increasingly providing 
fertile ground for agency relationship conflicts. Thus, this context supports the application of 
agency theory as the underlying theoretical perspective in this study. 
 
3.4 Corporate governance environment in Malaysia 
Prior to developing the underlying hypotheses of this thesis it is important to outline 
the corporate governance environment. Such an outline provides key background 
information for understanding the possible influence of corporate governance mechanisms 
on earnings conservatism in Malaysia. In addition, such a review assists to substantiate the 
application of agency theory as the theoretical framework underpinning the study.  
 
3.4.1 Equity market regulatory environment in Malaysia 
The equity market history in Malaysia dates back to the 1930s with formation of the 
Malayan Stock Brokers Association. This was followed in 1960 with the formal 
establishment of the Malayan Stock Exchange. Firms from the plantation and mining 
industries provided the core business listed on the Malayan Stock Exchange in the initial 
years. These firms were traditional controlled by British interests having been initially listed 
on the London Stock Exchange before switching to the Malayan Stock Exchange. In 1973 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was established. The KLSE was subsequently 
renamed the Bursa Malaysia in April 2004. 
The Bursa Malaysia is a key player in monitoring the corporate governance in 
Malaysia. A self-regulatory firm with its own Memorandum and Articles of Association, 
Bursa Malaysia is responsible for governing the conduct of members in securities dealing 
and surveillance of the market place. Bursa Malaysia is also responsible for development, 
revision and enforcement of key Listing Requirements that dictate key corporate governance 
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activities such as listing, disclosure requirements and standards to be maintained by a public 
listed firm(Devi, Hooper and Davey 2004). 
Despite a lengthy history of an established formal trading market to oversee equity 
transactions, many concerns were raised about the level of corporate governance in Malaysia 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. To tackle corporate governance issues and 
concerns arising from the Asian financial crisis, the High Level Finance Committee (HLFC) 
established the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) in 1998. The MICG is 
a non-profit public firm limited by guarantee with founding members consisting of the 
Federation of Public Listed Firms (FPLC), Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), 
Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), Malaysian Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA) and Malaysian Institute of Directors 
(MID) (Devi et al. 2004; Zainal-Abidin and Ahmad 2007). Apart from being given the 
express aim of restoring investor confidence in the Malaysian equity market, the MICG was 
formed to educate and create awareness among the corporate sector, investors and public on 
corporate governance best practices (Devi et al. 2004). Among other objectives, the MICG 
had to facilitate business and corporate governance development in the nation, promote 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance best practices and strengthen corporate 
governance principles and compliance effort. A pivotal action of the MICG upon its 
conception was the development of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (hereafter 
referred to as The Code) in March 2000. The Code introduced (or significantly revised) 
regulations governing pivotal corporate governance mechanisms including those related to 
the role and responsibilities of the external auditor and audit committee. Recently the MICG 
has revised The Code (released October 1, 2007) and provided further amendments aimed at 
strengthening the Malaysian corporate governance framework to meet expectations in the 
domestic and international capital markets. Revisions to The Code focused primarily on 
enhancing the role and responsibilities of the board, internal audit processes, external auditor 
quality and audit committee composition (Yatim, Kent and Clarkson 2006). 
Aside from Bursa Malaysia and the MICG, there are several other major regulators 
and regulations pertinent to the equity market. The CCM, for example, is responsible for 
monitoring corporate governance practices and standards in Malaysia. The main function of 
the CCM is to ensure that the provisions of key legislation are administered, enforced, 
carried out and complied with. The main legislation in question is the Firms Acts 1965, Trust 
Firms Act 1949, Kootu Funds (prohibition) Act 1971, and the Registration of Business Act 
1956. Among others, the functions of the CCM include the enhancement and promotion of 
the supply of business and corporate information, acting as an agent of the government, 
provision of services in collection and enforcement of prescribed fees, and supervision of 
regulatory matters relating to corporations, firms and business. The CCM also encourages 
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and promotes proper conduct amongst directors, secretaries and other officers of a 
corporation (Devi et al. 2004). 
Another major regulator responsible for monitoring corporate governance in 
Malaysia is the SC. The SC was established in accordance with the Securities Commission 
Act of 1993. A major function of the SC is to promote a strong and healthy securities market, 
and to maintain the confidence of investors in line with the provisions of the Securities 
Commission Act and Securities Industries Act of 1983. Prior to 1993, there was no single 
authority in Malaysia entrusted with the responsibility of regulating and systematically 
developing the nation‘s capital market. Prior to 1993, supervisory powers for regulating the 
capital market with Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the KLSE) and government 
institutions. The SC is a self-funded statutory body with investigative and enforcement 
power, and reports to the Minister of Finance. In its capacity as the regulator of the capital 
market, the SC played a significant role in the establishment of the Financial Reporting Act 
of 1997, and continues to be involved in the decision making processes of the MASB, the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (Devi et al. 2004). 
 
3.4.2 Financial accounting system in Malaysia 
Under British rule, for more than80 years prior to 1957, it is without surprise the 
origins of accounting standards and reporting practices in Malaysia have a strong foundation 
and similarity with UK practices (Ball et al. 2003). The Firms Act of 1965 further reinforced 
the influence of the British model on Malaysian financial accounting practices requiring 
disclosures which followed UK approaches, and published financial statements to reflect a 
true and fair view. Since the conceptualization of the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) in the 1970s, however, IASs have become the major force shaping accounting 
standards in Malaysia. 
The MASB is the primary authority responsible for issuing accounting standards 
concepts and principles. The MASB—together with the Financial Reporting Foundation 
(FRF)—provide the backbone of the financial accounting standard-setting framework in 
Malaysia. This framework is an independent standard-setting structure that seeks to represent 
all relevant parties in the standard-setting process, including preparers, users, regulators and 
the accountancy profession. The MASB was established under the Financial Reporting Act 
1997 (the Act). The main functions of the MASB are to(MASB 2011): 
 
 issue new accounting standards as approved accounting standards  
 review, revise or adopt approved accounting standards 
 issue statements of principles for financial reporting 
 sponsor or undertake development of possible accounting standards 
 conduct such public consultation as maybe necessary in order to determine 
the contents of accounting concepts, principles and standards 
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 develop a conceptual framework for the purpose of evaluating proposed 
accounting standards, and 
 make such changes to the form and content of proposed accounting 
standards as it considers necessary. 
 
The Financial Reporting Act of 1997, however, does not grant the MASB an 
enforcement role (Devi et al. 2004). The enforcement of approved accounting standards is 
seen to reside with the SC, Central Bank of Malaysia and the CCM. The Firms Act 1965 
states that financial statements shall be deemed not to have complied with the requirement of 
any law administered by these bodies unless they have been prepared and kept in accordance 
with MASB Approved Accounting Standards. 
 
3.4.3 Auditing environment 
As in many Common Law nations there is a legal requirement in Malaysia for public 
accounting firms to perform audits of the financial statements of publicly listed firms (see 
the Firms Act of 1965). As at end of 2004 there were more than 1000 public accounting 
firms in Malaysia (Devi et al. 2004). Three sizes of categories can be used to describe public 
accounting firms in Malaysia: (1) Big 4 international accounting firms; (2) medium sized 
firms with three to 10 partners; and (3) small firms with one to two partners or sole 
proprietors. The Big 4 international accounting firms during the time of this study were 
KPMG Peat Marwick, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte Touché Tohmasu and Ernst and 
Young (Ahamad-Rapani 2006; Muhamad-Sori and Karbhari 2006; Yatim et al. 2006; Carlin, 
Finch and Laili 2009).17 In Malaysia, the Big 4 firms audit in excess of 60% of firms listed 
on the Bursa Malaysia (Devi et al. 2004; Ahamad-Rapani 2006). 
The Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) and the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) are the two bodies responsible for issuing 
approved auditing standards in Malaysia. The MICPA (formerly known as MACPA, the 
Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants) had its origin in 1958 with the 
objective of advancing the status and development of the accounting and auditing profession 
in Malaysia. This body (MICPA) also is responsible for providing the opportunity for 
individuals aspiring to qualify as an accountant and/or auditor to be trained under local law 
and practice (The Malaysian Accountant 1988). The approved auditing standards and 
guidelines are to be applied in audits of financial statements, and to review engagements and 
related services that are performed by members of MICPA and MIA.  
In contrast to the MICPA, the MIA was established under the Malaysian 
Accountants Act of 1967. The MIA, therefore, is a statutory body that regulates auditing 
                                                     
17 Arthur Anderson, which had merged with a local firm Hanafiah Raslan and Mohamed, subsequently merged 
with Ernst and Young in 2002. 
47 
practices, and maintains a register of accountants coming under one of three categories of 
membership: public, registered and licensed accountants. Moreover, the MIA also looks after 
professional standards, education and training, supervision of the professional conduct of 
members, provision of professional work to the community, and the trust and respect of 
society. Overall, both the MICPA and MIA play a large role in setting auditing standards in 
Malaysia via a joint working group. 
 
3.5 Literature review: Direct custodian excellence and major components 
The financial accounting system and the quality of earnings may be subjected to 
influences from various corporate governance mechanisms and custodians. It is 
acknowledged in this thesis that the term direct custodian excellence has not been previously 
utilized in the extant literature. The term custodian (or custodians) is used to define corporate 
governance mechanisms comprising human-agents (i.e. individuals or small groups of 
people) driven by a structured human-agent decision-making process with formal authority 
for monitoring and oversight.18The notion of direct custodian, meanwhile, is utilized to draw 
a distinction between those custodians with immediate and explicit roles and responsibilities 
directed at monitoring and overseeing the financial reporting system of a firm from 
custodians with a less immediate or peripheral function. For instance, whilst a board of 
directors is recognized as having overall responsibility for the financial reporting system, this 
corporate governance mechanism has a far broader range of roles and responsibilities (e.g. 
establishing strategic alliances, defining mission objectives). Furthermore, corporate 
governance reforms introduced worldwide during past the decade have increasingly 
prompted boards of directors to delegate the oversight, monitoring and internal control 
responsibilities of the firm‘s financial reporting system squarely on the shoulders of the audit 
committee. In respect to the external auditor, the direct responsibilities attested to this 
corporate governance mechanism is firmly entrenched in the legislative statutes, institutional 
requirements (e.g. listing regulators) and market guidelines. 
Given the phrase direct custodian is developed for this thesis, it is not possible to 
draw directly on prior research to establish any formal inference on what affect the 
excellence of a direct custodian in executing their required responsibilities may have on 
earnings conservatism. Nonetheless, as argued in this thesis, the two most prominent and 
immediate direct custodians of the financial reporting system are the auditor and audit 
committee. Prior literature suggests the auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness are 
the key determining factors in assessing how the external auditor and audit committee may 
                                                     
18Non-custodian corporate governance mechanism may or may not involve human-agents. However, in contrast 
to custodian corporate governance mechanisms, those of a non-custodian nature (e.g. ownership structure) do not 
involve specific human-agent decisions and lack formal authority to monitor a firm‘s corporate governance and 
financial reporting system. 
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impact financial accounting issues. As the external auditor and audit committee constitute 
the most prominent direct custodians of the financial reporting system, it then follows that 
direct custodian excellence will be a function of audit quality and audit committee 
effectiveness. Given the wealth of extant literature discussing audit quality and audit 
committee effectiveness, the subsequent subsections provides a review of relevant research 
of these two concepts to aid in developing testable hypotheses for this thesis. 
 
3.5.1 Auditor quality 
Since Berle and Means (1932) raised concerns about agency costs and information 
asymmetry problems due to the separation of control and ownership, various researchers 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1980; Chow 1982) working within 
an agency theory framework have sought to highlight essential monitoring mechanisms that 
are key to ensure greater alignment of the interests of corporate management (the agent) and 
shareholders (the owner). The external auditor is widely recognized as one of the chief 
corporate governance mechanisms for ensuring great principal/agent alignment of interests 
by providing external verification of the reliability of the firm‘s financial statements 
(Leftwich 1980; Ferguson, Francis and Stokes 2003).Whilst it is in explicit interests of 
shareholders to engage an external auditor, is argued by agency theorists that it is in the 
interests of corporate management. Firth (1997 p.7), for example, argues corporate 
management‘s abilities will be hampered without the engagement of an external auditor 
because the lack of a credible external ―audit will likely increase the cost of capital, restrict 
access to capital, and impose severe restrictions on management‘s actions‖. External auditors 
also play an essential role in influencing disclosure policies and practices both at the firm 
level and regulator level (Owusu-Ansah 1998; Apostolou and Nanopoulos 2009). 
The external auditor‘s value and role has become firmly ingrained in key legislative 
statutes of the majority of nations worldwide. For example, in the US the need for an 
external audit is mandated in the US Securities Act. Whilst the important role of the external 
auditor is widely embedded in formal legislative statutes, Imhoff (2003 p.122), amongst 
others argues that during the past several decades ―what investors and creditors do observe 
all too often lately are instances where it appears the auditor and/or the audit committees 
were not effective. These are the cases of fraud, material errors or misstatements, material 
omissions (non-compliance with mandatory disclosure)‖. These views, such as that of 
Imhoff (2003), highlight a growing recognition that the quality of the external auditor is a 
pivotal property in determining the overall value of the audit function. 
Auditor quality has been one of the most important issues affecting the auditing 
profession (Vanstraelen 2000). Further, it is also a service and attribute highly valued by 
equity market participants (Moreland 1995; Franz, Crawford and Johnson 1998). It is 
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perceived that high auditor quality reduces the uncertainty associated with financial 
statements in the eyes of other contracting parties not involved in the preparation of such 
statements (Wallace 2004). In addition, contractual costs will also fall as auditing quality 
increases (Vanstraelen 2000). 
Though a range of definitions of audit quality have been proposed, that of DeAngelo 
(1981a, 1981b) has become widely recognized and is generally accepted as the seminal 
characterization encapsulating auditor quality. DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b) suggested auditor 
quality is the probability an auditor both discovers and reports any material misstatements 
and accounting system breaches that affect the contract between corporate management and 
investors. Based on the definition of DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b), auditor quality is perceived 
as a function of the auditor‘s competence (i.e. ability to discover material misstatements and 
accounting system breeches) and independence (i.e. ability to report material misstatements 
and accounting system breeches). 
Whilst there is generally a consensus surrounding a definition of auditor quality in 
the extant literature, there remains intense debate over the underlying determinants of this 
construct. Theoretical models consistent with the definition of DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b) and 
agency theory usually embody either a ‗reputation hypothesis‘ or a ‗deep pockets 
hypothesis‘ perspective toward auditor quality (Dye 1993; Lennox 1999). The reputation 
hypothesis perspective implies there is greater incentive for audit firms with higher 
reputation capital at risk to provide superior audits. Reputation hypothesis advocates suggest 
that due to greater political visibility, larger audit firms have a higher proportion of 
reputation capital at risk than smaller counterparts (Beatty 1989; Lennox 1999). Meanwhile, 
deep pockets hypothesis proponents argue audit firms with higher substantial economic 
wealth have a greater incentive to provide enhanced audits to minimize litigation risk (Dye 
1993). The underlying rationale of the deep pockets hypothesis is external parties (e.g. 
shareholders, special interest groups) are likely to target larger audit firms for litigation due 
to the perception larger audit firms have more resources to make restitution on any legal 
damages awarded. 
Various attributes underpinning auditor quality have been proposed by advocates of 
the reputation hypothesis or deep pockets hypothesis perspectives. Three factors that have 
gained considerable attention, and that are pertinent to this study, are: (a) auditor 
independence; (b) auditor specialization; and (c) auditor brand name. Discussion in the 
following sub-sections describes the prior literature related to the three noted factors and 
relevant influence on the quality of earnings. 
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3.5.1.1 Auditor independence 
There is a lengthy detailed history of auditor independence being recognized as a 
vital cornerstone attribute of the audit function (e.g. Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Stamp and 
Moonitz 1979; Firth 1997). Prior literature routinely segregates independence into: (a) 
independence in fact ; and (b) independence in appearance (DeAngelo 1981a; Ramsay 
2001).19A common extant literature and popular media perception is that if auditor 
independence is perceived to be impaired financial statement users impose a cost-of-capital 
premium for information risk associated with the inability to rely on the audit (Firth 1997; 
Johnstone, Sutton and Warfield 2001). Whilst an ‗actual‘ violation of independence logically 
implies it will be costly to the auditor, the mere perception independence is impaired by 
‗appearance‘ can be just as damaging (Olazabal and Almer 2001). 
In efficient capital markets rational agents forecast an auditor‘s independence is 
impaired when an economic bond is formed with clients leading to increased incentives for 
misrepresentations to prevail (DeAngelo 1981a; Salehi 2009). The provision of non-audit 
services by incumbent auditors to clients has long been considered (and increasingly in the 
past decade) by regulators worldwide as a major threat to auditor independence (Craswell 
1999).The provision of non-audit services to clients by incumbent auditors has grown 
dramatically during the past several decades in many developed and emerging economies 
(e.g. Firth 1997; Abbott, Parker, Peters and Rama 2003c;Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 
2005) as the range of services have expanded. Beattie and Fearnley (2002 p.20) postulate the 
main threats to independence (whether actual or perceived) from the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services to a client are the perceptions by financial statement that: (a) 
motivations for self-interest are enhanced, thereby increasing economic dependence; (b) 
there is a lack of self-review, with managerial and auditing decisions being one and the 
same; (c) there is an inclination to act as an advocate of corporate management (particularly 
in adversarial circumstances); and (d) familiarity is enhanced via closer affinity with the 
client's management. A prime focus of a number of studies examining the provision of non-
audit services by the incumbent auditor to clients has been directed toward the impact on 
earnings quality (with earnings management a particular concentration). Frankel et al. 
(2002), for example, provided evidence that when firms supplied higher non-audit services 
levels incumbent auditors were more likely to ‗just meet or beat‘ earnings forecasts. 
Furthermore, Frankel et al. (2002) found evidence of a positive association between non-
audit fees and (a) small earnings surprises, and (b) the extent of discretionary accruals. Based 
                                                     
19Firth (2002) contends independence in fact (i.e. actual independence) is generally unobservable; therefore, 
independence in appearance is assumed to be of prime importance to market participants (Beattie and Fearnley 
2002). Often, independence in appearance is perceived as representing actual independence (Olazabal and Almer 
2001). 
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on these findings, Frankel et al. (2002) concluded the provision of non-audit services 
threatened auditor independence as higher-fee-ratio clients receive preferential treatment 
from the incumbent auditor. 
Whilst other research (Frankel et al. 2002; Ferguson, Seow and Young 2004) has 
found a positive non-audit services/earnings management association, some research has 
challenged such findings. Ashbaugh et al. (2003), for example, report no association between 
earnings management and the provision of non-audit services when discretionary accruals 
underpinning firm performance are adjusted. They (Ashbaugh et al. 2003) argue the results 
of Frankel et al. (2002) are due to sensitivity in research design choices. Based on their 
findings, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) conclude there is a lack of systematic evidence sustaining 
claims the purchasing of non-audit services leads to the impairment of auditor independence 
and lower earnings quality (via higher earnings management). 
Aside from earnings management, another focus of researchers when comparing the 
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence, and therein earnings quality, is the 
frequency and degree of restatements of earnings. Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant 
(2003), for example, assessed whether the provision of non-audit services led to greater 
restated financial statements. Based on a sample of 110 firms that restated financial 
statements filed with the SEC during 2000 and 2001, they (Raghunandan et al. 2003) found 
the level of non-audit fees did not result in an inappropriate influence from incumbent 
auditors on the audit function leading to more restatements. In a similar study, Kinney, 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) partitioned on-audit services into financial information system 
design and implementation, internal audit, tax, and unspecified non-audit services. They 
(Kinney et al. 2004) found insignificant results between:(a) non-audit fees and financial 
information system design and implementation; and (b) non-audit fees and internal audit 
services. However, they (Kinney et al. 2004) found evidence that unspecified non-audit fee 
levels were positively associated with restatements. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of major studies examining the linkage between non-
audit services and earnings quality. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of major selected prior studies on auditor independence 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable  
Findings Earnings 
quality 
Audit  
function 
Overall 
governance 
Ashbaugh, 
LaFond and 
Mayhew (2003) 
US 
3,170 firms 
November 
and 
December 
2001 
Income 
increasing/ 
decreasing 
discretionary 
accrual 
(earnings 
management) 
- - No statistically significant association between NAS and income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. The association between NAS and absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is driven by income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) 
US 
159 firms 
2000–2001 Earnings 
restatement 
- - No significant association between NAS and earnings restatements. 
Chin, Tsao and 
Chi (2007) 
Taiwan  
254 firms 
2002–2003 Quality of 
voluntarily 
earnings 
forecast 
- - Firm with a high ratio of NAS tend to issue more optimistically biased and 
inaccurate forecasts under a lower auditor liability regime. 
 
Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) 
US 
1,871 firms 
2000 Abnormal 
accruals 
(earnings 
management)  
- - No significant association between the extent of NAS and abnormal accruals 
(earnings management). 
Ferguson, Seow 
and Young (2004) 
UK 
610 firms  
1996–1998 Restatement and 
discretionary 
working capital 
accruals 
(earnings 
management) 
- - NAS is positively associated with earnings management measures. 
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Table 3.1:Summary of major selected prior studies on auditor independence (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable  
Findings Earnings 
quality 
Audit  
function 
Overall 
governance 
Frankel, John and 
Nelson (2002) 
US 
3,074 firms 
February 5, 
2001–June 
15, 2001 
Discretionary 
accruals  
- - Positive and significant association between NAS and magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals and both, income-increasing as well as income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
Kinney, Palmrose 
and Scholz (2004) 
US 
979 firms 
January 
1995–
December 
2000 
Earnings 
restatements 
- 
 
(i) Financial 
information 
system design 
and 
implementation 
(ii) Internal 
audit services 
No significant results between: (a) non-audit fees and financial information 
system design and implementation; and (b) non-audit fees and internal audit 
services. However, there is evidence that unspecified non-audit fee levels are 
positively associated with restatements. 
 
Larker and 
Richardson 
(2004) 
US 
5,103 firms 
2000–2001 Absolute value 
of accruals 
(Earnings 
management) 
- Extent of 
corporate 
governance 
Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive relation with the absolute 
value of accruals. However, there is a negative relation between the level of 
fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e. higher fees 
are associated with smaller accruals) are strongest for client firms with weak 
governance.  
Raghunandan, 
Read and 
Whisenant (2003) 
US 
110 firms 
2000–2001 - - Financial 
statements 
restatement 
The level of non-audit fees did not result in an inappropriate influence from 
incumbent auditors on the audit function leading to more restatements. 
Reynolds, Deis 
and Francis 
(2004) 
US 
4,148 firms 
February 5, 
2001–May 
25, 2001 
Discretionary 
accruals 
(earnings 
management) 
- - No evidence that the relative level of NAS fees impairs auditor objectivity (no 
statistically significant association between NAS and discretionary accruals). 
Ruddock, Taylor 
and Taylor (2006) 
Australia 
3,746 firms 
1993–2000 Reduced 
earnings 
conservatism 
- - Supplying of NAS compromises auditor independence and results in the 
auditor accepting less conservative accounting, leading to poorer earnings 
quality. 
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3.5.1.2 Audit specialization 
Al-Basteki (2000) points out that the effectiveness of the audit function depends on 
the competency of the auditor, with more competent auditors likely to deter and detect 
irregularities, financial misstatement and questionable accounting practices, whether by error 
or fraud, than are non-specialist auditors. In respect to the technical competence of auditor 
quality, Maines (2001) claims this is a function of task-specific knowledge and expertise. 
Similarly, Healy and Palepu (2001) assert differences in the auditor‘s qualifications and 
professional training have an impact on the credibility of audit reports. Upon this basis it has 
been argued a better trained auditor (or specialist) will be more likely to detect and question 
non-compliance with accounting standards and generally accepted accounting principles than 
a non-specialist. Further, Abbott and Parker (2000) and Krishnan (2003) argue specialized 
auditors have greater expertise, resources and incentives to separate the information 
component of transactions from the background noise of business.  
Various researchers (e.g. Craswell, Francis and Taylor 1995; Solomon, Shields and 
Whittington 1999; Elder and Zhou 2002; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003) suggest 
specialization in a given industry serves as a hallmark of an auditor‘s technical competence. 
Solomon et al. (1999  p.191) define industry specialists as ―auditors who are so designated 
by their firms and whose training and practice experience largely are in a particular 
industry‖. The audit industry itself has increasingly come to recognize the value of 
specialization with Casterella, Francis, Lewis and Walker (2004) noting that in the early 
1990s the big international accounting firms began to strive to differentiate themselves by 
changing the organizational structure and development of marketing strategies highlighting 
industry specializations. 
As with auditor independence, a major focus of researchers examining the influence 
of auditor specialization has been on the quality of earnings and in particular earnings 
management. Elder and Zhou (2002), for example, in a study of 1,048 US initial public 
offerings (IPOs) from 1996 to 1998 spread over 17 industries, investigated whether industry 
specialist auditors provide higher quality audits in the IPO process in terms of lower earnings 
management. They (Elder and Zhou 2002) found IPOs audited by industry specialists exhibit 
less under pricing and smaller discretionary accruals. Similarly, Krishnan (2003) found 
discretionary accruals reported by clients audited by specialist auditors was on average 1.2% 
lower than those audited by non-specialist auditors. Krishnan (2003) concluded results were 
consistent with the view specialist auditors better alleviate accruals-based earnings 
management than non-specialist auditors leading to greater earnings quality. This conclusion 
is similar to Chen et al. (2005). Meanwhile, Balsam et al. (2003) showed firms audited by 
industry specialist auditors have lower discretionary accruals and higher earnings response 
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coefficients than clients of non-specialist auditors. Again, results of Balsam et al. (2003) 
infer industry specialists improve a client‘s earnings quality better than non-specialists.  
Another major stream of auditor specialization associated research has focused on 
the quality of disclosures and financial account restatements. Dunn and Mayhew (2004), for 
instance, show evidence supports the view that hiring an industry specialist auditor will 
improve a client‘s disclosure quality. Based on analyst disclosure quality evaluations 
reported in the annual Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
Corporate Information Committee Reports, Dunn and Mayhew (2004) show an analyst‘s 
ranking of disclosure quality in unregulated industries is higher for firms audited by industry 
specialists. Likewise, O` Keefe et al. (1994) document evidence that fewer violations of 
GAAS reporting standards are associated with specialist auditors. Hence, this supported their 
(O`Keefe et al. 1994) argument that firms audited by an industry specialist have a higher 
level of compliance better disclosure practices. Carcello and Nagy (2004), meanwhile, 
focused on the association between auditor specialization and fraudulent financial reporting 
which has also attracted research. They (Carcello and Nagy 2004) found a negative 
relationship leading them (Carcello and Nagy 2004) to conclude that financial fraud 
reporting is lower for firms audited by an industry specialist than by a non-industry 
specialist. 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of major studies examining the linkage between 
auditor specialization and earnings quality. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of major selected prior studies on auditor specialization 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Abbot and Parker 
(2000) 
US 
500 firms 
1994-1995 -  Audit committee 
effectiveness 
(independent 
members and 
active) 
Firms with effective audit committee (i.e. comprised of independent 
members and active) are more likely to employ auditor specialist which 
expected to provide a higher level of audit quality than do non-specialist. 
Balsam, Krishnan 
and Yang (2003) 
US 
50,116 
firms 
(DAC) 
19,091 
firms (ERC) 
1991-1999 Absolute level of 
discretionary 
accruals (DAC) 
and earnings 
response 
coefficients 
(ERC) 
- - Clients of industry specialist auditors have lower DAC and higher ERC 
(having higher earnings quality) than clients of non-specialist auditors. 
 
Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) 
US 
109firms 
1990-2001 - - Financial fraud Firms hiring auditor specialists are less likely to be associated with SEC 
enforcement actions for fraud reporting. 
Chan, Yuan and 
Jian (2010) 
US 
32,536 firm-
year 
observations 
2001-2006 - Information risk 
(impact on cost 
of debt) 
- Firms audited by joint national level and city level industry leaders or city-
only industry leaders have better credit ratings and lower bond spreads (i.e. 
debt investors charge lower cost-of-debt capital for firms audited by joint 
national level and city level industry leaders or city-only industry leaders as 
they perceive lower information risk for these firms). 
Chen , Lin and 
Zhou (2005) 
Taiwan 
365 firms 
1999-2002 Accruals-based 
earnings 
- - Specialist auditors (Big 5 auditors) better alleviate accruals-based earnings 
management in the IPO year in Taiwan than non-specialist auditors leading 
to greater earnings quality. 
Craswell, Francis 
and Taylor (1995) 
Australia 
1,484 firms 
1982-1987 - Audit fee 
premium 
- Auditor specialization allows auditor to charge a premium relative to non-
specialist auditors (offers higher level of assurance than does a non-
specialist which contributes positively to the auditor‘s credibility). 
DeFond, Francis 
and Wong (2000) 
Hong Kong 
348firms 
1992 - Audit fee 
premium and 
audit quality 
- There is evidence of Big 6 premium (i.e. higher audit quality and more 
expensive fees) for brand name and industry specialization. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of major selected prior studies on auditor specialization (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) 
US 
14,757 firm-
year 
observations 
1990-1995 - - AIMR scores 
(disclosure 
quality) 
There is evidence supporting the view that hiring an industry specialist 
auditor will improve a client‘s disclosure quality. 
Elder and Zhou 
(2002) 
US 
1,048 IPO 
firms 
 1996-1998 Discretionary 
accruals 
- - There is evidence that IPOs audited by industry specialists exhibit less 
under pricing and smaller discretionary accruals 
Jenkins, Kane and 
Velury (2006) 
US 
2,436 firms 
1990-1999 Discretionary 
accruals 
- - High quality auditors (industry specialist) were only partially effective in 
constraining the decline in discretionary accruals (earnings quality). 
Krishnan (2003) US 
4,422 firms 
1989-1998 Discretionary 
accruals 
- - Specialist auditors mitigate accruals-based earnings management more than 
non-specialist auditor. Thus, influence the quality of earnings. 
O` Keefe, King 
and Gaver (1994) 
US 
935 reviews 
1986 Compliance with 
GAAS 
- - There is significantly greater compliance with auditing standards for 
industry specialists than non-specialists. 
Rose-Green, 
Huang and Lee 
(2011) 
US 
737 firms 
2004 - - disclosure of 
internal control 
weaknesses 
Firms audited by industry specialist auditors are more likely to report 
disclosure of internal control weaknesses than firms audited by non-
specialist auditors indicating that industry specialist auditors are quality 
differentiated. 
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3.5.1.3 Auditor brand name 
Reputation capital—as defined by brand name—has been cited in the extant 
literature as another key component underlying auditor quality. Advocates of both the 
reputation hypothesis and deep pockets hypothesis perspectives of audit quality have 
suggested audit firms recognized as major brand leaders within the industry will have 
increased incentives to ensure higher auditing standards (DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b; Dye 
1993). For example, it is suggested an audit firm with a highly recognized brand name will 
be the subject of increased litigation risk because a litigating party may perceive such an 
audit firm will be more willing to settle to avoid damaging political costs that impair 
reputation capital (this view is consistent with the tenets of the reputation hypothesis 
perspective). Further, it may be thought such an audit firm is more successful financially 
and, therefore, will have deeper resources to draw upon to settle legal action (this view is 
consistent with the tenets of the deep pockets hypothesis perspective). 
A number of researchers have sought to investigate the possible linkage between 
brand name and key financial accounting issues such as earnings quality. Becker et al. 
(1998), for example, examined whether earnings management of firms audited by Big 520 
audit firms (proxy for high brand name audit firms) were significantly different from firms 
audited by Non-Big 5audit firms. Results presented by Becker et al. (1998) show 
discretionary accruals that increase income were significantly higher amongst firms audited 
by Non-Big 5 audit firms. Further, Becker et al. (1998) report clients of Non-Big 5 audit 
firms with incentives to smooth earnings downwards (upwards) report significantly higher 
income-decreasing (increasing) discretionary accruals relative to clients of Big 5 audit firms. 
Finally, brand name auditors are more likely to defend reputation capital by being less 
willing to accept questionable accounting methods, and report errors and irregularities 
(Becker et al. 1998). Findings of Becker et al. (1998) are consistent with subsequent 
research. Reynolds and Francis (2000), for instance, found auditors with prominent brand 
names were better able to detect earnings management due to superior knowledge. Chen et 
al. (2005), meanwhile, found higher quality auditors (as defined by Big 5 versus Non-Big 5) 
constrained the opportunistic behavior of corporate management more significantly than low 
quality auditors. 
Researchers suggest that whilst big brand name audit firms have an incentive to 
constrain earnings management, firms also have an incentive to engage such audit firms to 
prevent opportunistic behavior by corporate management (Reynolds and Francis 2000; Behn 
                                                     
20 At the time of their study (Becker et al. 1998) there were five recognized international audit firms (i.e. Arthur 
Anderson, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, KPMG and Deloitte and Touché). In the early 1990s the 
number was eight before consolidation reduced the number to first six then five. With the demise of Arthur 
Anderson the current number is four.  
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et al. 2008). Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999), for example, argued a high-accrual firm 
subject to great opportunistic mismanagement behavior by corporate management would 
seek to hire a high brand name audit firm as the reputation capital of engaging a brand name 
identity provided greater perceived assurance that earnings reported were credible. They 
(Francis et al. 1999) found support for this assertion reporting high-accrual firms did more 
often hire Big 5 auditors but reported lower levels of discretionary accruals than high-accrual 
firms using a Non-Big 5 audit firm. 
Table 3.3 provides a summary of major studies examining the linkage between 
auditor brand name and earnings quality. 
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Table 3.3:Summary of major selected prior studies on auditor brand name 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings 
quality 
Audit function Overall 
governance 
Beasley and 
Petroni (2001) 
US 
681 firms 
1991-1992 - - Proportion of 
outside directors 
The probability of insurer employing a brand name auditor that specializes 
in the insurance industry is increasing in the percentage of the members of 
the board of directors that are considered outsiders. 
Becker, DeFond, 
Jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam 
(1998) 
US 
10,881 firms 
1989-1992 Discretionary 
accruals 
(earnings 
management) 
- - Brand name auditors (i.e. Big 6 auditors) are able to detect earnings 
management because of superior knowledge and act to curb opportunistic 
earnings management to protect their reputations (i.e. firms hiring Non-Big 
6 auditors report significantly greater discretionary accruals than firms 
hiring Big 6 auditor). 
Behn, Choi and 
Kang (2008) 
US 
9,261 firms 
1996-2001 - - Analyst earnings 
forecast 
Big brand name audit firms have an incentive to constrain earnings 
management by corporate management (i.e. analysts‘ forecast accuracy is 
higher and the forecast dispersion is smaller for firms audited by Big 5 
auditor) 
 
Chen, Lin and 
Zhou (2005) 
Taiwan 
365 firms 
1999-2002 Unexpected 
accruals 
(earnings 
management) 
- - Higher quality auditors (as defined by Big 5 versus Non-Big 5) constrained 
the opportunistic behavior of corporate management more significantly 
than low quality auditors (i.e. less earnings management in the IPO year). 
Chen, Wu and 
Zhou (2006) 
Taiwan 
2,324 firms 
1998-2002 Discretionary 
accruals 
(earnings 
management) 
  Big brand name auditors (i.e. Big 5 auditors) are associated with lower 
discretionary accruals, consistent with auditors‘ brand name reputation 
constraining earnings management. 
Craswell, Francis 
and Taylor (1995) 
Australia 
1,484 firms 
1982-1987 - Audit fee 
premium 
- Big brand name auditor charges a premium relative to non-big brand name 
auditors (i.e. offers higher level of assurance which contributes positively 
to the auditor‘s credibility). 
Francis, Maydew 
and Sparks (1999) 
US 
74,390 firm-
year 
1975-1994 Accruals-based 
earnings 
management 
- - Firms hiring big brand name auditor (i.e. Big 6 auditors) reported lower 
discretionary accruals than firms hiring Non-Big 6 auditors. 
 
Reynolds and 
Francis (2000) 
US 
6,747 firms 
1996 Absolute value 
of total accruals/ 
discretionary 
accruals 
- - Auditors with prominent brand names were better able to detect earnings 
management due to superior knowledge and to protect reputational capital. 
 
61 
3.5.1.4 Summary of auditor quality influence 
The general overwhelming consensus in the extant literature is a firm engaging a 
higher quality auditor is also likely to report earnings of a better quality (e.g. Becker et al. 
1998; Francis et al. 1999; Balsam et al. 2003; Francis 2004; Caramanis and Lennox 2008). It 
is suggested a higher quality auditor will have a greater ability to detect and deter earnings 
management, unintentional errors (i.e. increased competence) and secure heightened 
reputation capital (i.e. preserve independence more stringently). Switching to a higher 
quality auditor with an established brand name can aid a firm in reassuring investors of the 
credibility of the reported earnings, and the desire of the firm to address corporate 
management opportunism concerns. Finally, firms engaging a higher quality auditor will 
likely reduce information risk of higher accruals based earnings (Li, Stokes, Taylor and 
Wong 2009). 
Given the reputed auditor quality/earnings quality linkage, and the view earnings 
conservatism is a potential catalyst for higher quality earnings, it is prudent to infer higher 
quality auditors are more likely to seek to enforce and encourage conservative earnings 
practices. As discussed in the previous sub-sections, a higher quality auditor is likely to have 
strong incentives to pursue earnings conservatism as a means of ensuring clients report 
higher quality earnings. For example, a higher quality auditor will seek to protect and 
enhance reputational capital and reduce litigation risk (e.g. DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b; Dye 
1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Balsam et al. 2003; Francis 2004; Caramanis 
and Lennox 2008). 
In respect to the three main components underlying auditor quality investigated in 
this study, incentives exist for why a more independent auditor with an established brand 
name and specializing in a given industry sector is likely to instill higher earnings 
conservatism than less independent auditors of a less well-known brand name and with lack 
of industry specialization. For instance, a more independent auditor (e.g. an incumbent 
auditor with zero or little non-audit services for the client relative to total fees) is less likely 
to have formed an economic bond with the client, thereby, affording the auditor greater 
flexibility to take affirmative action (e.g. writing a qualified audit report) to improve 
earnings, such as ensuring swifter recognition of losses by corporate management (i.e. 
greater earnings conservatism). As for auditor specialization, greater knowledge of the 
industry standards and practices, combined with an increased access to specific resources, 
ensures the specialist auditor is likely to be in a better position to detect more swiftly 
circumstances where an industry client should be reporting more conservative earnings (e.g. 
losses) to avoid unintentional misstatements. Furthermore, if an audit firm has sought to 
develop an industry specialization and markets itself as such, then the specialist audit firm 
will have getter reputation capital at stake and be the subject of higher litigation risks. To 
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preserve reputation capital and avoid costly litigation costs a specialist auditor is likely to be 
inclined to reinforce more conservative earnings practices from clients within the specialized 
industry. Finally, for an audit firm with a highly recognized brand name there will be 
incentives to reduce political costs arising from any litigation action if earnings of a client 
are found to be overstated. Thus, a high brand name audit firm is more likely to err on the 
side of caution and be more aggressive in ensuring clients adopt conservative accounting 
practices that enhance the quality of reported earnings. 
 
3.5.2 Audit committee effectiveness 
There is very limited empirical research that considers the relationship between the 
audit committee and earnings conservatism. Research, however, provides evidence of the 
linkage between audit committees and earnings quality, thereby suggesting the likelihood of 
an audit committee/earnings conservatism linkage (Beasley and Salterio 2001; DeZoort et al. 
2002; Klein 2002a; DeFond, Hann and Hu 2005). The mere presence of an audit committee, 
however, does not automatically imply an audit committee/earnings conservatism linkage 
exists. Rather, the effectiveness of the audit committee will determine whether the sub-
committee actively seeks to conserve earnings (Song and Windram 2000; DeZoort et al. 
2002; Klein 2002a; Vafeas 2005; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006; Turley and Zaman 
2007). DeZoort et al. (2002 p.41) offers a comprehensive definition of audit committee 
effectiveness by other corporate governance scholars (e.g. Xie et al. 2003; Cohen et al. 2004; 
Vera-Munoz 2005), and provide an appropriate base for this study: 
 
An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority and resources 
to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal 
controls, and risk management through its diligent oversight efforts. 
 
Various studies (e.g. Wright 1996; Klein 2002a, 2002b; Xie et al. 2003; Karamanou 
and Vafeas 2005; Vafeas 2005; Lennox and Park 2007; Steward and Munro 2007; Turley 
and Zaman 2007) suggest a more effective audit committee will improve earnings quality. 
Specifically, more effective audit committees are better able to mitigate opportunities for 
corporate management to engage in opportunistic behavior that can affect earnings quality 
(Klein 2002b). Furthermore, a more effective audit committee will have greater ability to 
override aggressive financial accounting policy choices initiated by corporate management 
that could promote less conservative earnings results. Finally, if an audit committee is 
effective in an arbitration role, the audit committee will develop more systematic 
compromises between corporate management and external parties, for example, the external 
auditor (DeZoort 1998; DeZoort and Salterio 2001). 
A number of determinants have been cited in the extant literature that researchers 
propose affect audit committee effectiveness (Abbott, Park and Parker 2000; Klein 2002a, 
63 
2002b; Abbott et al. 2003a; Carcello and Neal 2003; Xie et al. 2003; Van der Zahn and 
Tower 2004; Krishnan 2005a; Carcello, Hollingsworth and Klein 2006; Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and Rama 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and 
Scholz 2011). These determinants can be broadly categorized into four main components: (1) 
arrangement (i.e. audit committee independence, size and duality); (2) resources (i.e. 
financial expertise, committee experience); (3) authority (i.e. power enshrined in the audit 
committee); and (4) diligence (i.e. audit committee frequency of meeting) as commented by 
DeZoort et al. (2002). The first two components relate to structural composition and the 
latter two relate to operational composition features. Whilst it would be preferable to 
consider all possible determinants underlying audit committee effectiveness, various 
pragmatic constraints (e.g. unavailable data, inability to effectively operationalize) prevent 
such a comprehensive examination. Thus, this study considered three key components of an 
audit committee, that is, audit committee independence, financial expertise and diligence.  
 
3.5.2.1 Audit committee independence 
Corporate governance advocates, regulators and scholars frequently argue that an 
audit committee comprised of a higher proportion of independent directors (if not entirely) is 
more likely to be effective in discharging the sub-committee‘s responsibilities. Numerous 
studies have examined the relationship between audit committee independence and quality of 
financial reporting (Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes 1993; Abbott et al. 2000; Beasley and 
Petroni 2001; Klein 2002b; Bédard et al. 2004; Lee, Mande and Ortman 2004). Empirical 
results generally indicate audit committees comprised either entirely, or by a majority, of 
independent directors are more successful in improving the quality of reported earnings 
(Klein 2002b; Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan 2003b; Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 
2005), external audit function (Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and Neal 2000; Abbott et 
al. 2007)and improve the overall corporate governance practices within firms (Beasley and 
Salterio 2001; Klein 2002a; Chen et al. 2007). Table 3.4 provides a summary of major 
studies examining the influence of audit committee independence on key financial 
accounting and corporate governance issues. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of major selected prior studies on audit committee independence 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings 
quality 
Audit function Overall 
governance 
Abbott, Parker and Peters 
(2004) 
US 
88 firms 
January 1, 
1991 to 
December 31, 
1999 
Occurrence of 
restatements 
- - Firms with audit committees that are both independent and active 
(diligence) and have at least one member who is a financial expert 
exhibit a significant negative association with the occurrence of 
restatements. 
Abbott, Parker, Peters and 
Raghunandan (2003a) 
US 
538 firms 
February 5, 
2001 to June 
30, 2001 
- Lower non-audit 
fees 
- Audit committees consisting solely of independent directors and 
meet at least four times a year have lower non-audit fees; thereby, 
increasing audit committee effectiveness. 
Abbott, Parker, Peters and 
Rama (2007) 
US 
219 
questionnaires 
2000 - Routine internal 
audit activities 
outsourcing 
- Firms with independent, active and expert audit committees are 
less likely to outsource routine internal audit activities to the 
external auditor. 
Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) 
US 
159 firms 
2000-2001 Occurrence of 
restatements 
-  The probability of restatement‘s occurrence is significantly lower 
in firms whose audit committees have independent directors with 
financial expertise. 
Beasley and Salterio 
(2001) 
Canada  
627 firms 
1994 - - Large board of 
directors and 
outside members 
on boards 
Firms with (i) more outside directors (ii) segregate the board 
chairperson and chief executive officer position and (iii) larger 
board are significantly more likely to create independent audit 
committee with greater knowledge and experience. 
Carcello and Neal (2000) US  
223 firms 
1994 - Issuance of a 
qualified audit 
report 
- If majority of audit committee members are non-independent 
(affiliated directors), it is less likely for the auditor to issue a going-
concern report for firms experiencing financial distress in 1994. 
Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent (2005) 
Australia 
434 firms 
2000 Accruals quality - - Firms with a majority of non-executive directors on the board and 
audit committee are significantly associated with a lower likelihood 
of earnings management. 
Klein (2002a) US 
692 firm-year 
observations 
1992-1993 Opportunities for 
firm growth 
- - There is a negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and abnormal accruals (earnings management). 
Krishnan (2005) US 
128 firms 
1994-2000 - - Internal control 
problem 
There is a negative association between the presence of internal 
control problems and audit committee independence and audit 
committee with financial expertise. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of major selected prior studies on audit committee independence (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings 
quality 
Audit function Overall 
governance 
Lennox and Park (2007) US 
1,198 firms 
1995-2000 - Audit firms 
appointments 
- Firms with independent audit committee are less likely to appoint 
officer-auditor affiliation. 
McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) 
US 
51 firms 
1986 to 1989 SEC 
enforcement 
actions/material 
restatements of 
earnings 
- - Firms with audit committees which are comprised solely of outside 
directors and have at least one financial expert and meet at least 
three or four times a year have less financial reporting problems 
(SEC enforcement actions/material restatements of earnings). 
Van der Zahn and Tower 
(2004) 
US 
485 firm-year 
observations 
2000-2001 Discretionary 
accruals 
- - Firms with higher proportion of independent audit committee 
members, greater diligence and reduced presence on other boards 
and committees are more effective in constraining earnings 
management. 
Vicknair, Hickman and 
Carnes(1993) 
 
US 
100 NYSE 
firms 
1980 to 1987 - - Directors who 
have some 
operating 
association with 
the firm 
‗Grey‘ director representation on audit committees is pervasive 
across NYSE firms and over time. 
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 
(2003) 
US 
282 firms 
1992, 1994 
and 1996 
Discretionary 
current accruals 
- - Earnings management is less likely to occur if audit committee 
comprised of independent committee members and members with 
financial expertise which meets regularly. 
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As indicated in Table 3.4, empirical findings have generally supported the 
perception that independent audit committees are more effective in constraining corporate 
management and improving earnings quality. Klein (2002b), for example, found that the 
percentage of independent audit committees were negatively associated with a firm‘s 
abnormal accruals. Xie et al. (2003), meanwhile, observed a significant positive relationship 
between earnings management (as measured by discretionary accruals) and audit committees 
with a majority of outside directors. Similarly, Abbott et al. (2004) concluded that 
restatements were significantly less likely when audit committees were comprised of solely 
independent members. 
The past literature also suggests that firms with independent audit committee 
members have a lower incidence of fraud. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), for example, 
found that firms with reporting problems were less likely to have audit committees 
composed solely of outside directors. Additionally, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and 
Lapides (2000) found that firms experiencing fraud had less independent audit committees 
than firms not experiencing fraud. These findings are similar to other research (Beasley 
1996; Abbott et al. 2000; Carcello and Nagy 2002; Farber 2005). 
Finally, the audit committee independence is also thought to influence the quality of 
a firm‘s audit function, both external and internal (Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and 
Neal 2000; Abbott et al. 2003a; Chen et al. 2005). Carcello and Neal (2000), for example, 
showed that if the majority of audit committee members are non-independent, it is less likely 
that the auditors would issue a going concern report to financially distressed firms. Abbott et 
al. (2003a), meanwhile, found that audit committees comprised entirely of outside directors 
are significantly associated with audit fees suggesting the aspiration for high-quality audits. 
Moreover, firms with independent audit committees were less likely to outsource routine 
internal audit activities to the external auditors (Abbott et al. 2007).21 
 
3.5.2.2 Audit committee financial expertise 
Audit committee financial expertise has received growing attention amongst 
corporate governance advocates and researchers (McDaniel, Martin and Maines 2002; 
Bédard et al. 2004; DeFond et al. 2005; Chan and Li 2008). An expanding role, 
responsibilities and expectations is placing increasing pressure on the sub-committee‘s 
members to develop greater financial expertise to counter the escalating complexity and 
sophistication of the financial reporting system (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; ASX 
Corporate Governance Council 2003, 2007). 
                                                     
21 Given the fact that an outsourced internal auditor is not normally present at the firm‘s premises and unlikely to 
be as familiar with a firm‘s operations compared to an in-house internal audit function, the quality of the out-
sourced internal audit is perceived to be lower than an internal audit function which is in-house (DeFond, Francis 
and Wong 2000; Carcello and Nagy 2002; Casterella et al. 2004). 
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A number of studies (as summarized in Table3.5) have investigated the relationship 
between audit committee financial expertise and a firm‘s financial reporting processes. 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), for example, provide evidence that firms with poorer 
earnings quality were less likely to have a financial expert on the audit committee. Bedard et 
al. (2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) found that aggressive earnings management is 
negatively associated with the financial and governance expertise of audit committee 
members. In a similar vein Dhaliwal et al. (2006) concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between the existence of an accounting financial expert on the audit committee 
and the firm‘s accruals quality. Abbott et al. (2004), meanwhile, showed audit committees 
with greater financial expertise are better able to prevent occurrences of financial 
misstatements.  
In respect to the audit function, DeZoort et al. (2003) found evidence that financial 
experts on an audit committee would provide the sub-committee with greater resolve to 
support the external auditor during auditor-management disagreements. Also, DeFond et al. 
(2005) found greater audit committee financial expertise enhanced the firm‘s overall internal 
control environment. Finally, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Chan and Li (2008) 
showed that a firm‘s value was enhanced by the presence of a financial expert on the audit 
committee.  
Whilst the majority of studies generally support a positive association between audit 
committee expertise and earnings quality, other studies (e.g. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 
2004; DeFond et al. 2005; Lee and Mande 2005) fail to show any significant audit 
committee expertise/earnings quality relationship. Given some mixed empirical findings 
some caution may be required in interpreting the extent of an audit committee 
expertise/earnings quality linkage, and that such an association may not be universal to all 
aspects of the earnings quality concept. 
Table 3.5 provides a brief summarized overview of prominent studies examining the 
influence of audit committee expertise on financial accounting issues. 
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Table 3.5:Summary major selected prior studies audit committee financial expertise 
Author (s) Focus Period covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Abbott, Parker 
and Peters (2004) 
US 
88 firms 
January 1, 1991 
to December 31, 
1999 
Occurrence of 
restatements 
- - Firms with audit committees that are both independent and active 
(diligence) and have at least one member who is a financial expert 
exhibit a significant negative association with the occurrence of 
restatements. 
Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) 
US 
159 firms 
2000 to 2001 Occurrence of 
restatements 
- - Firms with audit committees comprised of independent directors 
with financial expertise have lower restatement problem. 
Carcello, Neal 
and 
Hollingsworth 
(2006) 
US 
400 firms 
July 15, 2003 to 
December 31, 
2003 
Discretionary 
current accruals 
- - Audit committees with an accounting financial expert are more 
effective in reducing earnings management. 
Chan and Li 
(2008) 
US 
200 firms 
2000 - - Firm value as 
represented by 
stock price 
(holding period 
return) 
The presence of expert-independent directors on the audit 
committee and board enhances firm value, thereby, increasing audit 
committee effectiveness. 
DeZoort, 
Hermanson and 
Houston (2003) 
US 
55 audit 
committee 
members 
2000 - Support auditor 
in an auditor-
management 
disagreement 
- More experienced audit committee members and experienced 
members who are CPAs were more supportive of the auditor in an 
auditor-management disagreement. 
Dhaliwal, Naiker 
and Navissi 
(2006) 
US 
3,501 audit 
committee 
members 
1995 to 1998 Accruals quality - - There is a positive relationship between the existence of an 
accounting financial expert on the audit committee and accruals 
quality. 
Krishnan (2005) US 
128 firms 
1994 to 2000 - - Extent of internal 
control problems 
Firms face greater internal control problems if the audit committee 
does not have independent members and financial experts. 
Krishnan (2008) US 
211 firms 
2000-2002 Accounting 
conservatism 
- - Audit committee's financial expertise is positively associated with 
conservatism when financial expertise is defined to include only 
accounting experts. 
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Table3.5:Summary major selected prior studies audit committee financial expertise (continued) 
Author (s) Focus Period covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 
(2007) 
US 
164 firms 
November 15, 
2004 to March 1, 
2005 
- - Internal control 
weaknesses 
Audit committees who meet regularly and have a smaller 
proportion of financial experts are more likely to detect internal 
control weaknesses. 
Mangena and 
Pike (2005) 
UK 
262 firms 
2001-2002 Interim financial 
disclosure 
- - There are positive association between financial expertise and 
interim disclosure. 
McMullen and 
Raghunandan 
(1996) 
US 
51 firms 
1986 to 1989 SEC enforcement 
actions/material 
restatements of 
earnings 
- - Firms with audit committees which are comprised solely of outside 
directors and have at least one financial expert and meet at least 
three or four times a year have less financial reporting problems 
(SEC enforcement actions/material restatements of earnings). 
Noland, Nichols 
and Flesher 
(2004) 
US 
1,036 
commercial 
banks 
- - - Internal controls Institutions with audit committee members who had banking or 
financial experience reported significantly more effective internal 
controls than institutions without this expertise on the audit 
committee. 
Xie, Davidson 
and DaDalt 
(2003) 
US 
282 firms 
1992, 1994 and 
1996 
Discretionary 
current accruals 
- - Earnings management is less likely to occur if there are 
independent audit committee members and a financial expert on the 
audit committee which meets regularly. 
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3.5.2.3 Audit committee diligence 
Diligence is viewed by regulators, corporate governance advocates and scholars as a 
major factor determining audit committee effectiveness (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000, 2007). This characteristic refers to the 
willingness of audit committee members to work together as needed to prepare and ask 
questions of management, external and internal auditors, and other relevant constituents, and 
to pursue answers when necessary (DeZoort et al. 2002). 
Key prior literature examining the influence of audit committee diligence on 
financial accounting issues pertinent to this study is summarized in Table 3.6. As shown in 
Table 3.6, a significant strand of the published literature has identified a positive relationship 
between the number of audit committee meetings (the proxy used for audit committee 
diligence) and the quality of reported earnings (Menon and Williams 1994; McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005). Abbott et al. (2000), Abbott et al. (2004) 
and Vafeas (2005), for example, report firms with audit committees meeting at least 
biannually were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for financial reporting problems. Xie 
et al. (2003) and Vafeas (2005), meanwhile, concluded that earnings management was less 
likely to occur if a firm‘s audit committee meets regularly. Beasley et al. (2000) and Farber 
(2005) concluded that increased audit committee activity resulted in a negative occurrence of 
financial restatements and fraud respectively. 
There are also a number of studies that have found a significant relationship between 
audit committee activity and the audit function. Stewart and Munro (2007), for instance, 
stated that frequent audit committee meetings with auditors were positively associated with a 
reduction in the firm‘s audit risk. Moreover, Abbott et al. (2007) indicated that firms with 
active audit committees were also less likely to outsource routine internal audit activities to 
the external auditor. 
Table 3.6 provides a brief summarized overview of prominent studies examining the 
influence of audit committee diligence on financial accounting issues. 
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Table 3.6:Summary of major selected prior studies on audit committee diligence 
Author (s) Focus Period covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Abbot and Parker 
(2000) 
US 
500 firms 
1994-1995 - - Occurrence of 
fraud and 
aggressive 
accounting 
Frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated 
with fraudulent financial reporting and financial reporting 
misstatement. 
Abbott, Parker 
and Peters (2004) 
88 observations 1991 to 1999 Occurrence of 
restatements 
- - Firms with audit committees that are both independent and active 
and have at least one member who is a financial expert exhibit a 
significant negative association with the occurrence of 
restatements. 
Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and 
Raghunandan 
(2003a) 
538 firms February 5, 2001 
to June 30, 2001 
- Lower non-audit 
fees 
- Audit committees consisting solely of independent directors and 
meet at least four times a year have lower non-audit fees; thereby, 
increasing audit committee effectiveness. 
Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and Rama 
(2007) 
219 
questionnaires 
2000 - Outsource routine 
internal audit 
activities to the 
external auditor 
- The results indicate that firms with independent, active and expert 
audit committees are less likely to outsource routine internal audit 
activities to the external auditor. 
Beasley, 
Carcello, 
Hermanson and 
Lapides (2000) 
66 firms 1987 to 1997 - - Existence of 
fraud 
Fraud firms and non-fraud firms differ to the extent that audit 
committees exist and are independent from management. In 
addition, the audit committees also differ in terms of audit 
committee diligence (number of meetings) and internal audit 
existence. 
Bedard, Chtourou 
and Courteau 
(2004) 
3,451 firms 1996 Discretionary 
current accruals 
- - Aggressive earnings management is negatively associated with the 
financial and governance expertise of audit committee members, 
audit committee member independence and a clear mandate 
defining the responsibilities of the audit committee. 
DeZoort, 
Hermanson and 
Houston (2003) 
US 
55 audit 
committee 
members 
2000 - Support auditor 
in an auditor-
management 
disagreement 
- More experienced audit committee members and experienced 
members who are CPAs were more supportive of the auditor in an 
auditor-management disagreement. 
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Table 3.6: Summary of major selected prior studies on audit committee diligence (continued) 
Author (s) Focus Period covered 
Dependent variable 
Findings Earnings quality Audit function Overall 
governance 
Farber (2005) 87 firms 1982 to 2000 - - Existence of 
fraud 
Fraud firms have fewer audit committee meetings and fewer 
financial experts, thereby, reducing audit committee effectiveness. 
McMullen and 
Raghunandan 
(1996) 
US 
51 firms 
1986 to 1989 SEC enforcement 
actions/material 
restatements of 
earnings 
- - Firms with audit committees which are comprised solely of outside 
directors and have at least one financial expert and meet at least 
three or four times a year have less financial reporting problems 
(SEC enforcement actions/material restatements of earnings). 
Menon and 
Williams (1994) 
200 firms 1986 to 1987 - - Reporting of 
consecutive 
period losses 
The majority of audit committees formed were not utilized 
effectively since the audit committees were staffed by insiders and 
met infrequently. Audit committees may, therefore, be created for 
the purposes of appearances rather than to increase stockholder's 
control of management. 
Vafeas (2005) 252 firms 1994 to 2000 Likelihood small 
earnings increase 
and meeting or 
beating analyst 
forecasts 
- - The independence and activity levels of an audit committee have a 
positive relationship with the quality of the earnings information 
produced. 
Van der Zahn and 
Tower (2004) 
US 
485 firm-year 
observations 
2000-2001 Discretionary 
accruals 
- - Firms with higher proportion of independent audit committee 
members, greater diligence and reduced presence on other boards 
and committees are more effective in constraining earnings 
management. 
Xie, Davidson 
and DaDalt 
(2003) 
US 
282 firms 
1992, 1994 and 
1996 
Discretionary 
current accruals 
- - Earnings management is less likely to occur if audit committee 
comprised of independent committee members and members with 
financial expertise which meets regularly. 
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3.5.2.4 Summary of audit committee effectiveness influence 
Overall, as indicated by the literature review associated with audit committee 
effectiveness research defined in the prior sub-sections, there are various incentives that exist 
to suggest why an audit committee may be motivated to promote earnings conservatism 
(Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and Nagy 2002). For instance, 
members of audit committees, especially independent members, have strong incentives to 
ensure the adoption of conservative accounting practices so as to protect and enhance their 
(i.e. members of the audit committee) reputational capital and improve or at the very least, 
not diminish, opportunities for appointment to boards of other firms (Abbott et al. 2000; 
Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and Nagy 2002). Although service on an audit committee 
may increase a director‘s reputation as an effective monitor, such service also exacerbates 
the potential reputational damage and, consequently, potentially creates less opportunity for 
appointment to other boards if financial misstatements occur by firms while such directors 
serve on the audit committee. Also, since conservatism reduces management‘s ability and 
incentive to overstate earnings by requiring a higher degree of verification for gaining 
recognition and reduces management ability to withhold unexpected losses, an effective 
audit committee is more likely to adopt conservatism. Furthermore, financial misstatements 
can lead to litigation risks and costs (Palmrose and Scholz 2002; Abbott et al. 2004). As a 
result, the preservation of reputational capital and reduction in litigations risks/costs serve as 
an important motivation for higher quality monitoring by audit committees. Past literature 
shows that conservatism helps in retaining reputational capital by reducing litigation risk 
(Watts 2003b; Pae et al. 2005; Lara et al. 2009a; Lara et al. 2009b). Therefore, it is more 
likely that an effective audit committee will engage in conservative accounting practices so 
that the reputational damage and threat of litigation can be prevented.22 
In respect to the three major components of audit committee effectiveness 
considered in this thesis, prior theoretical and empirical research provides a sound 
foundation to suggest that independent audit committee members are more likely to 
constrain management behavior in a number of areas and improve the quality of reported 
financial information. As part of improving the quality of reported financial information, 
audit committees with independent members are more likely to adopt financial accounting 
                                                     
22 Firm litigation costs arise when different parties to the firm sue managers, directors or auditors in an attempt to 
recover incurred losses caused by misstatements in the financial statements, thereby assigning responsibility for 
reported losses not reflecting the true underlying economic performance of the firm Lara et al. (2009b). 
According to Watts (2003a), Pae et al. (2005) and Lara et al. (2009a; 2009b),the right of shareholders to sue for 
financial statement misrepresentation creates a demand for conservative accounting in order to limit litigation 
losses stemming from allegations of overstated net assets or income. Watts (2003b), further, observed that courts 
generally punished overstatement of net assets or income more than understatement because stakeholders 
(especially shareholders) are more likely to suffer losses when earnings/assets are overstated than understated. 
Since the expected cost of overstatement is higher than the cost of understatement, management and auditors 
have incentives to report conservatism. 
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practices which will help restrain overstatement. Earnings conservatism is such a tool which 
can ensure that a firm‘s financial report is not overstated since conservatism requires the 
recognition of bad news sooner and delays the reporting of good news. More independent 
audit committees, therefore, are likely to support actions promoting earnings conservatism.  
Meanwhile, audit committee members with financial expertise can enhance 
conservatism by assessing the adequacy of financial provisions (e.g. warranty obligations, 
law suits, contingencies). An audit committee member with financial expertise will also be 
better able to detect aggressive earnings management since the financial expert can examine 
the reasonableness of explanations provided by management (Krishnan and Visvanathan 
2008). An audit committee member with financial expertise, in fact, will be motivated to 
encourage conservative accounting practices in order to preserve his reputational capital and 
the opportunity to serve on another board and, at the same time, to reduce litigation concerns 
(McDaniel et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 2005; Carcello et al. 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 2006). 
Finally, a diligent audit committee will always be motivated to maintain reputational 
capital and show greater concern about overstatements than understatements. If an audit 
committee meets regularly the committee will better be able to pick misstatements and 
ensure the quality of reported earnings. Since conservative accounting practices represent 
higher quality earnings, it is likely that diligent audit committees will be better able to ensure 
the adoption of conservative earnings practices by management. 
 
3.6 Hypotheses and conceptual schema 
As per the discussion in the prior section, the theoretical and empirical literature 
generally supports the view that auditor quality (audit committee effectiveness) is likely to 
have a positive (positive) influence on earnings conservatism so as to improve the quality of 
the reported earnings. That is, a firm engaging an external auditor of higher quality 
(comprising a more effective audit committee) is more likely to be associated with higher 
(higher) levels of conservative accounting practices such as the more timely recognition of 
losses and the reversal of such losses more swiftly leading to more persistent earnings. Given 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness are argued to be the primary underlying 
components of direct custodian excellence, it is rational to extend the analysis to infer higher 
direct custodian excellence will be associated with higher earnings conservatism. Upon this 
basis the following general proposition (denoted by GPDCE) considering the direct custodian 
excellence/earnings conservatism association is defined as follows:  
 
GPDCE: Earnings conservatism will be significantly higher amongst Malaysian 
publicly listed firms having pivotal direct custodians of the financial 
reporting system with higher quality than Malaysian publicly listed firms 
with pivotal direct custodians of the financial reporting system of lower 
quality. 
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As it is the intent of this study to consider earnings conservatism within the realms 
of timeliness and persistence as defined by Basu (1997), two separate testable hypotheses are 
formed to examine the specific influence of direct custodian excellence. The two testable 
hypotheses (denoted by GHa for timeliness of earnings conservatism and GHb for persistence 
of earnings conservatism) associated with the GPDCE are stated as follows: 
GHa: Malaysian publicly listed firms with direct custodian excellence are more 
likely to be associated with timelier recognition of negative news in reported 
earnings. 
GHb: Malaysian publicly listed firms with direct custodian excellence are more 
likely to be associated with the persistence of earnings. 
 
Whilst the main focus of this study is the overall impact of direct custodian 
excellence on earnings conservatism, the analysis will also consider the individual influence 
of each of the two main components underlying this construct. As per the discussion on audit 
quality, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests a positive influence. To this end the 
follow proposition specific to auditor quality is formed (denoted by GPAQ), followed by two 
testable hypotheses focusing on the timeliness of earnings conservatism (denoted byGH1a) 
and the persistence of earnings conservatism (denoted byGH1b). 
 
GPAQ: Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms engaging the 
services of a high quality external auditor will be significantly higher than 
Malaysian public listed firms engaging the services of a low quality external 
auditor. 
H1a: Malaysian publicly listed firms with a higher quality external auditor are 
more likely to be associated with timelier recognition of negative news in 
reported earnings. 
H1b: Malaysian publicly listed firms with a higher quality external auditor are 
more likely to be associated with the persistence of earnings. 
 
Finally, in respect to audit committee effectiveness the following general proposition 
and two testable hypotheses are formed as follows: 
 
GPACE: Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms with a more 
effective audit committee will be significantly higher than Malaysian public 
listed firms with a less effective audit committee. 
H2a: Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit committees are 
more likely to be associated with timelier recognition of negative news in 
reported earnings. 
H2b: Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit committees are 
more likely to be associated with the persistence of earnings. 
 
Figure 3.1 provides a diagrammatical overview of the study and the respective 
testable hypotheses. 
 
 
 
76 
Figure 3.1: The conceptual schema 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter documented four potential theories concerning corporate governance to 
explain various corporate governance phenomena. Agency theory is found the most 
applicable to be used as the underlying theoretical framework in this study. To better 
understand the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings conservatism in 
Malaysia, discussions on corporate governance environment in Malaysia including (i) equity 
market regulatory environment, (ii) financial accounting system and (iii) auditing 
environment were documented. A set of testable hypotheses23 were formulated based on 
                                                     
23 The primary focus of this study is to test the association between direct custodian excellence and earnings 
conservatism, with a secondary emphasis on the influence of auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness 
that underpin the main factor of interest. Accordingly, the main discussion in formulating hypotheses related to 
these factors concentrate on this end result. However, in conducting such hypotheses development, it is necessary 
(given the prior literature focus on components of auditor quality, and audit committee effectiveness) to make 
note of such individual components, and to include secondary associated hypotheses that are subsequently tested. 
This is needed to highlight the depth of testing and focus of this thesis, and to provide comparative analysis with 
prior work. Specific formulation of individual hypotheses associated with respective components is not developed 
to avoid undue increase in length of the thesis. However, hypotheses associated with individual components 
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detailed discussions on corporate governance mechanism (i.e. direct custodian excellence, 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness) to examine the influence of the variables 
on earnings conservatism. Finally, the conceptual schema was developed with a 
diagrammatical overview presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
making up auditor quality (AQi,t) and audit committee effectiveness (ACEi,t) are shown in the conceptual schema 
to clearly illustrate to readers what constitutes AQi,t and ACEi,t. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The initial focus of Chapter 3was defining the main theories thought to underpin 
corporate governance. Based on a review of these main theoretical perspectives of corporate 
governance, the theory deemed most appropriate for this study was identified. In order to 
give this study perspective the corporate governance environment in Malaysia was outlined. 
Such discussion also described major changes in corporate governance regulations in 
Malaysia during the past several decades. The focus of the discussion then concentrated on 
developing the testable hypotheses of this thesis. In support of the development of these 
hypotheses a detailed review of literature relating to auditor quality and audit committee 
effectiveness—the prime components of direct custodian excellence—was provided. Finally, 
a conceptual schema was provided outlining the key relationships of this study. 
This chapter provides details of the research method used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. The chapter begins with a justification of the sample selected, 
source documentation chosen and time period analyzed. The subsequent section explains 
how earnings conservatism is measured using the Basu (1997) models of timeliness and 
persistence. The measure to operationalize direct custodian excellence is then developed via 
definition of proxies for key auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness components. 
Finally, the statistical tests and models utilized to test the hypotheses are outlined, before a 
summary is provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.2 Sample, documentation and time period 
This section outlines the methodology applied in selecting the sample, source 
documentation and time period. 
 
4.2.1 Sample selection 
The initial sample24 comprises all publicly listed firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
as at January 1, 2002. Bursa Malaysia listed firms are chosen because information is publicly 
available. Moreover, Bursa Malaysia firms were selected since listed firms provide readily 
available information in an appropriate useable form. Consistent with prior research, 
financial and banking and insurance and utilities firms are excluded from the sample as such 
firms are regulated by specific regulatory boards (Ball et al. 2000; Givoly and Hayn 2000; 
Goodwin 2003; Ruddock et al. 2006; Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan 2007). Firms that were not 
continuously listed on the Bursa Malaysia during the observation period (e.g. IPO firms and 
firms de-listed for a period of time and re-listed) will also be excluded in order to avoid 
                                                     
24 Please refer to Table 5.1 for details more information on sample selection process. 
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undue influences of an unexpected rise in share price. Moreover, firms involved in joint 
mergers and acquisitions will also be excluded on the basis that such activities may impact 
the extent of financial reporting undertaken (Salter 1998). Consistent with Clifford and 
Evans (1997), unit trusts and foreign firms domiciled outside Malaysia will also be excluded 
because the financial statements of unit trusts and foreign firms domiciled outside Malaysia 
are not always prepared in accordance with the normal disclosure requirements for other 
firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. Firms suspected of having missing data during the 
observation period (e.g. firms that were suspended at some point during the observation 
period) are also excluded (Klein 2002b). 
From the resulting sample pool, 100 firms are randomly selected. Data will be 
collected for each firm selected from each firm-year covered in this study. The resulting 
sample will provide approximately 600 firm-year observations for use as data points in the 
subsequent testing. 
 
4.2.2 Source documentation 
The data for this study are obtained from a number of sources. The major item of 
focus earnings conservatism that will be measured based on the timeliness and persistence 
models developed by Basu (1997).25 Data required to complete the Basu (1997) timeliness 
and persistence base models will be obtained from DataStream and where necessary hand 
collected from annual reports. 
Direct custodian excellence is defined as the product of auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness. In respect to auditor quality, for purposes of this study this concept 
is measured as a function of auditor independence, auditor specialization and brand name 
reputation. In the case of audit committee effectiveness, this is measured as a function of 
audit committee independence, financial expertise of the audit committee, and the sub-
committee‘s diligence. 
With respect to components of auditor quality, information on non-audit fees and 
audit fees are collected to develop an appropriate proxy for auditor independence. This is 
hand collected from annual reports of firms included in the final useable sample for each 
year covered by the observation window. In respect to auditor specialization, audit fee data is 
again used along with details of industry classification for each selected firm. Whilst audit 
fee data is hand collected from annual reports, information to determine the industry type of 
each selected firm in the final useable sample is gathered from Bursa Malaysia‘s website. 
Finally, for brand name reputation information is hand collected from annual reports. 
                                                     
25 See Section 4.3 for the detailed discussion of Basu (1997) models. The Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model is 
also used for purposes of sensitivity testing. Hence, data was also collected to meet the requirements of that 
model. 
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As for audit committee effectiveness there is no established database of corporate 
governance information covering Malaysian publicly listed firms. Data used in the 
measurement of audit committee effectiveness and the three sub-components (i.e.audit 
committee independence, financial expertise of the audit committee, and the sub-
committee‘s diligence) is hand collected from annual reports. 
Whilst the main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between the 
timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism and (a) direct custodian excellence, (b) 
auditor quality, and (c) audit committee effectiveness, various robustness and various 
sensitivity tests will also be conducted.26 Data that was referred to earlier is required to 
conduct the sensitivity analysis. Such data (e.g. total assets, leverage) is obtained from 
annual reports or DataStream. 
 
4.2.3 Time period selection 
Analysis involves a longitudinal examination covering a six calendar-year period 
(January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007). The six-year period is selected to minimize any 
significant extraneous influences on findings as a result of fallout from the ‗Dot.Com 
Bubble‘ or the introduction of new International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Nonetheless, the period is also selected in order to determine the effectiveness of key 
corporate governance reforms introduced in 2001 and 2002. Further, for pragmatic reasons 
(i.e. unavailability of data) the observation prior to 2002 is not optimal. For example, 
information on key data such as non-audit fees, audit committee composition and frequency 
of audit committee meetings were not required to be published prior to 2002. Due to large 
pockets of missing data, analysis before 2002 is not realistic. The timeframe is also selected 
to collect the timeliest information available. When the study commenced, 2007 provided the 
timeliest information available. With a need to establish a relevant cut-off to give the study a 
specific timeframe, 2007 was pragmatically defined as the end of the observation window.  
 
4.3 Measurement of earnings conservatism 
Prior research suggests that earnings conservatism can be conceptualized in different 
ways (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Ruddock et al. 2006; Balkrishna et al. 2007; 
Lara et al. 2009a; Lara et al. 2009b). An approach to measuring earnings conservatism by 
Basu (1997) has received extensive attention and use in the extant literature. Basu‘s 
approach of measuring earnings conservatism is chosen to be used in this study because the 
method is commonly used in prior literature. Thus, it provides benchmark and comparability 
results with other studies that used Basu‘s method of measuring earnings conservatism. Basu 
(1997) developed models of earnings conservatism based on the: (a) asymmetrical timing of 
                                                     
26 See Section 4.6 for the detailed discussion of sensitivity tests. 
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positive and negative news (i.e. timeliness); and (b) time-series persistence of earnings (i.e. 
persistence).27 The following subsections describe the two main measures used to capture 
earnings conservatism. 
4.3.1 Basu (1997) model of timeliness 
The Basu (1997) timeliness approach of earnings conservatism is grounded in the 
assumption that the timeliness of earnings is asymmetric (Basu 1997; Ruddock et al. 2006; 
Balkrishna et al. 2007). According to Basu (1997), earnings are reverse-regressed on 
contemporaneous stock returns. The timeliness of earnings is inferred from the 
responsiveness of accounting income to changes in market value. Negative market adjusted 
stock returns are used as a proxy for bad news, whilst positive returns as a proxy for good 
news. In simple terms, this approach assesses whether earnings incorporates bad news 
(negative returns) more quickly than good news (positive returns). Timeliness is measured 
by the slope coefficient from a regression of annual earnings on contemporaneous stock 
returns (Basu 1997). 
The base model for the Basu (1997) timeliness approach takes the following form: 
 
OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + ∑γt + εi,t   [1] 
Where: 
OPIi,t = operating income firm i scaled by market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t; 
RETi,t = buy-and-hold return
28 over fiscal year t of firm i (i.e. (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the 
price of shares for firm i three (3) months after the end of the fiscal year t and Pt-1 is the 
price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t)29; 
NEGRETi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if RETt is negative, otherwise firm i 
scored zero (0); 
∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; 
αk, βk = coefficients; and 
εi,t = error term. 
  
Equation 1posits that using accounting earnings (a lagging variable) as the 
dependent variable and stock returns (a leading variable) as the independent variable better 
                                                     
27 Whilst the main results are based on the Basu (1997) timeliness and persistence models of earnings 
conservatism, a third measure of earnings conservatism is also used in the sensitivity analysis. The third approach 
is based on the difference in current period accruals and cash flows measured using the approach adopted by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005). 
28 There is some debate in the literature on whether returns such be based on ‗raw‘ or ‗market-adjusted‘ 
computations. There is a lack of consensus theoretically or empirically on which approach is best. Basu (1997) 
originally used ‗raw‘ returns. Consequently, this study uses ‗raw‘ returns in the presentation of the main findings. 
However, in the sensitivity analysis tests are performed again using ‗market-adjusted‘ returns. 
29 These returns are calculated from nine (9) months before the year-end t to three (3) months after the year-end t 
to exclude the effect of market response to the earnings release at the previous year-end. This approach has been 
used by many prior studies including Ball et al. (2000), Giner and Rees (2001), Joos (1997) and Kothari and 
Zimmerman (1995). Ball et al. (2000) claim that the rationale is to eliminate observations potentially with errors 
or with extreme values due to scaling. However, it is worth noting that potentially informative observations are 
removed and there is a danger of an incorrect inference. 
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estimates the slope coefficient.30 An indicator variable, NEGRETi,t is included in the 
regression to distinguish bad news from good news. 
 The slope coefficient β0 and β1 in Equation 1 are used to measure the responsiveness 
of reported earnings to the news captured in prior returns. These slope coefficients are 
termed return response coefficients. Empirical comparison of conservatism is based on the 
difference between the slope values for good news, β0  and for bad news, (β0 + β1).31 The bad 
news slope coefficient is steeper than the good news slope when conservatism exists. Under 
conservative accounting, β0 and β1 are expected to be positive and the ratio, (β0 + β1)/ β0 is 
expected to be higher than one because the accounting variables are considered to be more 
sensitive to bad news than to good news.  
 
4.3.2 Basu (1997) model of persistence 
The Basu (1997) timeliness model of earnings conservatism (i.e. Equation 1) 
presumes losses are recognized more quickly than gains and share prices reflect bad news in 
contemporaneous market losses earlier than good news via market gains. As the impact of 
news (whether good or bad) may not be captured in contemporaneous share prices alone, the 
second model defined by Basu (1997) as seen in Equation 2 presumes bad news reverses 
whilst good news persists. The deferred recognition of relatively good news results in 
positive changes in income being more likely to persist than negative earnings changes.  
Equation 2details the basic model underlying the persistence measure of earnings 
conservatism:  
 
∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + ∑γt + εi,t [2] 
Where:  
∆OPIi,t = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t scaled by the market value of 
equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
∆OPIi,t-1 = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1 (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆OPi,t-1 is negative, otherwise 
firm i scored zero; 
∑γt = represent fiscal year indicator variables; 
αk, βk = coefficients; and 
εi,t = error term. 
 
In Equation 2, the coefficient β1 indicates the incremental tendency to reverse for 
negative shocks over positive shocks in the subsequent period. The negative slope coefficient 
means reversal of the variable, and the positive means persistence. Under conservatism 
                                                     
30 The model‘s R², which generally assesses overall income timeliness of gains and losses combined, is not a 
valid indicator of conservatism because it does not explain the relative strength of the relation between bad and 
good news (Kung 2005). 
31 Good news sample (RETi,t< 0) is OPIi,t = α0 + β0RETi,t + εi,t and the bad news sample (RETi,t > 0) is OPIi,t = (α0 
+ β0) + (β0 + β1) RETi,t + εi,t. Hence, β0 and (β0 + β1) capture the incorporation in accounting earnings of good 
news and bad news respectively. 
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reporting, it is expected that the negative coefficient, (β0 + β1) on prior negative shocks are 
smaller than the coefficient β0 on prior positive shocks. 
 
4.4 Measurement of independent variables 
As noted earlier, the term direct custodian excellence has not been previously 
utilized in the extant literature. Rather, this phrase was created for this thesis to provide a 
common umbrella to encompass the joint influence of the two most prominent humanly 
physical corporate governance mechanisms that have come to directly influence a firm‘s 
financial reporting system in the past decades, that is, the external auditor and audit 
committee. It is acknowledged that prior research has examined the influence of the external 
auditor and audit committee on key financial accounting issues. Such research, however, 
overwhelmingly looked at the influence of each direct corporate governance mechanism in 
isolation rather than jointly. Given the efforts of this study to consider joint influences on 
earnings conservatism, the phrase direct custodians and direct custodian excellence are 
utilized. 
Discussion in prior chapters of this thesis suggest—based on an extensive literature 
review—that the influence of the external auditor on the financial accounting system will be 
determined substantially by the direct custodian‘s quality. Similarly, effectiveness will be a 
pivotal determining factor of the influence of the audit committee in addressing key financial 
accounting issues such as earnings quality, earnings management and adoption of 
conservative accounting practices. To this end, direct custodian excellence can be measured 
as a function of auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness; that is, direct custodian 
excellence = (auditor quality, audit committee effectiveness). For the purposes of this study 
direct custodian excellence is denoted by DCEi,t which is the composite score attributed to 
firm i at the end of time period t based on values assigned to underlying auditor quality and 
audit committee effectiveness components. The auditor quality score components of the 
DCEi,t is denoted by the variable AQi,t whilst audit committee effectiveness is denoted by 
ACEi,t. The noted relationship can be represented by the following mathematical relationship: 
 
DCEi,t = ∑ (AQi,t + ACEi,t)        [3] 
Where: 
DCEi,t = sum of component scores underpinning auditor quality and audit committee 
effectiveness for firm i at the end of time period t; 
AQi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning auditor quality, that is auditor 
independence (FEEi,t); auditor specialist (SPi,t) and brand name (BNi,t) for firm i at the end of 
time period t; and 
ACEi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning audit committee 
independence, that is audit committee independence (INDi,t); audit committee financial 
expertise (EXPi,t) and diligence of the audit committee (DILi,t) for firm i at the end of time 
period t. 
 
84 
Discussion in prior chapters suggests – based on an extensive literature review–that 
the influence of the external auditor on the financial accounting system will be determined 
substantially by the direct custodian‘s quality. Similarly, effectiveness is viewed as 
underpinning any influence the audit committee may have in addressing financial accounting 
issues. In consideration of these points, the discussion in the following sub-sections outlines 
the approach adopted to measure auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness in 
arriving at a composite score for direct custodian excellence.  
 
4.4.1 Measurement of auditor quality 
Frequently researchers have focused on a single component of auditor quality rather 
than a range of possible determinants. As this study aims to provide a broad holistic picture 
of the auditor quality construct, a composite score based on the auditor‘s independence, 
specialization and brand name is developed32. Specifically, for firm i in time period t, a 
composite score for auditor quality (i.e. AQi,t) is based on a score of one being awarded for 
each of the following individual characteristics being met: 
 The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the external auditor by firm i 
during time period t is less than 1:5 (or 20%). 
 The auditor of firm i during time period t is deemed to be an ‗industry 
specialist‘ in the industry sector to which firm i effectively operators as 
defined by Bursa Malaysia. 
 The auditor of firm i in time period t is one of the four major ‗Big 4‘ leading 
international accounting firms (i.e. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and 
Touché, KPMG and Ernst and Young). 
 
The range of scores for AQi,t, therefore, is from zero to three. AQi,t can be 
decomposed into three measures representing each individual component: (1) auditor 
independence (denoted as FEEi,t); (2) auditor specialist (denoted as SPi,t); and (3) auditor 
brand name(denoted as BNi,t).Each individual auditor quality component metric is scored as 
per the respective criteria outlined in scoring AQi,t. The calculation underpinning scores for 
AQi,t can be represented mathematically as: 
 
AQi,t = ∑ (FEEi,t + SPi,t+ BNi,t)        [4] 
Where: 
AQi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning auditor quality, that is auditor 
independence (FEEi,t); auditor specialization (SPi,t) and auditor brand name (BNi,t) for 
firm i at the end of time period t; 
FEEi,t = a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if during 
time period t the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the external auditor is less 
than 1:5 (or 20%); otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0); 
                                                     
32 There are some arguments that brand name and auditor specialization should not be included in the composite 
measure of auditor quality as both variables would be highly correlated. Thus, a sensitivity tests is performed 
considering of inclusion and exclusion for these variables. Please refer to Section 7.4 for details. 
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SPi,t = a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if during 
time period t the engaged auditor is recognized as an industry specialist for auditing 
purposes in the industry sector to which firm i is categorized by Bursa Malaysia; 
otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0); and 
BNi,t = a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if during 
the period t the auditor engaged is one of Big 4 major leading international accounting 
firms (i.e. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touché, KPMG and Ernst and Young). 
 
Justification for the proxy measures representing the three components of auditor 
quality is outlined in the following subsections. 
 
4.4.1.1 Measurement of auditor independence 
Prior research (e.g. Wines 1994; Casterella, Knechel and Walker 2002; Frankel et al. 
2002; Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds 2002; Myers, Myers and Omer 2003; Choi and 
Doogar 2005; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Basioudis, Papakonstantinou and Geiger 2008) has 
proposed alternative frameworks to define auditor independence and methods to measure 
this concept. An overwhelming focus of researchers, corporate governance reformists, 
regulators and the popular press during the past decade when discussing auditor 
independence has been the level of non-audit fees paid to the incumbent external auditor 
relative to total fees. Whilst not precisely a fresh notion (see Simunic 1984) as early 
evidence of concerns about influence of non-audit fees on auditor independence), a general 
presumption has developed since the Asian financial crisis and corporate scandals (e.g. 
Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat) at the turn of the millennium that perceptions of auditor 
independence will become increasingly negative as the proportion of non-audit fees paid to 
the incumbent external auditor compared to total fees rises (e.g. Lim and Tan 2008; Lim and 
Tan 2010). There is a lack of a clear conscientious on a precise non-audit fee/total fee ratio 
level that would constitute impairment of auditor independence. Whilst a cut-off remains 
primarily arbitrary, there is support in the literature and by law (e.g. MIA By-Law 2002) in 
applying a 1:5 (i.e. 20%) ratio limit. That is, if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees is 
below 20% then independence is not impaired and auditor quality is higher. Thus, for the 
dichotomous variable FEEi,t a score of one is awarded if the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees paid firm i to the external auditor during time period t is below 20% and zero otherwise. 
 
4.4.1.2 Measurement of auditor specialist 
Different measures have been employed to capture audit specialization across 
different time frames and countries. In general terms, two methods have emerged to measure 
for auditor industry specialization: (a) auditor industry market share; and (b) auditor industry 
portfolio share. The industry market share approach regards an accounting firm as an audit 
expert within an industry when the firm ―has differentiated itself from its competitors in 
terms of market share within a particular industry‖ (Neal and Riley 2004 p.170). In contrast, 
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they (Neal and Riley 2004 p.170) posit that the industry portfolio share approach regards 
―the relative distribution of audit services and related fees across the various industries for 
each audit firm considered individually‖. 
Whilst both methods offer respective merits, this study uses the industry market 
share approach. Craswell et al. (1995 p.300) justified adoption of this approach maintaining 
that ―demand for industry specialization drives audit firm investments in specialization and 
leads to industry-based clienteles‖. Such arguments provide the underlying rationale for 
using market share data to infer industry specialization. Thus, the measure for determining 
audit specialization is expressed below in Equation 5 as: 
 
Jik 
∑AFeesijk 
j=1 
IMSj,t = _________________ 
Ik JikAFeesijk 
∑ ∑ 
i=1 j=1 
           [5] 
The variable IMSi,t is the industry market share of audit firm i for time period t. 
Meanwhile, audit fees are defined by the variable AFees and the numerator in Equation 3 is 
the sum of audit fees paid to audit firm i by all Jik clients of audit firm i in industry k. Finally, 
the denominator is the sum of all audit fees paid to Ik audit firms with Jik clients in industry k. 
Prior research (e.g. Craswell and Taylor 1991; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Dunn 
and Mayhew 2004; Neal and Riley 2004) has used a range of industry market share cut-off 
points when determining if an audit firm is a specialist in a given industry. Predominantly 
the cut-off range is from 10% - 20%. For the purposes of the main analysis presented in this 
study a more restrictive cut-off is applied in determining an industry specialist. Specifically, 
if the IMSi,t score of audit firm i in time period t is greater than 20% for a given industry, 
then that audit firm i is classified as an industry specialist for that sector. 
In scoring the dichotomous variable SPi,t, firm i from industry sector k is scored one 
if the audit firm j engaged to conduct the external audit in time period t is defined as an 
industry specialist for industry sector k as per the relevant IMSj,t; otherwise firm i is scored 
zero. 
 
4.4.1.3 Measurement of auditor brand name 
Within a given economy (whether at a local, national, regional or worldwide level) 
highly reputable and respected audit firms undoubtedly exist. Nonetheless, to appease the 
perceptions of capital market participants across a broad scale, and to have the ability to 
enter a market with a preceding reputation, is likely to be associated with a small band of 
audit firms. Despite being associated with various notable scandals and controversies, the 
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Big 4 international audit firms (i.e. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touché, KPMG 
and Ernst and Young) are routinely acknowledged by regulators, researchers, investors and 
corporate management as the brand leaders within the audit markets across the world. In 
recognition of such brand leadership there is a general underlying perception that Big 4 audit 
firms are of a higher quality than Non-Big 4 audit firms. This is because Big 4audit firms 
have greater access to resources and knowledge than Non-Big 4 audit firms. Further, with 
more at stake in terms of reputation due to such brand recognition a Big 4 audit firm is likely 
to instill higher quality standards to preserve reputational capital than a Non-Big 4 audit firm. 
For the purposes of this study, therefore, auditor brand name (denoted by BNi,t) is 
operationalized by awarding a score of one if the external auditor engaged by firm i in time 
period t is a Big 4 audit firm; otherwise a score of zero is awarded. 
 
4.4.2 Measurement of audit committee effectiveness 
There is currently a lack of consensus on a precise measure for audit committee 
effectiveness. Following prior work (Beasley and Petroni 2001; Klein 2002a, 2002b; Van der 
Zahn and Tower 2004), this study develops a composite score for audit committee 
effectiveness based on the sub-committee‘s independence, expertise and diligence. 
Specifically, for firm i in time period t, a composite score for audit committee effectiveness 
(i.e. ACEi,t) is based on a score of one being awarded for each of the following individual 
characteristics being met: 
 Audit committee of firm i in time period t consists of a majority of 
independent directors. 
 At least one independent audit committee member of firm i in time period t 
is a qualified person with financial expertise identified as possessing 
necessary educational qualifications (i.e. degree in accounting), professional 
credentials (i.e. member of a professional accounting body) or work 
experience (i.e. experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief 
financial officer, controller, principal or chief accounting officer, CEO or 
president of a for-profit firm). 
 Audit committee of firm i in time period t meets five or more times. 
 
The range of scores for ACEi,t, therefore, is from zero to three. ACEi,t can be 
decomposed into three measures representing each individual component: (1) audit 
committee independence (denoted as INDi,t); (2) audit committee expertise (denoted as 
EXPi,t); and (3) audit committee diligence (denoted as DILi,t).Each individual audit 
committee effectiveness component metric is scored as per the respective criteria outlined in 
scoring ACEi,t. The calculation underpinning scores for ACEi,t can be represented 
mathematically as: 
 
 
 
ACEi,t = ∑ (INDi,t + EXPi,t+ DILi,t)       [6] 
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Where: 
ACEi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning audit committee effectiveness, 
that is audit committee independence (INDi,t); audit committee financial expertise 
(EXPi,t) and diligence of the audit committee (DILi,t) for firm i at the end of time period 
t; 
INDi,t =a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if at the 
end of time period t a majority of the members of the audit committee are classified as 
independent directors; otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0); 
EXPi,t =a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if at the 
end of time period t at least one member of the audit committee is deemed to have 
suitable financial expertise; otherwise, firm i is scored zero (0); and 
DILi,t =a dichotomous indicator variable whereby firm i is given a score of one (1) if during 
the period t the audit committee met five (5) or more times; otherwise, firm i is scored 
zero (0). 
 
Justification for the proxy measures representing the three components of audit 
committee effectiveness is outlined in the following subsections. 
 
4.4.2.1 Measurement of audit committee independence 
INDi,t is measured based on the definition of an independent director proposed under 
Malaysian corporate governance regulations that conform closely with corporate governance 
regulations in major leading economies. However, following past literature (McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003; Abbott et al. 
2004; Bédard et al. 2004), the final decision of the researcher on whether an audit committee 
member is independent is determined based on a review of all information disclosed in the 
firm‘s annual reports. 
Past literature outlines various ways of measuring audit committee member 
independence (Klein 2002a, 2002b; Abbott et al. 2003a; Abbott et al. 2003b; Xie et al. 2003; 
Vafeas 2005; Carcello et al. 2006). Some studies (Abbott et al. 2003a; Abbott et al. 2003b; 
Carcello et al. 2006) use a dichotomous variable giving a score of one when the audit 
committee entirely comprised of independent directors or zero otherwise. Alternatively, 
other studies (Klein 2002a, 2002b; Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005) measure audit committee 
independence as the percentage of independent members in the audit committee. Consistent 
with Abbott et al. (2003a; 2003b) and Carcello et al. (2006), main findings reported in this 
study are based on use of a dichotomous variable; that is, a score of one is awarded when the 
audit committee of firm i at end of time period t is comprised of a majority of independent 
directors, and zero otherwise. 
 
4.4.2.2 Measurement of audit committee financial expertise 
Audit committee financial expertise has been recognized by various studies as the 
key component of audit committee effectiveness. Scholars, regulators and researchers 
(Beasley and Salterio 2001; Bédard et al. 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower 2004; DeFond et 
al. 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008) have classified expertise into two different 
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categories, that is, financial expertise and non-financial expertise. For this particular study, 
emphasis is placed on financial expertise given the predominant use of financial expertise in 
the past literature (McDaniel et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Krishnan 
and Visvanathan 2008) and lack of clarity and available information to determine an 
individual‘s non-financial expertise. 
Consistent with prior literature (Xie et al. 2003; Bédard et al. 2004; Van der Zahn 
and Tower 2004; DeFond et al. 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008), 
this study measures EXPi,t such that an audit committee member is defined as having 
financial expertise if has existing or prior experience as a public accountant, auditor, 
principal or chief financial officer, controller, principal or chief accounting officer, and 
possesses recognized accounting qualifications and/or professional credentials. Thus, the 
variable EXPi,t is coded one if at least one member of the audit committee of firm i at the end 
of time period t is defined as being a financial expert. Otherwise a score of zero is awarded. 
 
4.4.2.3 Measurement of audit committee diligence 
Past literature (Menon and Williams 1994; Beasley et al. 2000; Xie et al. 2003; 
Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004; Farber 2005; Vafeas 2005) has often used the number 
of audit committee meetings as a proxy for audit committee diligence. It is suggested the 
number of audit committee meetings held is a representation of the degree of effort the audit 
committee puts forth in monitoring the financial reporting process. Although regulators in 
Malaysia (and generally worldwide) do not prescribe how often an audit committee should 
meet in a financial period, past literature (Menon and Williams 1994; McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Abbott et al. 2003b; Abbott et al. 2004; Steward and Munro 2007) has 
used the audit committee meeting at least four or five times annually as a standard measure 
of audit committee diligence. For the purposes of this study, therefore, audit committee 
diligence (as denoted by DILi,t) is operationalized by awarding a score of one if the audit 
committee of firm i in time period t meets at least five times or more financial year; 
otherwise a score of zero is awarded. 
 
4.5 Statistical tests and models 
The main focus of this study is to examine whether direct custodian excellence 
influences the level of a firm‘s earnings conservatism with regards to timeliness and 
persistence. 
To formally test whether Malaysian publicly listed firms subject to higher standards 
of direct custodian excellence are more likely to have higher levels of earnings conservatism, 
Equation 1 and Equation 2are extended. This extension includes the incorporation of 
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intercept and slope coefficients for the interactive effects of the any influence of direct 
custodian excellence. The models are defined in Equation 7 and Equation 8: 
 
OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DCEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 
+ β2RETi,t*DCEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t   [7] 
 
∆OPIi,t =  α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2DCEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + 
β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t 
+ ∑γt + εi,t         [8] 
Where: 
OPIi,t = operating income firm i scaled by market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t; 
RETi,t = buy-and-hold return over fiscal year t of firm i (i.e. (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the 
price of shares for firm i three (3) months after the end of the fiscal year t and Pt-1 is the 
price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t)33; 
NEGRETi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if RETt is negative, otherwise firm i 
scored zero (0); 
∆OPIi,t = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t scaled by the market value of 
equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
∆OPIi,t-1 = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1 (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆OPi,t-1 is negative, otherwise 
firm i scored zero; 
DCEi,t = sum of the composite scores for auditor quality (i.e. AQi,t) andaudit committee 
effectiveness (i.e. ACEi,t) for firm i at the end of time period t. Hence, DCEi,t = ∑(AQi,t + 
ACEi,t); 
∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; 
αk, βk = coefficients; and 
εi,t = error term. 
 
To formally test if a Malaysian publicly listed firm exposed to greater scrutiny of a 
higher quality auditor exhibits higher levels of earnings conservatism than a counterpart 
engaging a lower quality auditor, the composite proxy for auditor quality (i.e.AQi,t) is 
substituted for DCEi,t in Equation 9 and Equation 10: 
 
OPIi,t =  α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2AQi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*AQi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t
        [9] 
 
∆OPIi,t =  α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2AQi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + 
β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t       [10] 
Where: 
OPIi,t = operating income firm i scaled by market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t; 
RETi,t = buy-and-hold return over fiscal year t of firm i(i.e. (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the price 
of shares for firm i three (3) months after the end of the fiscal year t and Pt-1 is the price 
of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t)34; 
NEGRETi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if RETt is negative, otherwise firm i 
scored zero (0); 
                                                     
33See footnote 29 for detailed explanations. 
34See footnote 29 for detailed explanations. 
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∆OPIi,t = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t scaled by the market value of 
equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
∆OPIi,t-1 = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1 (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆OPi,t-1 is negative, otherwise 
firm i scored zero; 
AQi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning auditor quality, that is auditor 
independence (FEEi,t); auditor specialization (SPi,t) and auditor brand name (BNi,t) for 
firm i at the end of time period t. Hence, AQi,t = ∑(FEEi,t + SPi,t + BNi,t); 
∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; 
αk, βk = coefficients; and 
εi,t = error term. 
  
To formally test if Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit 
committees are more likely to have higher level of earnings conservatism than Malaysian 
publicly listed firms with less effective audit committee, the proxy for audit committee 
effective (i.e. ACEi,t) is substituted for DCEi,t in Equation 11 and Equation 12: 
 
OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2ACEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*ACEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + ∑γt + 
εi,t        [11] 
 
∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + 
β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t      [12] 
Where: 
OPIi,t = operating income firm i scaled by market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t; 
RETi,t = buy-and-hold return over fiscal year t of firm i (i.e. (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the 
price of shares for firm i three (3) months after the end of the fiscal year t and Pt-1 is the 
price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t)35; 
NEGRETi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if RETt is negative, otherwise firm i 
scored zero (0); 
∆OPIi,t = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t scaled by the market value of 
equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
∆OPIi,t-1 = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1 (i.e. MVEi,t-1); 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆OPi,t-1 is negative, otherwise 
firm i scored zero; 
ACEi,t = sum of the individual component scores underpinning audit committee effectiveness, 
that is audit committee independence (INDi,t); audit committee financial expertise 
(EXPi,t) and diligence of the audit committee (DILi,t) for firm i at the end of time period t. 
Hence, ACEi,t = ∑(INDi,t + EXPi,t + DILi,t); 
∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; 
αk, βk = coefficients; and 
εi,t = error term. 
 
In determining the influence of direct custodian excellence (auditor quality/audit 
committee effectiveness) on earnings conservatism, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients on β2 and β3 are considered. If a) higher standards of direct custodian excellence, 
b) higher auditor quality c) a more effective audit committee, is associated with firms 
                                                     
35See footnote 29 for detailed explanations. 
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reporting conservative earnings on a timely basis, then the β2 and β3 coefficients in tests of 
Equations 7, 9 and 11should be positive and significant. Positive and significant β2 and β3 
coefficients would indicate greater asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of good and bad 
news. In the reverse news regression model defined by Equations 8, 10 and 12, more 
conservative earnings would imply that a decline in earnings is a one period shock that 
reverses almost immediately whilst increases in earnings continue in subsequent period. If 
there is an increase in the reversal of earnings declines and persistence of earnings increase 
due to a) higher standards of direct custodian excellence, b) higher auditor quality, and c) a 
more effective audit committee, the β2 and β3 coefficients in tests based on Equations 8, 10 
and 12should be significant and negative.  
 
4.6 Sensitivity analysis 
Although the Basu (1997) timeliness and persistence models are commonly used 
methods measuring earnings conservatism, these approaches are not without limitation (e.g. 
Dietrich, Muller and Riedl 2003, 2007; Givoly et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). 
Dietrich et al. (2007), for example, argue that the difference in slopes predicted and reported 
by Basu (1997) when first testing his (Basu 1997) models reflects sample variance-ratio and 
truncation biases. Also, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) state the Basu (1997) models cannot 
differentiate transitory gain and loss components in earnings from random errors in accruals. 
They (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) further noted that the reverse regression (or persistence) 
approach defined by Basu (1997) assumes asymmetrical and efficient reaction to economic 
news. Given limitations of the Basu (1997) models, further analysis is performed using 
alternative measures of earnings conservatism such as that by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). 
Their (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) measure is based on the underlying relationship between 
contemporaneous accruals and cash flows. 
A key aspect of the Basu (1997) timeliness model of earnings conservatism involves 
the computation of share price returns. The finance and accounting literature documents a 
range of methods used by researchers to calculate returns. By way of robustness tests, 
analysis performed using the Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism will be 
performed again using alternative measures of returns such as market-adjusted returns using 
different index benchmarks. 
Aside from returns, different calculation bases have been used in computing 
earnings. For instance, some researchers have based earnings on net income after 
extraordinary items whilst others have concentrated on earnings in respect solely to 
operating activity components. To determine if the main findings from this study may be 
subject to earnings computation biases, additional regression tests (based on Equations 7 to 
12) are performed using alternative methods for calculating earnings. 
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In respect to the determination of DCEi,t,  AQi,t and DCEi,t scores, alternative criteria 
and benchmarks have been proposed in the literature. For example, in regards to auditor 
independence this study applies a non-audit fee to audit fee ratio cut-off of 1:5 (or 20%). 
Given this cut-off is generally arbitrary with the lack of a definitive consensus in the research 
literature the cut-off may be tightened or loosened accordingly. In recognizing scores for the 
independent variable proxies (i.e. DCEi,t, AQi,t and DCEi,t) can change depending on cut-off 
benchmark levels applied, a range of tests are performed again after applying both tighter 
and more lenient cut-off for different components underpinning direct custodian excellence. 
Prior research also suggests earnings conservatism may be influenced by key firm-
level characteristics such as firm size, leverage, industry type and growth opportunities 
(Beekes et al. 2004; Lara, Osma and Mora 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). To gauge 
if the main findings presented in this thesis may suffer from firm-level characteristic biases, 
a range of robustness tests are performed. For instance, the pooled sample is partitioned into 
sub-samples based on industry sectors. The regression analysis (based on Equations 7 to 12) 
is then performed again using each industry sub-sector sample. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The main focus of this chapter was to detail the research method used to test the 
hypotheses of this study. Initial discussion provides justification of the sample selected, 
source documentation chosen and time period analyzed. Subsequently, measures for the 
dependent and independent variables used in this study were outlined before the main 
empirical tests undertaken in this study were identified. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 5) the main descriptive statistics are reported. 
Discussion formally details the actual selection process culminating in the final useable 
sample. A breakdown of the final useable sample by industry sector is then detailed. 
Descriptive statistics spanning key firm-level characteristics (i.e. firm size and financial 
performance) of the final useable sample are then presented. Finally, descriptive results for 
direct custodian excellence (as per the two major components of auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness) are then detailed supported by breakdowns for key factors such as 
independence, diligence and expertise. 
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CHAPTER 5 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 outlined the research method applied in this study. Discussion initially 
outlined the procedure for determining the final useable sample, documentation to be 
gathered and measurement of the dependent and independent variables. The major statistical 
tests and the key multiple regression models to formally test the hypotheses were also 
defined in Chapter 4. Finally, the discussion in Chapter 4 detailed the robustness and 
sensitivity tests to be performed.  
In this chapter (Chapter 5), the main descriptive statistics are reported. Discussion 
first concentrates on formally describing the selection process of the final useable sample 
with an industry breakdown. Descriptive statistics spanning key firm-level characteristics 
(i.e. firm size and financial performance) of the final useable sample is then presented. In the 
third and fourth major sections of the chapter, descriptive results for auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness, with breakdowns for key factors, are presented. 
 
5.2 Sample selection process 
Analysis conducted in this study is based on a randomly selected sample of 100 
Malaysian firms listed on the Main Market of the Bursa Malaysia as of January 1, 2002 and 
continuously listed till December 31, 2007. The first step in determining the final useable 
sample was to establish an initial sample of Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
Main Market as of January 1, 2002. This initial sample comprised 847 firms. 
From the initial sample relevant exclusions based were made. First, all firms that had 
been liquidated, delisted and/or suspended during any part of the specified observation 
period were excluded. This totaled 188 firms. Consistent with prior literature, firms (i.e. a 
total of 54 observations) from the banking, finance, brokerage, and investment services 
industry were excluded. To reduce any abnormalities associated with an IPO, all firms that 
listed during the 2001 calendar year were also excluded as were any firms subject to merger 
and acquisition activities during the observation window. Thus, 21 firms with 2001 calendar 
year IPOs, and one firm involved in merger and acquisition activity, were excluded. 
Following the relevant exclusions the final initial sample (from which 100 firms were to be 
randomly selected) comprised 583 firms. The selection process is summarized in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Sampling selection procedures 
Details N 
All publicly listed firms on Bursa Malaysia Main Market as at January 1, 2002 847 
Less:  
i) Liquidated, delisted and suspended firms (188) 
ii) Banks, finance, brokerage investment services firms (54) 
iii) Firms with IPO in 2001 (21) 
iv) Firms involved in merger and acquisition activities (1) 
Firms available for random selection 583 
 
After randomly selecting 100 firms from the final initial sample of 583 the key 
source documentation (i.e. annual reports for the 2002–2007 financial years of each firm) to 
determine auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness was sought.36 If all sought 
annual reports could be collected without there being any missing data the final useable 
sample for analytical purposes would comprise 600 firm-year observations. Despite an 
extensive search of archives, databases, firm and stock exchange websites, and direct 
requests to firms, 18 annual reports could not be obtained. All collected annual reports were 
then comprehensively reviewed to determine if required information could be obtained. 
From this comprehensive review it was determined that data for 25 firm-year observations 
could not be established.37 After exclusions for missing documentation and data the final 
useable sample to be used in the analytical component of this study is 557 firm-year 
observations.  
Table 5.2 provides a breakdown of the final useable sample by the major industry 
classification of the Bursa Malaysia (see Table 5.2 Panel A) and by each calendar year (see 
Table 5.2 Panel B) this study covers. 
                                                     
36 Share price data could not be obtained from annual reports. Rather, this information was obtained from Bursa 
Malaysia archives and DataStream. 
37 To ensure a final useable sample of 600 firm-year observations a select and replace option could have been 
used. As the exclusion for missing documentation and data did not eliminate a randomly selected firm entirely the 
select and replace option was not undertaken so as to preserve the integrity of the original random selection 
process. 
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Table 5.2: Industry breakdown 
Panel A: Breakdown of firm-year observations by industry sector 
Sector Name N % 
Construction 98 17.594 
Consumer Products 102 18.313 
Industrial Products 129 23.160 
Mining 23 4.129 
Plantation 12 2.154 
Property 86 15.440 
Technology 12 2.154 
Trading & Services 95 17.056 
Total 557 100.000 
Panel B: Breakdown of firm-year observations by calendar year 
Year N % 
2002 84 15.081 
2003 91 16.338 
2004 92 16.517 
2005 96 17.235 
2006 96 17.235 
2007 98 16.517 
Total 557 100.000 
 
As indicated in Table 5.2 Panel A, the Industrial Products industry has the highest 
proportion of firm-year observations across the final useable sample (i.e. 129 of 557 firm-
year observations or 23.160%). The Consumer Products industry has the second highest 
level of representation (i.e. 102 firm-year observations or 18.313% of final useable sample). 
In contrast, the Plantation and Technology industry sectors have the lowest proportions with 
only 12 firm-year observations only (or 2.154% of the final useable sample). 
Relative to an industry sector breakdown of the Bursa Malaysia as at January 1, 
2002, the industry distribution for the final useable sample is quite similar.38 For example, as 
at January 1, 2002 firms from the Industrial Products industry represented 20.240% of all 
firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia Main Market. Meanwhile, firms from the Plantation and 
Technology industry sectors comprised on 2.774% and 2.401% of all firms listed on the 
Bursa Malaysia Main Market as at January 1, 2002. 
With respect to the calendar year breakdown (see Table 5.2 Panel B), no single 
calendar year had a full complement of observations.39 The highest number of observations 
for any one calendar year for the study‘s observation window is 2007 with 98 observations 
representing 17.594% of the final useable sample. In contrast, 2002 has the lowest 
                                                     
38 For comparison purposes, percentage of firms for the actual market of Bursa Malaysia is used instead of the 
percentage of firm-year observations. The details are presented in Appendix D: Table D:1. 
39 The maximum number of observations for a single calendar year is 100; hence, a full complement of 
observations. 
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representation with 84 observations (i.e. 15.081% of the final useable sample). The 
increasing proportional representation per calendar year is not unexpected given that is more 
likely missing data will occur in earlier rather than later years. 
 
5.3 Descriptive results of basic firm characteristics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for the final useable sample across two 
basic firm characteristics: (i) firm size; and (ii) financial performance.  
 
5.3.1 Firm size 
Table 5.3 reports firm size information for the final useable sample, with a 
breakdown across Bursa Malaysia industry classifications, across three commonly defined 
size dimensions: (i) total assets (see Table 5.3 Panel A); (ii) market capitalization (see Table 
5.3 Panel B); and (iii) cash flows from operating activities (see Table 5.3Panel C).  
Average firm size by total assets for the final useable sample is RM853,716,159 (see 
Table 5.3 Panel A). Firms from the Mining industry have the highest average total assets 
across the eight main industry sectors of the Bursa Malaysia (i.e. RM1,761,796,696) with 
firms from the Technology industry having the lowest (i.e. RM217,953,083). The smallest 
firm by total assets from any an individual firm-year observation is from the Property 
industry (i.e. RM15,105,000) whereas the largest by total assets is from the Industrial 
Products industry (i.e. RM9,936,780,000). 
In respect to market capitalization, average firm size for the final useable sample is 
RM894,756,072 (see Table 5.3 Panel B). As for industry sectors, the average size (based on 
market capitalization) of firms from the Consumer Product, Industrial Products and Trading 
& Services sectors are the highest (i.e. RM1,166,307,973; RM1,314,970,816 and 
RM1,359,725,761 respectively). As with total assets, the smallest industry sector based on 
market capitalization is the Technology industry (i.e. RM115,541,510) with the Construction 
industry being the second smallest on average (i.e. RM238,454,061). In regards to an 
individual firm-year observation, the Industrial Products industry had the highest market 
capitalization value (i.e. RM20,776,686,000) and the Consumer Products industry the lowest 
(i.e. RM1,963,400). 
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Table 5.3: Firm size characteristics with an industry sector breakdown 
Panel A: Total assets (RM millions) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 544.697 340.139 528.146 40.334 3,876.831 
Consumer Products 102 437.948 197.545 462.226 33.023 1,768.794 
Industrial Products 129 1,224.397 289.706 2,355.468 49.362 9,936.780 
Mining 23 1,761.797 329.444 2,656.379 93.140 7,260.433 
Plantation 12 471.791 352.085 334.301 77.593 1,118.000 
Property 86 736.475 388.934 964.801 15.105 4,342.096 
Technology 12 217.953 211.113 71.424 108.189 317.215 
Trading & Services 95 1,130.385 479.798 1,646.194 42.053 6,930.369 
Total 557 853.716 324.552 1,545.432 15.105 9,936.780 
Panel B: Market capitalization (RM millions) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 238.454 117.673 317.963 7.993 1,982.449 
Consumer Products 102 1,166.308 173.702 2,731.742 1.963 14,062.353 
Industrial Products 129 1,314.971 110.880 3,815.928 5.676 20,776.686 
Mining 23 896.395 117.048 1,286.591 18.205 3,609.358 
Plantation 12 740.503 405.143 764.243 45.000 2,253.626 
Property 86 306.424 118.298 544.271 31.419 3,633.767 
Technology 12 115.542 105.933 51.788 68.107 248.964 
Trading & Services 95 1,359.726 372.886 2,785.573 27.866 18,300.00 
Total 557 894.756 135.809 2,528.679 1.963 20,776.686 
Panel C: Cash flows from operating activities (RM millions) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 28.891 12.992 73.614 -121.114 500.716 
Consumer Products 102 72.287 12.365 196.047 -78.315 976.669 
Industrial Products 129 114.118 11.588 342.148 -109.093 1,740.778 
Mining 23 76.684 4.433 161.124 -41.504 601.122 
Plantation 12 57.395 47.535 62.285 -14.058 148.672 
Property 86 16.755 5.163 61.898 -133.094 355.630 
Technology 12 20.901 8.378 23.038 -2.712 59.737 
Trading & Services 95 120.610 15.989 319.289 -61.134 1,699.022 
Total 557 72.761 10.710 235.562 -133.094 1,740.778 
 
If judging firm size based on cash flow from operating activities, the average for the 
final useable sample is RM72,761,152 (see Table 5.3 Panel C). The Trading & Services 
industry is the sector with the highest average cash flow from operating activities (i.e. 
RM120,610,269) followed by the Industrial Products industry. Conversely, the Property 
industry is the smallest sector based on average cash flow from operating activities 
(i.e.RM16,754,701) with the Technology industry being the second smallest (i.e. 
RM20,900,949). The Property industry also has the smallest amount of cash flows from 
operating activities for an individual firm-year observation (i.e. RM-133,094,000) with the 
Industrial Products industry having the highest (RM1,740,778,000). 
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Overall, firms from the Industrial Products and Trading & Services industries are 
relatively similar in average size if considering each major size dimension jointly. This is 
likely due to these two industry sectors having a lengthy established history in Malaysia‘s 
economic development. In contrast, the Technology industry is consistently the smallest 
industry sector on average when considering the three size dimensions. This is primarily due 
to Malaysia still being an emerging economy and the Technology industry has yet to become 
as entrenched as other sectors.  
Whilst Table 5.3 provided a breakdown of the alternative firm size dimensions by 
industry sectors, Table 5.4 provides a firm size breakdown on a calendar year basis. As 
shown in Table 5.4 Panel A, aside from a dip from 2002 to 2003, average annual firm size by 
total assets increases year-on-year. The decline in average annual firm size by total assets 
from 2002 to 2003 may be explained by the severe acute respiratory syndrome crisis (SARS) 
that led to a serious recession in South-East Asia that would have reduced asset values. The 
increase in annual average firm size by total assets year-on-year from 2003 to 2007 is 
indicative of the economic growth in Malaysia following the SARS crisis and greater global 
prosperity. 
In contrast to firm size by total assets, Table 5.4 Panel B results show average annual 
firm size by market capitalization does not have a definitive upward (or downward) trend 
across the observation window. Rather, the annual firm size by market capitalization 
increases (declines) from 2002 to 2003 (2003 to 2005) and 2005 to 2006 (2006 to 2007). 
Average annual firm size by market capitalization is greatest in 2006 (i.e. RM1,026,243,088) 
and lowest in 2005 (i.e.RM754,662,087). The individual firm-year observation with the 
lowest market capitalization value is recorded in 2002 (i.e. RM1,963,400) with the highest in 
2006 (i.e. RM20,776, 686,000).  
Similar to average annual firm size by market capitalization, there is a lack of any 
definitive trend in changes in average annual firm size by cash flow from operating 
activities. As reported in Table 5.4 Panel C, the average annual firm size by cash flow from 
operating activities declines (increases) from 2002 to 2003 (2003 to 2005) and 2005 to 2006 
(2006 to 2007). The highest average annual firm size by cash flow from operating activities 
is in 2007 (i.e. RM97,828,424) with the lowest in 2003 (i.e. RM59,316,908). On an 
individual firm-year observation basis, 2004 has the lowest amount of cash flows from 
operating activities (i.e. RM-133,094,000) with the highest in 2006 (i.e. RM1,740,778,000). 
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Table 5.4: Firm size on yearly basis 
Panel A: Total assets (RM millions) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 803.179 267.953 1,513.721 15.105 9,936.780 
2003 91 789.410 285.005 1,447.831 40.334 9,414.204 
2004 92 819.244 318.118 1,484.275 43.548 9,489.807 
2005 96 874.175 335.805 1,580.286 34.167 9,397.167 
2006 96 883.053 372.606 1,539.087 39.467 9,493.122 
2007 98 940.329 369.239 1,713.411 33.023 9,793.303 
Total 557 853.716 324.552 1,545.432 15.105 9,936.780 
Panel B: Market capitalization (RM millions) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 849.401 126.938 2,344.296 1.963 13,950.061 
2003 91 917.898 153.200 2,292.500 2.749 14,062.353 
2004 92 822.068 116.698 2,253.585 5.105 15,928.793 
2005 96 754.662 106.865 2,258.439 3.927 17,017.095 
2006 96 1,026.243 144.005 2,975.631 3.927 20,776.686 
2007 98 988.812 146.966 2,931.267 5.676 19,688.383 
Total 557 894.756 135.809 2,528.679 1.963 20,776.686 
Panel C: Cash flows from operating activities (RM millions) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 63.886 8.120 201.980 -78.315 1,441.904 
2003 91 59.317 5.842 192.975 -52.872 1,385.383 
2004 92 65.423 8.230 219.831 -133.094 1,590.909 
2005 96 78.352 12.999 255.336 -121.114 1,597.306 
2006 96 69.122 12.706 264.995 -116.326 1,740.778 
2007 98 97.828 19.299 263.954 -82.879 1,589.575 
Total 557 72.761 10.710 235.562 -133.094 1,740.778 
 
Overall, the trough in average annual firm size for the final useable sample (as 
measured by average total assets and cash flows from operating activities) in 2003 is 
reflective of the economic trouble besieging Malaysia during the SARS crisis. In contrast, 
the peak in 2007 values reflects the strong global economy prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008/2009. 
 
5.3.2 Financial performance 
Table 5.5 provides information on the financial performance of the 557 firm-year 
observations with a breakdown by Bursa Malaysia industry classifications. The key 
measures for financial performance are: (a) return on assets (ROA); (b) market-to-book 
value (MTB); and (c) cash flows from operating activities deflated by the market value of 
equity (CFO).  
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Table 5.5: Financial performance on industry basis 
Panel A: Return on assets (ROA- %) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 2.353 2.568 14.950 -105.935 74.503 
Consumer Products 102 6.450 5.129 12.611 -23.265 50.582 
Industrial Products 129 2.480 3.403 9.121 -40.259 28.026 
Mining 23 3.372 2.500 8.702 -13.438 21.477 
Plantation 12 3.357 7.068 11.324 -17.813 15.646 
Property 86 1.724 1.795 5.574 -27.651 23.817 
Technology 12 -0.682 4.162 14.931 -44.333 9.356 
Trading & Services 95 4.582 3.353 23.402 -59.734 194.276 
Total 557 3.414 2.980 14.052 -105.935 194.276 
Panel B: Market-to-book value (MTB - %) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 118.132 85.095 114.258 10.199 616.746 
Consumer Products 102 366.790 100.789 886.864 -1.316 6,227.573 
Industrial Products 129 123.842 90.247 120.194 -69.435 961.374 
Mining 23 137.660 100.894 259.358 -756.016 554.162 
Plantation 12 173.709 186.925 112.313 38.286 360.048 
Property 86 75.686 51.120 91.031 19.842 693.964 
Technology 12 94.100 64.631 77.585 24.431 301.914 
Trading & Services 95 334.592 171.419 555.165 -29.932 3,934.697 
Total 557 196.841 87.735 467.341 -756.016 6,227.573 
Panel C: Cash flow from operating activities deflated by market value (CFO - %) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 4.764 3.740 8.970 -24.220 37.130 
Consumer Products 102 8.046 5.380 14.004 -34.440 57.870 
Industrial Products 129 4.902 5.040 8.085 -22.840 28.800 
Mining 23 3.543 1.450 8.822 -12.740 29.460 
Plantation 12 8.834 9.505 9.340 -4.970 22.970 
Property 86 1.604 1.275 5.792 -16.800 23.780 
Technology 12 10.104 5.645 10.618 -2.370 26.660 
Trading & Services 95 4.905 3.130 11.503 -33.120 41.680 
Total 557 5.085 3.610 10.184 -34.440 57.870 
 
As shown in Table 5.5 Panel A, the average ROA for the final useable sample (N = 
557 firm-year observations) is 3.414%. ROA average, meanwhile, varies between industries. 
For example, the average ROA for observations within the Consumer Products industry is 
the largest (i.e. 6.450%) whilst observations comprising the Technology industry had the 
lowest average ROA (i.e. -0.682%). As for individual observations, the lowest ROA is from 
the Construction industry (-105.935%) with the highest being from the Trading & Services 
industry (194.276%). 
In respect to MTB, Table 5.5 Panel B shows the average MTB of the final useable 
sample is 196.841%. Observations from the Consumer Products industry have the highest 
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average MTB of 366.790% which is just higher than the Trading & Services industry (i.e. 
334.592%). In contrast, observations forming the Property industry have the lowest average 
MTB of 75.686%. As for individual observations, the lowest MTB value is from the Mining 
industry (-756.016%) and the highest in the Consumer Products industry (i.e. 6228.00%). 
As indicated in Table 5.5 Panel C, the average CFO for the final useable sample is 
5.085%. Across the eight main Bursa Malaysia industries the Technology industry has the 
highest average CFO (i.e. 10.104%) that is just higher than for the Plantation and Consumer 
Products industries (i.e. 8.834% and 8.046% respectively). In contrast, the Property industry 
has the lowest CFO average (i.e. 1.604%). Meanwhile, the Consumer Products industry has 
the smallest and highest CFO values (-34.440% and 57.870% respectively). 
Overall, financial performance (based on ROA, MTB and CFO) for the Consumer 
Products industry appears on average to be relatively high compared to the other major 
industry sectors of the Bursa Malaysia. Though firms in the Industrial Products and Trading 
& Services industries were found to be the largest on average, firms from the Consumer 
Products industry appear to utilize assets more effectively in generating financial 
performance. Conversely, firms in the Property industry did not appear to have strong 
financial performance fundamentals. 
Meanwhile, Table 5.6 provides an annual breakdown of the financial performance 
(based on ROA, MTB and CFO) of the final useable sample. 
As shown in Table 5.6 Panel A the annual average ROA is generally quite stable 
around 2.000%–3.000% with two spikes in 2004 and 2007. Specifically, in 2002, 2003 and 
2005 the average ROA is approximately 2.000% whilst for 2006 it is approximately 3.000%. 
In 2004, meanwhile, average ROA is close to 6.000% whilst in 2007 it is around 5.000%. 
The spikes in 2004 may be a by-product of Malaysia‘s emergence from the economic 
recession spurned by the SARS crisis whereas the spike in 2007 reflects the global boom in 
the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis. On an individual observations basis, the 
lowest (highest) ROA value occurs in 2003 (2004).  
In the case of MTB values, the annual average rises from 2002 to 2003 (i.e. 
221.884% to 293.206%) before falling for the next two years (i.e. 2004 and 2005). There is 
again a rise in annual average MTB from 2005 to 2006 (i.e. 129.245% to 165.563%) with 
stability between 2006 and 2007 (i.e. 165.563% compared to 164.423%). On an individual 
observation basis the lowest MTB value is reported in 2003 (i.e. -756.016%) with the highest 
in 2005 (i.e. 6227.573%).  
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Table 5.6: Financial performance on yearly basis 
Panel A: Return on assets (ROA) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 2.000 2.207 9.259 -36.640 37.476 
2003 91 1.811 2.642 17.815 -105.935 74.503 
2004 92 6.058 2.940 21.235 -19.154 194.276 
2005 96 2.109 2.666 10.503 -59.574 34.485 
2006 96 3.219 3.506 11.029 -44.333 44.419 
2007 98 5.102 4.457 9.917 -30.662 50.582 
Total 557 3.414 2.980 14.052 -105.935 194.276 
Panel B: Market-to-book value (MTB) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 221.884 112.591 497.338 -756.016 3,934.697 
2003 91 293.206 119.776 670.815 -29.932 5,086.680 
2004 92 216.362 83.212 670.042 -1.316 6,227.573 
2005 96 129.245 70.256 189.528 -0.852 1,617.003 
2006 96 165.563 89.484 236.511 -0.755 1,836.875 
2007 98 164.423 83.767 308.902 -69.435 2,311.235 
Total 557 196.841 87.735 467.341 -756.016 6,227.573 
Panel C: Cash flows from operating activities deflated by market value of equity (CFO) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 4.288 3.530 8.799 -18.290 40.450 
2003 91 4.105 2.770 9.600 -33.120 56.270 
2004 92 4.605 2.865 9.151 -11.640 49.160 
2005 96 5.018 3.675 10.511 -34.440 42.700 
2006 96 5.054 3.505 10.560 -18.870 51.590 
2007 98 7.228 5.390 11.847 -28.140 57.870 
Total 557 5.085 3.610 10.184 -34.440 57.870 
 
As reported in Table 5.6 Panel C the annual average CFO value is quite stable 
between 2002 and 2006 (between 4.000% and 5.000%). In 2007 the annual average CFO 
value rises to approximately 7.000%. The stability of the annual average CFO values during 
the majority of the observation period suggests the firms in the final useable sample were 
able to maintain persistent steady (and generally improving) cash flow streams. On an 
individual observation basis the smallest CFO value (i.e. -34.440%) is recorded in 2005 and 
the highest (i.e. 58.870%) in 2007.  
Overall, Table 5.6 suggests the financial performance of firms included in the final 
useable sample is quite stable year-on-year based on ROA and CFO. In terms of MTB, 
however, annual financial performance appears to display greater variability. 
 
5.4 Descriptive result of auditor quality 
This section provides descriptive results related to the quality of the auditor 
associated with firms in the final useable sample. The initial discussion concentrates on audit 
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fee descriptive information with particular attention to the brand name of the audit firm. 
Discussion then covers the two key features of auditor quality: (a) auditor independence; and 
(b) auditor specialization 
 
5.4.1 Fees and brand name 
As auditor independence and auditor specialization is frequently defined in terms of 
audit fees (i.e. total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees), it is important to describe the fees 
paid by the final useable sample. Table 5.7 provides total fee, audit fee and non-audit fee 
information with a breakdown by the major industry classifications of the Bursa Malaysia. 
 
Table 5.7: Total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees by industry 
Panel A: Total fees (RM‘000) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 258.748 131.000 506.496 23.300 4,672.000 
Consumer Products 102 192.410 100.600 220.942 32.000 1,179.000 
Industrial Products 129 341.064 180.670 467.070 20.000 2,630.000 
Mining 23 251.920 128.500 565.980 15.500 2,806.000 
Plantation 12 163.128 175.307 79.287 51.000 296.000 
Property 86 187.757 126.538 193.420 31.000 942.670 
Technology 12 145.595 123.229 55.766 93.000 288.663 
Trading & Services 95 412.010 205.477 445.665 16.000 2,451.655 
Total 557 276.063 137.000 404.170 15.500 4,672.000 
Panel B: Audit fees (RM‘000) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 217.646 105.986 422.425 23.300 3,829.000 
Consumer Products 102 140.847 86.000 169.491 23.000 771.000 
Industrial Products 129 273.436 110.844 406.544 20.000 2,455.000 
Mining 23 124.459 124.715 96.300 15.500 392.000 
Plantation 12 117.821 100.900 64.132 51.000 248.500 
Property 86 140.585 100.250 127.204 31.000 555.000 
Technology 12 113.552 114.000 30.047 42.600 161.000 
Trading & Services 95 347.316 176.000 415.440 16.000 2,430.000 
Total 557 218.480 110.000 336.037 15.500 3,829.000 
Panel C: Non-audit fees (RM‘000) 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 41.102 6.650 96.055 0.000 843.000 
Consumer Products 102 51.563 16.322 84.748 0.000 420.125 
Industrial Products 129 67.629 21.000 129.905 0.000 1,034.000 
Mining 23 127.461 6.750 520.927 0.000 2,511.000 
Plantation 12 45.307 41.675 47.255 0.000 140.420 
Property 86 47.172 15.000 83.043 0.000 476.670 
Technology 12 32.043 8.250 48.637 0.000 166.116 
Trading & Services 95 64.694 24.900 113.114 0.000 596.000 
Total 557 57.584 16.200 145.492 0.000 2,511.000 
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Table 5.7 shows that for the final useable sample average total fees, audit fees and 
non-audit fees paid to the external auditor is RM276,063, RM218,480 and RM57,584 
respectively (see Table 5.7 Panel A, Panel B and Panel C). With specific regard to total fees 
(see Table 5.7 Panel A), averages vary across the eight major Bursa Malaysia industry 
classifications. Overall the Trading & Services industry had the highest average total fees 
(i.e.RM412,010) which is more than 20% higher than the next highest industry average; that 
is, for the Industrial Products industry with an average of RM341,064. On the opposite side 
of the coin the Technology industry had the lowest average total fees (i.e. RM145,595). On 
an individual basis the smallest total fees paid was for a firm-year observation from the 
Mining industry (i.e. RM15,500) whilst the highest (i.e. RM4,672,000) is from the 
Construction industry. 
As for audit fees, Table 5.7 Panel B shows the Trading & Services industry had the 
highest average (i.e. RM347,316) followed by the Industrial Products industry (i.e. 
RM273,436). Meanwhile, the Technology industry paid the lowest average audit fees (i.e. 
RM113,552) being just ahead of the Plantation industry (i.e. RM117,821). The lowest 
(highest) audit fees paid for an individual firm-year observation is for a firm in the Mining 
(Construction) industry, that is, RM15,500 (RM3,829,000). 
Across the eight major Bursa Malaysia industry categories the Mining industry paid 
the highest average amount of non-audit fees (i.e. RM127,461) which is almost double that 
for any other industry group. Somewhat unsurprising given average total fees, the Industrial 
Products and Trading & Services industries had the next highest average non-audit fees (i.e. 
RM67,629 and RM64,694 respectively). As with total fees and audit fees, the Technology 
industry has the lowest average non-audit fees (RM32,043). The individual observation 
paying the highest non-audit fees was from the Mining industry (RM2,511,000) whilst there 
was at least one observation from each industry that did not pay any non-audit fees. 
The high average fees (total, audit and non-audit) paid by the Industrial Products 
and Trading & Services industries is likely a by-product of firm size. As reported in Table 
5.3 Panel A, for example, the average total assets of firms in the Industrial Products and 
Trading & Services industries were second and third highest behind the Mining industry. 
Moreover, the complexity of Industrial Products and Trading & Services industries may also 
contribute to higher average fees. As the Technology industry is the smallest sector based on 
size (see Table 5.3), it is not entirely unexpected that this industry sector paid the lowest 
average fees. It also reinforces the perception the Technology industry is still in its infancy in 
Malaysia. 
Table 5.8, meanwhile, provides an annualized breakdown (as opposed to industry 
breakdown in Table 5.7) of total, audit and non-audit fees paid by firms in the final useable 
sample. Average total fees and audit fees have a similar year-on-year pattern. That is, from 
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2002 to 2004 average annual total fees and audit fees declined (see Table 5.8 Panel A and 
Panel B) before increasing year-on-year from 2004 to 2006. Between 2006 and 2007 average 
total fees and audit fees again declined. For non-audit fees (see Table 5.8 Panel C), the 
annualized average declined year-on-year from 2002 to 2003 (i.e.RM82,664 to RM41,625) 
before rising in 2004. Between 2004 and 2005 average non-audit fees declined again (i.e. 
RM47 971 to RM43,554). Following a substantial increase in 2006 (i.e. RM80,181) the 
average non-audit fees again declined in 2007 (i.e. RM51,536).  
 
Table 5.8: Malaysian total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees by years 
Panel A: Total fees (RM‘000) 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 307.010 127.350 590.172 16.000 4,672.000 
2003 91 248.271 132.000 311.024 15.500 1,613.000 
2004 92 245.501 138.106 270.761 15.500 1,187.000 
2005 96 249.969 136.450 302.746 19.440 1,701.000 
2006 96 319.047 157.393 484.150 31.000 2,806.000 
2007 98 287.492 162.500 394.159 32.500 2,167.000 
Total 557 276.063 137.000 404.170 15.500 4,672.000 
Panel B: Audit fees (RM‘000) 
Years N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 224.346 89.788 459.915 16.000 3,829.000 
2003 91 206.646 100.200 280.870 15.500 1,538.000 
2004 92 197.530 110.577 231.954 15.500 1,075.000 
2005 96 206.415 112.250 264.728 19.440 1,688.000 
2006 96 238.866 126.900 383.313 27.000 2,455.000 
2007 98 235.956 123.857 358.636 32.500 2,128.000 
Total 557 218.480 110.000 336.037 15.500 3,829.000 
Panel C: Non-audit fees (RM‘000) 
Years N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 82.664 26.750 170.688 0.000 1,034.000 
2003 91 41.625 20.000 53.949 0.000 259.000 
2004 92 47.971 10.750 86.998 0.000 534.941 
2005 96 43.554 13.806 77.809 0.000 430.857 
2006 96 80.181 18.500 264.506 0.000 2,511.000 
2007 98 51.536 13.650 102.684 0.000 596.000 
Total 557 57.584 16.200 145.492 0.000 2,511.000 
 
The fluctuations in average annualized total, audit and non-audit fees are likely a 
combination of introduction of additional observations between years (particularly for the 
period 2002–2005) and substantial one-off payments in a given year. Between 2002 and 
2003, for example, seven additional observations were included (see Table 5.8). Firms 
underlying these observations may have been smaller and less complex leading to lower 
fees; hence, the decline in average total, audit and non-audit fees. Meanwhile, in 2002 the 
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largest individual payment for audit fees (i.e.RM3,829,000 see Table 5.8 Panel B) was made. 
The payment is more than 50% higher than the next highest individual audit fee in 2006 (i.e. 
RM2,455,000) and 2.5 times larger than the largest audit fees paid in 2003 (i.e. 
RM1,538,000). The large one-off payment for audit fees in 2002 may have caused a spike in 
average total fees and audit fees in that year. Similarly, in 2006 the highest individual non-
audit fee (i.e. RM2,511,000) is paid (see Table 5.8 Panel C). This is 2.5 times larger than the 
next highest individual non-audit fee payment in 2003 (i.e. RM1,034,000), and more than 5 
times larger than the highest individual payment for non-audit services in 2005 (i.e. 
RM430,857) and 2007 (i.e. RM596,000) respectively. The large individual payment for non-
audit services in 2006, thus, significantly contributes to the spike in average annual total and 
non-audit fees in 2006.40 
Table 5.9 reports a breakdown of the average fees (total, audit and non-audit) paid to 
audit firms by brand name. Of the final useable sample of 557 firm-year observations, the 
Big 4 audit firms were involved in 326 cases (or 58.528%). Ernst and Young (EY) had the 
largest share of the audit market covering 172 of 326 (or 52.761%) firm-year observations 
associated with Big 4 audit firms. The dominance of EY can in part be explained by the 
acquisition of a number of clients from Arthur Andersen41 in 2001. KPMG Peat Marwick 
(KPMG) had the second highest audit market share of the Big 4 (79 of 326 Big 4 firm-year 
observations or 24.231%) closely followed by PWC, that is PriceWaterhouseCoopers (69 of 
326 Big 4 firm-year observations or 21.166%). The audit market share of Deloitte and 
Touché (DT), meanwhile, is virtually negligible (6 of 326 Big 4 firm-year observations or 
1.841%). In respect to Non-Big 4 audit firms, BDO Binder had the highest market 
representation, being engaged on 25 firm-year observations (i.e. 10.823% of all 231 Non-Big 
4 firm observations). 
 
 
                                                     
40 It may also be speculated the decline in average total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees between 2002 and 
2004 could also be attributed in part to introduction of new regulations in the wake of corporate scandals such as 
Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom.  
41 In Malaysia Ernst & Young took over the operations of Arthur Andersen (previously considered as a Big5 
firm), thereby leading to a jump in clientele (Ahamad-Rapani 2006). 
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Table 5.9: Malaysian total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees by audit firms 
Panel A: Total fees (RM‘000) 
Auditors N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Big 4:*       
DEL 6 339.667 353.000 93.940 226.000 472.000 
EY 172 310.853 123.500 431.854 20.000 2,630.000 
KPMG 79 323.955 170.000 598.272 17.000 4,672.000 
PWC 69 337.574 206.459 334.457 60.300 2,128.000 
Non-Big 4 231 213.755 129.008 307.814 15.500 2,806.000 
Total 557 276.063 137.000 404.170 15.500 4,672.000 
Panel B: Audit fees (RM‘000) 
Auditors N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Big 4:*       
DEL  6 283.333 285.000 47.681 226.000 333.000 
EY 172 253.856 110.000 381.896 20.000 2,455.000 
KPMG 79 248.385 105.000 487.615 17.000 3,829.000 
PWC 69 248.688 148.000 283.839 39.000 2,128.000 
Non-Big 4 231 171.205 99.255 236.999 15.500 2,430.000 
Total 557 218.480 110.000 336.037 15.500 3,829.000 
Panel C: Non-audit fees (RM‘000) 
Auditors N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Big 4:*       
DEL  6 56.333 43.500 62.752 0.000 141.000 
EY 172 56.998 17.675 98.152 0.000 461.000 
KPMG 79 75.570 23.000 158.732 0.000 1,034.000 
PWC 69 88.886 40.729 117.785 0.000 596.000 
Non-Big 4 231 42.551 10.000 175.054 0.000 2,511.000 
Total 557 57.584 16.200 145.492 0.000 2,511.000 
Legend:*Big 4 firms‘ abbreviations: DEL is Deloitte and Touche, EY is Ernst and Young, KPMG is 
KPMG Peat Marwick, PWC is PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
 
The dominance of the Big 4 audit firms is not unexpected based on prior research of 
the Malaysian audit market. Ahamad-Rapani (2006), for example, found based on year 2000 
data the Big 4 audit firms controlled 68.88% of the Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia Main Board. The higher representation of Non-Big 4 (i.e. 41.472%) in this study is 
attributed to use of the Main Market that was formed from a merger of the Main Board and 
Secondary boards of Bursa Malaysia. This merger diluted the audit market.42 Further, the 
collapse of Arthur Andersen likely prompted some firms to shift to a Non-Big 4 audit firm.  
As reported in Table 5.9, average total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees of each Big 
4 audit firm are higher than for Non-Big 4 audit firms. For example, in respect to total fees 
                                                     
42 Before the introduction of the Main Market, most firms listed on Main board of the Bursa Malaysia were 
audited by Big 4 firms but those on the Secondary Board were audited by Non-Big 4 audit firms (Ahamad-Rapani 
2006). 
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the average amount paid to Non-Big 4 audit firms (i.e.RM213,755) is approximately a third 
less than for any of the Big 4 audit firms. This differential in fees is consistent with prior 
worldwide research (i.e. Caneghem 2010) that suggests Big 4 audit firms receive a fee 
premium relative to Non-Big 4 audit firms, and is indicative of the perspective Non-Big 4 
audit firms are likely to provide services to smaller, less complex firms for which lower fees 
are charged.43 
Amongst the Big 4 audit firms DEL had the highest average total fees (i.e. 
RM339,667 see Table 5.9 Panel A) closely followed by PWC (i.e. RM337,574). The bulk of 
the higher average total fees paid to DEL can be attributed to audit fees whilst for PWC non-
audit fees play a substantial role. Specifically, as reported in Table 5.9 Panel B, DEL has the 
highest average audit fees amongst the Big 4 audit firms (i.e. RM283,333) whilst PWC has 
the second lowest (i.e. RM248,688). Meanwhile, PWC had the highest average non-audit 
fees amongst Big 4 audit firms (i.e.RM88,886) and DEL the lowest (i.e. RM56,333)—see 
Table 5.9 Panel C). On an individual observation basis, KMPG was paid the highest 
individual amount of total fees (i.e. RM4,672,000), audit fees (i.e.RM3,829,000) and non-
audit fees (i.e. RM1,034,000). 
 
5.4.2 Auditor independence 
As discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.4.1, the proxy measure is based on the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees. Specifically, an audit firm for an individual firm-year 
observation is viewed as independent if the ratio of non-audit services to total fees paid for 
firm i to the incumbent auditor during fiscal year t is less than 20%. When the condition for 
an individual firm-year observation is met a score of one is assigned.44 Table 5.10 provides 
information on auditor independence (i.e. firm-year observations scored one based on the 
defined proxy measure) with a breakdown by industry, year of observation and audit firm 
brand name. 
                                                     
43 It is noted, however, that Non-Big 4audit firms are periodically engaged in large audits. For example, the 
largest payment of total fees to an individual Non-Big 4 firm is RM2,806,000. In the main, however, Non-Big 4 
audit firms service smaller entities. 
44 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1.1) for further detailed discussion on the measurement of auditor independence. 
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Table 5.10: Auditor independence 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
Construction 98 66 67.347 
Consumer Products 102 53 51.961 
Industrial Products 129 77 59.690 
Mining 23 18 78.261 
Plantation 12 7 58.333 
Property 86 46 53.488 
Technology 12 7 58.333 
Trading & Services 95 55 57.895 
Total 557 329 59.066 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Year N N Scored 1 % 
2002 84 40 47.619 
2003 91 51 56.044 
2004 92 58 63.043 
2005 96 61 63.542 
2006 96 57 59.375 
2007 98 62 63.275 
Total 557 329 59.066 
Panel C: Breakdown by auditor brand 
Auditors N N Scored 1 % 
Big 4:*    
DEL 6 3 50.000 
EY 172 109 63.372 
KPMG 79 48 60.759 
PWC 69 26 37.681 
Non-Big 4 231 143 61.905 
Total 557 329 59.066 
Legend:*Big 4 firms‘ abbreviations: DEL is Deloitte and Touché, EY is Ernst and Young, KPMG is 
KPMG Peat Marwick, PWC is PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
  
Table 5.10 shows 329 of the 557 (i.e. 59.066%) firm-year observations comprising 
the final useable sample were scored one for auditor independence. On an industry basis the 
Mining industry has the largest proportion of firm-year observations scored one for auditor 
independence (i.e. 78.261%). This result is quite interesting given average audit fees and 
non-audit fees for the Mining industry (see Table 5.7 Panel B and Panel C) are very close. 
The result presented in Table 5.10 Panel A, therefore, suggests the majority of the Mining 
industry firms paid only a small amount of non-audit fees with some paying substantial 
amounts. The industry sector with the second highest proportion scoring one for auditor 
independence is the Industrial Products industry (i.e. 67.347%) whilst the Consumer 
Products industry had the least (i.e. 51.961%). 
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The annualized breakdown reported in Table 5.10 Panel B shows 2002 had the lowest 
proportion of firm-year observations scoring one for auditor independence (i.e. 47.619%) 
whilst 2005 had the highest proportion (i.e. 63.542%). On a year-on-year basis, the 
proportion of observations per year being scored one for auditor independence increased 
annually from 2002 to 2005 before a decline in 2006. The proportion again rose in 2007. The 
general increase in the proportion of observations in each year being scored one for auditor 
independence across the observation window (aside from the dip in 2006) is likely due to the 
strengthening of corporate governance standards governing auditor/client relationships in 
Malaysia and increased scrutiny of auditor independence by stakeholders. This is particularly 
true for the increase between 2002 and 2003 that followed the fallout from worldwide 
corporate accounting scandals. 
In respect to the brand name breakdown presented in Table 5.10 Panel C, a higher 
number of firm-year observations associated with a Big 4 auditor are scored one for auditor 
independence than those associated with Non-Big 4 audit firms (i.e. 186 compared to 143). 
However, a higher proportion of firm-year observations associated with a Non-Big 4 audit 
firm are scored one for auditor independence than those associated with Big 4 audit firms 
(i.e. 61.905% compared to 57.055%). Between the Big 4 audit firms, EY had the highest 
proportion of associated firm-year observations scored one for auditor independence (i.e. 
63.372%) which was closely followed by KPMG (i.e. 60.759%). PWC, meanwhile, had the 
lowest proportion of firm-year observations scored one for auditor independence (i.e. 
37.681%). The low proportion for PWC could be due to the type of firm this audit firm 
typically audits. That is, PWC may predominantly audit firms from an industry that regularly 
demands (or requires) the provision of associated non-audit services. Findings presented in 
the next section provide further insights into this issue. 
 
5.4.3 Audit specialization 
The second pivotal feature of auditor quality addressed in this study is auditor 
specialization.45 As discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.4.1, for this study an auditor for firm i is 
considered a specialist if the auditor has a 20% market share of total audit fees in industry k 
with industry market share determined by total audit fees of auditor j in industry k divided by 
total audit fees received by all auditors in industry k. If the aforementioned condition is met 
the firm-year observation is scored one. Table 5.11 provides a summary of the determination 
of market share and auditor specialization.46 
 
                                                     
45 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1.2) for a more detailed discussion of previous auditor specialization literature. 
46 In Table 5.11 the market share of Non-Big 4 audit firms are accumulated. While the market share may be 
greater than 20%, none of the individual market shares for Non-Big-4 audit firms in a given industry is in excess 
of 20%. Hence, a specialized auditor is only attributable to a Big 4 audit firm. 
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Table 5.11: Malaysian auditing firm‘s market shares and auditor specialization 
 
Big 4 Audit Firms* 
Panel E: Non-Big 4 Panel F: Total Audit Fees 
Panel G: 
Specialist Auditor Panel A: DEL Panel B: EY Panel C: KPMG Panel D: PWC 
Industry N RM'mil % N RM'mil % N RM'mil % N RM'mil % N RM'mil % N RM'mil % N % 
Construction 6 1.700 7.970 24 1.696 7.952 18 10.850 50.870 6 0.526 2.466 44 6.557 30.742 98 21.329 100.000 18 18.367 
Consumer Products 0 0.000 0.000 23 4.494 31.282 30 2.737 19.052 13 1.811 12.606 36 5.324 37.060 102 14.366 100.000 23 22.549 
Industrial Products 0 0.000 0.000 47 20.141 57.099 20 4.535 12.856 11 2.981 8.451 51 7.617 21.594 129 35.274 100.000 47 36.434 
Mining 0 0.000 0.000 6 0.612 21.384 1 0.017 0.594 0 0.000 0.000 16 2.233 78.022 23 2.862 100.000 6 26.087 
Plantation 0 0.000 0.000 6 0.396 28.006 6 1.018 71.994 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 12 1.414 100.000 12 100.000 
Property 0 0.000 0.000 29 3.739 30.924 0 0.000 0.000 25 5.132 42.445 32 3.220 26.631 86 12.091 100.000 54 62.791 
Technology 0 0.000 0.000 6 0.728 53.412 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 6 0.635 46.588 12 1.363 100.000 6 50.000 
Trading & Services 0 0.000 0.000 31 11.856 35.933 4 0.466 1.412 14 6.710 20.336 46 13.963 42.319 95 32.995 100.000 45 47.368 
Total 6 1.700 1.397 172 43.662 35.879 79 19.623 16.125 69 17.160 14.101 231 39.549 32.499 557 121.694 100.000 211 37.881 
Legend: *Big 4 firms‘ abbreviations: DEL is Deloitte and Touché, EY is Ernst and Young, KPMG is KPMG Peat Marwick, PWC is PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Auditors identified as specialist 
auditors are highlighted in bold. 
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As EY is the external auditor for the highest number and percentage of firm-year 
observations within the final useable sample, it is not surprising EY is the market leader 
(based on raw numbers) across a majority of the eight major industry categories of Bursa 
Malaysia. Specifically, EY had the highest number of observations in the (a) Construction, 
(b) Consumer Products, (c) Industrial Products, (d) Mining, (e) Property, (f) Technology, 
and (g) Trading & Services industries (see Table 5.11 Panel B). EY and KPMG have an 
equal number of observations in the Plantation industry (see Table 5.11 Panel B and Panel 
C). For the Consumer Products industry, KPMG is the audit firm with the highest number of 
firm-year observations (i.e. N = 30; see Table 5.11 Panel C). 
Just as EY dominates the raw number of observations in the majority of industries, 
this Big 4 audit firm also dominates the market share in the majority of industries. Indeed, 
EY has the highest market share (based on the sum of audit fees received by the auditor from 
audits of firms in a given industry divided by total audit fees paid by firms in the given 
industry) in five Bursa Malaysia industry categories. These industries are: (i) Consumer 
Product; (ii) Industrial Product; (iii) Mining; (iv) Technology; and (v) Trading & Services 
(see Table 5.11 Panel B). As reported in Table 5.11 Panel C, KPMG has the highest market 
share in the Construction (i.e. 50.870%) and Plantation (i.e. 71.994%) industries. Finally, 
PWC is the market leader by share in the Property industry (i.e. 42.445%; see Table 5.11 
Panel D). 
In respect to overall market share that underpinned the auditor specialization, Ernst 
and Young also has the largest market share of 35.879% of the big brand names. This is 
followed by KPMG Peat Marwick (16.125%) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (14.101%). 
Deloitte and Touché has the smallest market share of 1.397%.  
Overall, 211 of the 557 firm-year observations (or 37.881%) of the final useable 
sample are classified as having been audited by a specialist auditor (see Table 5.11 Panel G). 
In terms of raw number of observations, the Property industry had the highest representation 
(i.e. 54) closely followed by the Industrial Products (i.e. 47) and Trading & Services (i.e. 45) 
industries. The Mining and Technology industries had the least raw number of firm-year 
observations identified as being audited by a specialist (i.e. six). On a percentage basis all 
firm-year observations associated with the Plantation industry are deemed to have been 
audited by a specialist whilst the Construction industry had the lowest percentage (i.e. 
18.367%).  
 
5.5 Descriptive result of audit committee effectiveness 
The second major direct custodian described in this study is the audit committee. 
This study hypothesized a more effective audit committee is likely to be positively 
associated with earnings conservatism. For this thesis audit committee effectiveness is 
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defined by: (a) independence; (b) financial expertise; and (c) diligence. This section provides 
descriptive statistics related to the audit committee‘s size and effectiveness properties. 
 
5.5.1 Size of the audit committee 
Table 5.12 provides information on the size of the audit committee for a final 
useable sample with a breakdown by industry (see Panel A) and year of observation (see 
Panel B). The average size of audit committees for the final useable sample comprises 3.623 
members with a median of 3.000. The minimum number of members on the audit committee 
of an individual firm-year observation is 2.000 and the maximum is 6.000. 
 
Table 5.12: Size of audit committee 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 3.663 3.000 0.773 3.000 5.000 
Consumer Products 102 3.843 4.000 0.887 2.000 6.000 
Industrial Products 129 3.713 4.000 0.675 3.000 5.000 
Mining 23 3.174 3.000 0.388 3.000 4.000 
Plantation 12 4.083 4.500 0.996 3.000 5.000 
Property 86 3.581 4.000 0.603 3.000 5.000 
Technology 12 3.500 3.500 0.522 3.000 4.000 
Trading & Services 95 3.326 3.000 0.471 3.000 4.000 
Total 557 3.623 3.000 0.718 2.000 6.000 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 3.702 4.000 0.757 3.000 6.000 
2003 91 3.648 4.000 0.766 2.000 6.000 
2004 92 3.641 4.000 0.704 3.000 6.000 
2005 96 3.635 4.000 0.713 3.000 6.000 
2006 96 3.646 4.000 0.696 3.000 6.000 
2007 98 3.480 3.000 0.677 3.000 6.000 
Total 557 3.623 3.000 0.718 2.000 6.000 
 
As shown in Table 5.12 Panel A, the average size of an audit committee in the 
Mining, Property, Technology and Trading & Services industries are below the full final 
useable sample average. The Mining industry has the lowest average audit committee 
membership (i.e. 3.174) followed by the Trading & Services industry (i.e. 3.326). As the 
average total assets for the Mining and Trading & Services industries are substantially higher 
than other industry sectors (aside from the Industrial Products industry) it is somewhat 
surprising the audit committee size is low. This could suggest that whilst firms in the Mining 
and Industrial Products industries have large asset bases, accounting for these items is not 
complex, thereby, requiring a smaller audit committee for monitoring purposes. Another 
interesting observation is that whilst firms in the Plantation industry are amongst the 
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smallest based on total assets and market capitalization, this sector has the highest average 
audit committee by size (i.e. 4.083). On an individual firm-year observation basis the 
smallest and largest audit committees comprising two members and six members 
respectively are from the Consumer Products industry (see Table 5.12 Panel A). 
In terms of the annual breakdown (see Table 5.12 Panel B) the highest average audit 
committee size is recorded in 2002 (i.e. 3.702) and the lowest in 2007 (i.e. 3.480). Between 
2003 and 2006 the average size of audit committees of firms included in the final useable 
sample remained quite stable. Across the observation period the average size of audit 
committees of firms in the final useable sample is above the minimum recommended by The 
Code in Malaysia. Nonetheless, the decline overall in audit committee size from 2002 to 
2007 could be attributed to several factors. For example, audit committees are relatively new 
to the corporate governance structure of Malaysian publicly listed firms. With the passage of 
time and development of experience, Malaysian publicly listed firms may have found 
smaller audit committees more cohesive and effective. Alternatively, with growth of the 
Malaysian economy between 2002 and 2007, more firms have sought to list. This is likely to 
have put a resource strain on qualified individuals able to sit on boards of directors and audit 
committees. 
 
5.5.2 Audit committee independence 
Audit committee independence is commonly measured as the ratio (expressed as a 
percentage) of independent directors on the audit committee to total audit committee 
membership. As reported in Table 5.13, the average (median) audit committee independence 
of the final useable sample is 71.750% (66.667%). This average is consistent with prior audit 
committee research covering South-East Asian nations (e.g. Van der Zahn and Tower 2004). 
Table 5.13 Panel A provides a breakdown by industry audit committee 
independence. On average the Trading & Services industry has the highest percentage of 
audit committee independence (i.e. 75.351%) with the Plantation industry having the lowest 
average (i.e. 61.944%). With respect to individual firm-year observations, the lowest level of 
audit committee independence (i.e. 25.000%) is recorded in the Industrial Products industry. 
Only the Plantation industry did not have at least one firm-year observation whereby the 
entire audit committee was comprised of independent directors.  
On an annual basis Table 5.13 Panel B results show audit committee independence 
is virtually constant (between 70.000% and 71.000%) between 2002 and 2006 before a rise 
in 2007 to 77.109%. The increase in average audit committee independence in the last 
observation year may likely be due to the introduction of new corporate governance 
regulations governing audit committees that came into effect in 2007. Indeed, a key 
amendment of the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance effective in 2007 was 
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aimed at strengthening the audit committee by proposing the sub-committee be comprised of 
a majority of independent members.  
 
Table 5.13: Percentage of independent audit committee from total audit committee 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 69.864 66.667 14.337 33.333 100.000 
Consumer Products 102 74.935 75.000 11.936 50.000 100.000 
Industrial Products 129 69.341 66.667 14.972 25.000 100.000 
Mining 23 71.014 66.667 9.689 66.667 100.000 
Plantation 12 61.944 60.000 5.017 50.000 66.667 
Property 86 71.066 66.667 9.572 50.000 100.000 
Technology 12 73.611 75.000 9.289 66.667 100.000 
Trading & Services 95 75.351 75.000 12.150 66.667 100.000 
Total 557 71.750 66.667 12.904 25.000 100.000 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 70.972 66.667 13.486 25.000 100.000 
2003 91 70.256 66.667 10.619 25.000 100.000 
2004 92 70.399 66.667 11.281 25.000 100.000 
2005 96 70.521 66.667 11.141 25.000 100.000 
2006 96 70.903 66.667 11.938 25.000 100.000 
2007 98 77.109 75.000 16.678 25.000 100.000 
Total 557 71.750 66.667 12.904 25.000 100.000 
 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Klein 2002a; Carcello and Neal 2003; Agrawal 
and Chadha 2005; Vera-Munoz 2005) an audit committee in this study is deemed to be most 
effective when it consists of independent directors. Thus, as described in Chapter 4 Section 
4.4.2 a firm-year observation is scored one if the associated audit committee to that 
observation is comprised mainly of independent directors.47 Table 5.14 reports (with a 
breakdown by industry and year) the number and percentage of firm-year observations 
scoring one for audit committee independence based on the measure used in this study.  
For the entire final useable sample Table 5.14 shows only 64 of 557 (i.e. 11.490%) 
firm-year observations scored one where audit committees were comprised mainly of 
independent directors. On an industry basis the Trading & Services industry is the sector 
with the largest percentage of mainly independent audit committee members (i.e. 17.895% or 
17 of 95 Trading & Services industry observations). The second largest is the Consumer 
Products industry with 15 of 102 (or 14.706%) observations having mainly independent 
                                                     
47 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2.1) for detailed discussion on the measurement of an audit committee‘s 
independence. 
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audit committee members. The Plantation industry did not have a single firm-year 
observation associated with mainly independent audit committee members.  
 
Table 5.14: Audit committee independence 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
Construction 98 13 13.365 
Consumer Products 102 15 14.706 
Industrial Products 129 11 8.527 
Mining 23 2 8.696 
Plantation 12 0 0.000 
Property 86 5 5.814 
Technology 12 1 8.333 
Trading & Services 95 17 17.895 
Total 557 64 11.490 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
2002 84 9 10.714 
2003 91 5 5.495 
2004 92 6 6.522 
2005 96 7 7.292 
2006 96 8 8.333 
2007 98 29 29.592 
Total 557 64 11.490 
 
On an annual basis (see Table 5.14 Panel B) the proportion of audit committees with 
mainly independent members dropped between 2002 and 2003 (i.e. 10.714% to 5.495%) 
before rising (steadily) on an annual basis from 2003 to 2006 (i.e. 5.495% to 8.333%). In 
2007 the proportion of audit committees with mainly independent members also increased 
from the prior year though the increase is more noticeable. Indeed, of the 98 firm-year 
observations in 2007, 29 (or 29.592%) had proportion of audit committees with mainly 
independent members. This is fourfold increase over 2006. This rapid increase is likely due 
to the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance that became effective in 2007 and 
that emphasized the importance of an independent audit committee. 
 
5.5.3 Audit committee financial expertise 
Financial expertise is another key component of audit committee effectiveness. As 
per earlier discussion in this thesis, an audit committee is deemed to have financial expertise 
if at least one independent director on the sub-committee has an accounting degree and also 
has recognized professional accounting credentials. If the noted conditions are met then a 
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firm-year observation is scored one.48 Table 5.15 provides an industry and annual breakdown 
of audit committee financial expertise. 
 
Table 5.15: Audit committee financial expertise 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
Construction 98 44 44.898 
Consumer Products 102 44 43.137 
Industrial Products 129 35 27.132 
Mining 23 2 8.696 
Plantation 12 4 33.333 
Property 86 27 31.395 
Technology 12 6 50.000 
Trading & Services 95 34 35.789 
Total 557 196 35.189 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
2002 84 27 32.143 
2003 91 31 34.066 
2004 92 31 33.696 
2005 96 35 36.458 
2006 96 35 36.458 
2007 98 37 37.755 
Total 557 196 35.189 
 
For the entire final useable sample 196 of 557 firm-year observations (i.e. 35.189%) 
were associated with audit committees that had a financial expert as a member. On an 
industry basis, Table 5.15 Panel A indicates the Technology industry firm-year observations 
have the highest percentage of audit committees with financial expertise, that is, 6 of 12 (or 
50.000%).The industry sector with the second largest percentage is the Construction industry 
(i.e. 44.898%) which is followed by the Consumer Products industry at 43.137%. The 
Mining industry had the lowest percentage of firm-year observations associated with an audit 
committee having a financial expert that is 8.696%.  
Across the observation window there is an increase in the proportion of firm-year 
observations associated with audit committees having a financial expert. The change year-
on-year, though, is not altogether substantive except for between 2004 and 2005 when 
percentages increased from 33.696% to 36.458%. The year with the largest percentage of 
firm-year observations scoring one for financial expertise is 2007 with the smallest in 2002 
(i.e. 37.755% and 32.143% respectively). 
                                                     
48See Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2.2) for detailed discussion on the measurement of audit committee financial 
expertise. 
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Despite new corporate governance regulations stressing the importance of financial 
experts on the audit committee, the results presented in Table 5.15 Panel B suggest 
Malaysian publicly listed firms may not be as proactive toward adding financial experts as 
one may expect. This could be due to the lack of financial experts willing to sit on audit 
committees, or mere apathy.  
 
5.5.4 Audit committee diligence 
Diligence is the final component of audit committee effectiveness considered in this 
study. Table 5.16 provides information on number of audit committee meetings undertaken 
by firms included in the final useable sample. A breakdown by industry and year is also 
documented in Table 5.16.  
 
Table 5.16: Audit committee diligence (actual number of meetings) 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 5.020 5.000 0.930 4.000 10.000 
Consumer Products 102 4.716 5.000 0.825 3.000 7.000 
Industrial Products 129 4.605 5.000 0.666 3.000 7.000 
Mining 23 4.391 4.000 1.158 3.000 7.000 
Plantation 12 4.750 5.000 0.622 4.000 6.000 
Property 86 5.070 5.000 0.955 3.000 8.000 
Technology 12 4.583 4.500 0.669 4.000 6.000 
Trading & Services 95 5.137 5.000 0.930 3.000 9.000 
Total 557 4.855 5.000 0.887 3.000 10.000 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Sector Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 4.917 5.000 1.020 3.000 8.000 
2003 91 4.912 5.000 0.839 3.000 7.000 
2004 92 4.761 5.000 0.830 3.000 7.000 
2005 96 4.833 5.000 0.937 4.000 9.000 
2006 96 4.865 5.000 0.936 3.000 10.000 
2007 98 4.847 5.000 0.765 3.000 7.000 
Total 557 4.855 5.000 0.887 3.000 10.000 
 
For the entire final useable sample audit committees met on average 4.855 times. 
Across the eight major Bursa Malaysia industry categories, the Trading & Services sector 
had the highest average number of audit committee meetings per firm-year observation, that 
is, 5.137 times. In contrast, the lowest average number of audit committee meetings per firm-
year observation for a given industry sector is the Mining industry, that is, 4.391 times. The 
lowest number of times an audit committee met in an individual firm-year is three times. 
This low is observed in the Trading & Services, Consumer Product, Industrial Products and 
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Mining industries. In contrast, the Construction industry had the highest number of audit 
committee meetings (i.e. 10 times) for an individual firm-year observation.  
Table 5.16 Panel B shows that the average number of audit committee meetings for 
each observation year is quite stable ranging from a low of 4.761 times in 2004 to a high in 
2002 of 4.917 times. Across the observation period there is no distinctive upward or 
downward trend in annual average diligence. There is a minor decline from 2002 to 2004 
before an increase from 2004 to 2006. There is a slight decline from 2006 to 2007 (i.e. 4.865 
times to 4.847 times).  
As discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.4.2, a firm-year observation is scored one if 
during that year of observation the audit committee met five times or more.49 Table 5.17 
provides details of audit committee diligence with a breakdown by industry and year. 
 
Table 5.17: Audit committee diligence 
Panel A: Breakdown by industry sector 
Sector Name N N Scored 1 % 
Construction 98 71 72.449 
Consumer Products 102 56 54.902 
Industrial Products 129 68 52.713 
Mining 23 5 21.739 
Plantation 12 8 66.667 
Property 86 62 72.093 
Technology 12 6 50.000 
Trading & Services 95 73 76.842 
Total 557 349 62.657 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
Year N N Scored 1 % 
2002 84 50 59.524 
2003 91 62 68.132 
2004 92 52 56.522 
2005 96 57 59.375 
2006 96 61 63.542 
2007 98 67 68.367 
Total 557 349 62.657 
 
As reported in Table 5.17, 349 of the 557 firm-year observations of the final useable 
sample were scored one. This represents 62.657% of the final useable sample. On an 
industry basis, the Trading & Services industry had the highest proportion of diligent audit 
committees that is 73 of 95 observations or 76.842%. This is closely followed by the 
Construction and Property industries, that is, 71 of 98 observations (or 72.449%) and 62 of 
86 observations (or 72.093%) respectively. The smallest percentage is for the Mining 
                                                     
49 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2.3) for detailed discussion on the measurement of audit committee diligence. 
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industry where only 21.739% firm-year observations for this industry are associated with a 
diligent audit committee.  
In respect of the annual breakdown, Table 5.17 Panel B shows considerable year-on-
year changes in audit committee diligence across the observation period. There is an increase 
year-on-year of the proportion of observations in a given year being scored one for audit 
committee diligence from: (a) 2002 to 2003; and (b) 2004 to 2007. Meanwhile, there is a 
decline from 2003 to 2004. The year with the highest proportion of observations being 
scored one is in 2007 (i.e. 68.367%) with the lowest in 2004 (i.e. 56.522).  
 
5.6 Descriptive result for composite scores DCEi,t, AQi,t and ACEi,t 
While previous sections discussed descriptive statistics for each independent 
variable features in individual, this section will present the discussions using composite 
scores (i.e. direct custodian excellence, audit quality and audit committee effectiveness). As 
discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.4, two major components of direct custodian excellence are 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness. The direct custodian excellence variable is 
measured by combining the scores for auditor quality and the scores for audit committee 
effectiveness. Table 5.18 provides information on these composite scores with breakdown by 
industry and year of observation50. 
Table 5.18 Panel A Column I shows that the average composite scores of direct 
custodian excellence on an industry basis is 3.487. On average the Plantation industry has 
the largest composite score of direct custodian excellence (i.e. 4.500) with the Mining 
industry having the lowest composite score (i.e. 2.652). With respect to individual firm-year 
observations, for the smallest composite scores of DCEi,t, the entire industries have DCEi,t 
composite scores of at least one firm-year observation except for the Plantation industry 
with composite scores of three. Meanwhile, for the largest composite scores of DCEi,t, only 
the Mining industry did not show maximum composite scores of six (i.e. five). 
On an annual basis, Table 5.18 Panel B Column I shows that 2002 had the lowest 
average composite scores of direct custodian excellence (i.e. 3.274) whilst 2007 had the 
highest composite score (i.e. 3.582). On a year-on-year basis, the results shows average 
composite scores of direct custodian excellence do not have a definitive upward or 
downward trend across the study period. The average annual scores increase (decrease) from 
2002 to 2003 (2003 to 2004), 2004 to 2005 (2005 to 2006) and 2006 to 2007. In respect to 
individual firm-year observations, at least one firm-year observation has composite scores of 
one for the entire usable sample.  
                                                     
50 Please refer to Table G: 1 for explanation on descriptive statistics for composite scores of DCEi,t, AQi,t and 
ACEi,t.  
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Table 5.18: Descriptive statistics for composite scores of DCEi,t, AQi,t and ACEi,t 
Panel A: Breakdown by major industry classification 
  Column I:DCEi,t composite score Column II:AQi,t composite score Column III:ACEi,t composite score 
Industry N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 3.490 4.000 1.058 1.000 6.000 1.408 1.000 0.810 0.000 3.000 2.082 2.000 0.755 0.000 3.000 
Consumer Products 102 3.353 3.000 1.087 1.000 6.000 1.392 1.000 0.924 0.000 3.000 1.961 2.000 0.716 1.000 3.000 
Industrial Products 129 3.287 3.000 1.318 1.000 6.000 1.566 1.000 0.991 0.000 3.000 1.721 2.000 0.729 0.000 3.000 
Mining 23 2.652 2.000 1.071 1.000 5.000 1.348 1.000 0.935 0.000 3.000 1.304 1.000 0.470 1.000 2.000 
Plantation 12 4.500 4.500 1.168 3.000 6.000 2.583 3.000 0.515 2.000 3.000 1.917 2.000 0.793 1.000 3.000 
Property 86 3.779 4.000 1.442 1.000 6.000 1.791 2.000 1.053 0.000 3.000 1.988 2.000 0.819 0.000 3.000 
Technology 12 3.583 4.000 1.730 1.000 6.000 1.583 2.000 1.505 0.000 3.000 2.000 2.000 0.426 1.000 3.000 
Trading & Services 95 3.695 4.000 1.297 1.000 6.000 1.568 1.000 1.136 0.000 3.000 2.126 2.000 0.640 1.000 3.000 
Total 557 3.487 3.000 1.276 1.000 6.000 1.555 1.000 1.005 0.000 3.000 1.932 2.000 0.741 0.000 3.000 
Panel B: Breakdown by year of observation 
  Column I:DCEi,t composite score Column II:AQi,t composite score Column III:ACEi,t composite score 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 3.274 3.000 1.206 1.000 6.000 1.429 1.000 0.997 0.000 3.000 1.845 2.000 0.720 1.000 3.000 
2003 91 3.560 4.000 1.231 1.000 6.000 1.571 1.000 0.990 0.000 3.000 1.989 2.000 0.691 1.000 3.000 
2004 92 3.489 4.000 1.262 1.000 6.000 1.641 2.000 0.990 0.000 3.000 1.848 2.000 0.769 0.000 3.000 
2005 96 3.510 4.000 1.361 1.000 6.000 1.594 1.500 1.052 0.000 3.000 1.917 2.000 0.763 0.000 3.000 
2006 96 3.479 3.000 1.314 1.000 6.000 1.521 1.000 1.036 0.000 3.000 1.958 2.000 0.724 0.000 3.000 
2007 98 3.582 3.000 1.276 1.000 6.000 1.561 1.500 0.975 0.000 3.000 2.020 2.000 0.773 0.000 3.000 
Total 557 3.487 3.000 1.276 1.000 6.000 1.555 1.000 1.005 0.000 3.000 1.932 2.000 0.741 0.000 3.000 
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With regards to auditor quality composite scores, as reported in Table 5.18 Panel A 
Column II, the average composite scores of auditor quality on an industry basis is 1.555. On 
average the Mining industry has the lowest composite score of auditor quality (i.e. 1.348) 
with Plantation industry having the largest composite score (i.e. 2.583). With respect to 
individual firm-year observations, only Plantation industry has composite scores of auditor 
quality of at least two for the lowest scores whilst the entire industries have none. 
Meanwhile, for the largest composite score of auditor quality, all firm-year observations are 
associated with higher quality of auditor with composite scores of three.  
In respect to the annual breakdown, (see Table 5.18 Panel B Column II), the highest 
average auditor quality composite score is recorded in 2004 (i.e. 1.641) and the lowest in 
2002 (i.e. 1.429). However, the average composite score included in the final useable sample 
remained quite stable for the rest of the annual years (ranged between 1.521 to 1.571). In 
respect to individual firm-year observations, none of firm-year observations was scored one 
(1) for the lowest level of auditor quality. Meanwhile, for the highest level of auditor quality, 
the entire firm-year observations were scored maximum composite scores of three.  
Table 5.18 Panel A Column III shows that average composite scores of audit 
committee effectiveness on an industry basis is 1.932. Unlike the result shown in Table 5.18 
Panel A Column II, the highest average composite scores for audit committee effectiveness 
is Trading & Services industry (i.e. 2.126). This is followed by the Construction and 
Technology industry with average composite scores of 2.082 and 2.000 respectively. The 
smallest average composite scores for audit committee effectiveness is the Mining industry 
(i.e. 1.304). With regards to individual firm-year observations, all firm-year observations 
across all industries were scored at least one except the Construction, Industrial Products 
and Property industries with nil composite scores. Meanwhile, for the largest composite 
scores of audit committee effectiveness, all firm-year observations are associated with 
effective audit committee with composite scores of three except for the Mining industry (i.e. 
two). 
Overall, the Plantation and Trading & Services industries have the highest 
composite scores for direct custodian excellence, auditor quality and audit committee 
effectiveness. In contrast, the Mining industry is consistently being the industry with the 
lowest composite scores among the three variables. This could be due to Mining being an 
industry with the highest average non-audit fees, having the least number of firms identified 
as specialist and with poor diligence scores. In respect to the breakdown by year of 
observation, year 2002 remained as the year with the lowest composite scores across three 
variables (i.e. DCEi,t, ACEi,t and AQi,t). The firms were still in the process of adopting rules 
and regulations proposed by The Code which were introduced in 2002, and this could 
explain the poor result in 2002. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused extensively on reporting the main descriptive statistics of this 
study based on 557 final usable samples. Included in the first discussions were the sample 
selection process and the descriptive statistics for the final useable sample across the two 
basic firm characteristics of firm size and financial performance. Three commonly defined 
size dimensions of total assets, market capitalization and cash flows from operating activities 
were used to discuss firm size, whilst for financial performance, three key measures of return 
on assets (ROA),market-to-book value (MTB) and cash flows from operating activities 
deflated by the market value of equity (CFO) were used to discuss financial performance. 
Then the chapter concentrated on reporting descriptive statistics for auditor quality 
and audit committee effectiveness, with industry and annual breakdowns. In respect to 
auditor quality, the discussion covered the three key features of auditor quality, auditor brand 
name, auditor independence and auditor specialization, whilst for audit committee 
effectiveness, the discussion covered sub-committee independence, financial expertise and 
diligence. The last section of this chapter presents the descriptive statistics of direct 
custodian excellence, audit quality and audit committee effectiveness based on composite 
scores results. The next chapter will presents the main findings of the study. The discussion 
covers the result of multiple regression analysis of the Basu (1997) timeliness and 
persistence approaches. 
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented the main descriptive statistics of this study. The chapter focused 
on the sample selection process in determining the final usable sample comprising 557 firm-
year observations. Descriptive statistics associated with key firm characteristics (i.e. firm‘s 
size and financial performance) of 557 firm-year-observations was thoroughly discussed. 
Meanwhile, the chapter also presented and discussed descriptive statistics of the two main 
components associated with direct custodian excellence (i.e. auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness). 
The primary purpose of Chapter 6 is to present the main multivariate analysis 
findings of the study. Initial discussion in the chapter highlights the results of the multiple 
regression analysis51 using the original model specifications of earnings conservatism (i.e. 
timeliness and persistence) defined by Basu (1997). This discussion provides a benchmark in 
considering the impact of direct custodian excellence (plus auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness) on earnings conservatism. Statistical results of multivariate 
analysis to test the study‘s general proposition is then reported and discussed. This is then 
followed by the presentation of the main empirical analysis results testing the key 
hypotheses. 
 
6.2 Timeliness and persistence base models of earnings conservatism 
As discussed in Chapter 1, an objective of this study is to examine the nature and 
extent of earnings conservatism amongst Malaysian publicly listed firms. In an initial step to 
achieve this objective, the original models of the timeliness and persistence of earnings 
persistence defined by Basu (1997) are tested using the final useable sample. Statistical 
results of these tests are presented in the following two sub-sections52. 
 
6.2.1 Timeliness of earnings conservatism 
Table 6.1 presents empirical results of analysis testing the original Basu (1997) 
timeliness of earnings conservatism base model. Seven regressions are presented with results 
in Table 6.1 Column I (PS) including the full pooled sample with the remaining six for each 
specific individual year of the observation period. 
                                                     
51 Prior to conducting any of the analysis, items were checked extensively to clean the data, and where deemed 
necessary, adjusted in line with statistical procedures. Analysis showed no substantial and persistent problem with 
non-normality. A correlation matrix also was run to identify any potential multicollinearity problems in the 
regressions. Please refer to Appendix I (Table I:1) for details. 
52 Please refer to Appendix H (Table H:1, H:2, H:3 and H:4) for details descriptive statistics of variables entering 
regression model (i.e., timeliness and persistence approaches). 
126 
 
For the regression using the full 557 firm-year observations underpinning the study 
the Adjusted R2 value indicates approximately only 5.90% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (i.e. OPIi,t)53 is explained by the independent and control variables, and interaction 
terms (see Table 6.1 Column I). On the basis of the observation year, the highest amount of 
variation in the dependent variable (i.e. OPIi,t) explained by the independent variables and 
interaction term is for the regression using 2007 firm-year observations only (see Table 6.1 
Column VII; 16.00%). In contrast, the regression using only 2003 firm-year observations 
sees the lowest amount of dependent variable variation explained by the regression model 
(see Table 6.1 Column III; -0.30%). 
As show in Table 6.1, the coefficient on NEGRETi,t is positive (negative) for 
regression involving the pooled sample, and the 2002, 2005 and 2007 (2003, 2004 and 2006) 
observation year. Across the seven regressions reported in Table 6.1, only the coefficient 
NEGRETi,tfor the 2007 observation-year (see Table 6.1 Column VII) is statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.10).  
In respect to RETi,t, coefficients of this variable are positive in regressions for the 
pooled sample, and 2003, 2006 and 2007 observation-years (see Table 6.1 Column I, 
Column III, Column VI and Column VII). Of regressions with a positive coefficient on 
RETi,t, regressions using the pooled sample (see Table 6.1 Column I) and 2007 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.1. Column VII) are statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01). As for 
regressions with a negative sign on the RETi,t, coefficient (see Table 6.1 Column II), Column 
IV (2004) and Column V (2005), only the regression using 2004 firm-year observations is 
statistically significant (i.e. p< 0.05).  
As for the two-way RETi,t*NEGRETi,t interaction term, coefficients on this variable 
are positive in all regressions reported in Table 6.1 except for that using 2006 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.1 Column VI). For those regression with positive 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t coefficients, all are statistically significant (i.e. p<0.05 and p<0.01) except 
for the regression using 2003 firm-year observations (see Table 6.1 Column III). Meanwhile, 
the negative RETi,t*NEGRETi,t coefficient in the regression using 2006 firm-year 
observations is also insignificant from zero (see Table 6.1 Column VI). 
 
                                                     
53 To solve problems related to outliers, winsoring of the 1st percentile and 99th percentile of OPIi,t values have 
been conducted.  
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Table 6.1:Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.098 3.343 0.051 0.704 0.016 0.323 0.182 3.413 0.082 1.189 0.037 0.990 0.058 1.714 
NEGRETi,t 0.033 1.052 0.130 1.286 -0.001 -0.017 -0.091 -1.352 0.003 0.037 -0.097 -0.871 0.109 1.793
Ψ 
RETi,t 0.049 3.089
ǂ -0.030 -0.144 0.078 1.093 -0.305 -2.476† -0.119 -0.715 0.043 1.449 0.065 3.416ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.245 3.325
ǂ 0.663 2.292† 0.058 0.193 0.510 3.042ǂ 0.497 2.100† -0.054 -0.153 0.274 2.217† 
Year 2002 -0.059 -1.638 
            
Year 2003 -0.075 -2.087† 
            
Year 2004 -0.011 -0.317 
            
Year 2005 -0.066 -1.871† 
            
Year 2006 -0.075 -2.104† 
            
Adjusted R² 0.059 0.091 -0.003 0.087 0.036 0.020 0.160 
F-Value 5.391ǂ 3.778† 0.904 3.896† 2.167Ψ 1.638 7.162ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + ∑γt + εi,twhere: OPIi,t = operating income firm i scaled by market value of equity of 
firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t; RETi,t = buy-and-hold return over fiscal year t of firm i (i.e. (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the price of shares for firm i three (3) months after the 
end of the fiscal year t and Pt-1 is the price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t); NEGRETi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if RETt is negative, 
otherwise firm i scored zero (0); ∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; αk, βk = coefficients; εjt = error term; and Ψ, †, ǂ= significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence 
levels. 
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6.2.2 Persistence of earnings conservatism 
While Table 6.1 presented statistical results for the Basu (1997) timeliness of 
earnings conservatism basic model, Table 6.2 presents regression findings related to the 
persistence of earnings conservatism. 
For the regression using the full 557 firm-year observations underpinning the study 
the Adjusted R2 value indicates approximately only 8.40% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (i.e. ∆OPIi,t) is explained by the independent and control variables, and interaction 
terms (see Table 6.2 Column I). On the basis of the observation year, the highest amount of 
variation in the dependent variable (i.e. ∆OPIi,t) explained by the independent variables and 
interaction term is for the regression using 2002 firm-year observations only (see Table 6.2 
Column II; 58.20%). In contrast, the regression using only 2004 firm-year observations sees 
the lowest amount of dependent variable variation explained by the regression model (see 
Table 6.2 Column IV; 3.80%). 
In the case of the Basu (1997) persistence of earnings conservatism basic model, 
coefficients onNEG∆OPIi,t-1 are positive in four of the regressions presented (i.e. Table 6.2 
Column I, Column II, Column III and Column VII) and negative for the remaining three 
regressions (i.e. Table 6.2 Column IV, Column V and Column VI). Of the seven regressions 
presented in Table 6.2, none of the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are statistically significant 
from zero. 
As for the change on operating income from year t-2 to t-1 (defined by ∆OPIi,t-1), 
Table 6.2 results indicate the coefficient is negative except for regressions using the pooled 
sample (see Table 6.2 Column I), 2006 firm-year observations (see Table 6.2 Column VI) 
and 2007 firm-year observations (see Table 6.2 Column VII). For regression with negative 
∆OPIi,t-1 coefficients, the ∆OPIi,t-1 coefficient in the regression using 2005 firm-year 
observations is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. In contrast, for the 
regression using 2002 (2004) firm-year observations the significance of the ∆OPIi,t-1 
coefficient is high (lower) at the 0.1% (10%) confidence level. The ∆OPIi,t-1 coefficient in 
the regression using 2003 firm-year observations is statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, all 
∆OPIi,t-1 coefficients reported in Table 6.2 with a positive directionality are highly significant 
(i.e. p<0.01; see Table 6.2 Column I, Column VI and Column VII). 
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Table 6.2:Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.528 1.176 0.119 0.981 0.017 0.201 0.115 0.826 -0.101 -1.153 0.018 0.130 -0.125 -0.109 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.285 0.741 0.007 0.039 0.045 0.332 -0.135 -0.654 -0.036 -0.234 -0.044 -0.221 0.168 0.068 
∆OPIi,t-1 1.751 7.262
ǂ -1.259 -10.299ǂ -0.026 -0.265 -0.449 -1.830Ψ -0.255 -2.471† 1.154 7.679ǂ 4.009 5.097ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -1.994 -5.970
ǂ 1.117 8.326ǂ 0.281 2.273† 0.051 0.155 -0.787 -5.012ǂ -1.830 -8.560ǂ -4.933 -1.020 
Year 2002 -0.939 -1.468 
            
Year 2003 -0.920 -1.483 
            
Year 2004 -0.806 -1.297 
            
Year 2005 -0.965 -1.579 
            
Year 2006 -0.672 -1.092 
            
Adjusted R² 0.084 0.582 0.089 0.038 0.477 0.444 0.194 
F-Value 7.401ǂ 39.517ǂ 3.918† 2.205Ψ 29.901ǂ 26.310ǂ 8.772ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: ∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + ∑γt + εi,t where: ∆OPIi,t = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t 
scaled by the market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e. MVEi,t-1); ∆OPIi,t-1 = change in operating income of firm i in fiscal year t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1 (i.e. MVEi,t-1); NEG∆OPIi,t-1= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆OPi,t-1 is negative, otherwise firm i scored zero; ∑γt = 
represent fiscal year indicator variables; αk, βk = coefficients; εjt = error term; and Ψ, †, ǂ= significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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With regards to the two-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 interaction term, the 
directionality of the sign on coefficients for this variable are mixed in regression reported in 
Table 6.2. Specifically, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is negative in four of the 
seven regressions (i.e. Table 6.2 Column I, Column V, Column VI and Column VII). Of 
regression with a negative coefficient on the two-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 interaction 
term, the coefficient is highly significant (i.e. p<0.01) for the pooled sample (see Table 6.2 
Column I), 2005 firm-year observations (see Table 6.2 Column V) and 2006 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.2 Column VI). Conversely, for regression in which the coefficient 
on the two-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 interaction term is positive, the coefficient is 
significant for regression using 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.2 Column II; 
p<0.01) and2003 firm-year observations (see Table 6.2 Column III; p<0.05). 
 
6.3 Test of the GPDCE, GHa and GHb 
It was hypothesized in Chapter 3 that earnings conservatism will be significantly 
higher in firms with greater direct custodian excellence (DCEi,t) relative to firms with lower 
direct custodian excellence (DCEi,t). Results of regression analysis to test this hypothesis in 
respect to the timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism is presented in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
6.3.1 Analysis of DCEi,t and timeliness of earnings conservatism 
Table 6.3 presents main results of the statistical analysis (comprising seven 
regressions) of the association between DCEi,t and the timeliness of earnings conservatism.  
As reported in Table 6.3 Column I (PS), approximate 5.90% of the variation in the 
dependent variable OPIi,t is explained by the variables of interest when the study‘s full 557 
firm-year of observations are used. As for the regression using data from an individual 
observation year, the explanatory power of the test model fluctuates from a low of -1.20% 
(see Table 6.3 Column III) to a high of 19.60% (see Table 6.3 Column IV). F-Values 
reported in Table 6.3 suggest potential model specification concerns occur when analysing 
the persistence of earnings conservatism, and influence of direct custodian excellence, across 
a single periodic time frame (i.e. an individual year). 
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Table 6.3:Regression analysis of DCEi,t and timeliness of earnings conservatism 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.028 0.485 -0.148 -0.892 0.149 0.993 0.696 4.100 0.063 0.314 -0.065 -0.626 -0.125 -1.070 
NEGRETi,t 0.063 0.723 0.341 1.266 0.023 0.098 -0.677 -3.367
ǂ -0.068 -0.270 -0.661 -1.585 0.282 1.533 
DCEi,t 0.022 1.514 0.059 1.322 -0.044 -1.032 -0.115 -2.643
ǂ 0.015 0.276 0.038 1.203 0.053 1.700Ψ 
NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t -0.011 -0.443 -0.064 -0.807 -0.005 -0.074 0.136 2.583
ǂ 0.011 0.168 0.133 1.338 -0.049 -0.945 
RETi,t 0.123 2.652
ǂ 0.209 0.473 -0.151 -0.890 -2.442 -4.257ǂ -1.111 -1.394 0.151 2.048† 0.241 2.807ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.147 0.671 0.894 1.103 0.554 0.729 2.594 3.925
ǂ 1.075 1.145 -0.794 -0.504 -0.073 -0.192 
RETi,t*DCEi,t -0.026 -1.683
Ψ -0.071 -0.583 0.079 1.496 0.409 3.854ǂ 0.207 1.153 -0.046 -1.581 -0.055 -2.097† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t 0.033 0.534 -0.077 -0.317 -0.178 -0.794 -0.393 -2.805
ǂ -0.083 -0.368 0.215 0.616 0.107 0.954 
Year 2002 -0.058 -1.609 
            
Year 2003 -0.076 -2.130† 
            
Year 2004 -0.011 -0.319 
            
Year 2005 -0.067 -1.891 Ψ 
            
Year 2006 -0.076 -2.125† 
            
Adjusted R² 0.059 0.095 -0.012 0.196 0.035 0.076 0.170 
F-Value 3.931ǂ 2.239† 0.847 4.175ǂ 1.487 2.114† 3.834ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DCEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*DCEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t *DCEi,t+ ∑γt + εi,t 
where: DCEi,t = sum of firm i scores in time period t of AQi,t and ACEi,t. That is, DCEi,t = ∑(AQi,t + ACEi,t); see equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of other variables; and Ψ, †, ǂ= 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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As with results reported in Table 6.1, the directionality and significance of the three 
variables forming the basic Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism model (i.e. 
NEGRETi,t , RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) are mixed. For instance, the coefficient on 
NEGRETi,tis positive for regression involving the pooled sample (see Table 6.3 Column I), 
and 2002, 2003 and 2007 firm-year observations (see Table 6.3 Column II, Column III and 
Column VII respectively).The coefficients on NEGRETi,tin multiple regression reported in 
Table 6.3 are—regardless of whether directionality is negative or positive—only statistically 
significant for the regression using 2004 firm-year observations (see Table 6.3 Column IV; 
p<0.01).  
In respect to influence of direct custodian excellence, four variables are of interest in 
regression results shown in Table 6.3. These are: (i) DCEi,t; (ii) NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t; (iii) 
RETi,t*DCEi,t; and (iv) RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t. 
In respect to DCEi,t, the directional sign on coefficients for this variable across the 
seven regressions reported in Table 6.3 are predominantly positive. However, for the 
regression using(a) 2003 firm-year observations and (b) 2004 firm-year observations, the 
coefficient is negative (see Table 6.3 Column III and Column IV respectively). Of the 
regression in which a negative coefficient on DCEi,t is reported, only that using 2004 firm-
year observations (see Table 6.3 Column IV) is statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01). 
Meanwhile, in regression where the coefficient on DCEi,t, is positive, only that using 2007 
firm-year observations is statistically significant (see Table 6.3 Column VII; p<0.10). 
In regards to the two-way NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term, the coefficient on this 
variable in regression reported in Table 6.3 are negative in four (of seven) cases; that is, for 
the pooled sample (see Table 6.3 Column I) and regression using 2002, 2003 and 2007 firm-
year observations (see Table 6.3 Column II, Column III and Column VII). However, none of 
the four negative coefficients on the two-way NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term in 
regression reported in Table 6.3 are statistically significant at conventional significance 
levels. In the case of regression shown in Table 6.3 where the coefficient on the two-way 
NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term is positive (see Table 6.3 Column IV, Column V and 
Column VI), only that using 2004 firm-year observations is statistically significant (p<0.01). 
As for the coefficients on the two-way RETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term in the seven 
regressions reported in Table 6.3, three are positive (see Table 6.3 Column III, Column IV 
and Column V). Meanwhile, coefficients on the two-way RETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term are 
only statistically significant in three of the seven regressions reported in Table 6.3. These are 
for regressions using the pooled sample (see Table 6.3 Column I; p<0.10), 2004 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.3 Column IV; p<0.01) and 2007 firm-year observations (see Table 
6.3 Column VII; p<0.05). 
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Finally, in respect to the three-way RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term (that 
is, the primary variable of interest in testing the study‘s general hypothesis), coefficients are 
positive in the regression using the pooled sample, 2006 firm-year observations and 2007 
firm-year observations (see Table 6.3 Column I, Column VI and Column VII respectively). 
Regardless of the directionality on the coefficients on the three-way 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t interaction term in regression reported in Table 6.3, only one (i.e. 
in the regression using 2004 firm-year observations) is statistically significant at 
conventional levels (see Table 6.3 Column IV; p<0.01).  
 
6.3.2 Analysis of DCEi,t and persistence of earnings conservatism 
Table 6.4 reports the results of the main multivariate analysis performed to test the 
association between the persistence of earnings conservatism as defined by Basu (1997) and 
direct custodian excellence (DCEi,t). Of the seven regressions reported in Table 6.4, one uses 
the pooled sample comprising 557 firm-year observations (see Table 6.4 Column I) whilst 
the remaining regressions use the number of observations for specific individual observation 
years (see Table 6.4 Columns II–VII). 
As reported in Table 6.4 Column I, approximately 12.60% of the variation in the 
dependent variable ∆OPIi,t is explained by the variables of interest when the study‘s full 557 
firm-year of observations are used. As for the regressions using data from an individual 
observation year, the explanatory power of the test model fluctuates from a low of 5.90% 
(see Table 6.4 Column III) to a high of 91.30% (see Table 6.4 Column II). 
For the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 Column I), the coefficient 
on NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t,∆OPIi,t-1and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are positive whilst those 
onNEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1and∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are negative. Of the 
seven main variables of interest reported in Table 6.4 Column I, coefficients on four 
(i.e.∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t. and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) are 
statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01). Coefficients on the three remaining variables 
(i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t and NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t) are all insignificant from zero (see Table 
6.4 Column I). 
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Table 6.4:Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings persistence 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.144 -0.185 0.011 0.064 -0.108 -0.404 0.310 1.102 -0.077 -0.408 -0.478 -2.432 -3.853 -1.264 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.938 0.842 0.323 1.440 0.217 0.473 -0.927 -1.929
Ψ -0.012 -0.029 0.298 1.085 4.061 0.599 
DCEi,t 0.169 0.923 0.015 0.306 0.033 0.470 -0.061 -0.796 -0.014 -0.267 0.119 2.371
† 0.925 1.134 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -0.184 -0.612 -0.117 -1.771
Ψ -0.047 -0.371 0.286 2.212† 0.001 0.005 -0.083 -1.097 -0.963 -0.579 
∆OPIi,t-1 8.305 6.801
ǂ -3.380 -8.866ǂ 0.751 1.070 0.026 0.028 -2.059 -7.430ǂ 10.282 19.770ǂ 30.579 7.091ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -8.615 -5.244
ǂ 6.916 15.558ǂ -0.266 -0.172 -9.798 -6.858ǂ 0.750 0.747 -10.520 -15.795ǂ -31.633 -2.193† 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -1.848 -5.469
ǂ 0.681 5.607ǂ -0.199 -1.119 -0.125 -0.513 0.573 6.843ǂ -2.328 -17.690ǂ -7.455 -6.240ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t 1.868 3.965
ǂ -1.862 -13.145ǂ 0.142 0.369 2.985 7.345ǂ -0.508 -2.015† 2.109 8.889ǂ 7.526 1.606 
Year 2002 -0.862 -1.374 
            
Year 2003 -0.799 -1.313 
            
Year 2004 -0.739 -1.216 
            
Year 2005 -0.939 -1.571 
            
Year 2006 -0.561 -0.929 
            
Adjusted R² 0.126 0.913 0.059 0.483 0.650 0.882 0.414 
F-Value 7.707ǂ 125.559ǂ 1.810Ψ 13.129ǂ 26.183ǂ 102.653ǂ 10.771ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: ∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2DCEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t where: DCEi,t = sum of firm i scores in time period t of AQi,t and ACEi,t. That is, DCEi,t = ∑(AQi,t + ACEi,t); see equations in Table 6.2 for definitions of other variables; and 
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In the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.4 Column II) 
the directionality of the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t,∆OPIi,t-1andNEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t 
are identical to the pooled sample regression (see Table 6.4 Column I). Consistent with the 
pooled sample regression (see Table 6.4 Column I) the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and 
DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1 are insignificant from zero in the regression using only 2002 firm-year 
observations. In contrast, the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t is statistically significant 
(p<0.10) in the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations but it insignificant from 
zero when using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 Column I). Consistent with the pooled 
sample regression results (see Table 6.4 Column I), the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t. and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are all statistically 
significant (i.e. p<0.01) in the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations. However, 
the directionality of the coefficients is reversed. That is, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 and 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t (∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) are negative 
(positive) in the regression using 2002 firm-year observations, but positive (negative) in the 
regression using the pooled sample. 
The directionality of the coefficients on the seven primary variables in the regression 
using only 2003 firm-year observations (see Table 6.4 Column III) is identical to that 
reported in the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 Column I). However, 
unlike results reported using the pooled sample, all of the coefficients on the seven primary 
variables of interest are insignificant from zero in the regression using only 2003 firm-year 
observations. 
In the case of the regression using only 2004 firm-year observations, the coefficients 
on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are negative (see Table 
6.4 Column IV). Of these four variables, the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (p<0.10), ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (p<0.01) andNEG∆OPIi,t-1(p<0.05) are statistically significant. For variables 
with positive coefficients in the regression using only 2004 firm-year observations 
(i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) only two are 
statistically significant. This is for the two-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (i.e. p<0.05) and 
three-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t (i.e. p<0.01) interaction terms respectively.  
Directionality of the coefficients on the seven primary variables for the regression 
using only 2005 firm-year observations (see Table 6.4 Column V) are precisely the inverse 
of the directionality of coefficients in the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 
Column I). As with results using the pooled sample, the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are statistically significant at conventional levels 
(i.e. p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively). In contrast to Table 6.4 Column I (PS) results 
the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in the regression using only 2005 firm-year 
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observations (see Table 6.4 Column V) is insignificant from zero. Consistent with the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 Column I), the coefficients on 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t and NEG∆OPIi,t-1,DCEi,t are all insignificant from zero (see Table 6.4 
Column V). 
For the two regressions using 2006 and 2007 firm-year observations (see Table 6.4 
Column VI and Column VII) the directional sign of the coefficients on each of the seven 
primary variables are consistent with regression results using the pooled sample (see Table 
6.4 Column I). Furthermore, as with regression results using the pooled sample, the 
coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 (see Table 6.4 Column VI and Column VII; p<0.01 respectively), 
∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (see Table 6.4 Column VI and Column VII; p<0.01 and p<0.05 
respectively) and ∆OPIi,t-1 *DCEi,t (see Table 6.4 Column VI and Column VII; p<0.01 
respectively) are statistically significant. Meanwhile, the coefficient on the three-way 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *DCEi,t interaction term is statistically significant (see Table 6.4 
Column VI; p<0.01) for the regression using only 2006 firm-year observations consistent 
with the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.4 Column I). The coefficient on the 
three-way ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *DCEi,t interaction term is insignificant from zero in the 
regression using only 2007 firm-year observations. Finally, for the regression using only 
2006 firm-year observations the DCEi,t coefficient is statistically significant (see Table 6.4 
Column VI; p<0.05), a result in contrast with findings using the pooled sample (see Table 
6.4 Column I).  
 
6.4 Test of the GPAQ, H1a and H1b 
While previous sections presented statistical results of the effect of auditor quality 
and audit committee effectiveness in conjunction (termed as DCEi,t) to earnings 
conservatism, this section provides statistical results of the effect of audit quality (AQi,t) to 
earnings conservatism in isolation as proposed in an earlier chapter (i.e. Chapter 3). It is 
anticipated that external auditors of high quality (as defined by level of independence, 
industry specialization and brand name) are more likely to encourage greater earnings 
conservatism to ensure higher quality of earnings reported. Results of regression analysis to 
test this hypothesis in respect to the timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism is 
presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness 
Table 6.5 presents empirical results of analysis testing the association of audit 
quality and the timeliness of earnings conservatism. Seven regressions are presented with 
results in Table 6.5 Column I (PS) including the full pooled sample with the remaining six 
for each specific year of the observations‘ period. 
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For the regression using the full 557 firm-year observations underpinning the study 
the Adjusted R2 value indicates approximately only 5.40% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (i.e. OPIi,t) is explained by the independent and control variables, and interaction 
terms (see Table 6.5 Column I). On the basis of the observation year, the lowest amount of 
variation in the dependent variable (i.e. OPIi,t) explained by the independent variables and 
interaction term is for the regression using 2003 firm-year observations only (see Table 6.5 
Column III; 3.70%). In contrast, the regression using only 2007 firm-year observations sees 
the highest amount of dependent variable variation explained by the regression model (see 
Table 6.5 Column VII; 19.10%). 
As reported in Table 6.5, statistical results of the regression using pooled sample 
show mixed directionality of coefficients for seven main variables of the Basu (1997) 
modified earnings timeliness model. The coefficient of NEGRETi,t, NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, RETi,t, 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t are positive, whilst those on AQi,tand 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t are negative. Of the seven main variables of interest reported in 
Table 6.5 Column I, coefficients on two (i.e. RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.10). 
In the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.5 Column II), 
coefficients on five variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t, AQi,t, RETi,t, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t* AQi,t) are positive. Meanwhile, coefficients on the remaining two 
variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, and RETi,t*AQi,t.) are negative. Nevertheless, of the seven 
regressions presented in Table 6.5,none of the coefficients are statistically significant from 
zero.  
Unlike statistical result of regression using only 2002 firm-year observations with a 
majority of positive coefficients as shown in Table 6.5, fewer variables reported positive 
coefficients for regression using only 2003 firm-year observations. Only coefficients on 
three variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t.) are positive. 
Unfortunately, none of the coefficients are statistically significant from zero except for 
RETi,t*AQi,t. variable which is statistically significant (p<0.05). Meanwhile, for variables with 
negative coefficients (i.e. NEGRETi,t, AQi,t,  RETi,t  and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t), however, all 
of the coefficients are statistically insignificant from zero. 
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Table 6.5:Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.109 2.783 0.036 0.271 0.179 2.083 0.351 2.906 0.087 0.767 0.003 0.046 -0.127 -1.550 
NEGRETi,t 0.007 0.128 0.143 0.803 -0.060 -0.426 -0.248 -1.718
Ψ -0.036 -0.241 -0.399 -1.657 Ψ 0.285 2.484† 
AQi,t -0.007 -0.435 0.011 0.164 -0.125 -2.466 -0.120 -2.265
† -0.004 -0.068 0.024 0.639 0.104 2.444† 
NEGRETi,t*AQi,t 0.017 0.568 -0.009 -0.096 0.050 0.599 0.111 1.644 0.026 0.335 0.182 1.560 -0.086 -1.290 
RETi,t 0.043 1.665
Ψ 0.079 0.230 -0.064 -0.673 -0.490 -0.772 -0.720 -1.848Ψ 0.049 1.446 0.257 2.634ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.251 1.948
Ψ 0.634 1.269 0.430 0.887 0.942 1.392 0.911 1.844Ψ -0.366 -0.389 -0.037 -0.184 
RETi,t*AQi,t 0.005 0.285 -0.078 -0.419 0.143 2.061
† 0.107 0.491 0.353 1.665Ψ -0.006 -0.169 -0.099 -2.019† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t -0.004 -0.056 0.017 0.061 -0.332 -1.191 -0.261 -1.031 -0.233 -0.870 0.231 0.601 0.210 1.588 
Year 2002 -0.058 -1.593 
            
Year 2003 -0.075 -2.084† 
            
Year 2004 -0.012 -0.350 
            
Year 2005 -0.066 -1.864 Ψ 
            
Year 2006 -0.076 -2.102† 
            
Adjusted R² 0.054 0.052 0.037 0.148 0.045 0.043 0.191 
F-Value 3.623ǂ 1.646 1.498 3.259† 1.642 1.615 4.272ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2AQi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*AQi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t 
where: AQi,t = composite score index with firm i in time period t scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of non-audit services to total audit fees (i.e. fees paid for audit 
and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20; (b) external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; and (c) external auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte 
or KPMG). If criterion item not met then firm i in time period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score index is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in 
Table 6.1 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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With regards to the regression using only 2004 firm-year observations, the 
directionality of the coefficients on the seven primary variables (see Table 6.5 Column IV) is 
comparable to the statistical result reported in the regression using only 2003 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.5 Column III). The coefficients on NEGRETi,t, AQi,t, RETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t are negative, while the coefficients on the remainder of the variables 
(i.e. NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t.) are positive. However, in contrast 
to an insignificant result presented in the regression using only 2003 firm-year observations, 
the coefficients on NEGRETi,t (p-value < 0.10) and AQi,t (p< 0.05) in the regression using 
only 2004 firm-year observations are statistically significant. 
The directionality of the coefficients in the regression using only 2005 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.5 Column V) is indifferent relative to previous two regressions 
(i.e. regressions using only 2003 and 2004 firm-year observations). The coefficients on three 
variables (i.e.  NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t.) are negative, while the 
coefficients of the remainders of the variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t, AQi,t, RETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t) are positive. Nevertheless, the coefficients on RETi,t, 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t are statistically significant at conventional levels (see 
Table 6.5Column V; p<0.10). Meanwhile, the coefficients of the rest of the variables in the 
regression using only 2005 firm-year observations are statistically insignificant from zero. 
In the regression using only 2006 firm-year observations (see Table 6.5 Column VI), 
the directionality of the coefficients on four variables (i.e. AQi,t., NEGRETi,t* RETi,t, and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t) are positive. Meanwhile, the coefficients on NEGRETi,t, 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t and RETi,t*AQi,t, are negative. Nevertheless, none of the coefficients is 
statistically significant from zero except for the coefficient on NEGRETi,t which is significant 
at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.10). 
In the case of the regression using only 2007 firm-year observations (see Table 6.5 
Column VII) the directionality of the coefficients on most variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t, AQi,t,, 
RETi,t, RETi,t*AQi,t, and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t) are predominantly positive. In addition, the 
positively coefficients variables, except for the RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t variable, are 
statistically significant (i.e. NEGRETi,t and AQi,t, (p<0.01); RETi,t*AQi,t, (p<0.05). Meanwhile, 
only two variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t*AQi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) are reported negatively 
coefficient. However, all negatively coefficient variables are insignificant from zero. 
 
6.4.2 Analysis of AQi,t and earnings persistence 
While Table 6.5 presented statistical results of analysis testing the association of 
auditor quality and the timeliness of earnings conservatism, Table 6.6 presents main results 
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of the statistical analysis (comprising seven regressions) of the association between auditor 
quality and persistence of earnings conservatism.  
As reported in Table 6.6 Column I, approximate 12.40% of the variation in the 
dependent variable ∆OPIi,t is explained by the variables of interest when the study‘s full 557 
firm-year of observations are used. As for the regressions using data from an individual 
observation year, the explanatory power of the test model fluctuates from a low of 11.00% 
(see Table 6.6 Column III) to a high of 97.70% (see Table 6.6 Column VII). 
For the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.6 Column I), the coefficients 
onNEG∆OPIi,t-1, AQi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,tare 
negative whilst those on NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are positive. Of the seven 
variables in the regression using the pooled sample, only the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t is highly significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
remainder, however, displayed statistically insignificant results. 
In the case of the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.6 
Column II), across seven variables, the coefficients of four variables are statistically 
significant at a conventional level that is∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t (p<0.01); NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
and ∆OPIi,t-1  (p<0.05); and NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t, (p<0.10). With respect to directionality of 
the coefficient, the coefficients on three variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1 
*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) are negative. Conversely, the coefficients on AQi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*AQi,t,∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are positive.  
For the regression using only 2003 firm-year observations (see Table 6.6 Column 
III), the coefficients on two variables (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*AQi,t) of the seven variables in testing the association of earning persistence and auditor 
quality (in isolation) are statistically significant at the 5% confidence levels. The result is 
inconsistent when testing the association of earnings persistence and DCE (see Table 6.4 
Column III), which reported no significant result. However, in term of directionality of the 
coefficient, the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t,∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and 
∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are negative. On the contrary, the coefficients on AQi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are positive. 
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Table 6.6:Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings persistence 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.927 1.605 0.104 0.711 -0.087 -0.525 0.271 1.652 -0.155 -1.192 -0.398 -2.665 1.146 3.026 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -0.083 -0.117 -0.429 -2.168
† -0.007 -0.023 -0.348 -1.342 0.246 0.958 0.235 1.149 -0.976 -1.140 
AQi,t -0.209 -0.877 0.011 0.119 0.053 0.619 -0.120 -1.304 -0.026 -0.364 0.086 1.164 -1.232 -5.895
ǂ 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 0.235 0.623 0.228 1.970
† -0.024 -0.159 0.261 1.952Ψ -0.048 -0.369 -0.011 -0.096 1.162 2.793ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1 -0.603 -1.178 -1.342 -2.243
† 0.472 1.278 0.008 0.016 -0.776 -6.138ǂ 7.575 16.804ǂ -17.157 -42.810ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -0.215 -0.299 -0.914 -1.446 -3.974 -2.084
† -1.401 -2.624ǂ 1.528 2.254† -8.265 -17.989ǂ 16.490 12.195ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 1.518 5.183
ǂ 0.040 0.136 -0.265 -1.398 -0.257 -0.942 0.868 5.868ǂ -2.211 -14.388ǂ 17.172 56.149ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t -1.221 -3.250
ǂ 1.083 3.465ǂ 1.517 2.325† 1.516 5.190ǂ -1.492 -5.464ǂ 1.981 6.870ǂ -17.387 -18.719ǂ 
Year 2002 -1.124 -1.791 Ψ 
            
Year 2003 -0.959 -1.575 
            
Year 2004 -0.888 -1.458 
            
Year 2005 -0.911 -1.522 
            
Year 2006 -0.925 -1.529 
            
Adjusted R² 0.124 0.821 0.110 0.654 0.638 0.835 0.977 
F-Value 7.556ǂ 55.405ǂ 2.591† 25.598ǂ 24.925ǂ 69.798ǂ 586.263ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: ∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2AQi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t 
+ ∑γt + εi,t where: AQi,t = composite score index with firm i in time period t scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of non-audit services to total audit fees (i.e. fees paid for 
audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20; (b) external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; and (c) external auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte 
or KPMG). If criterion item not met then firm i in time period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score index is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in Table 6.2 
for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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As demonstrated in Table 6.6 Column IV, the coefficients of the variable of prime 
interest, ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t together with ∆OPIi,t-1 and NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are highly 
significant (p<0.01). Meanwhile, the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t is also significant at 
the conventional level (p<0.10).Unfortunately, the coefficients on other variables are 
statistically insignificant from zero. In relation to the directionality of the coefficient, the 
coefficients on four variables are negative (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1,AQi,t,∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
and∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t). The remainder, in contrast, are positive. 
In the regression using only 2005 firm-year observations (see Table 6.6 Column V), 
the majority of the coefficients on variables in testing earning persistence and auditor quality 
in isolation are statistically significant. For instance, the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-
1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are highly significant at the 1% confidence level. In 
addition, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is also statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. However, the coefficients on three variables in testing the Basu (1997) 
modified earnings persistence model (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1,AQi,t andNEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t) are 
statistically insignificant. Pertaining to the directionality of the coefficient, the coefficients 
on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are positive, whilst the rest are 
negative. 
It was revealed that the statistical result (i.e. in term significance levels for last four 
variables) in the regression using only 2006 firm-year observations (see Table 6.6 Column 
VI) is consistent with the statistical result shown in the regressions using only 2005 firm-
year observations (see Table 6.6 Column V). However, instead of three variables reporting 
highly significant (p<0.01) results and one variable reporting statistically significant results 
(p<0.05) in the regression using only 2005 firm-year observations, the coefficients on all 
four variables (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t variables) are 
highly significant (p<0.01) in the regression usingonly 2006 firm-year observations. The 
remainder of the variables remained statistically insignificant from zero. With regards to the 
directionality of the coefficients, the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t, ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are negative. In contrast, the coefficients on the rest of the 
variables are positive. 
Table 6.6 Column VII presents the statistical result of testing the Basu (1997) 
modified earnings persistence model using only 2006 firm-year observations. The 
coefficients on three variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t,∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1 
*AQi,t) are positive whilst the coefficients on other variables are negative. Of the seven 
variables, the coefficients on the majority of the variables are highly significant at 0.01 
conventional levels except for NEG∆OPIi,t-1 which is statistically insignificant from zero.  
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6.5 Test of the GPACE, H2a and H2b 
This section provides the main results for testing the effect of audit committee 
effectiveness (ACEi,t) on earnings conservatism. It has been proposed earlier in Chapter 3 
that a more effective audit committee (as defined by independence, financial expertise and 
diligence of sub-committee) is more likely to be able to enhance the quality of reported 
earnings, thus encouraging greater earnings conservatism. Results of regression analysis to 
test this hypothesis in respect to the timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism is 
presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.5.1 Analysis of ACEi,t and earnings timeliness 
Table 6.7 presents the statistical result for the modified Basu(1997) timeliness 
model, testing the association of audit committee effectiveness and the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism. Seven regressions are presented with results in Table 6.7. Of the seven 
regressions reported in Table 6.7, one uses the pooled sample comprising 557 firm-year 
observations (see see Table 6.7 Column I) whilst the remaining regressions use the number 
of observations for specific individual observation years (see Table 6.7 Columns II–VII). 
For the regression using the full 557 firm-year observations underpinning the study 
the Adjusted R2 value indicates approximately only 7.40% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (i.e. ∆OPIi,t) is explained by the independent and control variables, and interaction 
terms (see Table 6.7 Column I). On the basis of the observation year, the highest amount of 
variation in the dependent variable (i.e. ∆OPIi,t) explained by the independent variables and 
interaction terms is for the regression using 2004 firm-year observations only (see Table 6.7 
Column IV; 29.20%). In contrast, the regression using 2003 firm-year observations sees the 
lowest amount of dependent variable variation explained by the regression model (see Table 
6.7 Column III; -0.80%). 
Across seven regressions reported in Table 6.7, the coefficient on NEGRETi,t is 
statistically significant involving the 2002 (p<0.05) and 2006 (p<0.10) firm-year 
observations However, the coefficients on NEGRETi,t is statistically insignificant for the 
pooled sample, and the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007 year-observations. With regards to 
directionality of the coefficients, the coefficient on NEGRETi,t is positive for the pooled 
sample, and 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006 year-observations, while negative for the 2004 and 
2006 year observations.  
 
144 
 
Table 6.7:Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.035 -0.640 -0.340 -1.950 -0.146 -1.071 0.215 1.410 -0.006 -0.028 0.003 0.046 0.115 1.202 
NEGRETi,t 0.116 1.345 0.492 1.965
† 0.202 0.728 -0.237 -1.339 0.014 0.049 -0.399 -1.657Ψ 0.141 0.733 
ACEi,t 0.073 3.004
ǂ 0.224 2.410† 0.085 1.286 0.019 0.264 0.048 0.445 0.024 0.639 -0.021 -0.458 
NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t -0.049 -1.149 -0.208 -1.519 -0.106 -0.724 0.046 0.542 -0.006 -0.042 0.182 1.560 -0.021 -0.236 
RETi,t 0.162 4.045
ǂ 0.102 0.187 0.055 0.279 -1.642 -4.463ǂ 0.048 0.054 0.049 1.446 0.098 2.293† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.059 0.280 0.721 0.949 -0.011 -0.012 1.441 3.228
ǂ 0.051 0.049 -0.366 -0.389 0.504 1.206 
RETi,t*ACEi,t -0.071 -3.068
ǂ -0.086 -0.291 0.005 0.060 0.515 3.672ǂ -0.080 -0.247 -0.006 -0.169 -0.029 -0.963 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 0.110 1.044 -0.015 -0.035 0.040 0.082 -0.287 -1.496 0.235 0.532 0.231 0.601 -0.094 -0.501 
Year 2002 -0.053 -1.484 
            
Year 2003 -0.070 -1.971† 
            
Year 2004 -0.007 -0.197 
            
Year 2005 -0.061 -1.753 Ψ 
            
Year 2006 -0.065 -1.813 Ψ 
            
Adjusted R² 0.074 0.176 -0.008 0.292 -0.003 0.043 0.147 
F-Value 4.689ǂ 3.535† 0.895 6.351ǂ 0.962 1.615 3.381† 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2ACEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*ACEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t 
where: ACEi,t = composite score index where firm i in time period t is scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) audit committee of firm i in time period t is comprised mainly of 
non-executive independent directors; (b) at least one of the non-executive independent directors on the audit committee of firm i in time period t is suitably qualified and accredited to be 
deemed a financial accounting expert (i.e. a degree in accounting and a member of a professional accounting body); and (c) during the time period t the audit committee of firm i met five 
times or more. If a criterion is not met then firm i in time period t is scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in Table 
6.1 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Unlike statistical results presented in Table 6.3 where the coefficient on DCEi,t 
(auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness in conjunction) is reported statistically 
significant for 2004 firm-year observations (see Table6.7 Column IV) and 2007 firm-year 
observations (see Table6.7 Column VII), Table 6.7 exhibited that the coefficient on ACEi,t 
(audit committee effectiveness in isolation) is statistically significant for the pooled sample 
and 2002 year-observation (p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively). Pertaining to the sign of 
coefficient, the coefficients on ACEi,t are positive across seven regressions except for 2007 
firm-year observations (see Table6.7 Column VII). 
Inconsistent with the statistical result of the ACEi,t variable with two regressions (i.e. 
regressions using only the pooled sample and 2002 firm-year observations) which 
demonstrated statistically significant results, none of the coefficients on NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t is 
statistically significant across seven regressions as tabulated in Table 6.7. In terms of 
directionality of coefficients on ACEi,t, of the seven regressions the coefficients for five 
regressions (i.e. the pooled sample, and 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2007 firm-year observations) 
are negative. Meanwhile, the coefficients on ACEi,t for 2004 and 2006 firm-year observations 
are positive.  
With regards to the RETi,t variable, Table 6.7 depicted that the coefficient on RETi,t is 
positive and statically significant for the pooled sample (p<0.01) and 2007 (p<0.05) firm-
year observations. The significance result of the RETi,t variable in testing association of 
earnings timeliness and audit committee effectiveness (see Table 6.7) is found consistent 
with the significance result of the RETi,t variable result in testing the Basu (1997) basic 
earnings timeliness model as presented in Table 6.1. Apart from positive coefficients for the 
pooled sample and 2007 firm-year observations, four other regressions (i.e. 2002, 2003, 2005 
and 2006) also reported positive coefficients. In contrast, the coefficient on RETi,t is negative 
for 2004 firm-year observations. Nevertheless, the coefficient (see Table 6.7 Column IV) is 
highly significant (p<0.01). 
For the RETi,t*NEGRETi,t variable, across seven regressions, the coefficients on 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t are positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) for 2004 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.7 Column IV). A similar result was found in testing earnings 
timeliness with direct custodian excellence (combined effect of audit committee 
effectiveness and auditor quality) as presented in Table 6.3 Column IV). The coefficients on 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t for the remainder of the regressions (i.e. the pooled sample, and 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007 firm-year observations) are statistically insignificant from zero. 
With respects to the sign of coefficients, apart from the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 
using 2004 firm-year observations, the coefficients on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t using the pooled 
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sample, and 2002, 2005 and 2007 firm-year observations also positive. Conversely, the 
coefficients on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t using 2003 and 2006 firm-year observations are negative. 
Another variable for testing audit committee effectiveness and earnings timeliness is 
the RETi,t*ACEi,t variable. Table 6.7 depicted that the coefficient on RETi,t*ACEi,t using 2004 
firm-year observations is positive and highly significant (p<0.01). In addition, the coefficient 
on RETi,t*ACEi,t using 2003 firm-year observationsalso reported a positive coefficient, 
however, it is not statistically significant from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on 
RETi,t*ACEi,t for all the remaining regressionsare negative and statistically insignificant from 
zero except for the pooled sample (p<0.01). 
Among other variables in the Basu (1997) modified earnings timeliness model, 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t variable is of major interest to this research. Based on Table 6.7, 
none of the coefficients on the RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t variable across seven regressions is 
significant at any conventional level. However, four regressions (i.e. the pooled sample, and 
2003, 2005 and 2006 firm-year observations) exhibit positive coefficients for the 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t variable. In contrast, the coefficients on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 
variable for 2002, 2004 and 2007 firm-year observations are negative.  
 
6.5.2 Analysis of ACEi,t and earnings persistence 
While Table 6.7 presented statistical results of analysis testing of the association 
between audit committee effectiveness and the timeliness of earnings conservatism, Table 
6.8 presents the main results of the statistical analysis (comprising seven regressions) of the 
association between audit committee effectiveness and persistence of earnings conservatism. 
Seven regressions are presented with results in Table 6.8 Column I including the full pooled 
sample with the remaining six for each specific year of the observations period (i.e. 2002 to 
2007). 
As reported in Table 6.8 Column I (PS), approximately 22.90% of the variation in 
the dependent variable ∆OPIi,t is explained by the variables of interest when the study‘s full 
557 firm-year observations are used. As for the regressions using data from an individual 
observation year, the explanatory power of the test model fluctuates from a low of 6.20% 
(see Table 6.8 Column III) to a high of 94.30% (see Table 6.8 Column II). 
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Table 6.8:Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings persistence 
∆OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.309 0.434 -0.119 -0.979 0.055 0.198 0.161 0.767 0.183 0.910 0.624 1.506 -2.223 -1.250 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.748 0.762 0.261 1.493 -0.057 -0.136 0.101 0.314 -0.294 -0.860 -0.602 -0.930 2.308 0.610 
ACEi,t 0.131 0.439 0.071 1.126 -0.022 -0.165 -0.024 -0.237 -0.114 -1.137 -0.278 -1.334 0.689 0.814 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t -0.253 -0.532 -0.149 -1.662
 Ψ 0.035 0.172 -0.037 -0.223 0.131 0.792 0.250 0.758 -0.696 -0.416 
∆OPIi,t-1 7.003 12.259
ǂ -2.488 -16.673ǂ -0.403 -0.380 -0.721 -0.840 -3.005 -7.118ǂ 1.590 2.185† 21.192 17.078ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -6.434 -8.629
ǂ 3.122 20.010ǂ 1.065 0.951 5.224 5.537ǂ 1.530 3.187ǂ -1.345 -0.294 -22.836 -3.196ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t -2.630 -9.964
ǂ 1.146 8.830ǂ 0.186 0.357 0.137 0.321 1.083 6.639ǂ -0.470 -0.682 -7.375 -14.695ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t 2.025 4.914
ǂ -1.778 -13.286ǂ -0.579 -0.933 -2.095 -4.624ǂ -0.711 -2.995ǂ 0.009 0.004 7.776 2.186† 
Year 2002 -1.173 -1.993† 
            
Year 2003 -0.880 -1.544 
            
Year 2004 -0.886 -1.547 
            
Year 2005 -0.895 -1.596 
            
Year 2006 -0.916 -1.620 
            
Adjusted R² 0.229 0.943 0.062 0.686 0.650 0.445 0.762 
F-Value 14.799ǂ 198.105ǂ 1.857Ψ 29.426ǂ 26.256ǂ 11.877ǂ 45.450ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: ∆OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,twhere: ACEi,t = composite score index where firm i in time period t is scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) audit committee of firm i in time period t is 
comprised mainly of non-executive independent directors; (b) at least one of the non-executive independent directors on the audit committee of firm i in time period t is suitably qualified and 
accredited to be deemed a financial accounting expert (i.e. a degree in accounting and a member of a professional accounting body); and (c) during the time period t the audit committee of firm 
i met five times or more. If a criterion is not met then firm i in time period t is scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in 
Table 6.2 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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When effect of audit committee effectiveness on earnings persistence is examined in 
the regression using only the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I), the coefficients on 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1and ∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t are negative. In contrast, 
the coefficients on other variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ACEi,t,∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) are positive. Of variables with negative coefficients, the coefficients 
on ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1and ∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t are highly significant (p<0.01) while the 
coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, are statistically insignificant from zero. Meanwhile, of 
the variables with positive coefficients, the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*ACEi,t are statistically significant at 0.01 conventional levels. The other two variables with 
positive coefficients (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1andACEi,t,) conversely are not statistically significant. 
With respects to the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 
6.8 Column II), the statistical result is consistent with the statistical result presented using the 
pooled sample model (i.e. the coefficients on∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1,∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t 
and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t are highly significant (p<0.01). The only difference is the 
directionality of the coefficients of those variables. The coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t are negative, whilst there are positive coefficients for ∆OPIi,t-1 
*NEG∆OPIi,t-1,and∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t. The statistical results for the remainder of the variables in 
the regression using only 2002 firm-year observations are found to be parallel to the 
statistical result shown in the regression using the pooled sample model in terms of sign of 
coefficient and significance of the results, except for NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t which shows a 
moderately significant result (p<0.10).  
Unlike two previous regressions (i.e. see Table 6.8 Column I and Column II), none 
of the coefficients of the seven variables is statistically significant in the regression using 
only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.8 Column III). In term of directionality of the 
coefficients, the coefficients of four variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ACEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-
1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) are negative, whilst positive for the remainder of the variables.  
As depicted in Table 6.8 Column IV (2004), the coefficients on four variables 
(i.e.ACEi,t,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t,∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) in the regression 
using only 2004 firm-year observations are negative. Of the variables with negative 
coefficients, the variable of prime interest, (i.e.∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t variable) is 
found highly significant at the 1% confidence level. In contrast, of the variables with positive 
coefficients, only ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is highly significant at the 1% confidence level. 
For the regression using only 2005 firm-year observations (see Table 6.8 Column 
V), the statistical result for four variables (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-
1*ACEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) are found consistent with the statistical result in 
the regressions using only 2002 firm-year observations (see Table 6.8 Column II), in term of 
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significance level (i.e. p<0.01) and directionality of the coefficients (i.e. positive/negative). 
For the rest of the variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1ACEi,t and NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t) the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant from zero. Meanwhile, in terms of directionality of 
the coefficients, theNEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ACEi,t variables are reported as being negatively 
coefficient, while, positively coefficient for theNEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t variable. 
In the case of the regression using only 2006 firm-year observations (see Table 6.8 
Column VI), the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1,NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
*ACEi,t are positive. Nevertheless, only the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 is statistically significant 
at the conventional level (i.e. p<0.05). Conversely, the coefficients on the remainder of the 
variables in the regression using only 2006 firm-year observations are negative but 
statistically insignificant from zero. 
The result on the significance levels and directionality of the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-
1,∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t in the regression using only 2007 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.8 Column VII), is consistent with the significance levels and 
directionality of the coefficients for regression using pool sample. For other four variables, 
the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ACEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t are positive, 
while negative for NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t. The coefficient on the variable of prime interest, 
∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *ACEi,t, however, is significant at the 5% confidence level.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focused extensively on reporting the main findings of this study. 
Included in the discussions were the statistical result analyses of statistical results of the 
Basu (1997) timeliness and persistence approaches. The discussions were broken down into 
four sections. The first section outlined the statistical results of the Basu‘s basic model. In 
the following sections, a new variable of DCEi,t was introduced into the Basu (1997) 
earnings conservatism model to examine the effect of direct custodian excellence (auditor 
quality and audit committee effectiveness in combination) and earnings conservatism. 
Meanwhile, section three examined the effect of auditor quality in isolation on earnings 
conservatism. Lastly, in the final section, the statistical results of the association of audit 
committee effectiveness and earnings conservatism were exhibited. 
The following chapter (Chapter 7) provides sensitivity and robustness checks of this 
study. Several additional tests will be conducted to ascertain the credibility of the initial 
analysis. For the sensitivity test, earnings conservatism in Malaysia will be tested using the 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model which focuses on accruals and cash flows. In addition, 
various alternative measures of dependent and independent variables will be used as 
additional tests. 
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CHAPTER 7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented the study‘s main multivariate analysis findings. Initial 
discussion in Chapter 6 highlighted multiple regression analysis results using the Basu 
(1997) base models of timeliness and persistence. Statistical results of analysis examining 
the impact of direct custodian excellence on earnings conservatism were then outlined. The 
end of Chapter 6 documented analysis results testing the individual effects of auditor quality 
and audit committee effectiveness on earnings conservatism.  
Proceeding with the main analysis shown in Chapter 6, this chapter (Chapter 7) 
presents the major sensitivity and robustness tests conducted for this study. To determine the 
robustness of results using the Basu (1997) models, the approach of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005)that focuses on accruals and cash flows is used as alternative proxy of earnings 
conservatism. Given there are different measures of earnings (e.g. earnings per share) and 
returns (e.g. market adjusted share return), the main tests are re-tested and presented in this 
chapter using these alternative measures. Conscious of potential Big 4 audit firm biases, 
robustness tests are performed (and reported) whilst excluding specialist auditor and auditor 
brand name separately from the composite score. Regressions were also re-run to examine 
for any industry influence. Finally, robustness checks are performed using only the 
individual features of audit quality and audit committee effectiveness adopted in constructing 
the using composite scores index. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the main 
sensitivity and robustness test findings. 
 
7.2 Alternative model—Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
As discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.3, several alternative methods have been 
proposed to measure earnings conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, this study used 
the Basu (1997) models of timeliness and persistence as the primary benchmark for earnings 
conservatism in the main regression analysis. Another often used earnings conservatism 
model is that by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) that focuses on accruals and cash flows.54 
 Table 7.1 presents empirical results of tests using the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
model. Seven regressions in total are presented. Regression results presented in Table 7.1 
Column I (PS) use the full pooled sample (comprising 557 firm-year observations). In 
contrast, results for the remaining regressions use the number of observations from each 
individual observation year (see Table 7.1 Column II–VII). 
                                                     
54 The Ball and Shivakumar (2005) method is based on the underlying premise that bad news is recognized and 
reflected in the accruals and cash flows faster than good news. Specifically, this will be reflected by higher 
(lower) accruals (cash flows) when economic losses are recognized. 
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Table 7.1:Regression analysis of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
 
Sample Category 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.010 -0.890 -0.029 -2.009 0.004 0.121 -0.028 -1.597 -0.023 -1.447 -0.010 -0.627 -0.007 -0.445 
NEG∆CFOi,t 0.013 1.240 0.031 1.646 -0.013 -0.329 0.068 2.422
ǂ -0.011 -0.517 -0.047 -2.016ǂ 0.034 1.439 
∆CFOi,t -0.452 -6.501
ǂ -0.500 -3.986ǂ -0.715 -2.279ǂ -0.087 -0.460 -0.451 -2.107ǂ -0.558 -4.229ǂ -0.450 -4.011ǂ 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.004 -0.040 0.311 1.856
Ψ 0.147 0.297 -0.067 -0.206 -0.297 -1.079 -0.688 -3.155ǂ 0.449 2.073ǂ 
Year 2002 -0.021 -1.481 
            
Year 2003 -0.005 -0.385 
            
Year 2004 0.010 0.745 
            
Year 2005 -0.017 -1.219 
            
Year 2006 -0.005 -0.402 
            
Adjusted R² 0.214 0.362 0.096 0.129 0.261 0.498 0.228 
F-Value 19.923ǂ 16.681ǂ 4.191ǂ 5.477ǂ 12.204ǂ 32.389ǂ 10.550ǂ 
N 557 84 91 92 96 96 98 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = ∆ACCi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆CFOi,t + β0∆CFOi,t + β1∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t +∑γt + εi,t where:∆ACCi,t = change in accruals (i.e. difference 
between operating income and cash flow from operating activities) of firm i in fiscal year t scaled by the book value of total assets of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e.Ti,t-1); 
NEG∆CFOi,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ∆CFOi,t is negative, otherwise firm i scored zero; ∆CFOi,t = change in cash flow from operating activities of firm i in fiscal 
year t scaled by the book value of total assets of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t (i.e.TAi,t-1); ∑γt = represents fiscal year indicator variables; αk, βk = coefficients; εjt = error term; 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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As reported in Table 7.1 Column I (PS), approximately 21.40% of the variation in 
the dependent variable ∆ACCi,t is explained by the variables of interest. For regressions using 
data from an individual observation year (see Table 7.1 Column II–VII), explanatory power 
fluctuates from a low of 9.6% (see Table 7.1 Column III) to a high of 49.8% (see Table 7.1 
Column VI). 
As shown in Table 7.1, the coefficients on NEG∆CFOi,t are positive (negative) for 
regressions involving the pooled sample, and observation years 2002, 2004 and 2007 (2003, 
2005 and 2006). However, only the coefficient on NEG∆CFOi,t for the 2004 and 2006 
observation-years (see Table 7.1 Column IV and Column VI) are statistically significant at 
conventional levels (i.e. p<0.05) respectively. 
In terms of ∆CFOi,t, coefficients on this variable are negative across all seven 
regressions presented in Table 7.1. Moreover, the coefficients are statistically significant (i.e. 
p<0.01 and p<0.05) in each regression except for the 2004 firm-year observation (see Table 
7.1 Column IV) which is statistically insignificant from zero. 
As for the two-way ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t interaction term, coefficients are negative 
for the pooled sample, and observation-years 2004, 2005 and 2006 (see Table 7.1 Column I, 
Column IV, Column V and Column VI). Of these regressions, the coefficient on 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t is statistically significant, only when using 2006 firm-year 
observations (i.e. p<0.01). For regressions with a positive sign on the ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t 
coefficient (see Table 7.1 Column II, Column III and Column VII), regressions using 2002 
(i.e. p<0.1) and 2007 (i.e. p<0.05) firm-year observations are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Overall, Table 7.1 Column I results suggest the lack of earnings conservatism across 
the observation period. However, some results present in Table 7.1 Column II and VII 
suggest presence of earnings conservatism in some individual years (i.e. 2002 and 2007). 
 Despite a lack of clear evidence of earning s conservatism based on accruals and 
cash flows, Table 7.2 presents empirical results of analysis testing the association between 
direct custodian excellence and earnings conservatism based on the Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) model. Again, of the seven regressions reported in Table 7.2, one uses the pooled 
sample comprising 557 firm-year observations (see Table 7.2 Column I) whilst the 
remaining regressions use the number of observations for specific individual observation 
years (see Table 7.2 Columns I–VII). 
 
153 
 
Table 7.2:Regression analysis of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model—DCEi,t 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = ∆ACCi,t = α0 + β1NEG∆CFOi,t + β2∆CFOi,t + β3∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β4DCEi,t + β5DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β6∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t + 
β7∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t +∑γt + εi,t where: DCEi,t = see equations in Table 6.4.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.1; and; significant at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
 
 
Sample Category 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.031 -1.354 -0.081 -2.243 -0.050 -0.540 -0.015 -0.273 -0.112 -2.295 -0.018 -0.382 -0.048 -1.134 
NEG∆CFOi,t 0.023 0.703 0.079 1.330 0.047 0.367 0.205 2.220
† 0.044 0.719 -0.102 -1.476 0.073 0.921 
∆CFOi,t -0.170 -0.920 0.341 0.918 -0.089 -0.087 0.395 0.547 1.134 2.069
† -0.597 -1.500 -0.288 -1.063 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.849 -2.652
ǂ -0.598 -0.862 -1.758 -1.061 0.713 0.685 -2.722 -3.992ǂ -1.184 -1.971† -0.529 -0.792 
DCEi,t 0.006 1.119 0.019 1.738
 Ψ 0.015 0.606 -0.004 -0.304 0.024 1.960† 0.002 0.189 0.012 1.035 
DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.003 -0.365 -0.018 -1.084 -0.016 -0.468 -0.037 -1.512 -0.014 -0.850 0.016 0.832 -0.011 -0.519 
∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t -0.089 -1.648 -0.315 -2.388
† -0.175 -0.641 -0.127 -0.672 -0.447 -3.149ǂ 0.010 0.090 -0.054 -0.591 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t 0.253 2.824
ǂ 0.332 1.679 Ψ 0.569 1.247 -0.253 -0.865 0.712 3.869ǂ 0.157 0.940 0.283 1.499 
Year 2002 -0.021 -1.498 
            
Year 2003 -0.005 -0.359 
            
Year 2004 0.010 0.758 
            
Year 2005 -0.017 -1.253 
            
Year 2006 -0.003 -0.230 
            
Adjusted R² 0.223 0.377 0.086 0.149 0.350 0.487 0.237 
F-Value 14.305ǂ 8.162ǂ 2.213† 3.275ǂ 8.316ǂ 13.890ǂ 5.304ǂ 
N 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 
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For the regression using the full 557 firm-year observations (see Table 7.2 Column 
I), the adjusted-R2 value indicates approximately 22.30% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (i.e. ∆ACCi,t) is explained by the independent, control and interaction variables. For 
regressions using individual observation year data, the highest amount of variation in the 
dependent variable (i.e. ∆ACCi,t) explained by the independent, control and interaction 
variables is when using 2006 firm-year observations (see Table 7.2 Column VI; 48.70%). In 
contrast, the regression using 2003 firm-year observations had the lowest explanatory power 
based on adjusted-R2 values (see Table 7.2 Column III; 8.60%). 
In respect to the influence of direct custodian excellence on earnings conservatism 
based on the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model, four variables are of interest in the Table 
7.2 results. These are: (i) DCEi,t; (ii) DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t; (iii) ∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t; and (iv) 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t. 
Table 7.2 reports that the coefficient on DCEi,t is negative in the regression using the 
2004 year observations (see Table 7.2 Column IV) but statistically insignificant from zero. 
The coefficient on DCEi,t is positive in all remaining regressions reported in Table 7.2 with 
the majority being statistically significant. It is only for regressions using the 2002 and 2005 
year observations (see Table 7.2 Column II and Column V) that the coefficient on DCEi,t is 
statistically significant at 10% and 5% confidence levels respectively. 
 As for the two-way DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t, interaction term, coefficients are negative 
across all regressions shown in Table 7.2 except for that based on the 2006 year-observations 
(see Table 7.2 Column IV). None of the coefficients, however, are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Meanwhile, for the two-way ∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t interaction term, 
coefficient directionality in each regression mirrors coefficients on DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t. In 
contrast to DCEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t results, however, the coefficients on ∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t are 
significant in two of the regressions(i.e. 2002 firm-year observations, Table 7.2 Column II, 
p<0.05; and, 2005 firm-year observations, Table 7.2 Column V, p<0.01). 
Finally, for the three-way ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,tinteraction term, coefficients 
are positive in all regressions besides the 2004 year observations only. Of the six regressions 
with positive directionality, coefficients ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,t for the pooled sample, 
2002 and 2005 year observations are statistically significant (p<0.01, p<0.10 and p<0.01 
respectively). Coefficients on ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*DCEi,tin the remaining regressions 
shown in Table 7.2 are insignificant. 
Overall, Table 7.2 results imply a significant, though a somewhat limited, 
association between direct custodian excellence and earnings conservatism based on accruals 
and cash flows. 
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Table 7.3 presents empirical results of testing of the association between audit 
quality and earnings conservatism based on the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model. 
Meanwhile, Table 7.4 reports the additional regression analysis examining the audit 
committee effectiveness–earnings conservatism (based on Ball and Shivakumar 2005) 
linkage. Seven regressions are presented in both Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 consistent with the 
format of Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. 
In respect to the primary variables of interest for Table 7.3 Column I (i.e.AQi,t; 
AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t;∆CFOi,t*AQi,t; and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t), the coefficients on 
∆CFOi,t*AQi,t and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t are positive but negative are on AQi,t and 
AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t. None of the coefficients are statistically significant. For regressions 
using 2002 and 2003 firm-year observations (see Table 7.3 Column II and Column III) the 
coefficients on AQi,t and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t (AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t and ∆CFOi,t*AQi,t) 
are positive (negative) but insignificant from zero. Meanwhile, when using the 2004 
observation year data the coefficients on AQi,t, AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t,∆CFOi,t*AQi,t and 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t are negative. Of these, only the coefficient on AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t 
is statistically significant (p<0.10). When using 2005 firm-year observations only (see Table 
7.3 Column V), the coefficients on AQi,t and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t (AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t, 
and ∆CFOi,t*AQi,t) are positive (negative). The coefficients on ∆CFOi,t*AQi,t (p<0.05) and 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t (p<0.01) are statistically significant. Table 7.3 Column VI, 
meanwhile, reports results using 2006 year observations only. Coefficients on the four 
primary variables are all positive and insignificant from zero. Finally, the coefficients on 
AQi,t, ∆CFOi,t*AQi,t and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t (AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t) are positive 
(negative) and insignificant from zero in the regression using only 2007 year observations 
(see Table 7.3 Column VII). 
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Table 7.3:Regression analysis of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model—AQi,t 
 
Sample Category 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.007 -0.468 -0.048 -1.862 0.001 0.010 -0.009 -0.265 -0.053 -1.732 -0.018 -0.700 -0.023 -0.820 
NEG∆CFOi,t 0.021 1.038 0.033 0.958 0.045 0.605 0.152 2.746
ǂ 0.002 0.041 -0.067 -1.522 0.039 0.855 
∆CFOi,t -0.486 -4.134
ǂ -0.206 -0.624 -0.578 -0.920 0.000 0.000 0.332 0.831 -0.624 -2.716ǂ -0.456 -2.656ǂ 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.162 -0.789 -0.285 -0.720 -0.149 -0.155 0.851 1.074 -1.591 -3.233
ǂ -0.989 -2.255† 0.181 0.396 
AQi,t -0.002 -0.255 0.017 0.935 0.002 0.069 -0.013 -0.811 0.019 1.196 0.007 0.446 0.009 0.552 
AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.004 -0.346 -0.006 -0.286 -0.033 -0.814 -0.052 -1.757
Ψ -0.006 -0.281 0.010 0.418 -0.002 -0.071 
∆CFOi,t*AQi,t 0.024 0.353 -0.265 -0.966 -0.084 -0.247 -0.021 -0.109 -0.499 -2.354
† 0.038 0.297 0.025 0.190 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t 0.106 0.903 0.461 1.536 0.270 0.475 -0.685 -1.479 0.873 3.207
ǂ 0.188 0.784 0.140 0.525 
Year 2002 -0.021 -1.514 
            
Year 2003 -0.006 -0.433 
            
Year 2004 0.010 0.732 
            
Year 2005 -0.017 -1.274 
            
Year 2006 -0.004 -0.327 
            
Adjusted R² 0.218 0.359 0.096 0.173 0.321 0.487 0.207 
F-Value 13.922ǂ 7.645ǂ 2.363† 3.713ǂ 7.428ǂ 13.880ǂ 4.606ǂ 
N 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = ∆ACCi,t = α0 + β1NEG∆CFOi,t + β2∆CFOi,t + β3∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β4AQi,t + β5AQi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β6∆CFOi,t*AQi,t + 
β7∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*AQi,t +∑γt + εi,t where: AQi,t = see equations in Table 6.6.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.1; and; significant at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table 7.4 presents the empirical results of analysis testing the association between 
audit committee effectiveness and earnings conservatism based on the Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) approach. Across seven regressions reported in Table 7.4 the coefficients on ACEi,t 
and ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t are positive. In contrast, the coefficients on 
ACEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t and ∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t are negative in all seven regressions (except for the 
coefficient on ACEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t in the regression using only 2006 firm-year 
observations).The coefficient on ACEi,t is statistically significant in the regressions using all 
observations (Table 7.4 Column I (PS), p<0.05) and 2005 firm-year observations (Table 7.4 
Column V (2005), p<0.05). For the two-way ACEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t interaction term the 
coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.10) only in the regression using 2002 firm-year 
observations. In contrast, for the two-way ∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t interaction term the coefficients 
are significant from zero when using the full sample, and 2002 and 2005 firm-year 
observations (see Table 7.4 Column I, Column II and Column V; p<0.01, p<0.05 and 
p<0.01). Finally, in the case of the three-way ∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t interaction term, 
the coefficient is significant at the 1% (5%) confidence level when using the full sample and 
2005 (2007) firm-year observations. 
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Table 7.4:Regression analysis of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model—ACEi,t 
 
Sample Category 
 
Column I (PS) Column II (2002) Column III (2003) Column IV (2004) Column V (2005) Column VI (2006) Column VII (2007) 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.052 -2.276 -0.081 -2.179 -0.088 -0.915 -0.046 -0.888 -0.127 -2.861 -0.014 -0.264 -0.045 -1.024 
NEG∆CFOi,t 0.022 0.753 0.120 2.204
† -0.015 -0.114 0.070 0.857 0.060 1.057 -0.104 -1.475 0.072 1.154 
∆CFOi,t 0.137 0.744 0.043 0.163 0.060 0.061 0.321 0.664 1.485 2.541
† -0.219 -0.338 -0.114 -0.395 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -1.027 -3.606
ǂ 0.297 0.694 -1.988 -1.262 -0.405 -0.494 -2.823 -3.828ǂ -1.426 -1.846 Ψ -0.800 -1.404 
ACEi,t 0.023 2.297
† 0.029 1.619 0.045 0.999 0.014 0.476 0.053 2.532† 0.001 0.041 0.020 0.988 
ACEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t -0.006 -0.433 -0.044 -1.706
 Ψ 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 -0.153 -0.035 -1.246 0.033 0.959 -0.020 -0.667 
∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t -0.331 -3.453
ǂ -0.339 -2.298† -0.382 -0.820 -0.312 -0.942 -0.998 -3.537ǂ -0.160 -0.530 -0.188 -1.240 
∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t 0.551 3.938
ǂ 0.116 0.578 1.040 1.412 0.258 0.542 1.326 3.623ǂ 0.411 1.068 0.672 2.358† 
Year 2002 -0.022 -1.603 
            
Year 2003 -0.006 -0.456 
            
Year 2004 0.009 0.622 
            
Year 2005 -0.017 -1.234 
            
Year 2006 -0.005 -0.344 
            
Adjusted R² 0.232 0.395 0.081 0.102 0.338 0.489 0.264 
F-Value 14.980ǂ 8.728ǂ 2.128† 2.471ǂ 7.926ǂ 13.983ǂ 5.977ǂ 
N 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII: OPIi,t = ∆ACCi,t = ∆ACCi,t = α0 + β1NEG∆CFOi,t + β2∆CFOi,t + β3∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β4ACEi,t + β5ACEi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t + β6∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t + 
β7∆CFOi,t*NEG∆CFOi,t*ACEi,t +∑γt + εi,t where: ACEi,t = see equations in Table 6.8.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.1 and; significant at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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7.3 Alternative measures of earnings and returns 
Just as earnings conservatism may be measured using alternative techniques, 
earnings and returns may also be measured using different approaches. As different measures 
of earnings and returns can be employed, and subsequently utilized in the Basu (1997) 
timeliness and persistence models of earnings conservatism, the main regression results and 
findings could be affected. Consequently, robustness and sensitivity tests are performed 
using alternative measures of earnings and returns.  
 
7.3.1 Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
The main test results using the Basu (1997) timeliness model (see Chapter 6) defined 
earnings as the operating profit of firm i for the period of t deflated by the market 
capitalization of firm i at the end of period t-1 (i.e.OPIi,t). Meanwhile, returns (RReti,t) were 
defined as the raw (i.e. unadjusted) share returns of firm i for time period t that is (Pt – Pt-
1)/Pt-1 where Pt is the price of shares for firm i three (3) months after the end of the fiscal 
year t and Pt-1 is the price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t. For 
purposes of re-testing, earnings are redefined (alternative measure denoted as OPISi,t)55 as the 
operating profit of firm i at the end of time period t deflated by the number of outstanding 
common shares of firm i at the end of time period t, and divided by the price per share of 
firm i at end of time period t. Meanwhile, returns are redefined (and denoted as AReti,t) as the 
market-adjusted share return of firm i for time period t that is [((Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1) – ((KLCIt - 
KLCIt-1) /KLCIt-1)] where Pt is the share price of firm i three (3) months after the end of time 
period t; Pt-1 is the price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t); KLCIt 
is the value of the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index three (3) months after the end of time 
period t; and KLCIt-1 is the value of Kuala Lumpur Composite Index nine (9) months prior to 
the fiscal year t. 
Table 7.5 presents statistical results of three regressions using the basic Basu (1997) 
earnings timeliness base model using the alternative measures of earnings and returns. The 
first regression (see Table 7.5 Column I) only included the alternative earnings measure 
(i.e.OPISi,t) whilst the regression in Table 7.5 Column II only used the alternative return 
(i.e.AReti,t). The third regression (see Table 7.5 Column III) used both alternative measures.  
  
                                                     
55 To solve problems related to outliers, winsoring of the 1st percentile and 99th percentile of OPISi,t values have 
been conducted. 
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Table 7.5:Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
 
Column I Column II Column III 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.100 3.620 0.098 3.226 0.101 3.491 
NEGRETi,t 0.025 0.856     
NEGAReti,t   0.052 1.710
Ψ 0.045 1.577 
RETi,t 0.046 3.050
ǂ     
AReti,t   0.047 2.697
ǂ 0.044 2.669ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.234 3.350
ǂ     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t   0.273 4.220
ǂ 0.263 4.293ǂ 
Year 2002 -0.049 -1.433 -0.090 -2.497† -0.080 -2.331† 
Year 2003 -0.077 -2.274† -0.037 -1.049 -0.040 -1.211 
Year 2004 -0.012 -0.348 -0.014 -0.402 -0.015 -0.452 
Year 2005 -0.069 -2.058† -0.063 -1.814 Ψ -0.066 -2.014† 
Year 2006 -0.076 -2.242† -0.053 -1.547 -0.054 -1.642 
Adjusted R² 0.062 0.070 0.074 
F-Value 5.604ǂ 6.265ǂ 6.519ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I–OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II–OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGAReti,t + β0AReti,t + 
β1AReti,t*NEGAReti,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column III–OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEGAReti,t + β0AReti,t + 
β1AReti,t*NEGAReti,t + ∑γt + εi,t. ; where: OPISi,t = operating profit for time period t deflated by the 
number of outstanding common share of firm i three (3) months after the end of time period t-1of firm 
i for the time period tdeflated by the price per outstanding common share of firm i nine (9) months 
prior to the fiscal year t ; AReti,t = market-adjusted share return of firm i for time period t that is [((Pt – 
Pt-1)/Pt-1) – ((KLCIt - KLCIt-1) /KLCIt-1)] where Pt is the share price of firm i three (3) months after the 
end of time period t and Pt-1 is the price of shares for firm i nine (9) months prior to the fiscal year t; 
NEGAReti,t= indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if ARett is negative, otherwise firm i scored 
zero (0); For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 6.1 and;
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
As reported in Table 7.5 Column I, Column II and Column III, directionality of the 
coefficients on three variables forming the basic Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings 
conservatism model are consistent withthe main statistical results (see Table 6.3 Column I). 
Furthermore, the significance of the coefficients is generally similar to the main statistical 
results. The only variation of note is the coefficient on NEGRETi,t is statistically insignificant 
for the main finding (see Table 6.3 Column I) but statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level when returns are measured using a market-adjusted approach that is AReti,t 
(see Table 7.5 Column II). Regardless, Table 7.5 results also support the existence of the 
timeliness of earnings conservatism amongst Malaysian publicly listed firms despite the use 
of alternative measures of earnings and return. 
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Table 7.6 presents empirical results of analysis retesting the association of direct 
custodian excellence and the timeliness of earnings conservatism using alternative measures 
of earnings and returns.  
 
Table 7.6:Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I Column II Column III 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.027 0.492 0.071 1.078 0.065 1.041 
NEGRETi,t 0.064 0.776     
NEGAReti,t   0.005 0.057 0.008 0.099 
DCEi,t 0.023 1.674
Ψ 0.010 0.570 0.013 0.754 
NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t -0.013 -0.577     
NEGAReti,t*DCEi,t   0.012 0.468 0.009 0.371 
RETi,t 0.121 2.755
ǂ     
AReti,t   0.112 2.069
† 0.112 2.182† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.149 0.717     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t   0.121 0.605 0.104 0.549 
RETi,t*DCEi,t -0.026 -1.805
 Ψ     
AReti,t*DCEi,t   -0.023 -1.271 -0.024 -1.396 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t 0.029 0.499     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*DCEi,t   0.049 0.882 0.051 0.972 
Year 2002 -0.048 -1.402 -0.090 -2.495† -0.080 -2.328† 
Year 2003 -0.079 -2.318† -0.040 -1.127 -0.043 -1.296 
Year 2004 -0.012 -0.347 -0.015 -0.437 -0.016 -0.489 
Year 2005 -0.069 -2.077† -0.063 -1.817 Ψ -0.067 -2.025† 
Year 2006 -0.077 -2.259† -0.054 -1.561 -0.055 -1.667 Ψ 
Adjusted R² 0.063 0.071 0.074 
F-Value 4.127ǂ 4.524ǂ 4.727ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Column I, II and III: OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DCEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*DCEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t where: DCEi,t = see 
equations in Table 6.3.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.5and; 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
In respect to Table 7.6 Column I (where OPISit is used as the dependent variable 
rather than OPIit), directionality and significance of the coefficients on each variable are 
generally consistent with the main results (see Table 6.4 Column I). The only notable 
variation is the coefficient on DCEi,tis statistically significant (i.e. p<0.10) when OPISit is the 
dependent variable butinsignificant when OPIit is used. As for regressionsusing an alternative 
returns measure (see Table 7.6 Column II and Column III), coefficients on the majority of 
the variables remained the same as those presented in Table 6.3 Column I. A minor variation 
is associated with the coefficients on NEGAReti,t*DCEi,t (versus NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t in Table 
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6.4 Column I) that are positive but insignificant from zero compared to negative and 
insignificant from zero in the main test results. Consistent with Table 6.4 Column I, the 
coefficients on the main variable of interest (i.e. the three-way interaction term) are positive 
and insignificant from zero in the three regressionsshown in Table 7.6. Thus, despite using 
alternative measures for earnings and returns the Table 7.6 findings reaffirm the Table 6.4 
Column I result implying lack of a significant association between direct custodian 
effectiveness and the timeliness of earnings conservatism.  
Table 7.7 presents statistical results of tests of the association between auditor 
quality and earnings timeliness using alternative measures of earnings and returns. 
 
Table 7.7:Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I Column II Column III 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.103 2.779 0.128 2.982 0.119 2.932 
NEGRETi,t 0.011 0.208     
NEGAReti,t   0.008 0.144 0.014 0.275 
AQi,t -0.002 -0.118 -0.021 -1.036 -0.013 -0.678 
NEGRETi,t*AQi,t 0.009 0.331     
NEGAReti,t*AQi,t   0.029 0.987 0.021 0.764 
RETi,t 0.043 1.749
Ψ     
AReti,t   0.030 1.045 0.033 1.197 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.250 2.047
†     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t   0.297 2.647
ǂ 0.293 2.650ǂ 
RETi,t*AQi,t 0.002 0.157     
AReti,t*AQi,t   0.013 0.729 0.009 0.522 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t -0.011 -0.158     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*AQi,t   -0.018 -0.293 -0.020 -0.336 
Year 2002 -0.048 -1.386 -0.087 -2.416† -0.077 -2.253† 
Year 2003 -0.078 -2.273† -0.035 -1.006 -0.039 -1.181 
Year 2004 -0.013 -0.380 -0.014 -0.390 -0.016 -0.469 
Year 2005 -0.069 -2.052† -0.061 -1.744 Ψ -0.065 -1.976† 
Year 2006 -0.076 -2.240† -0.050 -1.425 -0.051 -1.550 
Adjusted R² 0.056 0.067 0.069 
F-Value 3.760ǂ 4.304ǂ 4.451ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Column I, II and III: OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2AQi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*AQi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t where: AQi,t = see 
equations in Table 6.5.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.5;and 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
 With regards to the directionality of the coefficients on the prime variables of 
interest in Table 7.7 Column I, Column II and Column III, these are comparable and 
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consistent with the main associated statistical results reported in Table 6.5 Column I (PS). In 
terms of the significance of the coefficients, these are also highly comparable with Table 6.5 
Column I. For example, for the main variable of concern (i.e. the three-way interaction 
terms) the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t (AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*AQi,t) in Table 7.7 
Column I (Column II and Column II) is negative and statistically insignificant from zero as 
per Table 6.5 Column I findings. The results indicate the lack of association between auditor 
quality and the timeliness of earnings conservatism highlighted in Table 6.5 Column I is not 
affected by use of alternative measures of earnings and returns. 
Table 7.8 presents statistical results from the Basu (1997) timeliness model testing 
the association of audit committee effectiveness and earnings timeliness using alternative 
measures of earnings and returns than those presented in the main associated results in Table 
6.7 Column I.  
As reported in Table 7.8 Column I, directionality and significance of the coefficient 
on each variable is consistent with that of the main associated results (see Table 6.7 Column 
I). For Table 7.8 Column II and Column III results, the directionality and significance on the 
coefficients yield some minor variation relative to Table 6.7 Column I results.For instance, 
the coefficient on AReti,t*NEGAReti,tis negative in Table 7.8 Column II and Column III 
results rather than positive as in the Table 6.7 Column I results. Of major significance, 
however, is the difference associated with the three-way interaction term 
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*ACEi,t. In Table 7.8 Column II and Column III results, the coefficients on 
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*ACEi,t are negative and significant (i.e. p<0.01). In contrast, for the main 
finding the coefficient on the corresponding three-way interaction term is positive and 
insignificant. Table 7.8 Column II and Column III results suggest an association between 
audit committee effectiveness and timeliness of earnings whereas Table 6.7 Column I results 
infer no such association. Thus, any audit committee effectiveness–timeliness of earnings 
conservatism association may be tenuous and dependent on the measure of returns. 
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Table 7.8: Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I Column II Column III 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.016 -0.319 -0.018 -0.296 0.007 0.125 
NEGRETi,t 0.094 1.151     
NEGAReti,t   0.059 0.691 0.037 0.502 
ACEi,t 0.064 2.806
ǂ 0.067 2.357† 0.055 2.185† 
NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t -0.041 -1.019     
NEGAReti,t*ACEi,t   -0.012 -0.291 -0.004 -0.103 
RETi,t 0.152 4.003
ǂ     
AReti,t   0.175 3.887
ǂ 0.161 3.805ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.045 0.223     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t   -0.070 -0.372 -0.055 -0.322 
RETi,t*ACEi,t -0.067 -3.040
ǂ     
AReti,t*ACEi,t   -0.084 -3.072
ǂ -0.077 -2.993ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 0.111 1.111     
AReti,t*NEGAReti,t*ACEi,t   0.195 2.106
† 0.182 2.156† 
Year 2002 -0.044 -1.293 -0.086 -2.394† -0.076 -2.234† 
Year 2003 -0.073 -2.163† -0.035 -1.009 -0.040 -1.206 
Year 2004 -0.008 -0.240 -0.010 -0.296 -0.012 -0.356 
Year 2005 -0.065 -1.947 Ψ -0.059 -1.701 Ψ -0.063 -1.930 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.066 -1.966† -0.045 -1.324 -0.045 -1.391 
Adjusted R² 0.075 0.086 0.088 
F-Value 4.758ǂ 5.367ǂ 5.469ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend: 
Column I, II and III: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2ACEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*ACEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t where: ACEi,t = see 
equations in Table 6.7.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 7.5;and 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
7.3.2 Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
Additional robustness and sensitivity tests using the Basu (1997) persistence of 
earnings conservatism model are performed using an alternative measure of earnings. 
Specifically, for the main test results reported in Table 6.4 Column I, Table 6.6 Column I 
and Table 6.6 Column I, earnings is defined as the change in operating profit of firm i for the 
period of t-1 to t deflated by the market capitalization of firm i at the end of period t-2 and t-
1 (i.e.∆OPIi,t). The revised measure of earnings (denoted as ∆OPISi,t-1) is defined as change 
in operating profit deflated by the number of outstanding common shares of firm i for the 
period of t-1 to t divided by change in share price of firm i at the end of period t-2 and t-1. 
Statistical results of regression using ∆OPISi,t are presented in Table 7.9 Column I, Column 
II, Column III and Column IV. Table 7.9 Column I shows the results of the Basu (1997) base 
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model for persistence of earnings conservatism, with Column II concentrating on the 
influence of direct custodian excellence. Meanwhile, Table 7.9 Column III (Column IV) 
considers the influence of auditor quality (audit committee effectiveness). 
As shown in Table 7.9 Column I, the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1and ∆OPIi,t-1are 
positive, while the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1are negative. Directionality of the 
coefficients is consistent with results presented in Table 6.2 Column I (PS). As for 
significance levels, results are mixed. Both the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1are significant (i.e. p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively) when the alternative 
measure ∆OPISit is used. Meanwhile NEG∆OPIi,t-1is statistically insignificant from zero. 
These results, however, are highly similar to the main result presented in Chapter 6. The only 
noted variation is the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1in Chapter 6 results were 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level instead of 10% confidence level in Table 
7.9 Column I. Table 7.9 Column II results show that across the seven variables of interest the 
coefficients on NEG∆OPISi,t-1, DCEi,t, NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t and OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-
1*DCEi,t are negative. Directionality of the coefficients on the seven variables of interest in 
Table 7.9 Column II is, in the main, contrary to Table 6.4 Column I (PS). Specifically, only 
the signs on ∆OPISi,t-1 and NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t in Table 7.9 Column II is in the same 
direction for the corresponding variables (i.e.∆OPIi,t-1 and NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) in Table 6.4 
Column I (PS). Aside from affecting directionality, use of the alternative measure of 
earnings also has an impact on the significance of the coefficients. The significance of the 
coefficients on NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t and ∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t in Table 7.9 Column II are 
similar to the corresponding variables (i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) in 
Table 6.4 Column I (PS). Meanwhile, the coefficients on ∆OPISit and OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-
1*DCEi,t are insignificant in Table 7.9 Column II results though significant at 1% confidence 
level for the corresponding ∆OPIit and OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t variables in Table 6.4 
Column I (PS). Finally, the coefficient on NEG∆OPISi,t-1*∆OPISi,t-1is significant at 1% 
confidence level in Table 7.9 Column II results but insignificant from zero for the 
corresponding NEG∆OPIi,t-1*∆OPIi,t-1variable in Table 6.4 Column I (PS).  
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Table 7.9: Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
 
Column I Column II Column III Column IV 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.194 0.886 0.324 0.933 0.286 1.063 0.150 0.429 
NEG∆OPISi,t-1 0.868 1.466 -0.628 -0.952 -0.516 -0.760 0.191 0.262 
∆OPISi,t-1 0.715 23.549
ǂ 0.075 0.417 -0.272 -1.625 0.695 4.820ǂ 
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 -0.274 -1.708
Ψ 0.380 3.049ǂ 0.156 0.565 -0.494 -2.591ǂ 
DCEi,t   
-0.024 -0.315 
 
   
NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t   
-1.374 -4.728ǂ 
 
   
∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t   
0.155 1.666 Ψ 
 
   
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t   
-0.176 -0.578 
 
   
AQi,t     
-0.005 -0.053   
NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t     
-0.322 -0.926   
∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t     
0.106 0.405   
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t     
0.234 0.948   
ACEi,t      
 0.067 0.483 
NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t      
 0.693 1.776 Ψ 
∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t      
 -0.320 -2.101† 
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t      
 0.327 2.064† 
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Table 7.9: Regression analysis of earnings persistence (continued) 
 
Column I Column II Column III Column IV 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -0.213 -0.670 -0.544 -1.829 Ψ -0.231 -0.748 -0.236 -0.741 
Year 2003 -0.621 -2.001 -0.076 -0.257 -0.568 -1.887 Ψ -0.642 -2.073† 
Year 2004 -0.183 -0.590 -0.035 -0.118 -0.105 -0.351 -0.116 -0.375 
Year 2005 -0.149 -0.487 -0.186 -0.636 -0.094 -0.314 -0.151 -0.496 
Year 2006 -0.103 -0.337 0.324 0.933 -0.176 -0.596 -0.134 -0.439 
Adjusted R² 0.517 0.561 0.550 0.523 
F-Value 75.283ǂ 65.612ǂ 57.518ǂ 51.710ǂ 
N 557 557 557 557 
 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—∆OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + β0∆OPISi,t-1 + β1∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II—
OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + α2DCEi,t + α3NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t + β0∆OPISi,t-1 + β1∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + β2∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t + β3∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*DCEi,t 
+ ∑γt + εi,t;(c) Column III—OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + α2AQi,t + α3NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t + β0∆OPISi,t-1 + β1∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + β2∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t + β3∆OPISi,t-
1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t;(d) Column IV—OPISi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPISi,t-1 + β1∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 + 
β2∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t;where: ∆OPISi,t = change in operating profit deflated by the number of outstanding common shares of firm 
i for the period of t divided by change in share price of firm i at the end of t-1; ∆OPISi,t-1 = change in operating profit deflated by the number of outstanding common shares of 
firm i for the period of t-1 divided by change in share price of firm i at the end of period t-2; See definitions of DCEi,t, AQi,t and ACEi,t in Table 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8. For 
definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 6.2and; significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table 7.9 Column III shows directionality and significance of coefficients on 
variables forming the basic Basu (1997) persistence of earnings conservatism model (i.e. 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1* NEG∆OPIi,t-1) are similar to corresponding variables in 
Table 6.6 Column I. The only difference of note is the coefficient on ∆OPISi,t-
1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1 is positive in Table 7.9 Column III, whereas the corresponding variable (i.e. 
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1) in Table 6.6 Column I is negative. As for variables including the 
measure for auditor quality (i.e. AQi,t, NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t, ∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t and OPISi,t-1* 
NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t ), coefficients on all four variables are statistically insignificant from 
zero. This is partially inconsistent with the corresponding Table 6.6 Column I results where 
coefficients on OPIi,t-1*AQi,tand ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Also, in term of directionality for these four variables, the coefficients 
NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t, and ∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*AQi,t are negative and positive in Table 
7.9 Column III results but positive and negative for the corresponding variables (i.e. 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t, and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t) in Table 6.6 Column I. 
Finally, Table 7.9 Column IV indicates the directionality of coefficients on all seven 
variables is mainly consistent with corresponding variables in Table 6.8 Column I. However, 
the coefficient on NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t ( ∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t) is positive 
(negative) in Table 7.9 Column IV but negative (positive) for NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t (∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) in the corresponding Table 6.8 Column I. As for the significance of 
the coefficients in Table 7.9 Column IV relative to Table 6.8 Column I, there are three 
differences. Specifically, the coefficients on NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t, ∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t and 
∆OPISi,t-1*NEG∆OPISi,t-1*ACEi,t in Table 7.9 Column IV are significant at 10%, 5% and 5% 
confidence levels. However, for the corresponding variables in Table 6.8 Column I (i.e. 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t) these are non-
significant and significant at 1% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
Overall, the use of an alternative measure of earnings appears to have an impact on 
the association between the persistence of earnings conservatism and (a) direct custodian 
excellence, (b) auditor quality, and (c) audit committee effectiveness. Consequently, caution 
in interpreting the main results reported in Table 6.2, Table 6.4, Table 6.6 and Table 6.8 
applies. 
 
7.4 Brand name/specialist 
Prior research across various lines of enquiry in the finance and accounting literature 
highlight the possible differential in engaging a highly reputed audit firm versus a less 
reputable counterpart. Typically, many researchers have drawn a distinction between the Big 
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4 audit firms and Non-Big 4 firms.56As a further robustness check of the main findings, 
regression is performed again after: (a) excluding separately the measure for auditor brand 
name from the composite score to minimize Big 4 bias; and (b) excluding specialist auditor 
rather than auditor brand name. 
 
7.4.1 Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
 Table 7.10 presents the empirical results using a revised composite score for direct 
custodian excellence (countering for any brand name and specialist biases) in respect to the 
timeliness of earnings conservatism. Two regressions are presented: (i) regression with brand 
name excluded (see Table 7.10 Column I); and (ii) regression with specialist excluded (see 
Table 7.10 Column II). 
As shown in Table 7.10 Column I and Column II, the directionality and significance 
levels of the coefficients on the three variables forming the basic Basu (1997) timeliness of 
earnings model (i.e. NEGRETi,t , RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) are consistent with the main 
results (see Table 6.3 Column I).  
In terms of the influence of direct custodian excellence with brand name excluded 
(see Table 7.10 Column I), directionality of the coefficients on four variables of interest (i.e. 
DCEBNEXi,t,NEGRETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t, RETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t and RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*DCEBNEXi,t) is consistent with Table 6.3 Column I results. In terms of the significance of 
the coefficients, meanwhile, some variations are found. For instance, the coefficient on 
DCEBNEXi,t is significant at 10% confidence level (see Table 7.10 Column I), whereas the 
coefficient on DCEi,t in the main results (see Table 6.3 Column I) is statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on RETi,t-1*DCEi,t in the main findings reported in Table 6.3 
Column I is statistically significant at 10% confidence level, but the coefficient on the 
corresponding variable (i.e.RETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t) in the results shown in Table 7.10 Column 
Iis statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
The regression results performed after excluding industry specialists (see Table 7.10 
Column II) also yields coefficients on the four direct custodian variables of interest (i.e. 
DCESPEXi,t, NEGRETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t, RETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t and RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*DCESPEXi,t) with the same directionality for coefficients on the associated variables in the 
main results reported in Table 6.3 Column I (PS). Again, some variations in terms of 
significance are noted. Specifically, the coefficient on DCESPEXi,t (RETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t) is 
significant at the 5% (5%) confidence level whilst the corresponding variable from the main 
                                                     
56The terms Big 8, Big 6 or Big 5 have also been used at alternative times. However, due to consolidation within 
the audit industry and major accounting/corporate scandals, the numbers of highly reputable audit firms have 
diminished from eight to the current level of four. The Big 4 terms has been constant across the timeframe of this 
study. Consequently, to avoid confusion this term is applied here. 
170 
 
results–that is, DCEi,t (RETi,t-1*DCEi,t) is not statistically significant (significant at 10% 
confidence level). 
 
Table 7.10: Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I: Brand Name 
Excluded 
Column II: Specialist 
Excluded 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.018 0.302 -0.020 -0.324 
NEGRETi,t-1 0.088 0.996 0.120 1.255 
RETi,t-1 0.167 3.529
ǂ 0.157 3.350ǂ 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 0.113 0.493 0.250 1.025 
DCEBNEXi,t 0.033 1.827
Ψ 
 
 
NEGRETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t -0.024 -0.821  
 
RETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t -0.052 -2.637
ǂ 
 
 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*DCEBNEXi,t 
0.058 0.736 
 
 
DCESPEXi,t   
0.043 2.281† 
NEGRETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t   
-0.034 -1.118 
RETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t   
-0.046 -2.417† 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*DCESPEXi,t   
0.010 0.122 
Year 2002 -0.058 -1.606 -0.055 -1.521 
Year 2003 -0.075 -2.096† -0.073 -2.047† 
Year 2004 -0.011 -0.319 -0.009 -0.262 
Year 2005 -0.066 -1.884 Ψ -0.063 -1.805 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.074 -2.087† -0.073 -2.050† 
Adjusted R² 0.065 0.068 
F-Value 4.228ǂ 4.369ǂ 
N 557 557 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—RETi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t-1 + 
α2DCEBNEXi,t + α3NEGRETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t + β0RETi,t-1 + β1RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 + β2RETi,t-
1*DCEBNEXi,t + β3RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II—RETi,t = α0 + 
α1NEGRETi,t-1 + α2DCESPEXi,t + α3NEGRETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + β0RETi,t-1 + β1RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 + 
β2RETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + β3RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: DCEBNEXi,t= sum of 
firm i scores in time period t of AQi,t and ACEi,t. That is, DCEi,t = ∑(AQi,t + ACEi,t) where score from 
brand name feature is excluded from AQi,t total score; DCESPEXi,t= sum of firm i scores in time 
period t of AQi,t and ACEi,t. That is, DCEi,t = ∑(AQi,t + ACEi,t) where score from specialist feature is 
excluded from AQi,t total score; For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 6.3 and; Ψ, 
†, ǂ = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels.  
 
Table 7.11 reports results of tests performed again examining the association 
between auditor quality and timeliness of earnings conservatism but after (a) brand name is 
excluded (see Table 7.1I Column I); and (b) industry specialist excluded (see Table 7.11 
Column II). 
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Table 7.11:Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I: Brand Name 
Excluded 
Column II: Specialist 
Excluded 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.121 3.281 0.106 2.582 
NEGRETi,t-1 0.012 0.249 0.017 0.288 
RETi,t-1 0.054 2.142
† 0.045 1.780Ψ 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 0.258 2.045
† 0.341 2.526† 
AQBNEXi,t -0.022 -0.874  
 
NEGRETi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t 0.019 0.448  
 
RETi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t -0.008 -0.279  
 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*AQBNEXi,t 
-0.011 -0.095 
 
 
AQSPEXi,t   
-0.007 -0.282 
NEGRETi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t   
0.012 0.280 
RETi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t   
0.005 0.180 
RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-
1*AQSPEXi,t   
-0.088 -0.831 
Year 2002 -0.060 -1.643 -0.056 -1.547 
Year 2003 -0.076 -2.120† -0.076 -2.108† 
Year 2004 -0.012 -0.336 -0.014 -0.404 
Year 2005 -0.066 -1.867 Ψ -0.066 -1.878 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.077 -2.143† -0.076 -2.127† 
Adjusted R² 0.055 0.057 
F-Value 3.706ǂ 3.792ǂ 
N 557 557 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—RETi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t-1 + 
α2AQBNEXi,t + α3NEGRETi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t + β0RETi,t-1 + β1RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 + β2RETi,t-
1*AQBNEXi,t + β3RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II—RETi,t = α0 + 
α1NEGRETi,t-1 + α2AQSPEXi,t + α3NEGRETi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + β0RETi,t-1 + β1RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 + 
β2RETi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + β3RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: AQBNEXi,t = composite 
score index with firm i in time period t scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of 
non-audit services to total audit fees (i.e. fees paid for audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t 
is less than 0.20; and (b) external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; If criterion item is 
not met then firm i in time period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score 
index is from zero (0) to two (2);AQSPEXi,t = composite score index with firm i in time period t 
scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of non-audit services to total audit fees (i.e. 
fees paid for audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20; and (b) external auditor 
is a Big 4 audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte or KPMG). If criterion item is not met then firm i in time 
period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score index is from zero (0) to 
two (2); For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 6.3and; 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels.  
 
In the regression tabulated in Table 7.11 Column I with brand name excluded from 
the computation of auditor quality, directionality of the coefficients on all variables is 
consistent with the directionality of corresponding coefficients in Table 6.5 Column I except 
that related to RETi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t and RETi,t-1*AQi,t. For the former the coefficient is 
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negative (see Table 7.11 Column I) but positive for the latter (see Table 6.5 Column I). As 
for significance of the variables, RETi,t-1 and RETi,t-1*NEGRETi,t-1 are significant at the 5% 
confidence level in Table 7.11 Column I finals but at the 10% confidence level in the main 
results (see Table 6.5 Column I). Coefficients on all other variables remained statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level. 
Regression results testing the auditor quality – timeliness of earnings conservatism 
association whereby the industry specialist is excluded from the composite auditor quality 
score (see Table 7.11 Column II) shows directionality on the coefficients of all seven 
variables mirror that of corresponding variables in Table 6.5 Column I (PS) findings. 
Furthermore, the significance of the coefficients is consistent aside from that associated with 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t which is significant at 5% confidence level in Table 7.11 Column II results 
but at the 10% confidence level for the main results. 
 
7.4.2 Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
While Table 7.10 and Table 7.11 presented statistical results from the retesting of the 
Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism model using revised composite scores for 
direct custodian excellence and auditor quality, results presented in Table 7.12 and Table 
7.13 concentrate on the persistence of earnings conservatism.  
With regards to the three variables forming the basic Basu (1997) persistence of 
earnings conservatism model (i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1), the 
directionality and significance of the coefficients on these variables in Table 7.12 Column I 
(Brand NameExcluded) and Table 7.12 Column II (SpecialistExcluded) mirror the main 
findings presented in Table 6.4 Column I (PS). 
In terms of the four direct custodian excellence associated variables in the regression 
where the composite score is calculated after excluding the score for brand name (i.e. Table 
7.12 Column I; DCEBNEXi,t,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,tand ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t), the directionality and significance are consistent with the four 
corresponding variables in the main results (see Table 6.4 Column I) that 
isDCEi,t,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,tand ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t. Similarly, 
for the regression whereby the direct custodian excellence composite is calculated without 
consideration for industry specialists (see Table 7.12 Column II), the coefficients on the four 
direct custodian excellence associated variables (i.e. DCESPEXi,t,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t, 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,tand ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t) have the same directionality 
and significance as the four corresponding variables in the main results (see Table 6.4 
Column I) that isDCEi,t,NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,tand ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t. 
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Table 7.12: Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings persistence 
 
Column I: Brand Name 
Excluded 
Column II: Specialist 
Excluded 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.043 0.058 -0.286 -0.366 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 1.021 0.962 1.261 1.120 
∆OPIi,t-1 9.871 11.695
ǂ 10.213 12.529ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -9.507 -7.388
ǂ -9.679 -8.451ǂ 
DCEBNEXi,t 0.166 0.792  
 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t -0.238 -0.691  
 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t -2.664 -9.965
ǂ 
 
 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEBNEXi,t 
2.413 5.106ǂ 
 
 
DCESPEXi,t   
0.236 1.112 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t   
-0.316 -0.916 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t   
-2.643 -10.771ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*DCESPEXi,t   
2.331 5.904ǂ 
Year 2002 -1.112 -1.878 Ψ -1.025 -1.759 Ψ 
Year 2003 -0.975 -1.702 Ψ -0.730 -1.292 
Year 2004 -0.870 -1.519 -0.699 -1.237 
Year 2005 -0.987 -1.752 Ψ -0.915 -1.646 
Year 2006 -0.719 -1.266 -0.630 -1.125 
Adjusted R² 0.224 0.245 
F-Value 14.348ǂ 16.038ǂ 
N 557 557 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + 
α2DCEBNEXi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEBNEXi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEBNEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (b) Column II—∆OPIi,t = α0 
+ α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2DCESPEXi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCESPEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: 
DCEBNEXi,t and DCESPEXi,t = see definition in Table 7.10. For definitions of other variables, see 
equations in Table 6.4and; 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
Table 7.13 reports results of multivariate analysis performed testing earnings 
persistence using a revised composite score for auditor quality with findings contrasted to 
Table 6.6 Column I results. Specifically, in Table 7.13 Column I the computation of auditor 
quality excludes scores for brand name whilst Table 7.13 Column II results are based on 
auditor quality scored without consideration for industry specialization. 
Relative to Table 6.6 Column I results, the coefficients on three of the corresponding 
variables reported in Table 7.13 Column I have contrasting directionality, that is, 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (positive in Table 7.13 Column I versus negative Table 6.6 Column I), ∆OPIi,t-1 
(negative versus positive) and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t (positive versus negative). 
Significance of coefficients also contrasts for four of the seven corresponding variables. 
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Specifically, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are significant at the 5% 
and 1% confidence level in Table 7.13 Column I results but insignificant from zero in Table 
6.6 Column I (PS) results. Also, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t (∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t) is significant at the 1% confidence level in Table 7.13 Column I 
results but insignificant from zero for the corresponding variable, that is, ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 
(∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t) in the main findings (see Table 6.6 Column I). 
 
Table 7.13: Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings persistence 
 
Column I: Brand Name 
Excluded 
Column II: Specialist 
Excluded 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.635 1.114 0.482 0.769 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.149 0.221 0.262 0.337 
∆OPIi,t-1 1.534 2.512
† 2.706 4.686ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -2.194 -2.948
ǂ -3.276 -4.375ǂ 
AQBNEXi,t -0.116 -0.326  
 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t 0.133 0.236  
 
∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t 0.207 0.388  
 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*AQBNEXi,t 
0.178 0.283 
 
 
AQSPEXi,t   
-0.001 -0.002 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t   
0.014 0.025 
∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t   
-0.792 -1.818Ψ 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*AQSPEXi,t   
1.076 1.902 Ψ 
Year 2002 -0.965 -1.501 -0.897 -1.400 
Year 2003 -0.869 -1.393 -0.820 -1.316 
Year 2004 -0.803 -1.288 -0.748 -1.199 
Year 2005 -0.929 -1.516 -0.936 -1.530 
Year 2006 -0.710 -1.148 -0.614 -0.994 
Adjusted R² 0.080 0.085 
F-Value 5.050ǂ 5.294ǂ 
N 557 557 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + 
α2AQBNEXi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-
1*AQBNEXi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II—∆OPIi,t = α0 + 
α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2AQSPEXi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
+ β2∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: AQBNEXi,t and 
AQSPEXi,t = see definition in Table 7.11. For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 
6.6and; 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels.  
 
For the regression using the specialist excluded from the composite score of auditor 
quality (see Table 7.13 Column II), the coefficients on four variables (i.e. NEG∆OPIi,t-1, 
∆OPIi,t-1, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t,and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t) is positive, while 
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the remaining (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1, AQSPEXi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t) is negative. 
In comparison to the same test but using unrevised composite score for auditor quality, (see 
Table 6.6 Column I), the coefficients on three variables (i.e.∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1, 
AQSPEXi,t/AQi,t  and NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQSPEXi,t /NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t) are consistent. In respect 
to the significance level, consistent with Table 6.6 Column I (PS), the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-
1*AQi,t / ∆OPIi,t-1*AQBNEXi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t/∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 
are significant at conventional levels. However, instead of significant at 1% confidence level, 
the coefficient on variables using a revised composite score for auditor quality is significant 
at 10% confidence level. Moreover, another variation is that the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 
and∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 for regression using a revised composite score is also significant 
at conventional levels (p<0.01), while insignificant for regression using an unrevised 
composite score of auditor quality. 
 
7.5 Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 classifications 
Whilst Section 7.4 addressed one particular aspect of a possible Big 4/Non-Big 4 
bias (with respect to the calculation of the composite score in relation to brand name and/or 
industry specialist), differences may also be noted if partitioning the firm-year observations 
by the type of auditor (i.e. Big 4 or Non-Big 4) that conducted the audit. To this end, the 
main tests performed on the pooled sample (N = 557 firm-year observations) are repeated for 
a Big 4 (N = 326 firm-year observations) and Non-Big 4 (N = 231 firm-year observations) 
sub-samples.  
 
7.5.1 Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
Table 7.14 presents empirical results of two regressions(Column I for Big 4 sub-
sample, and Column II for Non-Big 4 sub-sample) testing the original Basu (1997) timeliness 
of earnings conservatism base model. 
Directionality of the coefficients on the three primary variables underpinning the 
basic Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism model (i.e. NEGRETi,t, RETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t ) in the two regressions reported in Table 7.14 are consistent with the main 
results (see Table 6.1 Column I). For the test using Big 4 firm-year observations the 
coefficients on RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t are statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01). This 
result is consistent with the main findings. In contrast, for the regression including Non-Big 4 
firm-year observations, only the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t is statistically significant 
(i.e. p<0.10). Overall, Table 7.14 results suggest timeliness of earnings conservatism prevails 
across the Big 4 and Non-Big 4 sub-samples, though more pronounced in the former than 
latter. 
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Table 7.14:Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.089 2.535 0.106 2.086 
NEGRETi,t 0.046 1.258 0.010 0.186 
RETi,t 0.060 3.188
ǂ 0.037 1.318 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.248 2.715
ǂ 0.223 1.836Ψ 
Year 2002 -0.028 -0.640 -0.103 -1.655 
Year 2003 -0.088 -2.075† -0.048 -0.761 
Year 2004 -0.020 -0.469 0.004 0.067 
Year 2005 -0.035 -0.827 -0.103 -1.745 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.025 -0.590 -0.136 -2.192† 
Adjusted R² 0.073 0.042 
F-Value 4.206ǂ 2.251† 
N 326 231 
Legend:  
Column I and II: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + ∑γt + εi,twhere: See 
equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of all variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 confidence levels. 
 
Table 7.15 presents results of regression using the separate Big 4 and Non-Big 4 sub-
samples that test the association between the timeliness of earnings conservatism and (a) 
direct custodian excellence (see Table 7.15 Column I and Column II), (b) auditor quality (see 
Table 7.15 Column III and Column IV) and (c) audit committee effectiveness (see Table 
7.15 Column V and Column VI). The Big 4 (Non-Big 4) sub-sample is used in regressions 
reported in Table 7.15 Column I, Column III and Column V (Column II, Column IV and 
Column VI). 
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Table 7.15: Regression analysis of DCEi,t, AQi,t, ACEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 Column III: Big 4 Column IV: Non-Big 4 Column V: Big 4 Column VI: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.047 -0.514 0.032 0.322 0.140 1.783 0.141 2.381 -0.105 -1.658 -0.022 -0.224 
NEGRETi,t 0.154 1.052 0.093 0.624 0.032 0.257 -0.017 -0.224 0.165 1.631 0.130 0.855 
RETi,t 0.124 1.556 0.376 4.344
ǂ 0.157 1.194 0.056 1.852 Ψ 0.109 2.683ǂ 0.452 4.322ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.195 0.502 -0.098 -0.257 0.074 0.201 0.280 1.580 0.193 0.775 -0.284 -0.776 
DCEi,t 0.034 1.606 0.042 1.166         
NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t -0.028 -0.790 -0.047 -0.811         
RETi,t*DCEi,t -0.019 -0.832 -0.174 -4.192
ǂ         
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t 0.016 0.170 0.163 1.112         
AQi,t     -0.021 -0.628 0.030 0.438     
NEGRETi,t*AQi,t     0.005 0.090 -0.037 -0.343     
RETi,t*AQi,t     -0.048 -0.750 -0.240 -2.555
†     
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t     0.081 0.499 0.119 0.474     
ACEi,t         0.102 3.558
ǂ 0.061 1.394 
NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t         -0.068 -1.339 -0.065 -0.851 
RETi,t*ACEi,t         -0.036 -1.399 -0.222 -4.119
ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t         0.037 0.291 0.261 1.465 
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Table 7.15: Regression analysis of DCEi,t, AQi,t, ACEi,t and earnings timeliness (continued) 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 Column III: Big 4 Column IV: Non-Big 4 Column V: Big 4 Column VI: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -0.023 -0.525 -0.102 -1.693 Ψ -0.036 -0.811 -0.110 -1.776 -0.018 -0.427 -0.092 -1.523 
Year 2003 -0.085 -1.994† -0.032 -0.532 -0.092 -2.158† -0.050 -0.795 -0.085 -2.034† -0.025 -0.413 
Year 2004 -0.018 -0.416 0.000 0.006 -0.020 -0.457 -0.011 -0.183 -0.011 -0.251 0.009 0.154 
Year 2005 -0.036 -0.848 -0.092 -1.594 -0.035 -0.813 -0.106 -1.798 Ψ -0.032 -0.761 -0.086 -1.487 
Year 2006 -0.021 -0.490 -0.133 -2.228† -0.025 -0.579 -0.150 -2.428† -0.014 -0.325 -0.118 -1.965† 
Adjusted R² 0.069 0.109 0.073 0.063 0.106 0.103 
F-Value 3.023ǂ 3.355ǂ 3.123ǂ 2.284† 4.211ǂ 3.191ǂ 
N 326 231 326 231 326 231 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DCEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*DCEi,t + 
β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t *DCEi,t+ ∑γt + εi,t ; (b) Column II—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2AQi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*AQi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t *AQi,t+ 
∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column III—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2ACEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*ACEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t *ACEi,t+ ∑γt + εi,t; where: 
DCEi,t , AQi,t and ACEi,t = see equations in Table 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7.For definitions of other variables, see equations in Table 6.1; and 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence 
levels. 
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Directionality of the coefficients on the three variables (i.e. NEGRETi,t, RETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) that are included in all six regressions reported in Table 7.15, generally 
are consistent with the corresponding regressions reported in Table 6.3 Column I (PS), Table 
6.5 Column I (PS) and Table 6.7 Column I (PS). Only three differences in directionality are 
noted: (1) negative sign on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t in Table 7.15 Column II when positive for 
corresponding regression (see Table 6.3 Column I);(2) negative sign on NEGRETi,t in Table 
7.15 Column IV when positive for corresponding regression (see Table 6.5 Column I); and 
(3) negative sign on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t in Table 7.15 Column VI when positive for 
corresponding regression (see Table 6.7 Column I). The significance of the coefficients on 
NEGRETi,t, RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t also generally mirror that of the corresponding main 
results. However, some important variations are noted. Specifically, the coefficient on RETi,t 
in Table 7.15 Column I and Column III are insignificant from zero whereas the coefficient is 
significant for the corresponding main results (see Table 6.3 Column I and Table 6.5 Column 
I). Also, the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t is statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels in Table 7.15 Column III and Column IV but significant (p<0.10) in the corresponding 
main findings (see Table 6.5 Column I). 
In regards to regression results (see Table 7.15 Column I and Column II) including 
the four variables associated with direct custodian excellence (i.e.DCEi,t, NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t , 
RETi,t*DCEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t), directionality and significance of the 
coefficients are consistent with the main results reported in Table 6.3 Column I (PS) except 
in one case. Specifically, the coefficient on RETi,t*DCEi,t is statistically significant (i.e. 
p<0.01) when using Non-Big 4 firm-year observations but insignificant from zero for the 
main results (see Table 6.3 Column I). 
Results reported in Table 7.15 Column III and Column IV associated with variables 
that include a measure for auditor quality (i.e.AQi,t, NEGRETi,t*AQi,t , RETi,t*AQi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t) have some variation from the main associated results tabulated in 
Table 6.5 Column I (PS). Specifically, the coefficient on RETi,t*AQi,t is positive and 
insignificant from zero in the main results (see Table 6.5 Column I). When regressions are 
performed using the partitioned Big 4 and Non-Big 4 sub-samples the coefficient on 
RETi,t*AQi,t is negative (see Table 7.15 Column III and Column IV). Further, for the 
regression using the Non-Big 4 sub-sample, the RETi,t*AQi,t coefficient is significant at 
conventional levels that is p<0.05 (see Table 7.15 Column IV). Also, the coefficient on 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t is positive and insignificant when using only Big 4 sub-sample 
observations (see Table 7.15 Column III) but negative and insignificant in the main results 
(see Table 6.5 Column I). 
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As for results related to variables including a measure for audit committee 
effectiveness (i.e.ACEi,t, NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t , RETi,t*ACEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t), the 
directionality of the coefficients on these variables as reported in Table 7.15 Column V and 
Column VI, mirror that of the main results reported in Table 6.7 Column I (PS). There is 
some variation, however, in terms of significance. Specifically, in the main results (see Table 
6.7 Column I) the coefficients on ACEi,t and RETi,t*ACEi,t are significant (i.e. p<0.01 
respectively). For results shown in Table 7.15 Column V and Column VI, however, the 
coefficients on ACEi,t and RETi,t*ACEi,t are insignificant from zero. 
Whilst results of regressions performed after partitioning the sample into Big-4 and 
Non-Big-4 groupings present some differences to the main results (and between the two sub-
groups), the variations are generally minor. Of greatest importance is the variations noted are 
not associated with the key three-way interaction terms (i.e. RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t, 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t). Specifically, Table 7.15 results 
indicate that regardless of the engagement of a Big-4 or Non-Big-4 audit firm, there persists 
to be a substantive lack of a significant association between the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism and (a) direct custodian excellence, (b) auditor quality, and (c) audit committee 
excellence. Thus, the findings in Table 7.15 reinforce the main results shown in Table 6.3 
Column I, Table 6.5 Column I and Table 6.7 Column I respectively. 
 
7.5.2 Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
Table 7.16 presents empirical results of two regressions(Column I for Big 4 sub-
sample, and Column II for Non-Big 4 sub-sample) testing the original Basu (1997) 
persistence of earnings conservatism base model. 
Directionality and significance of the coefficients on the three primary variables 
underpinning the basic Basu (1997) persistence of earnings conservatism model 
(i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) in the regression reported in Table 
7.16 Column I are consistent with the main results (see Table 6.2 Column I). For the 
regression results using the Non-Big 4 sub-sample (see Table 7.16 Column II), the 
coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is also consistent with the corresponding main results 
tabulated in Table 6.2 Column I. However, the directionality of the coefficients on 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.16 Column II are contrary to Table 6.2 Column I 
results. The non-significance of the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.16 Column II results is 
also contrary to the significant (i.e. p<0.01) coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 for the main results (see 
Table 6.2 Column I). Overall, as the coefficients on the two-way interaction term (i.e.∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) are negative and significant (and consistent with Table 6.2 Column I 
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results), the results suggest persistence of earnings conservatism prevails across the Big 4 
and Non-Big 4 sub-samples. 
 
Table 7.16: Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 1.140 1.576 0.040 0.274 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.577 0.941 -0.049 -0.372 
∆OPIi,t-1 3.637 8.753
ǂ -0.047 -0.634 
∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
-3.797 -7.319ǂ -0.770 -5.276ǂ 
Year 2002 -2.149 -2.103† -0.087 -0.404 
Year 2003 -1.991 -2.023† -0.036 -0.171 
Year 2004 -1.850 -1.853 Ψ 0.139 0.679 
Year 2005 -1.535 -1.552 -0.287 -1.444 
Year 2006 -1.810 -1.819 0.061 0.302 
Adjusted R² 0.188 0.168 
F-Value 10.380ǂ 6.800ǂ 
N 326 231 
Legend:  
Column I and II:∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + ∑γt + εi,t ; 
where: see equations in Table 6.2 for definitions of all variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
Table 7.17 presents results of regressions using the separate Big 4 and Non-Big 4 
sub-samples that test the association between the persistence of earnings conservatism and 
(a) direct custodian excellence (see Table 7.17 Column I and Column II), (b) auditor quality 
(see Table 7.17 Column III and Column IV) and (c) audit committee effectiveness (see Table 
7.17 Column V and Column VI). The Big 4 (Non-Big 4) sub-sample is used in regressions 
reported in Table 7.17 Column I, Column III and Column V (Column II, Column IV and 
Column VI). 
Directionality and significance of the coefficients on the three variables 
(i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) included in all six regressions 
reported in Table 7.17 are relatively mixed in respect to consistency with corresponding 
coefficients in regressions reported in Table 6.4 Column I, Table 6.6 Column I and Table 6.8 
Column I. The coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 
7.17 Column I and Column V, regressions are of the same direction and significance as the 
main corresponding results reported in Table 6.4 Column I and Table 6.8 Column I. The 
directionality of the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in 
Table 7.17 Column IV is also consistent with the main findings reported in Table 6.6 
Column I. However, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.17 Column IV is 
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significant at 5% confidence level but insignificant from zero for the main results (see Table 
6.6 Colum I). As for the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in 
Table 7.17 Column II, these are in the opposite direction to the main corresponding findings 
in Table 6.4 Column I. Further, all coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.17 Column II are insignificant whereas in the main corresponding 
results (see Table 6.4 Column I) the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are 
statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01 respectively). As for the coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t-1, 
∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.17 Column III, only that on ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is consistent with the main corresponding findings in Table 6.6 Column I. 
Furthermore, coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are significant (i.e. p<0.01) 
whilst all coefficients on the NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 6.6 
Column I were insignificant from zero. Finally, the directionality of coefficients on 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in Table 7.17 Column VI results are contrary to the 
main corresponding reports in Table 6.8 Column I. Further, the ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
coefficient in Table 7.17 Column VI is insignificant from zero, whereas the corresponding 
coefficient in Table 6.8 Column I is significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 In regards to regression results reported in Table 7.17 Column I related to the four 
variables associated with direct custodian excellence (i.e.DCEi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t , 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t), directionality and significance of the 
coefficients are consistent with the main results reported in Table 6.4 Column I. In contrast, 
the directionality on the coefficients of DCEi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t , ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t and 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t reported in Table 7.17 Column II are directly opposite to the 
coefficients on the corresponding variables in the main results (see Table 6.4 Column I). 
There are also some differences in respect to the significance of the coefficients reported in 
Table 7.17 Column II relative to corresponding main results in Table 6.4 Column I. 
Specifically, the coefficient on DCEi,t (∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t) is significant (not significant) at 
conventional levels in Table 7.17 Column II results but not significant (significant) at 
conventional levels for the main results reported in Table 6.4 Column I. 
As for results reported in Table 7.17 Column III associated with four variables that 
include a measure for auditor quality (i.e.AQi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t , ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t), directionality of the coefficients is in complete contrast to that 
for the main associated results tabulated in Table 6.6 Column I. The significance of the 
coefficients on AQi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t , ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t in 
Table 7.17 Column III results, however, are consistent with Table 6.6 Column I findings. 
Meanwhile, for the regression on Non-Big 4 sub-sample firm-year observations, the 
coefficients on AQi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t , ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t are 
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consistent with Table 6.6 Column I (PS) results. Again, however, significance of the 
coefficients varies. Specifically, the coefficient on AQi,t (∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,tand ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t) is significant (not significant) at conventional levels in Table 7.17 
Column IV results but not significant (significant) in Table 6.6 Column I findings. 
In the case of tests reported in Table 7.17 Column V, the directionality of the 
coefficients on four variables including a measure for audit committee effectiveness 
(i.e.ACEi,t, NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t , RETi,t*ACEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t) mirror that of the 
main results reported in Table 6.8 Column I. However, unlike Table 6.8 Column I results, 
the coefficient on RETi,t*ACEi,t is not significant at conventional levels. Meanwhile, the 
directionality on the coefficients for ACEi,t, NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 
(RETi,t*ACEi,t) are contrary (consistent) with the directionality of the coefficients on 
corresponding variables of the main results (see Table 6.8 Column I). The coefficient on 
ACEi,t and RETi,t*ACEi,t in Table 7.17 Column VI results, meanwhile, are contrary to Table 
6.8 Column I findings. 
In general, results of regression performed using only Big 4 sub-sample firm-year 
observations was consistent with main results associated with direct custodial excellence and 
audit committee effectiveness (see Table 6.4 Column I and Table 6.8 Column I). Conversely, 
when considering auditor quality when isolating the analysis to Big 4 sub-sample firm-year 
observations, this produces results contrary to the main findings (see Table 6.6 Column I). 
When only using Non-Big 4 sub-sample firm-year observations, however, the additional 
regression analysis yields results usually inconsistent with the main results using the full 
sample. This is regardless of whether the focus is on direct custodial excellence, auditor 
quality or audit committee effectiveness. Overall, the Big 4/Non-Big 4 dichotomy appears to 
have a bearing on the association between the persistence of earnings conservatism and: (a) 
direct custodial excellence; (b) auditor quality; and (c) audit committee effectiveness as 
reported in the main findings. This affect appears more centred on the engagement of Non-
Big 4 audit firms than a Big 4 audit firm.  
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Table 7.17: Regression analysis of DCEi,t, AQi,t, ACEi,t and earnings persistence 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 Column III: Big 4 Column IV: Non-Big 4 Column V: Big 4 Column VI: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.356 -0.240 0.668 2.465 0.656 0.477 0.321 1.719 0.591 0.490 0.387 1.526 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 2.079 0.923 -0.549 -1.426 1.274 0.641 -0.340 -1.591 1.177 0.720 -0.293 -0.816 
∆OPIi,t-1 26.388 11.048
ǂ -0.152 -0.476 10.967 5.313ǂ -0.284 -1.493 10.185 9.193ǂ 0.145 0.413 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -25.699 -8.679
ǂ 0.465 0.715 -11.828 -4.933ǂ -0.523 -2.255† -9.597 -7.392ǂ 0.301 0.425 
DCEi,t 0.383 1.197 -0.250 -2.807
ǂ         
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -0.500 -0.950 0.192 1.341         
∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -6.340 -9.649
ǂ 0.039 0.438         
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t 6.093 7.381
ǂ -0.531 -2.069†         
AQi,t     0.178 0.332 -0.425 -2.543
†     
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t     -0.311 -0.364 0.434 1.570     
∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t     -3.261 -3.619
ǂ 0.287 1.391     
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t     3.564 3.428
ǂ -0.509 -0.878     
ACEi,t         0.389 0.783 -0.192 -1.759
Ψ 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t         -0.550 -0.697 0.142 0.815 
∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t         -4.874 -6.359
ǂ -0.064 -0.495 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t         4.251 4.610
ǂ -0.499 -1.671 Ψ 
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Table 7.17: Regression analysis of DCEi,t, AQi,t, ACEi,t and earnings persistence (continued) 
 
Column I: Big 4 Column II: Non-Big 4 Column III: Big 4 Column IV: Non-Big 4 Column V: Big 4 Column VI: Non-Big 4 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -1.960 -2.154† -0.089 -0.421 -2.206 -2.171† -0.111 -0.518 -2.110 -2.174† -0.063 -0.295 
Year 2003 -1.200 -1.369 -0.039 -0.191 -1.965 -2.016† -0.067 -0.316 -1.350 -1.444 -0.018 -0.089 
Year 2004 -1.378 -1.559 0.095 0.471 -1.771 -1.800 Ψ 0.146 0.708 -1.594 -1.681 Ψ 0.082 0.401 
Year 2005 -1.158 -1.322 -0.320 -1.627 -1.396 -1.430 -0.292 -1.455 -1.433 -1.533 -0.300 -1.519 
Year 2006 -1.044 -1.182 0.091 0.456 -1.450 -1.467 0.053 0.262 -1.784 -1.899 Ψ 0.101 0.504 
Adjusted R² 0.368 0.198 0.212 0.180 0.276 0.184 
F-Value 16.798ǂ 5.733ǂ 8.293Ψ 5.199Ψ 11.338ǂ 5.325ǂ 
N 326 231 326 231 326 231 
Legend: 
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I and II—∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2DCEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column III and IV—∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2AQi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + 
β2∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column V and VI—∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 *NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: DCEi,t , AQi,t and ACEi,t = see definitions in Table 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8. For definitions of other variables, 
see equations in Table 6.2; and 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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7.6 Industry classifications 
In this section, the statistical results of re-tests of main regression models (related to 
both the Basu (1997) timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism models) to 
examine any cross-sectional influences of industry are outlined. Whilst Bursa Malaysia 
Stock Exchange industry classifications allow firm-year observations to be broken into eight 
major groups, the additional robustness and sensitivity analysis is conducted using only five 
groupings. Due to sufficient observations, the Construction, Consumer Products, Industrial 
Products and Trading & Services industries are considered separately. Meanwhile, firm-year 
observations from the Plantation, Mining, Property, and Technology industries are 
condensed into a single grouping titled ‗Others‘. 
 
7.6.1 Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
Table 7.18 presents the empirical results of analysis testing using the original Basu 
(1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism across the five major industry groupings. 
Directionality of the coefficients on the three prime variables of interest (i.e. NEGRETi,t, 
RETi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) for regressions involving firm-year observations from the 
Construction, Consumer Products and Industrial Products industry sectors (see Table 7.18 
Column I, Column II and Column III) mirror the main regression results (see Table 6.1 
Column I).  
In contrast to the main regression findings, however, the coefficient on RETi,t 
(RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) is insignificant from zero in regression results tabulated in Table 7.18 
Column I (Table 7.18 Column II and Column III) for Construction (Consumer Products and 
Industrial Products) sector firm-year observations. For the regression using the Trading & 
Services (Others) industry sector firm-year observations, the coefficient on RETi,t 
(NEGRETi,t) is negative, a result contrary to the main findings in Table 6.1 Column I where 
the coefficient is positive. Also, the coefficient on RETi,t (RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) is insignificant 
from zero in the two (single) regressions using the Trading & Services and Others industry 
sector firm-year observations. This lack of significance is contrary to the main corresponding 
results shown in Table 6.1 Column I. In sum, whilst the main results reported in Table 6.1 
Column I imply the timeliness of earnings conservatism when considering the full sample, 
Table 7.18 suggests this phenomenon varies across industry sectors. 
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Table 7.18: Regression analysis of earnings timeliness 
 Industry Category 
 Column I:  
Construction 
Column II:  
Consumer Products 
Column III:  
Industrial Products 
Column IV:  
Trading & Services 
Column V:  
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.208 2.442 0.024 0.335 0.095 1.397 0.105 1.555 0.053 0.958 
NEGRETi,t 0.067 0.686 0.052 0.686 0.089 1.295 0.007 0.104 -0.012 -0.207 
RETi,t 0.081 1.399 0.078 2.874
ǂ 0.218 2.516† -0.008 -0.286 0.029 0.661 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.448 1.734
 Ψ 0.135 0.684 0.268 1.551 0.231 1.679 Ψ 0.111 0.777 
Year 2002 -0.114 -1.114 -0.023 -0.229 -0.040 -0.545 -0.104 -1.281 -0.017 -0.270 
Year 2003 -0.233 -2.218† -0.061 -0.667 -0.097 -1.340 -0.074 -0.899 0.034 0.559 
Year 2004 -0.124 -1.212 -0.026 -0.275 0.049 0.681 0.031 0.389 0.037 0.603 
Year 2005 -0.168 -1.673 Ψ -0.085 -0.912 -0.083 -1.155 -0.069 -0.874 0.033 0.530 
Year 2006 -0.149 -1.387 -0.052 -0.559 -0.055 -0.745 -0.048 -0.579 -0.094 -1.553 
Adjusted R² 0.053 0.041 0.120 0.003 0.012 
F-Value 1.679Ψ 1.539 3.193  1.029 1.204 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV and V: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + ∑γt + εi,twhere: see equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of all variables; and Ψ, †, 
= significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table 7.19 presents results of statistical analysis of the association between direct 
custodian excellence and the timeliness of earnings conservatism taking into consideration of 
possible cross-sectional variations across different industry sectors. Findings are compared to 
Table 6.3 Column I findings. 
Directionality of the coefficients of the seven variables of interested presented in 
Table 7.19 Column I is generally consistent with the main results detailed in Table 6.3 
Column I (PS). The only difference of note is on the coefficient for the three-way interaction 
term (i.e. RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t) which is positive in the main results (see Table 6.3 
Column I) but negative for the regression using only the Construction industry sector firm-
year observations. In terms of the significance of the coefficients reported in Table 7.19 
Column I, relative to Table 6.3 Column I findings, there are several variations. Specifically, 
the coefficients on NEGRETi,t, NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t are insignificant 
from zero for the main findings (see Table 6.3 Column I) but significant at conventional 
levels (i.e. p<0.05, p<0.05 and p<0.05 respectively) in Table 7.19 Column I using only the 
Construction industry sector firm-year observations. 
For the regression results based solely on the Consumer Products industry sector 
firm-year observations (see Table 7.19 Column II), the directionality of coefficient on six of 
the seven variables of interest are contrary to the corresponding results in Table 6.3 Column 
I. RETi,t*NEGRETi,t is the only variable where the directionality of the coefficient is the same 
in industry specific (see Table 7.19 Column II) and full sample results (see Table 6.3 
Column I). Coefficients on all the variables of interest in Table 7.19 Column II are 
insignificant from zero. For the variables RETi,t and RETi,t*DCEi,t, the lack of significance of 
the coefficient in Table 7.19 Column II is contrary to corresponding results using the full 
sample (see Table 6.3 Column I; p<0.05 and p<0.05 respectively). 
The directionality of the coefficients on the seven variables of interest in the 
regression results using only the Industrial Products industry sector firm-year observations 
(see Table 7.19 Column III) closely mirror the main findings (see Table 6.3 Column I). It is 
only the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t that is negative in the industry specific test (see 
Table 7.19 Column III) relative to the main findings of Table 6.3 Column I. In respect to the 
significance of the coefficients, however, three differences are noted. Specifically, in the 
industry specific regression (see Table 7.19 Column III) the coefficient on NEGRETi,t, DCEi,t 
and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t are significant but insignificant from zero in the main findings 
(see Table 6.3 Column I). 
Four of the seven coefficients (i.e. NEGRETi,t, DCEi,t, NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) on the variables of interest in Table 7.19 Column IV results (using the 
Trading & Services industry sector firm-year observations only) are contrary to Table 6.3 
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Column I findings (i.e. negative, negative, positive and negative versus positive, positive, 
negative and positive respectively). Also, coefficients on all the variables of interest in Table 
7.19 Column II are insignificant from zero. For the variables RETi,t and RETi,t*DCEi,t, the 
lack of significance of the coefficient in Table 7.19 Column IV is contrary to corresponding 
results using the full sample (see Table 6.3 Column I; p<0.05 and p<0.05 respectively). 
Finally, only one of the seven coefficients (i.e. RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) on the variables of 
interest in Table 7.19 Column V results (using the Others industry sector firm-year 
observations only) is contrary to Table 6.3 Column I findings (i.e. negative versus positive). 
Similarly, on the significance of the coefficient on DCEi,t in Table 7.19 Column V results is 
contrary to Table 6.3 Column I (PS) results. Specifically, the coefficient on DCEi,t is 
significant at the 5% confidence level in Table 7.19 Column V but insignificant from zero in 
the main findings (see Table 6.3 Column I). 
Table 7.19 results indicate isolating the analysis to specific industry sectors will 
undoubtedly influence the main findings. Furthermore, Table 7.19 findings related to the 
three-way interaction term RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t, indicate direct custodian excellence 
may influence the timeliness of earnings conservatism in specific industries. However, as 
indicated by the main findings, direct custodian excellence does not appear to be 
significantly associated with the timeliness of earnings conservatism when considering the 
whole market. 
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Table 7.19: Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings timeliness 
  Industry Category 
 
Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.022 -0.114 0.257 1.509 -0.133 -1.106 0.126 0.897 -0.221 -1.874 
NEGRETi,t 0.774 2.015
† -0.187 -0.686 0.285 1.671Ψ -0.195 -0.890 0.183 1.258 
DCEi,t 0.065 1.299 -0.070 -1.461 0.079 2.343
† -0.003 -0.068 0.065 2.572† 
NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t -0.212 -1.999
† 0.083 1.018 -0.063 -1.224 0.049 0.874 -0.046 -1.254 
RETi,t 0.296 2.451
† -0.237 -0.757 0.589 2.390† 0.010 0.118 0.324 2.556† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 1.889 1.968
† 1.032 1.230 -0.564 -1.186 -0.025 -0.059 -0.431 -1.104 
RETi,t*DCEi,t -0.075 -2.008
† 0.104 1.012 -0.122 -1.750Ψ -0.009 -0.244 -0.070 -2.477† 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t -0.439 -1.550 -0.243 -1.053 0.272 1.886
 Ψ 0.070 0.598 0.142 1.335 
Year 2002 -0.106 -1.048 -0.009 -0.086 -0.065 -0.885 -0.092 -1.102 0.003 0.043 
Year 2003 -0.208 -1.973† -0.096 -1.007 -0.114 -1.590 -0.085 -1.003 0.052 0.869 
Year 2004 -0.113 -1.096 -0.050 -0.522 0.054 0.751 0.024 0.292 0.061 0.989 
Year 2005 -0.135 -1.304 -0.121 -1.241 -0.093 -1.310 -0.072 -0.880 0.041 0.673 
Year 2006 -0.124 -1.163 -0.073 -0.790 -0.060 -0.801 -0.054 -0.648 -0.081 -1.359 
Adjusted R² 0.089 0.042 0.148 -0.025 0.044 
F-Value 1.785 Ψ 1.370 2.871ǂ 0.808 1.503 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV and V:OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DCEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DCEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*DCEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t *DCEi,t+ ∑γt 
+ εi,t ; where: see equations in Table 6.3 for definitions of all variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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7.6.2 Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
Table 7.20 presents the empirical results of analysis testing the original Basu (1997) 
persistence of earnings conservatism across the five major industry groupings. Directionality 
of the coefficients on the three prime variables of interest (i.e.NEG∆OPIi,t-1, ∆OPIi,t-1 and 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) for the regression involving firm-year observations from the 
Consumer Products industry sector (see Table 7.20 Column II) mirror the main regression 
results (see Table 6.2 Column I). In contrast to the main regression findings (see Table 6.2 
Column I, the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1) is negative (positive) in 
the regression in only those firm-year observations associated with the Construction 
(Trading & Services) industry sector as reported in Table 7.20 Column I (Column IV). 
Meanwhile, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 is negative (as opposed to positive for the main 
findings in Table 6.2 Column I) in industry specific regressions for the Construction, 
Industrial Products, Trading & Services and Others industry sectors (see Table 7.20 Column 
I, Column III, Column IV and Column V). 
As for the significance of the coefficients, the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 is insignificant 
from zero in regressions using firm-year observations from the Construction, Industrial 
Products and Others industry sectors (see Table 7.20 Column I, Column III, Column IV and 
Column V). Results for these regressions are contrary to the main findings reported in Table 
6.2 Column I where the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 is significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Finally, the coefficient on the ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 variable in Table 7.20 Column V (that 
uses firm-year observations from the Others industry sectors) is insignificant from zero. The 
coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 in the main regression results (see Table 6.2 Column I) 
is significant at the 1% confidence level. 
The main results reported in Table 6.2 Column I imply the persistence of earnings 
conservatism prevails across the Malaysian capital market. Whilst Table 7.20 results 
generally support the main findings of Table 6.2 Column I, there is some scope to the 
findings that suggest persistence of earnings conservatism is likely to be more prevalent in 
some industries than others. 
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Table 7.20: Regression analysis of earnings persistence 
  Industry Category 
 
Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.099 0.331 3.367 1.616 0.018 0.187 0.134 0.839 0.182 2.546 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -0.241 -0.961 1.993 0.986 0.012 0.131 0.023 0.153 0.056 1.016 
∆OPIi,t-1 -0.004 -0.041 5.552 6.383
ǂ -0.064 -0.697 -0.690 -5.255ǂ -0.011 -0.077 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -1.254 -5.886
ǂ -5.485 -4.410ǂ -0.948 -7.043ǂ 0.511 2.644ǂ -0.005 -0.035 
Year 2002 0.024 0.059 -7.409 -2.346† -0.060 -0.407 -0.203 -0.869 -0.149 -1.641 
Year 2003 -0.143 -0.358 -4.861 -1.574 0.006 0.040 -0.057 -0.251 -0.154 -1.724 Ψ 
Year 2004 -0.098 -0.242 -4.747 -1.556 -0.010 -0.075 0.228 1.014 -0.206 -2.305† 
Year 2005 -0.024 -0.062 -3.837 -1.303 -0.305 -2.231† -0.223 -0.996 -0.219 -2.460† 
Year 2006 0.525 1.331 -6.292 -2.003† -0.038 -0.274 -0.050 -0.221 -0.328 -3.665ǂ 
Adjusted R² 0.287 0.280 0.476 0.256 0.072 
F-Value 5.870 ǂ 5.920ǂ 15.650ǂ 4.999ǂ 2.290† 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV and V:∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + ∑γt + εi,t where: see equations in Table 6.2 for definitions of all 
variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
193 
 
Table 7.21 presents results of statistical analysis of the association between direct 
custodian excellence and the timeliness of earnings conservatism taking into consideration 
possible cross-sectional variations across different industry sectors. Findings are compared to 
Table 6.4 Column I findings. 
Directionality of the coefficients of the seven variables of interest presented in Table 
7.21 Column I, Column II and Column V mirror precisely that of the main findings reported 
in Table 6.4 Column I. As for the regression results using the Industrial Products industry 
firm-year observations, the directionality of six of the seven coefficients also mirror that of 
the main findings (see Table 7.21 Column II and Table 6.4 Column I respectively). The only 
discrepancy is the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1 that is positive in Table 7.21 Column III results but 
negative in the corresponding main results (see Table 6.4 Column I). As for the regression 
using firm-year observations from the Trading & Services industry sector (see Table 7.21 
Column IV), the coefficients on all the variables except NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are in the opposite 
direction to that reported in the main findings (see Table 6.4 Column I). 
In terms of the significance of the coefficients reported in Table 7.21 Column I, 
relative to Table 6.4 Column I (PS) findings, there is only a single variation. Specifically, the 
coefficient on DCEi,t is significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.10) in the regression using 
the Construction industry sector firm-year observations but insignificant from zero in the 
main findings (see Table 6.4 Column I). Meanwhile, the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are insignificant from zero in regressions 
using only the Consumer Products and Others industry sectors respectively (see Table 7.21 
Column II and Column V). In contrast the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are significant at the 1% confidence level in the main regression 
model results (see Table 6.4 Column I). 
The coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t is also insignificant from zero in 
the regressions including the firm-year observations from the Industrial Products and 
Trading & Services industry sectors (see Table 7.21 Column III and Column IV). This again 
is contrary to Table 6.4 Column I (PS) findings. Finally, in respect to ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t variables, coefficients in industry specific regressions involving the Industrial 
Products, Trading & Services and Others industry sectors (see Table 7.21 Column III, 
Column IV and Column V) are insignificant from zero. This is contrary to the main findings 
reported in Table 6.4 Column I where the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1 and ∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t are 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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Table 7.21: Regression analysis of DCEi,t and earnings persistence 
  Industry Category 
 
Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.624 -1.513 1.894 0.454 -0.044 -0.256 0.441 1.527 0.158 1.264 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 0.688 1.160 2.484 0.398 0.001 0.002 0.066 0.128 0.059 0.346 
DCEi,t 0.207 1.913
 Ψ 0.242 0.227 0.020 0.448 -0.084 -1.287 0.004 0.169 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -0.218 -1.323 -0.420 -0.243 0.006 0.073 0.004 0.031 -0.001 -0.013 
∆OPIi,t-1 9.899 10.853
ǂ 28.114 4.966ǂ 0.589 0.729 -1.190 -2.863† 0.155 0.472 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -12.412 -10.410
ǂ -31.571 -1.533 -1.804 -2.023† 1.110 1.942 Ψ -0.575 -1.062 
∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t -2.490 -10.853
ǂ -6.728 -4.025ǂ -0.219 -0.812 0.219 1.221 -0.049 -0.571 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-
1*DCEi,t 
2.828 9.205ǂ 7.589 1.451 0.314 0.987 -0.247 -1.091 0.184 1.101 
Year 2002 -0.081 -0.293 -7.274 -2.432† -0.046 -0.301 -0.250 -1.045 -0.124 -1.313 
Year 2003 -0.176 -0.666 -3.597 -1.230 -0.004 -0.025 -0.130 -0.547 -0.145 -1.575 
Year 2004 -0.299 -1.113 -3.544 -1.227 -0.002 -0.014 0.194 0.848 -0.200 -2.135† 
Year 2005 -0.074 -0.288 -3.030 -1.060 -0.294 -2.111† -0.244 -1.080 -0.215 -2.386† 
Year 2006 0.037 0.143 -3.487 -1.147 -0.028 -0.200 -0.072 -0.308 -0.315 -3.447ǂ 
Adjusted R² 0.708 0.367 0.463 0.245 0.054 
F-Value 20.598ǂ 5.873ǂ 10.257ǂ 3.514ǂ 1.628 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend:  
Column I, II, III, IV and V:∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2DCEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: see equations in Table 6.4 for definitions of all variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table 7.21 results indicate isolating the analysis to specific industry sectors can 
produce differing findings on the persistence of earnings conservatism within the Malaysian 
capital market and in particular the impact of direct custodian excellence. In terms of Table 
7.21 findings related to the three-way interaction term ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*DCEi,t, results 
suggest direct custodian excellence is associated with the persistence of earnings 
conservatism only in terms of the Construction industry. Main findings shown in Table 6.4 
Column I, however, infer direct custodian excellence is a factor significantly associated with 
the persistence of earnings conservatism across the Malaysian capital market as a whole. 
Thus, when considering Table 6.4 Column I and Table 7.21 findings, one may conclude 
direct custodian excellence is a determinant of the persistence of earnings conservatism for 
the market in general but is likely to be more prominent in some industry sectors than 
others.57 
 
7.7 Individual component of AQi,t and ACEi,t 
The main results reported in Chapter 6, and the robustness and sensitivity tests 
reported thus far in Chapter 7, use composite index scores for direct custodian excellence, 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness. This section details results of sensitivity 
tests conducted using individual features of audit quality and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
7.7.1 AQit, components and timeliness of earnings conservatism 
 Table 7.22 presents empirical results of regression analysis testing the association 
between the timeliness of earnings conservatism and individual features of auditor 
qualitythat is, (a) auditor independence (see Table 7.22 Column I), (b) auditor brand name 
(see Table 7.22 Column II), and (c) industry specialization (see Table 7.22 Column III). 
                                                     
57 The discussion in Chapter 7 Section 7.6 only addresses the potential influence of cross-sectional variations in 
industry sectors in regards to association between direct custodian excellence and (a) timeliness of earnings 
conservatism, and (b) persistence of earnings conservatism. Additional tests were performed considering the 
impact of industry differences on the association between auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness on 
both the timeliness and persistence of earnings conservatism. Results of these additional tests yield findings and 
conclusions consistent with that presented in Chapter 7 Section 7.6 in relation to direct custodian excellence. For 
purposes of brevity the additional analysis related to auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness is not 
incorporated in the main text. Rather, tabulated findings and discussion is provided in Appendix F.  
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Table 7.22:Individual AQi,t components and earnings timeliness 
 
Individual Component 
 
Column I: 
Independence (Fees) 
Column II: 
Brand Name 
Column III: 
Specialization 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.117 3.405 0.085 2.324 0.109 3.340 
NEGRETi,t 0.031 0.684 0.018 0.389 0.032 0.862 
RETi,t 0.052 3.100
ǂ 0.034 1.351 0.036 1.489 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 0.353 3.252
ǂ 0.232 2.140† 0.314 3.518ǂ 
FEEi,t -0.014 -0.369     
NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t -0.021 -0.328     
RETi,t*FEEi,t -0.061 -1.135     
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t -0.133 -0.868     
BNi,t   
0.019 0.544 
  
NEGRETi,t*BNi,t   
0.025 0.407 
  
RETi,t*BNi,t   
0.025 0.766 
  
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*BNi,t   
0.020 0.135 
  
SPi,t     
-0.025 -0.705 
NEGRETi,t*SPi,t     
-0.008 -0.154 
RETi,t*SPi,t     
0.024 0.743 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*SPi,t     
-0.127 -1.318 
Year 2002 -0.057 -1.572 -0.059 -1.631 -0.062 -1.703 Ψ 
Year 2003 -0.074 -2.057† -0.074 -2.064† -0.074 -2.065† 
Year 2004 -0.013 -0.380 -0.012 -0.325 -0.013 -0.365 
Year 2005 -0.065 -1.863 Ψ -0.065 -1.846 Ψ -0.066 -1.874 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.075 -2.114† -0.072 -2.015† -0.075 -2.083† 
Adjusted R² 0.062 0.058 0.057 
F-Value 4.050ǂ 3.842ǂ 3.796ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend:  
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2FEEi,t + 
α3NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*FEEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t + 
∑γt + εi,t; (b) Column II—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2BNi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*BNi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*BNi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*BNi,t + ∑γt + εi,t. ; and (c) Column III—
OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2SPi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*SPi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + 
β2RETi,t*SPi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*SPi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: FEEi,t = ratio of non-audit services to 
total audit fees (i.e. fees paid for audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20;BNi,t 
= external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; and SPi,t = external auditor is a Big 4 
audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte or KPMG); For definitions of other variables, see equations in 
Table6.1; and 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
Of the three regressions reported in Table 7.22, the focus on auditor independence 
has the highest explanatory power, whilst that concentrating on industry specialization the 
lowest (i.e. 6.20 % versus 5.70%). Overall, the explanatory power of the three regressions 
shown in Table 7.22 is higher than for related main results shown in Table 6.5 Column I (i.e. 
5.40%). 
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The directionality of coefficients on the three primary variables forming the basic 
Basu (1997) timeliness of earnings conservatism model (i.e.NEGRETi,t , RETi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t) are positive across all regressions reported in Table 7.22. This result is 
consistent with the statistical result reported in Table 6.5 Column I). The significance of the 
coefficients, however, is mixed. For instance, the coefficient on RETi,tis significant 
(i.e.<0.01) in the regression focusing on auditor independence but statistically insignificant 
from zero for both regressions concentrating on auditor brand name and industry 
specialization. 
In testing the association between the timeliness of earnings and auditor 
independence, four variables are of prime interest; that is, FEEi,t, NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t, 
RETi,t*FEEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t. As for auditor brand name (industry 
specialization) the four variables of interest are BNi,t, NEGRETi,t*BNi,t, RETi,t*BNi,t and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*BNi,t(SPi,t, NEGRETi,t*SPi,t, RETi,t*SPi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*SPi,t). The 
coefficients on the four auditor independence associated variables (i.e.FEEi,t, 
NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t, RETi,t*FEEi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*FEEi,t) in Table 7.22 Column I are 
negative and statistically insignificant from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on BNi,t, 
NEGRETi,t*BNi,t, RETi,t*BNi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*BNi,t are all positive but statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels (see Table 7.22 Column II). Finally, the coefficients on 
SPi,t, NEGRETi,t*SPi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*SPi,t are negative and insignificant from zero 
whilst the coefficient on RETi,t*SPi,t is positive and insignificant (see Table 7.22 Column III). 
Overall, Table 7.22 results imply auditor independence, auditor brand name and 
industry specialization are not significantly associated with the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism. These results reinforce the perception indicated in Table 6.5 Column I results 
that auditor quality does not appear to influence the timeliness of earnings conservatism. 
Table 7.23, meanwhile, presents results of the empirical analysis testing the 
influence of the three individual components of auditor quality (i.e. auditor independence, 
auditor brand name and diligence) on the persistence of earnings conservatism. Of the three 
regressions presented in Table 7.23, the explanatory of those focusing on auditor 
independence, or industry specialization, are highly comparable (i.e. 27.90 and 28.00% 
respectively). Meanwhile, only 18.40% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by variables focusing on auditor brand name. Overall, the explanatory power of 
the three models shown in Table 7.23 is higher than that of the main associated findings (see 
Table 6.6 Column I). 
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Table 7.23: Individual AQi,t components and earnings persistence 
 
Individual Component 
 
Column I: 
Independence 
(Fees) 
Column II: 
Brand Name 
Column III: 
Specialization 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.304 0.635 0.848 1.682 0.741 1.723 
NEG∆OPIi,t 0.612 1.145 0.082 0.144 0.052 0.118 
∆OPIi,t 5.747 14.639
ǂ -0.123 -0.381 -0.122 -0.459 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t -6.050 -12.996
ǂ -0.663 -1.037 -0.815 -1.628 
FEESi,t 0.302 0.694     
NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t -0.404 -0.586     
∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t -5.656 -12.082
ǂ 
    
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t 5.833 9.017
ǂ 
    
BNi,t   
-0.314 -0.676 
  
NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t   
0.406 0.550 
  
∆OPIi,t*BNi,t   
3.752 8.220ǂ 
  
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t   
-3.114 -4.119ǂ 
  
SPi,t     
-0.454 -1.028 
NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t     
0.521 0.746 
∆OPIi,t*SPi,t     
5.424 12.038ǂ 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t     
-4.538 -6.850ǂ 
Year 2002 -1.244 -2.181† -1.281 -2.112† -1.300 -2.286† 
Year 2003 -0.902 -1.632 -1.176 -2.000† -0.777 -1.410 
Year 2004 -0.726 -1.315 -0.997 -1.696 Ψ -0.741 -1.343 
Year 2005 -1.014 -1.868 Ψ -0.988 -1.710 Ψ -0.859 -1.585 
Year 2006 -0.598 -1.095 -1.010 -1.732 Ψ -0.978 -1.787 Ψ 
Adjusted R² 0.279 0.184 0.280 
F-Value 18.926ǂ 11.444ǂ 18.978ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend:  
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2FEESi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t* FEESi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t* NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t* FEESi,t + β3∆OPIi,t* 
NEG∆OPIi,t* FEESi,t + ∑γt + εi,t ; (b) Column II—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2BNi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t*BNi,t + 
β3∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column III—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2SPi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t*SPi,t + 
β3∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: FEEi,t ; BNi,t and SPi,t = see definitions in Table 7.22. 
For other variables, see equations in Table 6.2; and 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
confidence levels. 
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Comparative to the main findings reported in Table 6.6 Column I using the auditor 
quality composite score, the directionality and significance of the coefficients on the three 
variables forming the basic Basu (1997) persistence of earnings conservatism model (i.e. 
NEG∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t and ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t) is somewhat mixed. Specifically, the 
coefficients on NEG∆OPIi,t are positive and insignificant from zero in the three regressions 
tabulated in Table 7.23. In contrast, the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t in the main corresponding 
findings is negative and insignificant (see Table 6.6 Column I). In the regression considering 
auditor brand name (see Table 7.23 Column II) the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t is positive and 
statistically significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.01). In the main corresponding results 
(see Table 6.6 Column I) the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t is negative and statistically insignificant. 
Finally, whilst the directionality of the ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t coefficient for the regression 
focusing on auditor independence is the same as the main findings (see Table 6.6 Column I), 
the former is statistically significant whereas the latter is not significant. 
In the regression focusing on the auditor independence/persistence of earnings 
conservatism association (see Table 7.23 Column I) there are four variables of primary 
relevance. These are: FEESi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t, ∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t and 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t. The directionality of the coefficients on these four variables in 
the Table 7.23 Column I findings are the reverse of that for the main associated results 
tabulated in Table 6.6 Column I. However, the coefficients on FEESi,t and 
NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t (∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t and ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*FEESi,t) are insignificant 
(significant) just as are the coefficients on the corresponding main findings in Table 6.6 
Column I.  
Meanwhile, the coefficients on the four variables addressing the (a) auditor brand 
name/persistence of earnings conservatism associations (i.e. BNi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t, 
∆OPIi,t*BNi,t and ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*BNi,t) and (b) audit firm specialization/persistence of 
earnings conservatism (i.e. SPi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t, ∆OPIi,t*SPi,t and 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*SPi,t) associations all have the same direction and significance as the 
corresponding tabulated main findings (see Table 6.6 Column I).  
Overall, Table 7.23 findings suggest auditor brand name and audit firm 
specialization (auditor independence) influence the persistence of earnings conservatism in a 
similar (dissimilar) manner as when the composite perspective of auditor quality is used 
 
7.7.2 ACEi,t components and timeliness of earnings conservatism 
As for Table 7.24, information tabulated relates to empirical analysis testing the 
association between three individual features of audit committee effectiveness (that made up 
the associated composite score) and the timeliness of earnings conservatism. The three audit 
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committee attributes are audit committee independence, financial expertise and committee 
diligence. 
 
Table 7.24: Individual ACEi,t components and earnings timeliness 
 
Individual Component 
 
Column I: 
Independence 
Column II: 
Expertise 
Column III: 
Diligence 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) -0.004 -0.044 0.085 2.636 0.040 1.076 
NEGRETi,t 0.057 0.390 0.029 0.775 0.093 1.918
Ψ 
RETi,t 0.245 3.486
ǂ 0.059 3.378ǂ 0.075 3.463ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t -0.148 -0.403 0.214 2.364
† 0.231 2.056† 
INDi,t 0.108 1.290     
NEGRETi,t*INDi,t -0.027 -0.182     
RETi,t*INDi,t -0.206 -2.857
ǂ 
    
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*INDi,t 0.412 1.100     
EXPi,t   
0.052 1.303 
  
NEGRETi,t*EXPi,t   
-0.005 -0.077 
  
RETi,t*EXPi,t   
-0.059 -1.401 
  
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*EXPi,t   
0.128 0.828 
  
DILi,t     
0.093 2.574† 
NEGRETi,t*DILi,t     
-0.101 -1.643 
RETi,t*DILi,t     
-0.056 -1.743 Ψ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DILi,t     
0.035 0.236 
Year 2002 -0.058 -1.593 -0.058 -1.592 -0.055 -1.527 
Year 2003 -0.074 -2.076† -0.072 -2.016† -0.074 -2.075† 
Year 2004 -0.012 -0.333 -0.009 -0.262 -0.010 -0.280 
Year 2005 -0.066 -1.876 Ψ -0.065 -1.844 Ψ -0.063 -1.780 Ψ 
Year 2006 -0.083 -2.322† -0.073 -2.048† -0.067 -1.869 Ψ 
Adjusted R² 0.067 0.058 0.065 
F-Value 4.348ǂ 3.872ǂ 4.198ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend:  
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2INDi,t + 
α3NEGRETi,t*INDi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*INDi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*INDi,t + 
∑γt + εi,t.; (b) Column II—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2EXPi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*EXPi,t + β0RETi,t + 
β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*EXPi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*EXPi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column III—
OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2DILi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*DILi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + 
β2RETi,t*DILi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*DILi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: INDi,t = audit committee of firm i in 
time period t is comprised mainly of non-executive independent directors; EXPi,t = at least one of the 
non-executive independent directors on the audit committee of firm i in time period t is suitably 
qualified and accredited to be deemed a financial accounting expert (i.e. a degree in accounting and a 
member of a professional accounting body); and DILi,t = during the time period t the audit committee 
of firm i met five times or more; see equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of other variables; and Ψ, †, 
= significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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The explanatory power of the regression focusing on audit committee independence 
(see Table 7.24 Column I) is the highest amongst the three regressions shown in Table 7.24. 
In contrast, the regression related to audit committee expertise (see Table 7.24 Column II) 
had the lowest explanatory power.  
Directionality of the coefficients on NEGRETi,t, RETi,t, INDi,t, and 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*INDi,t are positive in the regression results noted in Table 7.24 Column I. 
In contrast, the coefficients on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t, NEGRETi,t*INDi,t and RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 
are negative. These findings are consistent with results shown in Table 6.7 Column I. In 
contrast to the main findings (see Table 6.7 Column I), the directionality of the coefficient on 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t is negative in Table 7.24 Column I rather than positive 
In terms of significance, the majority of coefficients on Table 7.24 Column I 
variables of interest that focus on auditor independence are consistent with corresponding 
coefficients for the main associated findings tabulated in the Table 6.7 Column I. For 
instance, the coefficients on RETi,t and RETi,t*INDi,t are significant at the 1% confidence 
level in Table 7.24 Column I which is consistent with the main findings using the composite 
score index (i.e. RETi,t and RETi,t*ACEi,t; Table 6.7 Column I). However, the coefficient on 
ACEi,t is statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01; see Table 6.7 Column I) when using the full 
composite score for auditor quality but insignificant from zero for the corresponding variable 
(i.e. INDi,t) when considering auditor committee independence in isolation (see Table 7.24 
Column I). 
 As for audit committee expertise (see Table 7.24 Column II), the directionality of the 
coefficients across the seven variables of interest are consistent with results shown in Table 
6.7 Column I (PS). However, the significance of the coefficients on Table 7.24 Column II 
results relative to Table 6.7 Column I (PS) findings are mixed. As reported in Table 6.7 
Column I (PS) the coefficients on RETi,t, ACEi,t and RETi,t*ACEi,t are statistically significant 
at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.01). However, when using individual scores for audit 
committee expertise rather than the composite score, only the coefficients on the 
corresponding variables of RETi,t and RETi,t*INDi,t are statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01 
and p<0.05 respectively; see Table 7.24 Column II). Coefficients on all remaining variables 
in Table 7.24 Column II are insignificant from zero. 
Similar to Table 7.24 Column II results, directionality on the coefficients across the 
seven variables in the regression test considering the influence of audit committee diligence 
(see Table 7.24 Column III) on the timeliness of earnings conservatism are consistent with 
the main results shown in Table 6.7 Column I. In term of significance, coefficients on 
NEGRETi,t, RETi,t, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t, DILi,t and RETi,t*DILi,t in Table 7.24 Column III are 
significant at conventional levels. In comparison, only the coefficients on RETi,t, ACEi,t and 
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RETi,t*ACEi,t (corresponding variables in main findings to RETi,t, DILi,t and RETi,t*DILi,t) are 
statistically significant in Table 6.7 Column I (PS) results. 
Findings reported in Table 7.24 highlight some variations relative to the main 
findings when the analysis focuses on individual components of audit committee 
effectiveness (as opposed to a composite score). However, Table 7.24 findings are consistent 
with the main findings (see Table 6.7 Column I) in respect to influence on the timeliness of 
earnings conservatism. Specifically, consistent with Table 6.7 Column I findings, results in 
Table 7.24 suggest audit committee independence, audit committee expertise and audit 
committee diligence are not individually (or collectively) significantly associated with the 
timeliness of earnings conservatism. 
Table 7.25 presents regression results of analysis testing the association between the 
persistence of earnings conservatism and the three individual components of audit committee 
effectiveness (i.e. independence, expertise and diligence). The regression focusing on audit 
committee diligence yields the highest explanatory power (see Table 7.22 Column III) with 
approximately 21.60% of the variation in the dependent variable ∆OPIi,t explained. In 
contrast, the regression focusing on audit committee independence had the lowest 
explanatory power (see Table 7.25 Column I; 8.10%). 
As reported in Table 7.25 Column I, the coefficients on three variables (i.e.∆OPIi,t, 
∆OPIi,t*INDi,t and ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*INDi,t) are positive. The directionality of each 
coefficient on the seven variables reported in Table 7.25 Column I mirror corresponding 
variables of the main results using the composite score for audit committee effectiveness 
(Table 6.7 Column I). None of the coefficients on the seven variables comprising the 
regression tabulated in Table 7.25 Column I, however, are significant at conventional levels. 
This contrasts to the main results using the composite score of audit committee effectiveness 
(see Table 6.8 Column I) where four variables (i.e. ∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t, 
∆OPIi,t*ACEi,t and ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*ACEi,t) are statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01). 
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Table 7.25: Individual ACEi,t components and earnings persistence 
 
Individual Component 
 
Column I: 
Independence 
Column II: 
Expertise 
Column III: 
Diligence 
 β 
t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 1.086 0.851 0.562 1.233 0.130 0.251 
NEG∆OPIi,t -0.325 -0.169 0.418 0.925 0.574 0.988 
∆OPIi,t 0.167 0.136 3.365 10.762
ǂ 4.228 12.352ǂ 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t -1.956 -0.277 -3.415 -8.631
ǂ -4.344 -10.421ǂ 
INDi,t -0.599 -0.475     
NEG∆OPIi,t*INDi,t 0.613 0.312     
∆OPIi,t*INDi,t 1.650 1.321     
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*INDi,t -0.106 -0.015     
EXPi,t   
0.213 0.441 
  
NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t   
-0.390 -0.508 
  
∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t   
-3.461 -7.523ǂ 
  
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t   
2.321 3.139ǂ 
  
DILi,t     
0.447 0.962 
NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t     
-0.589 -0.803 
∆OPIi,t*DILi,t     
-4.326 -9.567ǂ 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t     
3.596 5.012ǂ 
Year 2002 -0.935 -1.453 -1.214 -1.994† -0.932 -1.573 
Year 2003 -0.892 -1.428 -1.085 -1.837 Ψ -0.610 -1.060 
Year 2004 -0.727 -1.163 -0.872 -1.471 -0.638 -1.105 
Year 2005 -0.947 -1.546 -1.116 -1.920 Ψ -0.613 -1.079 
Year 2006 -0.632 -1.024 -0.945 -1.612 -0.655 -1.149 
Adjusted R² 0.081 0.173 0.216 
F-Value 5.065ǂ 10.718ǂ 13.732ǂ 
N 557 557 557 
Legend:  
Regression results based on following model: (a) Column I—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2INDi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t*INDi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t*INDi,t + 
β3∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*INDi,t + ∑γt + εi,t ; (b) Column II—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2EXPi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t + 
β3∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; and (c) Column III—OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t + α2DILi,t + 
α3NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t + β0∆OPIi,t + β1∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t + β2∆OPIi,t*DILi,t + 
β3∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t + ∑γt + εi,t; where: INDi,t; EXPi,t and DILi,t = see definitions in Table 
7.24. For other variables, see equations in Table 6.2; and 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table 7.25 Column II and Column III results indicate indifferent results in terms of 
the directionality and significance of the coefficients on the variables of interest relative to 
the main results tabulated in Table 6.8 Column I (PS). The coefficients on three variables 
from Table 7.25 Column II (i.e. ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t and ∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t) 
and Table 7.25 Column III (i.e. ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t, NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t and ∆OPIi,t*DILi,t) 
are negative with all others being positive Moreover, Table 7.25 Column II (Column III) 
report the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t and 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*EXPi,t (∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t, ∆OPIi,t*DILi,t and 
∆OPIi,t*NEG∆OPIi,t*DILi,t) are statistically significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.01). 
The coefficients on the remaining variables in Table 7.25 Column II and Column III are 
insignificant from zero. Results related to the variables in Table 7.25 Column II and Column 
III with significant coefficients are very similar to the main results using the composite index 
score of audit committee effectiveness (see Table 6.8 Column I). 
In summary, Table 6.8 Column I (PS) results infer a significant association between 
audit committee effectiveness and the persistence of earnings conservatism. Further analysis 
of the individual components of audit committee effectiveness tabulated in Table 7.25 
suggest the audit committee effectiveness/persistence of earnings conservatism results 
appears to be driven by audit committee expertise and diligence with independence a non-
factor. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter reported results of various sensitivity and robustness tests conducted to 
determine any impact on the main findings reported in Chapter 6. Such tests included: (a) 
use alternative measure earnings conservatism; (b) alternative measures of earnings and 
return; (c) revised composite scores computed after excluding auditor brand name and 
industry specialization; (d) industry and auditor classification (Big 4 and Non-Big 4); and (e) 
individual audit quality and audit committee effectiveness components. The additional 
analysis provides further insights into main relationships examined in this study. Chapter 8, 
meanwhile, provides a summary of the study and findings. Discussion on the acceptance or 
rejection of the study‘s testable hypotheses is outlined. In addition, implications from the 
analysis are discussed in respect to methodology, future research, and the competing 
interests of investors, regulators, practitioners and corporate management. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1 Study overviews 
Lingering earnings quality concerns have plagued the Asian business environment 
since the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Such concerns have led to calls for increased 
reliance and application of conservative accounting practices to improve earnings quality. 
Another major concern resulting from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis that received 
enormous attention during the past decade and a half, is the standard of corporate governance 
across nations within the Asian region. Whilst significant changes to corporate governance 
regulations within Asia have been implemented, questions remain about whether effective 
consequences resulted. Some academic scholars, regulators and business practitioners 
suggest corporate governance mechanisms can have a profound influence on conservative 
accounting practices leading to improvements in earnings quality. Empirical tests of these 
views are currently limited with findings mixed. In light of the changing corporate 
governance landscape in Asia following the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, an important 
open empirical question on whether newly introduced regulations affecting corporate 
mechanisms influenced conservative accounting practices persists. 
Malaysia provides an opulent and timely setting for testing empirical questions 
related to conservative accounting practices and corporate governance mechanisms. To 
restore investor and shareholder confidence in wake of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, 
Malaysian capital market regulators and government authorities developed and implemented 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (The Code) in 2000. The Code provides a set 
of principles and best practices on corporate governance. Significant emphasis is given to 
two mechanisms—the external auditor and audit committee—that can directly affect the 
financial accounting process, including conservative accounting practices. An implicit 
implication of The Code is that the financial reporting process will be enhanced by the 
engagement of a higher quality auditor and development of an effective audit committee. 
Subsequent revisions of The Code following other financial accounting scandals (e.g. Enron, 
Parmalat) has only served to further supplement these views.This study‘s main objective, 
therefore, is to examine whether, as direct custodians of the financial reporting process, the 
quality of the external auditor and effectiveness of the audit committee, are associated with 
conservative accounting practices, specificallythe extent and nature of earnings conservatism 
amongst Malaysian public listed firms. 
Utilizing agency theory as the underlying theoretical framework, it is proposed in 
this thesis that a Malaysian publicly listed firm with higher direct custodian excellence (i.e. 
higher auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness) will display significantly higher 
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earnings conservatism than a counterpart with lower levels of direct custodian excellence. 
For this study direct custodian excellence is considered a function of auditor quality and 
audit committee effectiveness. There is presently a lack of consensus on a precise measure of 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness. Hence, for this study auditor quality is 
operationalized in reference to independence, specialization and brand name, whilst audit 
committee effectiveness is defined in terms of independence, financial expertise and 
diligence. Earnings conservatism, meanwhile, is defined in respect to timeliness and 
persistence as proposed by Basu (1997). Empirical analysis is based on a sample of 557 
firm-year observations developed from data collected from a randomly selected sample of 
100 Malaysian firms listed continuously on the Main Market of the Bursa Malaysia from 
January 1, 2002 till December 31, 2007. Aside from the main analysis, a series of robustness 
and sensitivity tests were performed. Conclusions of the statistical analysis on the testable 
hypotheses are summarized in the next section. 
 
8.2 Summary of major findings 
Table 8.1 provides a summary of the general propositions and testable hypotheses 
formulated and examined. For this study, a general preposition is formulated regarding the 
underlying association between earnings conservatism and: (a) direct custodian excellence 
(see Table 8.1 Panel A); (b) auditor quality (see Table 8.1 Panel B); and (c) audit committee 
effectiveness (see Table 8.1 Panel C). As earnings conservatism is examined both in terms of 
timeliness and persistence, two testable hypotheses were developed in conjunction with each 
general proposition. The acceptance or rejection of each testable hypothesis (as determined 
from the empirical analysis) is also summarized in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Acceptance and rejection of all hypotheses 
Panel A:Direct custodian excellence (DCE) and earnings conservatism 
GPDCE—Earnings conservatism will be significantly higher amongst Malaysian publicly 
listed firms having pivotal direct custodians of the financial reporting system of a higher 
quality than Malaysian publicly listed firms with pivotal direct custodians of the financial 
reporting system of lower quality. 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
GHa 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with direct custodian 
excellence are more likely to be associated with timelier 
recognition of negative news in reported earnings. 
Rejected 
GHb 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with direct custodian 
excellence are more likely to be associated with the 
persistence of earnings. 
Rejected 
Panel B:Auditor quality (AQ) and earnings conservatism 
GPAQ—Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms engaging the services of a 
high quality external auditor will be significantly higher than Malaysian public listed 
firms engaging the services of a low quality external auditor. 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
H1a 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with a higher quality external 
auditor are more likely to be associated with timelier 
recognition of negative news in reported earnings. 
Rejected 
H1b 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with a higher quality external 
auditor are more likely to be associated with the persistence of 
earnings. 
Accepted 
Panel C:Audit committee effectiveness (ACE) and earnings conservatism 
GPACE—Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms with a more effective 
audit committee will be significantly higher than Malaysian public listed firms with a less 
effective audit committee. 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
H2a 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit 
committees are more likely to be associated with timelier 
recognition of negative news in reported earnings. 
Rejected 
H2b 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit 
committees are more likely to be associated with the 
persistence of earnings. 
Rejected 
 
8.2.1 Hypotheses conclusion—direct custodian excellence 
Based on the discussion presented in earlier chapters of this thesis (see Chapter 2 and 
3), it is postulated (see GPDCE) that a Malaysian publicly listed firm subject to higher direct 
custodian excellence will have higher earnings conservatism, and is expected to be 
significantly higher relative to a counterpart subject to a lower standard of direct custodian 
excellence. Based on this proposition, the hypothesis GHa stipulates a Malaysian publicly 
listed firm subject to a higher standard of direct custodian excellence is more likely to be 
associated with timelier recognition of negative news in reported earnings. Meanwhile, GHb 
proposed greater persistence of earnings is more likely to be associated with a Malaysian 
publicly listed firm subject to higher standards of direct custodian excellence. 
Results presented in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.1) provide evidence of the timeliness of 
earnings conservatism within the Malaysian capital market during the period of observation 
defined in this study. However, as evidenced by the main empirical results reported in 
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Chapter 6 (see Table 6.3 Column I), the association between direct custodian excellence and 
the timeliness of earnings conservatism is statistically insignificant. Tests using individual 
annual periods (i.e. 2002 to 2007) further show the lack of an association between direct 
custodian excellence and the timeliness of earnings conservatism.58 Similarly, the majority of 
sensitivity tests reported in Chapter 7, for example, alternative measures of earnings and 
returns (see Table 7.6); revised composite score for direct custodian excellence (see Table 
7.10), and partitioning into Big 4 and Non-Big 4 audit firm samples (see Table 7.15) fail to 
indicate a statistically significant association between direct custodian excellence and the 
timeliness of excellence. The only sensitivity test highlighting a significant direct custodian 
excellence–timeliness of earnings conservatism linkage is when the sample is partitioned 
into specific industry sectors. However, this is only in regards to the Industrial Products 
industry (see Table 7.23 Column III). Overall, findings from the empirical analysis reported 
in Chapters 6 and 7 fail to support GHa; hence, GHa is rejected. 
Empirical results detailed in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.4 Column I) show a significant 
association between direct custodian excellence and the persistence of earnings 
conservatism. However, the direction of the association is contrary to expected (i.e. positive 
rather than negative). This result suggests a Malaysian publicly listed firm subject to lower 
standards of direct custodian excellence was more likely to be associated with persistent 
earnings conservatism. The significant positive direct custodian excellence–persistence of 
earnings conservatism linkage is also noted when limiting the analysis to firm-year 
observations for the 2004 and 2006 calendar years (see Table 6.4 Column IV and VI). A 
significant negative association (as predicted) does arise when considering firm-year 
observations for the 2002 and 2005 calendar years (see Table 6.4 Column II and V).  
 Generally, robustness and sensitivity tests such asalternative measures of earnings 
and returns (see Table 7.9 Column II), and partitioning by industry breakdown (see Table 
7.27) provides a lack of evidence of a significant negative direct custodian excellence–
persistence of earnings conservatism association. It is noted, however, that upon partitioning 
the sample into firm-year observations when a Non-Big 4 audit firm is engaged a negative 
and statistically insignificant (see Table 7.19 Column II) association is found. This suggests 
that amongst those firms engaging a Non-Big 4 audit firm, those subject to higher direct 
custodian excellence were more likely to be associated with persistent earnings conservatism 
than counterparts where standards of direct custodian excellence are lower. Regardless of 
                                                     
58 Results in Table 6.3 Column IV (2004) do highlight a statistically significant association. However, the 
directionality of the association is contrary to what was expected; thus, the GHa is again not supported. 
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this latter result, the main results and the vast majority of subsequent robustness and 
sensitivity tests support the rejection of GHb. 
 
8.2.2 Hypotheses conclusion—auditor quality 
GPAQ postulates earnings conservatism of a Malaysian public listed firm engaging 
the services of a high quality external auditor will be significantly higher than a counterpart 
using the services of an inferior external auditor. Consistent with the tenants of GPAQ, 
H1awas tested to determine if a Malaysian publicly listed firm using a higher quality external 
auditor was more likely to be associated with the timely recognition of negative news in 
reported earnings relative to a Malaysian publicly listed firm engaging an external auditor of 
a lower quality. The main regression results (see Table 6.5 Column I) indicate a statistically 
insignificant association between the quality of the auditor engaged by Malaysian publicly 
listed firms and the timeliness of earnings conservatism. The insignificant association 
persisted when the analysis was limited to firm-year observations from an individual 
calendar year (see Table 6.5 Column II–Column VI). Additional sensitivity and robustness 
tests (see Chapter 7) generally support the main finding of a lack of association between 
auditor quality and timeliness of earnings conservatism within the Malaysian capital market 
setting. In line with the main results, and supported by the various robustness and sensitivity 
tests, H1a is rejected. 
H1b, meanwhile, also suggests a Malaysian publicly listed firm engaging an audit 
firm of higher quality is more likely to be associated with persistent earnings conservatism 
than a counterpart using an audit firm of inferior quality. Consistent with expectations, the 
main regression results (see Table 6.6 Column I) show a negative and statistically significant 
association between auditor quality and the persistence of earnings conservatism. Several 
regressions (see Table 6.6 Column V and VII) focusing on firm-year observations for a 
specific calendar year show a negative and significant association between auditor quality 
and earnings conservatism. Robustness and sensitivity test (i.e. using alternative measures of 
earnings and returns, a revised composite score for auditor quality, partitioning of the full 
sample by audit firms and industry) results, however, suggest the main findings of a 
significant auditor quality–persistence of earnings management linkage may be sensitive to 
measurement and sampling approaches. Consequently, whilst the main findings prompt the 
acceptance of H1b, caution needs to be applied in assessing the robustness of this finding. 
 
8.2.3 Hypotheses conclusion—audit committee effectiveness 
The third major proposition (i.e.GPACE) focuses on the possible influence of the audit 
committee on earnings conservatism. Specifically, it is speculated in GPACE that a firm with a 
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more effective audit committee is likely to have a greater probability of being associated 
with higher levels of earnings conservatism than a firm with a less effective audit committee. 
Following the underlying tenets of GPACE, it is stipulated in H2a that Malaysian 
publicly listed firms with a more effective audit committee, are more likely to be associated 
with the timelier recognition of negative news in reported earnings. The main empirical 
results (see Table 6.7 Column I), however, fail to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
association between audit committee effectiveness and the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism is found to be insignificant for each individual calendar year transcending the 
observation period of this study. As for the sensitivity and robustness analysis, results 
presented in Chapter 7 suggest the audit committee effectiveness–timeliness of earnings 
conservatism linkage may persist under limited circumstances. For example, when the test 
sample is limited to firm-year observations associated with the Industrial Products industry 
sector there is a significant positive association between audit committee effectiveness and 
the timeliness of earnings conservatism (see Appendix E). Robustness and sensitivity test 
findings also imply the audit committee effectiveness–timeliness of earnings conservatism 
linkage is subject to measurement sensitivities. For example, in contrast to the main findings 
(see Table 6.7 Column I), empirical results using modified measures for earnings and returns 
(see Table 7.8 Column II and III) indicate a positive and statistically significant finding as 
expected. 
As the main empirical tests indicate a lack of an association between audit 
committee effectiveness and timeliness of earnings conservatism, H2ais rejected. However, 
this conclusion is with the caveat that the audit committee effectiveness – earnings timeliness 
linkage may exist within some sectors of the Malaysian capital market or specific conditions 
apply. 
As for H2b, it proposes a Malaysian publicly listed firm with a more effective audit 
committee is more likely to be associated with the persistence of earnings. As shown in 
Chapter 6 (see Table 6.8 Column I), main regression results show a statistically significant 
association between audit committee effectiveness and the persistence of earnings 
conservatism. However, contrary to expectations the directional sign is in the opposite 
direction (i.e. positive rather than negative). This suggests a firm with a less effective audit 
committee is more likely to be associated with higher persistence of earnings conservatism 
than a firm with a more effective audit committee. The positive audit committee 
effectiveness–persistence of earnings conservatism association is also highlighted when the 
sample includes only firm-year observations for the 2007 calendar year (see Table 6.8 
Column VII). However, contrary to the main regression results (see Table 6.8 Column I), 
when analysis is limited to firm-years from individual calendar year periods there is some 
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support for H2b. Specifically, for regressionsusing firm-year observations from 2002, 2004 
and 2005 only (see Table 6.8 Column II, IV and V) there is negative and statistically 
significant audit committee effectiveness and persistence of earnings conservatism. Results 
for individual calendar years may imply the audit committee effectiveness–persistence of 
earnings conservatism association is subject to temporal influences. 
In respect to robustness and sensitivity tests, several results are consistent with the 
expectations of H2b. For instance, when the sample is limited to firm-year observations 
where a Non-Big 4 audit firm is engaged a negative and statistically insignificant (see Table 
7.21 Column II) association is found. The majority of robustness and sensitivity tests, 
however, either support the positive significant association highlighted by the main 
regression results (see Table 6.8 Column I) or there is no statistically significant association. 
Consequently, given findings from the main regression analysis and majority of robustness 
and sensitivity tests are contrary to expectations H2b is rejected. 
 
8.2.4 Summary of conclusions on general propositions 
 As GHa and GHb are rejected based on the empirical analysis presented earlier in this 
thesis, there is limited evidence to support the general proposition (i.e.GPDCE) that a 
Malaysian publicly listed firm subject to higher standards of direct custodian excellence will 
display higher levels of earnings conservatism than a counterpart facing lower levels of 
direct custodian excellence. Similarly, based on results leading to the rejection of H2a and 
H2b the empirical findings do not find support for GPACE. As for GPAQ the empirical findings 
provide partial support. This is based on the acceptance (rejection) of H1b (H1a).  
 
8.3 Implications of the study 
 Findings from this study provide valuable insights toward the understanding of 
factors that may potentially influence earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Results provide 
important inferences for key stakeholders including: (i) regulators and policymakers; (ii) 
investors and shareholders; (iii) corporate management; and (iv) scholars and academics. 
 
8.3.1 Regulators and policymakers 
Malaysian capital market regulators and policymakers faced major criticism 
following the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis due to perceptions the crisis was precipitated 
by poor corporate governance practices in the nation. In response to such criticism the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (The Code) was introduced in 2000 with 
subsequent adjustments during the past decade. A key feature of The Code, and subsequent 
revisions, was the drive to improve auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness. 
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Prior theoretical research suggests improvements in auditor quality and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee may lead to more conservative accounting practices. If 
the intention of Malaysian capital market regulators and policymakers was to improve 
conservative accounting practices via enhanced auditor quality and audit committee 
effectiveness in the wake of newly introduced regulations, the findings of this study suggest 
such an objective is highly optimistic. 
Results presented in Chapter 6 and 7 indicate evidence of earnings conservatism 
(both in terms of timeliness and persistence) within the Malaysian capital market across the 
study‘s observation window. Empirical tests, however, are contrary to expectations in 
indicating the lack of an association between direct custodian excellence and the: (a) 
timeliness of earnings conservatism; and (b) persistence of earnings conservatism. At best 
there is only some evidence linking auditor quality with the persistence of earnings 
conservatism. Based on this Malaysian regulators and policymakers seeking to adjust 
corporate governance requirements to influence conservative accounting practices with the 
aim of enhancing earnings quality should focus on mechanisms outside the periphery of 
direct custodian excellence (i.e.auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness). If 
Malaysian regulators and policymakers seek to enhance earnings conservatism though the 
introduction of new requirements that affect auditor quality and audit committee 
effectiveness, results from this study suggest the costs of such new requirements are likely to 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
8.3.2 Investors and shareholders 
Previous literature provides empirical evidence conservative accounting practices 
benefit financial accounting users such as investors and shareholders. For example, Kung et 
al. (2008) suggest conservatism is an effective mechanism for constraining managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, conservatism provides an important discouragement for 
corporate management actively seeking to manipulate earnings (Watts 2003a; Chen et al. 
2007;Kung et al. 2008). Conservative accounting practices can act as a mechanism to reduce 
agency cost and minimizing firm litigation cost (Huijgen and Lubberink 2005), or provide an 
important role in mitigating bondholder–shareholder conflicts over dividend policy debt 
costs (Ahmed et al. 2002).  
Whilst earnings conservatism may benefit investors and shareholders, it is fortuitous 
if such users of financial accounting information are able to use key signals in determining 
the probability a firm may engage in conservative accounting practices. Such signals can aid 
in enabling investors and shareholders to better value a firm and separate potential ‗lemons 
from the pack‘. If, as predicted by prior theoretical arguments, the quality of the external 
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auditor and effectiveness of the audit committee influence earnings conservatism, then these 
could serve as key signals for investors and shareholders. However, as shown by the main 
findings of this study, there is a lack of a clear association between direct custodian 
excellence and earnings conservatism. Consequently, findings from this study suggest 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness is not an effective barometer by which 
investors and shareholders can effectively assess the probability of a Malaysian publicly 
listed firm engaging in conservative accounting practices that will lead to improved earnings 
quality. Investors and shareholders, therefore, will need to look to other possible signals. 
Furthermore, if investors and shareholders seek to improve the quality of earnings 
via more comprehensive conservative accounting practices, results from this study suggest 
action to improve the quality of the auditor or effectiveness of the audit committee is 
unlikely to lead to the desired conclusion (i.e. implementation of more conservative 
accounting practices leading to better earnings quality). Again, if investors and shareholders 
wish to introduce mechanisms, practices or procedures designed to promote greater earnings 
conservatism to enhance earnings quality, results from this study imply investors and 
shareholders within the Malaysian capital market setting should not concentrate on auditor 
quality or audit committee effectiveness. 
 
8.3.3 Corporate management 
Results from this study should assist in creating greater awareness amongst 
corporate management of the importance of earnings conservatism in enhancing the quality 
and credibility of the firm‘s financial accounting information. As argued earlier, 
conservatism is an important underlying attribute often used by capital market participants to 
benchmark the quality of a firm‘s earnings (Kung et al. 2008). In order to make financial 
statements more informative and useful to investors and shareholders (Ball and Shivakumar 
2005), corporate management is urged to practice conservative accounting. Moreover, it is 
recognized that conservatism is an effective mechanism for constraining managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Watts 2003a; Chen et al. 2007; Kung et al. 2008) such as 
manipulation of earnings.  
Even though conservatism acts as a natural deterrent to earnings manipulation, it is 
the function of pivotal ‗human-driven‘ corporate governance mechanisms that enact and 
enforce the principle; in this study this is the role of the external auditor and audit committee. 
The main findings of this study imply the lack of a significant association between direct 
custodian excellence (and auditor quality or audit committee effectiveness) on earnings 
conservatism amongst Malaysian publicly listed firms. The lack of an association may 
provide corporate management a signal that key custodians of the financial reporting process 
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(i.e. the external auditor and audit committee) within the Malaysian business environment 
may not be concerned with conservative accounting practices. Consequently, corporate 
management of Malaysian publicly listed firms may perceive this as an opportunity to 
engage in more aggressive accounting practices that could benefit their self-interests. 
Adopting a greater opportunistic attitude would be a pessimistic outcome. Rather, findings 
from this study suggests there is an increased onus on corporate management to act ethically 
and morally in the interests of shareholders by not seeking to manipulate earnings for 
personal gain due to the lack of effective direct custodian corporate governance mechanisms 
in promoting conservative accounting practices.  
 
8.3.4 Scholars and academics 
Some prior studies (Beekes et al. 2004; Hamilton, Ruddock, Stokes and Taylor 
2005; Ruddock et al. 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; 
LaFond and Watts 2008; Lara et al. 2009a) provide evidence that corporate governance 
provisions (i.e. the board of directors, audit committees and auditor characteristics) play an 
important role in promoting accounting conservatism. Findings from this study, however, 
show that no evidence is found of direct custodian mechanisms (i.e. auditor quality and audit 
committee effectiveness) earnings conservatism. Findings of this study, therefore, have 
implications for scholars. Firstly, findings from this study cannot be generalized to other 
nations since this study focuses only on Malaysia. When performing similar studies in the 
future in an international setting, institutional factors of a nation would need to be considered 
since institutional factors may have an impact on the association between earnings 
conservatism and direct custodian mechanisms. 
Using different models of earnings conservatism, results of this study show that 
there is no evidence earnings conservatism is influenced by audit committee effectiveness. 
Therefore, scholars wishing to undertake future research in this area may have to use 
different proxy measures for earnings conservatism than the proxy measures adopted in this 
study. Similarly, in the case of direct custodian excellence, using two different features (i.e. 
auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness) this study indicates that neither have a 
consistent impact on the timeliness or persistence of earnings conservatism. Future 
researchers, therefore, may seek to use alternative features and proxies to measure the 
association between direct custodian excellence and the quality of reported earnings in the 
Malaysian (or other domestic) setting.  
Past literature shows the external auditor and audit committee acts as monitoring 
controls to align managers' and shareholders' interests, thus, reducing agency cost and 
limiting the ability of managers to act opportunistically (Collier and Gregory 1999; Abbott et 
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al. 2000; Abbott and Parker 2000; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Bédard et al. 2004; Cohen et 
al. 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Carcello et al. 2011). Findings from this study shed 
doubt on the extent of the monitoring role of the external auditor and audit committee in 
respect to conservative accounting practices. Therefore, scholars undertaking research within 
an agency theory context may need to consider different corporate governance mechanisms 
such as the board of directors or other sub-committees when investigating earnings 
conservatism, and by association, earnings quality. 
 
8.4 Contributions of the study 
This study provides key contributions to the extant literature on earnings 
conservatism and corporate governance. While prior research has focused heavily on 
developed nations (such as the US and UK) when investigating earnings conservatism 
(Givoly and Hayn 2002; Beekes et al. 2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Lobo and Zhou 
2006), little attention has been given to emerging economies. Emerging economies have 
provided the ‗spark-plug‘ for economic recovery following the 2008–2009 Global Financial 
Crisis. Consequently, financial accounting information about firms in emerging economies is 
under increased scrutiny as investors seek higher returns from investment in these areas. 
Understanding of key accounting issues (such as earnings conservatism and the effect of 
corporate governance) is required to better assist investors in their assessment. This study 
provides such insights.  
Though some recent studies of earnings conservatism in Malaysia has been 
forthcoming (e.g. Ball et al. 2003; Mohammed et al. 2010;Vichitsarawong et al. 2010), 
findings from this study provide updated evidence in building a more comprehensive library 
on this phenomenon in Malaysia. For example, similar to previous studies (i.e. Mohammed 
et al. 2010; Vichitsarawong et al. 2010), this study confirms the existence of earnings 
conservatism in Malaysian firm as exhibited in Table 6.1: Regression analysis of earnings 
timeliness (i.e. β = 0.245, positive and significant at 1% significance level for full sample). 
Moreover, the result shown is consistent with the claim made by Vichitsarawong (2010) that 
indicate accounting conservatism improved in the post-crisis periods (i.e. 1999- 2004). In 
addition, this study also consistent with Mohammed et al. (2010) that provide evidence of 
conditional conservatism in Malaysia for the period of 2004 to2007. Result shown in Table 
6:1 indicate evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia specifically for 2004, 2005 and 
2007 (i.e. β = 0.510 significant at 1% significance level, β = 0.497, β = 0.274, both 
significant at 5% significance level respectively).   
Nevertheless, when association of earnings conservatism and corporate governance 
mechanisms were examined, this study offers different results as compared to other studies. 
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For example, Mohammed et al. 2010 found that audit committee size and independence are 
related to conditional conservatism. This study, however found no evidence of direct 
custodian mechanisms (i.e auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness) or individual 
component of auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness, influencing earnings 
conservatism. The reasons for different result could be subject to dissimilar sample selection 
process, different time frame and unique measurement of independent variables (i.e 
application of a composite scoring approach) used in the study. 
 A major concentration of much of the prior research on earnings conservation has 
been on establishing the existence and the extant of this issue via various techniques (Basu 
1997; Lubberink and Huijgen 2001; Givoly and Hayn 2002). Aside from determining the 
existence and extant of an issue, it is important to assess potential determinants and 
consequences. Some recent empirical work has taken steps toward addressing this substantial 
gap in the earnings conservatism literature (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2002). This study provides a 
valuable contribution by seeking to investigate the linkage between corporate governance 
features and the potential impact on earnings conservatism (Beekes et al. 2004; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2008). In addition, the study broadens understanding of the potential impact of 
corporate governance features on financial accounting matters. In filling in such gaps in the 
literature this study helps build a more comprehensive analysis and understanding of the 
relationship between specific key features of corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism in an alternative capital market setting. 
 This study also makes empirical testing and analytical contributions. For instance, by 
examining and measuring earnings conservatism in an alternative setting via several 
methods, this study helps to determine if such measures can be applied more universally or is 
limited (e.g. only in developed but not emerging economies). Use of several methods helps 
to indicate what form of conservatism (i.e. conditional or unconditional conservatism) is 
more prominent in the Malaysian market. In terms of direct custodian excellence, auditor 
quality and audit committee effectiveness, this study assists in determining the validity of 
using composite measures to capture the complex, multidimensional nature of these 
constructs. Whilst many studies on auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness have 
been undertaken, there remains considerable debate and conjecture on how each construct 
should best be measured. This study assists in providing methodological evidence on 
application of a composite scoring approach (e.g. Beasley and Salterio 2001) relative to 
focusing on individual elements (e.g. Klein 2002a).  
 These findings contribute to helping Malaysian stakeholders (e.g. SC, Central Bank 
of, CCM) better understand the potential impact of the introduction of new regulations 
related to the external auditors and audit committees on earnings conservatism. Findings 
217 
 
from this study can better aid stakeholders within the Malaysian capital market to (a) 
develop better regulation strategies and policies, (b) establish better investment procedures 
and assessments, and (c) knowledge to improve financial accounting and corporate 
governance structures at the firm and national levels.  
Overall, this study provides important insights into earnings conservatism and 
corporate governance determinants in an emerging market (i.e. Malaysia). However, the 
study is not without limitations as highlighted in the next section.  
 
8.5 Limitations of the study 
As with any positivist empirical analysis, this study is not without limitations. In this 
study, conservative earnings are defined as being reflected by the recognition of bad news 
more quickly than good news. This approach is consistent with Basu (1997). However, other 
ways of measuring conservatism exist including accruals based measures, market-to-book 
ratio, cash flow measures, asymmetric timeliness and discretionary accruals. Thus, while 
adopting a standard approach to measuring earnings conservatism through the timeliness and 
persistence lens, it is important to recognize other techniques may yield clearer findings. 
Also, the approach adopted in this study ignores possible cross-sectional influences on 
earnings conservatism or the corporate governance mechanisms. Caution should, therefore, 
be taken in interpreting the study‘s findings in light of the omission of possible control 
variables.59 
Another limitation is the measurement of direct custodian excellence, auditor quality 
and audit committee effectiveness. According to Balsam et al. (2003), for example, auditor 
quality is a multidimensional construct that is inherently unobservable. Using a limited 
number of attributes (such as independence, specialization and brand name) to develop a 
composite proxy measure of auditor quality, therefore, could yield different result if other 
associated attributes of auditor quality are included. This issue also applies to audit 
committee effectiveness and direct custodian excellence. Caution must be applied in 
interpreting findings from this study in light of the complex nature of measuring the key 
corporate governance variables included. 
As noted in various parts of this thesis, the empirical analysis is based on a sample of 
557 firm-year observations from a larger population. Since all data for measuring key 
variables (such as auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness is hand-collected from 
annual reports) time limited the ability to collect details for the entire population. Whilst all 
                                                     
59 It must be noted that some additional testing was performed including some typical control variables for cross-
sectional differences (e.g. leverage, firm size) with findings yielding results similar to those presented in this 
study. 
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due care was taken in selecting the sample, caution must be noted that the final sample may 
(though the probability is potentially low) not be representative of the population. Further, as 
some information was hand collected from annual reports, errors with figures or data 
reported therein may be incorrect. Thus, results from this study are somewhat dependent on 
the accuracy and completeness of information disclosed by the firm‘s management. 
Another limitation of the study is it only covers a six year observation window (i.e. 
2002 to 2007). Thus, there is a limitation in generalizing results to time periods prior to 2002 
and after 2007. As explained earlier in the thesis, problems with data availability prior to 
2002 precluded the collection of data before that point. For example, Bursa Malaysia only 
mandated disclosure of non-audit services from 2002. Moreover, mandatory disclosure of 
audit committee information was brought into effect by the Revamped KLSE Listing 
Requirements issued on January 22, 2001. Nonetheless, caution should be taken in applying 
findings to earlier years and more recent times. 
This study uses data from an individual emerging economy. While prior empirical 
research provides evidence of conservatism, such research was conducted in developed, 
sophisticated capital market environments. Theoretical arguments regarding earnings 
conservatism and factors that may influence earnings conservatism have been 
overwhelmingly developed with an established and sophisticated capital market setting in 
mind. Given the limited research of earnings conservatism within an emerging economy 
capital market setting, hypotheses and propositions developed in this study have relied on 
literature based on a developed economy. Prior research has showed the institutional settings 
of developed and emerging economies may differ significantly. Consequently, developing 
hypotheses for an emerging economy setting based on views and opinions drawn from a 
developed economy setting may not be suitable. Consequently, results from this study need 
to be considered with some caution, and findings may not be as readily applicable to other 
emerging market settings. 
Finally, the independence of the sample used may be questionable. This is because 
as this study uses the same firms for the six-year observation period. However, with no 
alternative parsimonious way to undertake the longitudinal analysis underpinning this study 
where changes in the results of the selected firm-years are of interest to the researchers 
(Beekes et al. 2004; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Kung et al. 2008) the approach is 
considered acceptable. Nonetheless, generalization of the findings may have some 
limitations. 
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8.6 Suggestions for future research 
Empirical findings from this study offer various avenues for future research. For 
example, future research could utilize other approaches to measuring earnings conservatism. 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and Beaver and Ryan (2000), for example, uses market 
value based proxies whereas Givoly and Hayn (2000) rely on accruals based proxy measures 
for earnings conservatism. Similarly, for audit committee effectiveness, future research could 
attempt to construct a more comprehensive proxy incorporating other properties that is audit 
committee size, audit committee member ownership, activity level, interaction with internal 
auditors, industry expertise and tenure (DeZoort 1998; Raghunandan, Rama and Scarbrough 
1998; Collier and Gregory 1999). The proxy measure for auditor quality may also be 
adjusted to incorporate other features such as length of tenure of an audit firm, qualifications 
of the audit partner-in-charge or interconnectivity between senior executives of the firm and 
the audit firm. By constructing more comprehensive measures for audit committee 
effectiveness and auditor quality the proxy for direct custodian excellence will also improve. 
Collection of such data, however, is likely to rely on utilization of other research methods 
beyond archival collection. Such research methods could include interviews, surveys and 
questionnaires that may assist in better defining the inner workings of audit committees. 
Empirical tests can then be performed again.  
For purposes of this study (driven in part by data limitations) a six year observation 
window (i.e.2002–2007) is used. Future research may utilize a different time frame, longer 
or shorter observation periods (monthly, quarterly or half year), or periods that traverse a 
specific event (e.g. Asian financial crisis, Enron). Such research will aid in building a more 
comprehensive understanding of the influence of the direct custodian excellence on earnings 
conservatism. 
Also, being a study with a single-nation focus (i.e. Malaysia) a logical extension for 
future research is to evaluate the direct custodian excellence–earnings conservatism 
association in another domestic, regional or broader international setting. For instance, 
scholars could conduct related research to this study by choosing nations with different 
institutional settings (e.g. Code Law versus Common Law, litigation risk, institutional 
ownership and cultural difference).  
Finally, this study only examines the influence of a limited set of corporate 
governance mechanisms on earnings conservatism. Future research may seek to consider the 
joint influence of direct custodian excellence and other corporate governance mechanisms 
(e.g. remuneration committee; internal audit function) on earnings conservatism. 
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8.7 Conclusions of the study 
Direct custodian excellence (i.e. influence of combined effects of auditor quality and 
audit committee effectiveness) and earnings conservatism have become two important issues 
during the past decade. Regulators and theorists have alleged a potential direct custodian 
excellence/earnings conservatism linkage. However, empirical research of this linkage has 
not been forthcoming. This study formally conducts a comprehensive empirical analysis of 
the association between earnings conservatism and direct custodian excellence within the 
Malaysian capital market setting. Utilizing two different perspectives of earnings 
conservatism, that is, the Basu (1997) concepts of timeliness and persistence, and measuring 
audit committee effectiveness using a composite score based on key characteristics of 
auditor quality (i.e. independence, specialization and brand name) and audit committee 
excellence (i.e. independence, financial expertise and diligence), extensive statistical tests 
(including numerous robustness and sensitivity tests) were conducted based on a sample of 
557 firm-year observations spanning the 2002–2007 calendar years. 
Empirical tests yield insightful results. Specifically, the findings suggest the 
timeliness and persistence of earnings of Malaysian firms subjected to higher standards of 
direct custodian excellence would not be significantly greater than Malaysian firms with 
lower levels of direct custodian excellence. Furthermore, findings indicate audit committee 
effectiveness is unlikely to be associated with earnings conservatism (both in terms of 
timeliness and persistence) with the Malaysian capital market. The quality of the external 
auditor, meanwhile, is found not to be significantly associated with the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism. However, there is some evidence to support the view that a Malaysian publicly 
listed firm engaging a higher quality auditor is more likely to have higher levels of persistent 
earnings conservatism than a counterpart using the services of a lower quality external 
auditor. 
Overall, findings from this study provide valuable insights and understanding not 
only in respect to the direct custodian excellence/earnings conservatism linkage, but the 
individual dynamics and significance of corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism/quality concepts. Despite recognized caveats, findings from this study have 
merit in highlighting important insights with significant implications for various key 
financial accounting stakeholders (e.g. regulators, corporate management, practitioners, 
investors and scholars). In advancing the knowledge and understanding of direct custodian 
excellence and earnings conservatism, and the related association between the two concepts, 
this study also highlights various paths for future interest and productive empirical research. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: This appendix provides a comprehensive summary table for studies of trends in earnings conservatism in the US. 
Table A: 1 - Summary table for studies of trends in earnings conservatism in the US 
 
Author (s) 
 
Title 
 
Focus 
 
Period covered 
 
Findings 
Ahmed, Billings, 
Morton and 
Stanford-Harris 
(2002) 
 
The role of accounting 
conservatism in mitigating 
bondholder–shareholder 
conflicts over dividend 
policy and in reducing debt 
cost 
US. 
1. 568 firms 
2. 484 firms 
 
1. 1993 to 1998 
2. 1987 to 1992 
Accounting conservatism plays an important role in i) mitigating bondholder–shareholder 
conflicts over dividend policy, and ii) reducing a firm‘s debt costs. Firms with more severe 
bondholders–shareholders‘ dividend policy conflict use more conservative accounting practices, 
while firms which supply more conservative reporting have better debt rating and therefore incur 
lower debt costs. 
 
Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) 
The effect of international 
institutional factors on 
properties of accounting 
earnings 
US. 40,000 
firm-year 
observations 
 
 
1985 to 1995 
 
 
Levels of conservatism will vary depending on the institutional context or remain a function of its 
political and legal systems. There is a significant increase in the conservatism level in the US for 
the period of 1985 to 1995. For the US, (Common Law nation), accounting numbers are used to 
reduce info asymmetry among stakeholder and thus demand more conservative reporting. 
Common Law nations (e.g. the US) are significantly more timely than Code Law nations due 
entirely to quicker incorporation of economic losses (income conservatism). 
Basu (1997) The conservatism principle 
and the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings 
 
US.43,321 firms 1963 to 1990 The earnings sensitivity to current negative returns increased relative to earnings sensitivity to 
current positive returns over the period 1963–1990, consistent with accounting conservatism 
increase over time. Two factors attributed to this increases, (i) the legal liability exposure of 
auditors and managers for tardy disclosure of bad news has increased significantly over the last 
three decades, and (ii) contracting parties increased demand for conservatism. 
 
Givoly and Hayn 
(2002) 
Rising conservatism: 
Implications for financial 
analysis  
US. 896 firms 1968 to 1998 Financial reporting already conservatively biased by accounting conventions has become more 
conservative since the early 1980s. 
Kim and Kross 
(2005) 
The ability of earnings to 
predict future operating cash 
flows has been increasing— 
not decreasing 
US. 100,266 
firms 
1973 to 2000 Relationship between current earnings and future operating cash flows has increased over time 
(evidence of accounting conservatism) 
Klein and 
Marquardt 
 (2006) 
Fundamentals of accounting 
losses 
US. 259,116 
firms 
1951 to 2001 Non-accounting factors and firm size in particular, play the dominant role over accounting 
conservatism in determining losses. 
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Table A: 1 - Summary table for studies of trends in earnings conservatism in the US (continued) 
 
Author (s) 
 
Title 
 
Focus 
 
Period covered 
 
Findings 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 
(2008) 
Does the SOX definition of 
an accounting expert matter? 
The association between 
audit committee directors‘ 
accounting expertise and 
accounting conservatism 
US. 211 firms 2000 to 2002 Audit committee‘s financial expertise is positively associated with conservatism 
 
 
Lang, Raedy  
and Yetman,  
(2003) 
 
How representative are firms 
that are cross-listed in the 
United States? An analysis 
of accounting quality 
US. 413 firms 1990 to 2001  Firms issuing (or preparing to issue) debt or equity in foreign markets are more likely to report 
conservatively relative to other domestic firms. And cross-listed firms appear to be less 
aggressive in terms of earnings management and report accounting data that are more 
conservative, take account of bad news in a more timely manner, and are more strongly 
associated with share price 
LaFond and 
Watts (2008) 
The information role of 
conservatism 
 
US. 20,389 
firms year 
observations 
1983 to 2001 Informationasymmetry is positively related to accounting conservatism (the larger the info 
asymmetry between inside and outside investors, the more conservative are the firm‘s financial 
statements) 
Lara, Osma and 
Penalva (2005) 
Accounting conservatism 
and corporate governance 
US. 1,623 
firms(9,209 
firm-year 
observations) 
1992 to 2003 Firms with strong (weak) governance are more (less) conservative than firms with weak (strong) 
governance (there is a positive association between governance and conservatism). 
Lobo and Jian 
(2006) 
Did conservatism in FR 
increase after the SOX Act? 
Initial evidence 
 
 
US. 4,441 firms Pre and post SOX 
(2 years before 
and 2 years after 
SOX) 
Firms on average are more conservative in financial reporting after the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SEC requires that CEO and CFO certify financial statement, reducing 
potential earning overstatements) than then they were in the two year immediately preceding the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Acts. It is concluded that litigations under Securities Acts 
encourage conservatism because litigation is much more likely when earnings are overstated. 
Penman and 
Zhang (2002) 
Accounting conservatism, 
the quality of earnings and 
stock returns 
 
 
US. 38,540 
firms 
1975 to 1997 Stock market did not penetrate the quality of earnings of firms with conservative accounting. 
Prior research claims that practice of conservatism yield lower earnings thus, earnings are of high 
quality. But, conservative accounting with investment growth depresses earnings and accounting 
rates of returns and creates unrecorded reserves. Firms slowing investment release these reserves 
creating earnings and higher rates of returns.If the change is temporary, then the effects on 
earnings and rates of returns are temporary which means poor quality earnings. 
Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) 
Does size matter? The 
influence of large clients on 
office level auditor reporting 
decisions 
US. 6,747 firms 1996 Big 5 auditors do not report conservatively for larger clients. 
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Table A: 1 - Summary table for studies of trends in earnings conservatism in the US (continued) 
 
Author (s) 
 
Title 
 
Focus 
 
Period covered 
 
Findings 
 
Roychowdhury 
and Watts (2007) 
 
Asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings, market-to-book 
and conservatism in financial 
reporting  
 
 
US. 45,664 
firms 
 
1972 to1999 
 
Asymmetric timeliness appears to measure conservatism more efficiently when it is estimated 
cumulatively over multiple periods. For shorter periods, the market-to-book value method 
provides better measurement.  
 
 
Srivastava and 
Tse (2007) 
 
What drives changes in 
accounting conservatism? 
The effects of the 
promptness of recognizing 
anticipated gains versus 
losses in conservatism 
 
US. 99,109 
firm-year 
observations 
 
1972 to2006 
 
Level of conservatism increased more rapidly in high technology industries in the US rather than 
other industries over the period of 1972 to 2006 due to slower gains recognized and accelerated 
losses recognized. 
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APPENDIX B: This appendix provides a tabulated summary of some major prior studies examining firm characteristics and earnings conservatism. 
Table B: 1- Summary major firm characteristic/earnings conservatism studies 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Firm characteristics 
Findings 
Firm size Industry Leverage Other 
Ding and 
Stolowy 
(2006)  
 
France.  
267 firms 
(2,670 firm-
year 
observations) 
1990 to1999 Market 
capitalization 
- - - Small firms tended to be more conservative than large ones. 
Possible explanations: (i) size anomaly is a natural consequence 
of market efficiency, since small firms are more risky in terms of 
the market value of equity, and (ii) small firms tend to be less 
diversified than large ones (returns are more volatile). 
Easton and Pae 
(2004) 
US. 
54,313 firm-
year 
observations 
1988 to 2002 Change in 
cash 
investments 
and change in 
lagged 
operating 
assets 
Pharmaceuti-
cal industry 
and others 
- - Change in cash investments provides significant incremental 
explanatory power for returns over earnings and earnings 
changes (firm invest in ‗+‘ NPV projects and BV and earnings do 
not capture the value of the investment until expected future 
benefits are realized). Accounting for pharmaceutical industry is 
more conservative than other industries. 
Gotti (2008) US. 
6,282 firm-
year 
observations 
1963 to 2005 - - Debt-to-assets 
ratio 
(i) Executive 
compensation  
(ii) Audit firm 
(iii) Audit 
opinion 
Firms with: (1) high debt-to-asset ratios, (2) executives 
compensated more heavily on the firm's accounting performance, 
(3) audited by a Big-7 auditor in the previous year and received 
an unqualified auditor opinion, and (4) received an unqualified 
audit report with a going concern assumption, are more 
conservative than the rest of the sample. 
Klein and 
Marquardt 
(2006) 
US. 
259,116 firm-
year 
observations 
 
1951 to 2001 Total assets - - - Non-accounting factors and firm size in particular, play the 
dominant role over accounting conservatism in determining 
losses. 
 
Kwon, Yin and 
Han (2006) 
US. 
2,728 high-
tech and 984 
low-tech firms 
2000 - High-tech 
firms versus 
low-tech firms 
- - There is a higher level of accounting conservatism in high-tech 
firms compared to low-tech firms. 
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Table B: 1 - Summary major firm characteristic/earnings conservatism studies (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Firm characteristics 
Findings 
Firm size Industry Leverage Other 
Lubberink and 
Huijgen (2001) 
Holland. 
124 firms 
1983 to 1995 - - - Heteroge-
neous 
executives‘ 
risk attitudes 
Risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than 
do less risk-averse managers. 
Pae, Thornton, 
and Welker 
(2005)  
US. 
119,983 firm-
year 
observations 
1970 to 2000 - - - Price-to-book 
ratio 
A portfolio of firms with lower price-to-book ratios has 
substantially greater earnings conservatism than portfolios of 
firms with higher-to-book ratios.  
Srivastava and 
Tse (2007) 
US. 99,109 
firm-year 
observations 
1972 to2006 - High 
technology 
industry 
versus other 
industries 
- - Level of conservatism increased more rapidly in the high 
technology industry in the US rather than other industries. This 
could be due to slower gains recognized and accelerated losses 
recognized. 
Legend: Adapted from Sultana (2010). 
240 
 
APPENDIX C: This appendix provides a tabulated summary of some major prior studies examining institutional factors and earnings conservatism. 
Table C: 1 - Summary major institutional factor/earnings conservatism studies 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Institutional factors   
Findings Legal 
regimes 
Accounting 
policies and 
regulations 
Political 
influence 
Cross-listing 
of firms 
Ball, Kothari 
and Robin 
(2000) 
7 inter-national 
GAAP regimes 
(Germany, 
Japan, France, 
the US, the 
UK, Canada 
and Australia) 
40,359 firm-
year 
observations 
1985 to 1995 Common Law 
nations 
(Australia, 
Canada, the 
US and UK) 
and Code Law 
nations 
(France, 
Germany and 
Japan) 
- - - For Common Law nations, accounting numbers are used to 
reduce information asymmetry among stakeholders and thus 
demand more conservative reporting, while Code Law nations 
have less demand for conservative practices because accounting 
numbers used to determine payouts to shareholders, managers, 
employee, government and other stakeholders, and information 
asymmetries among parties are likely to be resolved privately. 
Generally, a Common Law nation is significantly more timely 
than Code Law countries due entirely to quicker incorporation of 
economic losses (income conservatism). 
Brown, He and 
Teitel (2006) 
20 nations 
47,802 firm-
year 
observations 
1993 to 2004 - Nation-
specific level 
of accruals 
intensity 
- - Conditional conservatism is positively associated with the value 
relevance of earnings in nations with higher accrual intensity 
(incremental to the effects of shareholder protection).  
Bushman and 
Piotroski 
(2006) 
38 nations 
86,927 firm-
year 
observations 
1992 to 2001 Investor 
protection 
regimes, 
judicial 
systems and 
strength of 
public 
enforcement 
- State 
involvement 
in economy 
(i.e. publicly 
traded 
government 
firms) 
- Results suggest: (i)Firms in nations with strong investor 
protection and high quality judicial systems reflected bad news in 
reported earnings numbers in a more timely fashion than firms in 
nations characterized by weak investor protection and low quality 
judicial systems; (ii) firms in nations with strong public 
enforcement (i.e. securities law) slowed the recognition of good 
news in reported earnings numbers relative to nations with weak 
public enforcement; and (iii) in nations characterized by high 
state involvement in the economy, firms speeded recognition of 
good news and slowed recognition of bad news in reported 
earnings relative to firms with less state involvement. 
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Table C: 1- Summary major institutional factor/earnings conservatism studies (continued) 
Author (s) Focus 
Period 
covered 
Institutional factors   
Findings Legal 
regimes 
Accounting 
policies and 
regulations 
Political 
influence 
Cross-listing 
of firms 
Huijgen and 
Lubberink 
(2005) 
US.  
86 firms 
1993 to 2002 - - - UK firms 
cross-listed in 
the US and 
UK firms 
without a US-
listing 
Earnings of UK firms (cross-listed in the US) are significantly 
more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US 
listing. This is because cross-listed firms are threatened by 
litigation from a wider audience of shareholders and a stricter 
enforcement system. 
Kung, James 
and Cheng 
(2008) 
Hong Kong. 
5,639 firm-
year 
observations 
and 
China 8,047 
firm-year 
observations 
1994 to 2003 - - - Chinese firms 
cross-listed in 
Hong Kong 
(H-shares) 
and Chinese 
firms without 
an overseas-
listing (A-
shares) 
Results shows that Chinese firms cross-listed in HK (H-shares) 
are not significantly more conservative than firms without cross-
listing. They suggest that the location of listing has little effect on 
accounting conservatism because cross-listed companies retain a 
significant exposure to domestic institutional environment. 
 
Lara, Osma 
and Mora 
(2005) 
UK, France 
and Germany.  
4,743 firm-
year 
observations 
1990 to 2001 Investor 
protection 
regimes and 
less dispersed 
ownership 
(France and 
Germany) 
versus the UK 
- - - Code Law based nations‘ (i.e. France and Germany) managers 
have incentives to reduce earnings consistently while a Common 
Law based nation (i.e. the UK) does not. Results show that after 
controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings 
response to bad news in Code Law nations decreases 
significantly. 
Pope and 
Walker (1999) 
US. 18,380 
firm-year 
observations 
and UK. 7,189 
firm-year 
observations 
1976 to 1996 - Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items and 
bottom-line 
earnings 
- - Level of conservatism inherent in earnings before extraordinary 
items was significantly higher under US GAAP than under UK 
GAAP, while the result is the opposite for bottom-line earnings. 
Legend: Adapted from Sultana (2010). 
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APPENDIX D: This appendix displays industry sector breakdown of the Bursa Malaysia as 
at January 1, 2002.In the study, for comparison purposes, the percentage of firms for the 
actual market of Bursa Malaysia is used instead of the percentage of firm-year observations. 
For details, please refer to Table 5.2 (industry breakdown) and footnote 27. 
 
Table D: 1 - Breakdown of firm-year observations by industry sector Industry 
Panel A: 
Sector Name N % 
Construction 116 19.897 
Consumer Product 118 20.240 
Industrial Product 118 20.240 
Mining 22 3.774 
Plantation 16 2.774 
Property 84 14.408 
Technology 14 2.401 
Trading & Services 95 16.295 
Total 583 100.000 
243 
 
APPENDIX E: This appendix presents empirical results of analysis testing of the association of audit quality and the timeliness of earnings conservatism with 
industry breakdown. Five regressions are presented with results in Table E: 1 Column I (PS) to Column IV (Trading & Services) reports results for specific 
industries (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & Services) and one regression for combined result for industries with 
small number of observations (i.e. Plantation, Mining, Property and Technology). 
 
Table E: 1 - Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.032 0.240 0.043 0.376 0.019 0.207 0.149 1.615 -0.110 -1.299 
NEGRETi,t 0.521 2.570
† -0.086 -0.526 0.190 1.659Ψ -0.124 -0.959 0.085 0.839 
AQi,t 0.089 1.456 -0.058 -1.016 0.059 1.413 -0.032 -0.788 0.084 2.494
† 
NEGRETi,t*AQi,t -0.349 -2.721
ǂ 0.103 1.069 -0.077 -1.175 0.083 1.225 -0.047 -0.974 
RETi,t 0.185 2.222
† 0.551 1.409 0.326 2.533† -0.017 -0.553 0.266 2.645ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t 1.443 3.132
ǂ -0.918 -1.341 0.141 0.410 0.108 0.495 -0.355 -1.391 
RETi,t*AQi,t -0.085 -1.551 -0.229 -1.174 -0.091 -1.192 0.015 0.367 -0.129 -2.605
ǂ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t -0.872 -2.699
ǂ 0.534 1.522 0.100 0.492 0.071 0.538 0.266 2.099† 
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Table E: 1 - Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings timeliness (continued) 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -0.071 -0.717 -0.036 -0.352 -0.043 -0.580 -0.084 -0.994 -0.016 -0.269 
Year 2003 -0.168 -1.648 0.005 0.058 -0.104 -1.416 -0.083 -0.958 0.037 0.625 
Year 2004 -0.114 -1.163 0.022 0.241 0.061 0.822 0.026 0.312 0.051 0.835 
Year 2005 -0.111 -1.133 -0.034 -0.357 -0.079 -1.085 -0.070 -0.856 0.027 0.449 
Year 2006 -0.104 -0.988 -0.018 -0.199 -0.054 -0.707 -0.049 -0.575 -0.080 -1.327 
Adjusted R² 0.137 0.114 0.109 -0.027 0.053 
F-Value 2.281† 2.084† 2.310† 0.796 1.613 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, and V: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2AQi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*AQi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t 
where: AQi,t = composite score index with firm i in time period t scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of non-audit services to total audit fees (i.e.fees 
paid for audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20; (b) external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; and (c) external auditor is a Big 4 
audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte or KPMG). If criterion item is not met then firm i in time period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the composite score index is 
from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Based on Table E: 1, the Adjusted R2 of 13.70% for regression using only the 
Construction industry is the largest. It indicates that approximate 13.70% of the variation in 
the dependent variable (i.e. OPIi,t) is explained by the variables of interest. This R
2 value is 
more than double the Adjusted R2 value of 5.40% for the regression using pooled sample 
(see Table 6.5 Column I). In contrast, the Trading & Services industry has the lowest value 
of Adjusted R2 value of -2.70%.  
Table E: 1 reports that the coefficient on NEGRETi,t is positive for regressions using 
Construction and Industrial Products observations (see Table E: 1 Column I and Column 
III). This is consistent with the result for similar variable shown in Table 6.5 Column I). In 
contrast, the coefficient on similar variable for regressions using Consumer Products and 
Trading & Services is negative. Although the directionality of the coefficient for regressions 
using the Construction and Industrial Products observations is consistent to the result for 
pooled sample, conversely, in terms of significance, the result is contradictory. While the 
coefficient for regression using the pooled sample is statistically insignificant, the 
coefficients for both regressions (i.e. Construction and Industrial Products) are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively). 
For AQi,t, in terms of significance, the coefficient on this variable in Table E: 1 
reports statistically insignificant results across four regressions of major industries (i.e. 
Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & Services). This result 
is similar to the result shown in Table 6.5 Column I for similar variables. Nevertheless, while 
the coefficient for the pooled sample is negative, in contrast the coefficient for regressions 
using only Construction and Industrial Products (see Table E: 1 Column I and Column III) 
is positive. 
With regards to NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, the coefficient on this variable is positive for 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.5 Column I). Consistently, the coefficients 
on similar variables are also positive for regressions using Consumer Products and Trading 
& Services (see Table E: 1 Column II and Column III). In contrast, there is a negative for 
regressions using only Construction and Industrial Products (see Table E: 1 Column I and 
Column III). In term of significance, while the coefficient on the similar variable is 
statistically insignificant from zero for the pooled sample (see Table 6.5 Column I), 
conversely only the regression using the Construction observations is statistically significant 
(i.e. p<0.01). 
In respect to RETi,t*NEGRETi,t, across all regressions presented in Table E: 1, the 
majority of the coefficients are positive and consistent with the result shown in Table 6.5 
Column I except for the regression using the Consumer Products observations, with a 
negative coefficient. Meanwhile, while the coefficient on the similar variable is statistically 
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significant at 10% confidence level, only the coefficient for the regression using 
Constructions is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The coefficients for the 
remaining regressions, however, are statistically insignificant. 
For RETi,t*AQi,t, none of the coefficient across all regressions is statistically 
significant from zero (see Table E-1 Column I to Column IV). This is similar to the result 
reported for similar variables in Table 6.5 Column I. However, in terms of directionality of 
the coefficient, the majority of the regressions show contradictory results to the result for the 
regression using the pooled sample. While the coefficient for the regression using the pooled 
sample is positive, only the coefficient for the regression using the Trading & Services 
(Table E: 1 Column IV) observations is consistent with that result. The coefficients on the 
remaining regressions (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products and Industrial Products), 
however, are negative. 
As for RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*AQi,t, the coefficient on this variable is statistically 
insignificant for regressions using Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & 
Services. This is similar to the result shown in Table 6.5 Column I. In contrast, the 
coefficient on the similar variable is statistically significant (i.e. p<0.01) for the regression 
using only the Constructions observations. In term of directionality of the coefficient, only 
the coefficient for regression using Constructions observations is negative and consistent 
with the directionality of the coefficient for the regression using the pooled sample. The rest 
(see Table E: 1 Column II, Column III and Column IV), however, are negative. 
Table E: 1 Column IV (Trading & Services) reports that the coefficient on RETi,t is 
negative and consistent with the result shown in Table 6.5 Column I for the similar variable. 
Others (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products and Industrial Products), however, are 
inconsistent with the positive coefficient on RETi,t. Nevertheless, while the coefficient for the 
regression using the 577 firm-year observations is statistically significant (i.e. p<0.10), only 
the coefficient for the regressions using Constructions and Industrial Products is statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.05). 
Table E: 2 presents the statistical results from the modified Basu (1997) timeliness 
model, testing the association of audit committee effectiveness and the timeliness of earnings 
conservatism. The regression result is broken down into five industries. 
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Table E: 2 - Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings timeliness 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.101 0.623 -0.169 -1.242 -0.128 -0.980 -0.177 -0.989 -0.141 -1.116 
NEGRETi,t 0.020 0.060 0.274 1.184 0.156 0.819 0.121 0.426 0.199 1.349 
ACEi,t 0.066 0.856 0.083 1.431 0.137 2.083
† 0.144 1.726 Ψ 0.087 1.692 Ψ 
NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 0.004 0.029 -0.099 -0.819 -0.025 -0.236 -0.061 -0.477 -0.108 -1.481 
RETi,t 0.362 2.473
† 0.008 0.069 0.666 1.843Ψ 0.320 1.738 Ψ 0.210 1.659 Ψ 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t -0.491 -0.599 1.315 2.161
† -0.913 -1.690 Ψ -0.263 -0.431 0.091 0.244 
RETi,t*ACEi,t -0.165 -2.079
† 0.076 0.746 -0.232 -1.393 -0.164 -1.796 Ψ -0.077 -1.537 
RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t 0.484 1.289 -0.631 -1.970
† 0.707 2.419† 0.245 0.909 -0.022 -0.112 
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Table E:2 - Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings timeliness (continued) 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -0.104 -1.015 0.003 0.026 -0.072 -0.987 -0.111 -1.373 0.004 0.061 
Year 2003 -0.218 -2.023† -0.066 -0.729 -0.120 -1.665 Ψ -0.099 -1.171 0.048 0.778 
Year 2004 -0.127 -1.231 -0.044 -0.494 0.038 0.535 0.022 0.271 0.058 0.923 
Year 2005 -0.159 -1.546 -0.068 -0.762 -0.087 -1.241 -0.069 -0.844 0.053 0.838 
Year 2006 -0.142 -1.311 -0.045 -0.507 -0.067 -0.910 -0.051 -0.612 -0.086 -1.414 
Adjusted R² 0.072 0.144 0.159 0.012 0.007 
F-Value 1.625 2.421† 3.032  1.096 1.079 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV, and V: OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2ACEi,t + α3NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + β0RETi,t + β1RETi,t*NEGRETi,t + β2RETi,t*ACEi,t + β3RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t + ∑γt 
+ εi,t where: ACEi,t = composite score index where firm i in time period t is scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) audit committee of firm i in time period t is 
comprised mainly of non-executive independent directors; (b) at least one of the non-executive independent directors on the audit committee of firm i in time period t is 
suitably qualified and accredited to be deemed a financial accounting expert (i.e. a degree in accounting and a member of a professional accounting body); and (c) during the 
time period t the audit committee of firm i met five times or more. If a criterion is not met then firm i in time period t is scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range of the 
composite score is from zero (0) to three (3); See equations in Table 6.1 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence 
levels. 
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Based on Table E: 2 Column III (Industrial Products), the Adjusted R2 value of 
15.90% for the regression using only the Industrial Product industry is the largest. This is 
followed by the Adjusted R2 value of 14.40% for the regression using only Consumer 
Products firm-year observations (see Table7.25 Column II). These two Adjusted R2 values 
are double the Adjusted R2 value of 7.40% for the regression using the full 557 firm-year 
observations (see Table 6.7 Column I). In contrast, the regression using only Trading & 
Services firm-year observations sees the lowest value of Adjusted R2 of 1.20% (see 
Table7.25 Column IV).  
Table E: 2 Column I (Constructions) to Column IV (Trading & Services) reports that 
the directionality and coefficient on NEGRETi,t is positive and significant for regressions 
using Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & Services 
observations. This is consistent with the result for regression using the pooled sample as 
shown in Table 6.7 Column I (PS). 
  For ACEi,t, the coefficient on this variable is positive across all regressions 
(see Table E: 2 Column I to Column IV). This directionality of the coefficient is similar to 
the coefficient on similar variables for regressions using the full 577 firm-year observations 
(see Table 6.7 Column I). However, while the coefficient for the regression using the pooled 
sample is statistically significant at conventional levels (i.e. p<0.01), only the coefficient for 
regressions using Industrial Products and Trading & Services are statistically significant at 
conventional levels (i.e. p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively). The rest (i.e. Constructions and 
Consumer Products), however, are statistically insignificant from zero. 
 With regards to NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t, , the coefficient on this variable is insignificant 
from zero across all regressions (see Table E: 2 Column I to Column IV). This is consistent 
with the result shown for the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.7 Column I). 
In terms of directionality of the coefficient, only the regression using Constructions 
observations (see Table E: 2 Column I) have contradicted the results of the regression using 
the pooled sample. Meanwhile, the remaining regressions have similar negative coefficients 
to the result shown in Table 6.7 Column I). 
 Table E: 2 Column I (Constructions) to Column IV (Trading & Services) reports that 
the coefficients on RETi,t are positive for all regressions. This is consistent with the 
coefficient on similar variables for the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.7 
Column I). Nevertheless, while the coefficient for the regression using the pooled sample is 
significant at 1% confidence level, the coefficients for the regressions using Constructions, 
Industrial Products and Trading & Services (see Table E: 2 Column I; p<0.05), Column III 
(Industrial Products; p<0.10) and Column IV (Trading & Services; p<0.10) are also 
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significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on RETi,t for the regression using 
Consumer Products observations (see Table E: 2 Column II), however, is insignificant. 
 Table E: 2 Column II (Consumer Products) reports that unlike the coefficient for 
others regressions that are consistent with the negative coefficient of regressions using the 
557 firm-year observations that is pooled sample, the coefficient on RETi,t*NEGRETi,t is 
positive for regressions using only Consumer Products observations. However, in terms of 
significance, while the result of the coefficient for the regression using the pooled sample is 
statistically insignificant (see Table 6.7 Column I), two regressions are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. Consumer Products, p<0.05; and Industrial Products, 
p<0.10) on an individual industry basis. 
 As for RETi,t*ACEi,t, the majority of the coefficients on this variable across all 
regressions are negative and consistent with the result of similar variables for the regression 
using the full 577 firm-year observations. This is, however, in contrast to the positive 
coefficient for regression using Consumer Products observations. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients for regressions using Construction and Trading & Services are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. p< 0.05 and p<0.10 respectively). This is consistent 
with the result of the significant coefficient for regression using the pooled sample (see 
Table 6.5 Column I; p<0.01).  
 The result for the last variable in testing the association of audit committee 
effectiveness and earnings timeliness, RETi,t*NEGRETi,t*ACEi,t, is a mixture. For instance, 
while the coefficient on the similar variable for the regression using Consumer Products is 
negative and inconsistent with the result for the pooled sample, the coefficients for 
regressions using Constructions, Industrial Product and Trading & Services are positive (see 
Table E: 2 Column I, Column III and Column IV). In terms of significance, while the 
coefficient on similar variables as shown in Table 6.5 Column I is statistically insignificant, 
the coefficient for regressions using Consumer Products (i.e. p<0.05) and Industrial 
Products (i.e. p<0.05) are statistically significant at conventional levels (see Table E: 2 
Column II and Column III). 
Table E: 3 presents the main results of the statistical analysis of the association 
between auditor quality and persistence of earnings conservatism. The main results of the 
regressions are broken down into five industries. 
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Table E: 3 - Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings persistence 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.318 0.785 2.045 0.783 -0.071 -0.523 0.291 1.507 0.137 1.343 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -0.739 -1.438 3.173 0.853 0.061 0.360 0.023 0.085 -0.079 -0.666 
AQi,t -0.244 -1.156 0.217 0.164 0.060 0.999 -0.142 -1.825
 Ψ 0.008 0.230 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 0.351 1.090 -0.855 -0.408 -0.017 -0.169 0.058 0.424 0.062 1.091 
∆OPIi,t-1 0.598 2.229
† 19.252 4.946ǂ 0.151 0.494 -0.854 -5.945ǂ 0.180 0.850 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -2.109 -5.281
ǂ -19.514 -1.667Ψ -1.187 -3.666ǂ 0.716 3.257ǂ -0.758 -2.585ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t -0.466 -2.389
† -5.857 -3.574ǂ -0.212 -0.708 0.452 2.405† -0.124 -1.227 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t 0.810 2.243
† 5.900 1.458 0.344 0.981 -0.479 -2.049† 0.408 2.836ǂ 
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Table E:3 - Regression analysis of AQi,t and earnings persistence (continued) 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 0.270 0.622 -7.933 -2.609ǂ -0.046 -0.309 -0.227 -0.977 -0.090 -0.946 
Year 2003 0.151 0.376 -4.343 -1.464 -0.009 -0.061 -0.114 -0.494 -0.118 -1.307 
Year 2004 0.098 0.241 -3.679 -1.254 -0.015 -0.104 0.237 1.062 -0.185 -2.014† 
Year 2005 0.108 0.276 -2.998 -1.051 -0.299 -2.159† -0.192 -0.874 -0.194 -2.182† 
Year 2006 0.670 1.666 Ψ -3.980 -1.291 -0.036 -0.256 -0.042 -0.188 -0.279 -3.116ǂ 
Adjusted R² 0.335 0.345 0.466 0.283 0.112 
F-Value 5.079ǂ 5.438ǂ 10.365ǂ 4.060ǂ 2.383† 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV and V: ∆OPIi,t = α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2AQi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-
1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 *AQi,t + ∑γt + εi,t where: AQi,t = Composite score index with firm i in time period t scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) ratio of non-audit 
services to total audit fees (i.e.fees paid for audit and non-audit services) of firm j in time t is less than 0.20; (b) external auditor of firm i in time t is an industry specialist; 
and (c) external auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (PWC, EY, Delloitte or KPMG). If criteria item not met then firm i in time period t scored zero (0) for that criterion. The range 
of the composite score index is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in Table 6.2 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
confidence levels. 
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Based on Table E: 3, the Adjusted R2 of 46.60% for regression using only the 
Industrial Products industry is the largest. It indicates that approximately 46.60% of the 
variation in the dependent variable (i.e. OPIi,t) is explained by the variables of interest. This 
is followed by 34.50% Adjusted R2 value for regression using only the Consumer Products 
industry. The Adjusted R2 value for regressions for Construction and Trading & Services are 
33.50% and 28.30% respectively. Nevertheless, these Adjusted R2 values are higher than the 
Adjusted R2 value of only 12.40% for the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.6 
Column I).  
With regards to NEG∆OPIi,t-1, none of coefficients on this variable are statistically 
significant for any of the regressions shown in Table E:3 Column I (Constructions) to 
Column IV (Trading & Services).This result, however, is similar to the result shown in Table 
6.6 Column I (PS) for similar variables. In terms of significance, only the coefficient for 
regression using the Constructions observations is similar to the negative coefficient for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table E: 3 Column I).  
For AQi,t, of four regressions of major industries, the coefficient on two regressions 
(i.e. Construction and Trading & Services) are negative and similar to the result for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.6 Column I). However, while the coefficient 
on this variable is statistically insignificant for the regression using the pooled sample, only 
the coefficient for regression using Trading & Services has contradicted the result (i.e. Table 
E: 3 Column IV; p<0.10). 
In respect to NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t, none of the coefficients on this variable are 
statistically significant for any of the regressions shown in Table E: 3 Column I 
(Constructions) to Column IV (Trading & Services).This result, however, is similar to the 
result shown in Table 6.6 Column I (PS) for similar variables. Nevertheless, in comparison 
to the result for the regression using the pooled sample (i.e. positive coefficient), of the four 
regressions, two regressions show different results (i.e. Consumer Products and Industrial 
Products; positive coefficient). 
As for ∆OPIi,t-1, while the result of the coefficient for the regression using the pooled 
sample is statistically insignificant from zero (see Table 6.6 Column I), most regressions (i.e. 
Constructions; p<0.05, Consumer Products; p<0.01 and Trading & Services; p<0.01 ) show 
different results, except for the coefficient for the regression using the Industrial Products 
observations. In addition, only the coefficient for the regression using Trading & Services 
observations (see Table E: 3 Column IV) has similar results to the pooled sample (i.e. 
negative coefficient). The remaining coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1, for three other regressions (i.e. 
Constructions, Consumer Products and Industrial Products) are positive. 
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As demonstrated in Table E: 3, the coefficients on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 are 
statistically significant at conventional levels for each of the regressions (i.e. Constructions; 
p<0.01, Consumer Products; p<0.10, Industrial Products; p<0.01 and Trading & Services; 
p<0.01). Conversely, the coefficient on similar variables for regressions using full 557 firm-
year observations is statistically insignificant from zero. Nevertheless, in terms of 
significance, most of the regressions have similar negative coefficients to the results of the 
coefficient for the regression using the pooled sample except for the coefficient for the 
regression using Trading & Services (see Table E: 3 Column IV). 
The directionality of the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t for three regressions (i.e. 
Constructions, Consumer Products and Industrial Products) is negative and consistent with 
the coefficient of similar variables as shown in Table 6.6 Column I (PS) except for the 
coefficient for regression using Trading & Services (see Table E: 3 Column IV). In terms of 
significance, while the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t is statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level, only the coefficient for the regression using Industrial Products is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficients for the remaining regressions are statistically 
significant at conventional levels (i.e. Constructions; p<0.05, Consumer Products; p<0.01 
and Trading & Services; p<0.01). 
Finally, for ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*AQi,t, the directionality of the coefficient on this 
variable is only negative for the regression using Trading & Services (see Table E: 3 Column 
IV) and is consistent with the result of the coefficient for the regression using the pooled 
sample (see Table 6.6 Column I). In contrast, the coefficients for remaining regressions are 
positive. Nevertheless, in terms of significance, of four regressions of major industries, only 
two regressions (i.e. Constructions and Trading & Services) are statistically significant at 
conventional levels (i.e. p<0.05). This is similar to the result for the regression using the full 
557 firm-year observations (i.e. p<0.01). 
Table E: 4 presents the main results of the statistical analysis of the association 
between audit committee effectiveness and persistence of earnings conservatism. Five 
regressions are presented with results in Table E: 4 Column I (Construction) to Column IV 
(Trading & Services) reporting results for specific industries (i.e. Constructions, Consumer 
Products, Industrial Products and Trading & Services) and one regression for the combined 
result for industries with a small number of observations (i.e. Plantation, Mining, Property 
and Technology). 
As reported in 7.29 Column III (Industrial Products), approximately 46.50% of the 
variation in the dependent variable ∆OPIi,t is explained by the variables of interest when 129 
firm-year observations for Industrial Products are used. This Adjusted R2 of 46.50% for the 
regression using only the Industrial Product industry is the largest amongst five regressions. 
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Meanwhile, the Adjusted R2 values for regressions using remaining industries firm-year 
observations are in the range of 24.30% and 28.20% (see Table E: 4 Column I to Column 
IV). This is approximately similar to the Adjusted R2 for the regression using the pooled 
sample (see Table 6.8 Column I).  
Table E: 4 reports that the coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is statistically insignificant for 
all regressions (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & 
Services). This is consistent with the coefficient on similar variables for the regression using 
the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). However, while the directionality of the 
coefficient on NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is positive for the regression using the pooled sample, in contrast 
the coefficient for regressions using Constructions and Industrial Products observations are 
negative. 
As for ACEi,t, the directionality of the coefficient on this variable is positive for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). Similarly, only the coefficient 
for regressions using Trading & Services (see Table E: 4 Column IV) observations is 
positive. However, in terms of significance, the coefficient on ACEi,t is statistically 
insignificant for all regressions (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products 
and Trading & Services). This is consistent with the coefficient on similar variables for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). 
With regards to NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, the coefficient on this variable is statistically 
insignificant for all regressions (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products 
and Trading & Services). This is consistent with the coefficient on similar variables for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). In terms of directionality of the 
coefficient, only the coefficient for the regression using Trading & Services observations is 
negative and similar to the result of the coefficient for the regression using the pooled sample 
(see Table E: 4 Column IV and Table 6.8 Column I). 
For ∆OPIi,t-1, the directionality of the coefficient on this variable is positive for all 
regressions (i.e. Constructions, Consumer Products, Industrial Products and Trading & 
Services). This is consistent with the positive coefficient on similar variables for the 
regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). However, in terms of 
significance, while the coefficient on similar variable as shown in Table 6.8 Column I (PS) is 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level, only the coefficient for the regression using 
Consumer Products observations is statistically significant at conventional levels (i.e. p< 
0.10). 
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Table E: 4 - Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings persistence 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
(Constant) 0.534 0.977 3.922 0.864 0.057 0.322 -0.070 -0.186 0.141 1.228 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -0.481 -0.611 0.650 0.107 -0.005 -0.017 0.198 0.360 0.230 1.655
 Ψ 
ACEi,t -0.195 -0.865 -0.178 -0.095 -0.034 -0.389 0.068 0.453 -0.017 -0.346 
NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t 0.132 0.374 0.607 0.204 0.011 0.073 -0.094 -0.370 -0.124 -1.736
 Ψ 
∆OPIi,t-1 0.725 1.345 7.212 1.786
Ψ 0.969 0.678 0.238 0.391 -0.808 -1.608 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 -2.697 -0.653 -7.645 -0.779 -1.530 -0.748 0.028 0.018 1.486 2.735
ǂ 
∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t -0.265 -1.332 -1.676 -0.444 -0.509 -0.715 -0.493 -1.567 0.420 1.637 
∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t 0.495 0.358 2.122 0.221 0.284 0.280 0.272 0.349 -1.100 -3.426
ǂ 
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Table E:4 - Regression analysis of ACEi,t and earnings persistence (continued) 
 Industry Category 
 Column I: 
Constructions 
Column II: 
Consumer Products 
Column III: 
Industrial Product 
Column IV: 
Trading & Services 
Column V: 
Others 
 β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
Year 2002 -0.060 -0.143 -7.297 -2.237† -0.047 -0.306 -0.140 -0.579 -0.078 -0.858 
Year 2003 -0.221 -0.530 -4.713 -1.484 0.025 0.173 0.047 0.191 -0.065 -0.736 
Year 2004 -0.257 -0.606 -4.725 -1.515 0.022 0.150 0.320 1.341 -0.102 -1.126 
Year 2005 -0.077 -0.195 -3.976 -1.292 -0.298 -2.126† -0.144 -0.614 -0.148 -1.690 Ψ 
Year 2006 0.417 1.040 -6.295 -1.956 Ψ -0.015 -0.107 0.016 0.067 -0.266 -3.068ǂ 
Adjusted R² 0.282 0.251 0.465 0.243 0.169 
F-Value 4.179ǂ 3.815ǂ 10.353ǂ 3.491ǂ 3.233ǂ 
N 98 102 129 95 133 
Legend: 
Column I, II, III, IV and V: ∆OPIi,t =α0 + α1NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + α2ACEi,t + α3NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β0∆OPIi,t-1 + β1∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 + β2∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + β3∆OPIi,t-1 
*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t + ∑γt + εi,twhere: ACEi,t = composite score index where firm i in time period t is scored one (1) for each of following criteria met: (a) audit committee 
of firm i in time period t is comprised mainly of non-executive independent directors; (b) at least one of the non-executive independent directors on the audit committee of 
firm i in time period t is suitably qualified and accredited to be deemed a financial accounting expert (i.e. a degree in accounting and a member of a professional accounting 
body); and (c) during the time period t the audit committee of firm i met five times or more. If a criterion is not met then firm i in time period t is scored zero (0) for that 
criterion. The range of the composite score is from zero (0) to three (3); see equations in Table 6.2 for definitions of other variables; and = significant at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. 
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Table E: 4 reports that the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1 is negative for 
regressions using Construction, Consumer Products and Industrials Products (see Table E: 4 
Column I, Column II and Column III). This result is consistent with the coefficient on 
similar variables for the regression using the pooled sample (see Table 6.8 Column I). 
However, in contrast to the statistically significant result of the coefficient for the regression 
using the full 557 firm-year observations, none of the coefficients for all regressions is 
statistically significant. 
With regards to the two-way interaction term ∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, the directionality of 
the coefficient on this variable for the pooled sample as shown in Table 6.8 Column I (PS) is 
negative and consistent with the negative directionality of the coefficient for all regressions 
(see Table E: 4 Column I, Column II, Column III and Column IV). In terms of significance, 
the coefficient on ∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t is statistically insignificant from zero for all regressions. 
This is, however, in contrast to the statistically significant result of the coefficient on this 
variable for the regression using the pooled sample as shown in Table 6.8 Column I (PS). 
Finally, for the variable of interest in testing the association between audit 
committee effectiveness and earnings persistence, ∆OPIi,t-1*NEG∆OPIi,t-1*ACEi,t, the 
coefficient on this variable is statistically insignificant from zero for all regressions (see 
Table E: 4 Column I, Column II, Column III and Column IV).This is inconsistent with the 
statistically significant result of the coefficient on this variable for the regression using the 
pooled sample as shown in Table 6.8 Column I (PS). In terms of the directionality of the 
coefficient, Table 6.8 Column I (PS) reported that the coefficient on this variable is positive 
and consistent with the directionality of the coefficient for all regressions. 
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APPENDIX F: This appendix provides details of results that demonstrate association of 
direct custodian excellence, auditor quality and audit committee effectiveness if testable 
hypotheses were formulated for unconditional conservatism (e.g. using accruals and cash 
flows) as defined by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). 
 
Table F: 4- Acceptance and rejection of hypotheses for unconditional conservatism 
 
Panel A:Direct custodian excellence (DCEi,t) and earnings conservatism 
GPDCE - Earnings conservatism will be significantly higher amongst Malaysian publicly 
listed firms having pivotal direct custodians of the financial reporting system of a higher 
quality than Malaysian publicly listed firms with pivotal direct custodians of the 
financial reporting system of a lower quality. 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
GHc 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with direct custodian 
excellence are more likely to be associated with 
unconditional earnings conservatism (i.e. recognition of 
negative operating cash flows quicker than positive 
operating cash flows). 
Accepted 
 
Panel B:Auditor quality (AQi,t) and earnings conservatism 
GPAQ - Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms engaging the services of 
a high quality external auditor will be significantly higher than Malaysian public listed 
firms engaging the services of a low quality external auditor. 
 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
H1c 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with a higher quality 
external auditor are more likely to be associated with 
unconditional earnings conservatism (i.e. recognition of 
negative operating cash flows quicker than positive 
operating cash flows). 
Rejected 
 
Panel C:Audit committee effectiveness (ACEi,t) and earnings conservatism 
GPACE - Earnings conservatism of Malaysian public listed firms with a more effective 
audit committee will be significantly higher than Malaysian public listed firms with a 
less effective audit committee. 
 
Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
H2c 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with more effective audit 
committees are more likely to be associated with 
unconditional earnings conservatism (i.e. recognition of 
negative operating cash flows quicker than positive 
operating cash flows). 
Accepted 
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APPENDIX G: This appendix provides some explanation on descriptive statistics for 
composite scores of DCEi,t, AQi,t and ACEi,t (i.e. Table 5.18).  
 
Table G: 5- Descriptive statistics for composite scores of DCEi,t, AQi,t and ACEi,t 
Panel A: Breakdown by major industry classification 
Sector Name DCE AQ ACE 
Construction 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Consumer Products 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Industrial Products 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Mining 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Plantation 3.000 2.000 1.000 
Property 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Technology 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Trading & Services 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Minimum Score 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 
DCE is a product of AQ and ACE. A company could have got a score of zero (0) for either 
AQ or ACE but none of the companies have minimum score of zero for both composites of 
AQ and ACE. That is the reason for the minimum score of DCE is one (1), when the 
minimum scores for AQ and ACE, both are zero (0).  
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APPENDIX H: This appendix provides descriptive statistics for variables entering 
regressions models (e.g. RETi,t, NEGRETi,t, ∆OPIi,t-1, NEG∆OPIi,t-1). 
 
Table H: 6- Descriptive variable for timeliness approach (by sectors) 
Panel A: Variable ofRETi,t 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 0.094 -0.044 0.693 -0.667 3.750 
Consumer Products 102 0.110 0.015 1.076 -0.979 10.300 
Industrial Products 129 -0.011 -0.067 0.428 -0.944 1.923 
Mining 23 0.177 -0.011 0.631 -0.591 2.000 
Plantation 12 0.041 -0.065 0.425 -0.575 0.788 
Property 86 0.068 -0.061 0.603 -0.645 3.557 
Technology 12 0.014 -0.123 0.451 -0.494 0.800 
Trading & Services 95 0.150 -0.089 1.042 -0.917 8.000 
Total 557 0.078 -0.046 0.775 -0.979 10.300 
Panel B: Variable of NEGRETi,t 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 0.561 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Consumer Products 102 0.461 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Industrial Products 129 0.577 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Mining 23 0.522 1.000 0.511 0.000 1.000 
Plantation 12 0.667 1.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Property 86 0.581 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Technology 12 0.583 1.000 0.515 0.000 1.000 
Trading & Services 95 0.574 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Total 557 0.553 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
 
Table H:1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables entering regression model 
using timeliness approach on an industry basis (i.e. RETi,t and  NEGRETi,t). Table H:1 Panel 
A provides information on variable ofRETi,t. The average value of RETi,t for the final useable 
sample is 0.078 with a median of -0.046. The minimum value of RETi,t is -0.979 and the 
maximum is 10.300.As shown in Table H:1 Panel A, the average value of RETi,t in the 
Industrial Products, Plantation, Property and Technology industries are below the full final 
useable sample average. The Industrial Products industry has the lowest average value of 
RETi,t (i.e.-0.011) followed by the Technology industry (i.e.0.014). As the average total assets 
for the Mining and Trading & Services industries are substantially higher than other industry 
sectors, it is not surprising the value of RETi,t is the highest. Another interesting observation 
is that Consumer Products industry has the highest and also the lowest value of RETi,t (see 
Table H:1 Panel A). In respect to variable of NEGRETi,t, as reported in Table H:1 Panel B, 
the average value of NEGRETi,t on industry basis is 0.553. The highest average value of 
NEGRETi,t is Plantation (i.e. 0.667) which is above the average value for full industry. 
While, Consumer Products has the lowest average value of NEGRETi,t (i.e. 0.461).   
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Table H: 2- Descriptive variable for timeliness approach (by years) 
Panel A: Variable ofRETi,t 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 -0.167 -0.275 0.310 -0.706 0.800 
2003 91 0.240 0.131 0.515 -0.594 2.139 
2004 92 -0.173 -0.203 0.341 -0.944 1.574 
2005 96 -0.093 -0.129 0.336 -0.979 1.063 
2006 96 0.462 0.227 1.035 -0.800 8.000 
2007 98 0.167 -0.049 1.235 -0.915 10.300 
Total 557 0.078 -0.046 0.775 -0.979 10.300 
Panel B: Variable of NEGRETi,t 
Years N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 0.738 1.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 
2003 91 0.374 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
2004 92 0.772 1.000 0.422 0.000 1.000 
2005 96 0.708 1.000 0.457 0.000 1.000 
2006 96 0.198 0.000 0.401 0.000 1.000 
2007 98 0.551 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Total 557 0.553 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
 
Table H:2 provides an annual breakdown for the descriptive statistics of variables 
entering regression model using timeliness approach (i.e. RETi,t and  NEGRETi,t). The 
average value of RETi,t for full sample is 0.078 (see Table H:2 Panel A). The highest average 
value is recorded in 2006 (i.e. 0.462) and the lowest average value is in 2005 (i.e. -0.093). 
Overall, the average value of RETi,t is quite unstable throughout the years. Meanwhile, the 
highest value of RETi,t is recorded in 2007 (i.e. 10.300) and the lowest is in 2005 (i.e. -0.979). 
With regards to variable of NEGRETi,t (see Table H:2 Panel B), the average value of 
NEGRETi,t on yearly basis is 0.553. The highest average value of NEGRETi,t is recorded in 
2004 (i.e. 0.772) which is above the average value for full industry. Among others, year 
2002 and 2005 also recorded value of NEGRETi,t above the average value for full industry 
(i.e. 0.738 and 0.798) respectively. Meanwhile, the lowest average value of NEGRETi,t (i.e. 
0.198) is recorded in year 2006.   
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Table H: 3- Descriptive variable for persistence approach (by sectors) 
Panel A: Variable of ∆OPIi,t-1 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 0.159 0.002 1.441 -4.794 9.272 
Consumer Products 102 0.040 0.005 1.457 -8.060 6.231 
Industrial Products 129 0.019 0.012 0.635 -4.678 4.893 
Mining 23 -0.080 0.012 0.296 -1.281 0.091 
Plantation 12 0.016 0.017 0.102 -0.243 0.144 
Property 86 -0.130 0.001 1.423 -12.913 1.483 
Technology 12 -0.104 0.012 0.410 -1.396 0.128 
Trading & Services 95 0.014 0.009 0.729 -4.117 4.411 
Total 557 0.017 0.006 1.120 -12.913 9.272 
Panel B: Variable of NEG∆OPIi,t-1 
Name N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Construction 98 0.459 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Consumer Products 102 0.392 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 
Industrial Products 129 0.377 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Mining 23 0.478 0.000 0.511 0.000 1.000 
Plantation 12 0.333 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Property 86 0.477 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 
Technology 12 0.250 0.000 0.452 0.000 1.000 
Trading & Services 95 0.351 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000 
Total 557 0.406 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 
 
Table H:3 presents the descriptive statistics for variables entering regression model 
using persistence approach on an industry basis (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1and  NEG∆OPIi,t-1). Table H:3 
Panel A shows that for the final usable sample the average value of ∆OPIi,t-1is 0.017. Overall, 
the Construction industries has the highest average value of ∆OPIi,t-1 (i.e. 0.159) which is 
almost ten times the average for full final usable sample. On individual basis, the Property 
industries has the smallest value of ∆OPIi,t-1 (i.e. -12.913). Whereas, Construction industries 
has the largest value of 9.272.With regards to variable ofNEG∆OPIi,t-1 (see Table H:3 Panel 
B), the average value ofNEG∆OPIi,t-1is 0.406 for 557 firm year-observations. Across the 
eight major Malaysia industry categories, the Construction, Mining and Property have the 
average value of NEG∆OPIi,t-1above the industry average.  
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  Table H: 4- Descriptive variable for persistence approach (by years) 
Panel A: Variable of∆OPIi,t-1 
Year N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 -0.156 -0.002 1.661 -12.913 6.001 
2003 91 0.009 0.006 1.101 -8.060 5.952 
2004 92 -0.003 0.001 0.627 -3.729 3.584 
2005 96 0.049 0.012 0.930 -5.636 5.007 
2006 96 -0.035 0.001 0.936 -4.678 6.231 
2007 98 0.209 0.025 1.251 -1.396 9.272 
Total 557 0.017 0.006 1.120 -12.913 9.272 
Panel B: Variable of∆OPIi,t-1 
Years N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
2002 84 0.524 1.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 
2003 91 0.385 0.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 
2004 92 0.457 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
2005 96 0.333 0.000 0.474 0.000 1.000 
2006 96 0.479 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 
2007 98 0.276 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 
Total 557 0.406 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 
 
Table H:4 provides an annual breakdown for the descriptive statistics of variables 
entering regression model using persistence approach  (i.e. ∆OPIi,t-1and  NEG∆OPIi,t-1).The 
average value of ∆OPIi,t-1for full sample is 0.017 (see Table H:4 Panel A). The highest 
average value is recorded in 2007 (i.e. 0.209) and the lowest average value is in 2002 (i.e. -
0.156). Overall, the average value of RETi,t is quite unstable throughout the six years under 
study. Meanwhile, the highest value of ∆OPIi,t-1is recorded in 2007 (i.e. 9.272) and the 
lowest is in 2002 (i.e. -12.913). With regards to variable of NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (see Table H:4 
Panel B), the average value of NEG∆OPIi,t-1on yearly basis is 0.406. The highest average 
value of NEG∆OPIi,t-1is recorded in 2002 (i.e. 0.524) which is above the average value for 
full industry. Among others, year 2004 and 2006 also recorded value of NEG∆OPIi,t-1above 
the average value for full industry (i.e. 0.457 and 0.479) respectively. Meanwhile, the lowest 
average value of NEG∆OPIi,t-1 (i.e. 0.276) is recorded in year 2007.   
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APPENDIX I: This appendix presents a correlation matrix for all variables entering the regression models to identify any potential multicollinearity problems 
in the regressions. Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent variables. Before the regression analysis is undertaken, the data was 
analyzed for the effect of the multicollinearity. It refers to the high correlation among the independent variables that may render the model is invalid.  
Table I: 7- A correlation matrix for independent variables  
 FEEi,t BNi,t SPi,t AQi,t INDi,t EXPi,t DILi,t ACEi,t DCEi,t 
FEEi,t 1.000         
BNi,t -0.049 1.000        
SPi,t -0.005 0.657  1.000       
AQi,t 0.464  0.784  0.803  1.000      
INDi,t -0.028 0.073† 0.032 0.037 1.000     
EXPi,t -0.006 0.086† 0.060 0.068 0.074† 1.000    
DILi,t 0.044 -0.062 -0.009 -0.013 -0.048 0.079† 1.000   
ACEi,t 0.017 0.036 0.042 0.046 0.301  0.718  0.691  1.000  
DCEi,t 0.375  0.639  0.657  0.814  0.205  0.471  0.391  0.617  1.000 
Legend: 
For definitions of AQi,t components, see equations in Table 7. 22; For definitions of ACEi,t components, see equations in Table 7. 24; and  = significant at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels (1-tailed). 
 
 
Table I:1 shows that the level of correlation between independent variables (i.e. component of AQi,t and ACEi,t) are relatively low which is between -0.490 and 
0.464 at 1% significance level. According to Judge et al. (1988), correlation below absolute 0.8 should not be too harmful with regards to multicollinearity. 
